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Preface
5The report also reminds us that, contrary to the common 
misperception that money is neither good nor bad, 
investments of ‘dirty money’ into licit economies can 
create problems ranging from distortions of resource 
allocation to the “crowding out” of licit sectors. In some 
cases, the influx of tainted money undermines the repu-
tations of local institutions. Significantly, these invest-
ments can hamper investment and economic growth. 
While the situation is less clear for financial centers 
receiving illicit funds, the long-term consequences may 
be negative if they fail to actively fight money-launder-
ing. Research also indicates that the socio-economic 
costs related to drug abuse are twice as high as the illicit 
income generated by drug trafficking. Indeed, in some 
countries (for example, the United States and the United 
Kingdom) the ratio is 3:1.  This report argues that the 
severest consequence of criminal funding is that they 
perpetuate and promote criminal activities, creating a 
cycle of organized criminal activity and drug trafficking 
that leeches off societies.  
Less than 1 per cent of global illicit financial flows are 
currently seized and frozen. UNODC’s challenge is to 
work within the UN system and with Member States to 
help build the capacity to track and prevent money-
laundering, strengthen the rule of law and prevent these 
funds from creating further suffering. 
  
Yury Fedotov
UNODC Executive Director
“Always follow the money” has been sound advice in law 
enforcement and political circles for decades. Neverthe-
less, tracking the flows of illicit funds generated by drug 
trafficking and organized crime and analysing the mag-
nitude and the extent to which these are laundered 
through the world’s financial systems remain daunting 
tasks.
UNODC’s research report, Estimating illicit financial 
flows resulting from drug trafficking and other transna-
tional organized crimes, attempts to shed light on the 
total amounts likely to be laundered across the globe, as 
well as the potential attractiveness of various locations to 
those who launder money. As with all such reports, 
however, the final monetary estimates are to be treated 
with caution. Further research and more systematic col-
lection of data on this topic are clearly required.  
Prior to this report, perhaps the most widely quoted 
figure for the extent of money-laundering was the IMF’s 
‘consensus range’ of between 2-5 per cent of global 
GDP, made public in 1998. A study-of-studies, or meta-
analysis, conducted for this report, suggests that all 
criminal proceeds are likely to have amounted to some 
3.6 per cent of GDP (2.3 - 5.5 per cent) or around 
US$2.1 trillion in 2009. 
The resulting best estimate of the amounts available for 
money-laundering would be within the IMF’s original 
‘consensus range’, equivalent to some 2.7 per cent of 
global GDP (2.1 – 4 per cent) or US$1.6 trillion in 
2009. From this figure, money flows related to transna-
tional organized crime activities represent the equivalent 
of some 1.5 per cent of global GDP, 70 per cent of 
which would have been available for laundering through 
the financial system. The largest income for transna-
tional organized crime seems to come from illicit drugs, 
accounting for a fifth of all crime proceeds.
Research in the area of illicit financial flows generated by 
one key transnational organized crime sector, the global 
market for cocaine, was also conducted for this report. 
The gross profits out of cocaine sales (totaling US$85 
billion) were estimated at US$84 billion for the year 
2009, compared with about US$1 billion earned by the 
farmers in the Andean region. Most of the gross profits 
(retail and wholesale) were generated in North America 
(US$35 billion) and in West and Central Europe 
(US$26 billion). 
Preface
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71% (probably around 0.2%) of the proceeds of crime 
laundered via the financial system are seized and 
frozen. 
 • More in-depth research was undertaken, in the con-
text of the present study, on illicit financial flows 
generated by the transnational organized crime market 
for cocaine and the distribution of these flows across 
regions. Overcoming the complexities of the problem 
and the lack of readily available data required innova-
tive approaches. 
 • The gross profits out of cocaine sales (totalling US$85 
bn) were estimated at US$84 billion for the year 
2009. (About US$1 billion were production costs, 
mainly going to farmers in the Andean region). Most 
of the profits (retail and wholesale) were generated in 
North America (US$35 bn) and in West and Central 
Europe (US$26 bn). 
 • While the local cocaine market in South America 
(including Caribbean and Central America) are still 
rather small in dollar terms (U$S3.5 bn), the gross 
profits of organized crime groups operating in South 
America, selling the drugs to the local markets as well 
as to overseas markets rise to some US$18 billion. 
 • The calculations, derived from estimates of the size of 
the market, the number of traffickers and the market 
structure (derived from individual drug seizures), sug-
gested that, at the wholesale level, some 92% of global 
cocaine gross profits were available for laundering in 
2009. The proportion fell to 46% at the retail level. 
 • A new ‘gravity model’ was developed to show the 
likely laundering flows, based on indicators of the 
potential attractiveness of locations to money launder-
ers. Out of more than US$84 billion in gross profits 
and some US$53 billion available for laundering, the 
base version of the gravity model predicts that some 
US$26 billion leave the jurisdictions where the profits 
were generated. 
 • The largest outflows, according to the model, would 
take place from countries in North America (US$10 
bn), South America (US$7 bn) and Europe (US$7 
bn). These regions would together account for 95% of 
all cocaine profit-related outflows worldwide. 
 • In terms of net outflows (outflows less inflows) the 
model suggests that the main destination outside the 
regions where the profits were generated would be the 
 • The purpose of this study was to examine the mag-
nitude of illicit funds generated by drug trafficking 
and organized crime, and the extent to which they are 
laundered. Research in this area is still limited and re-
sults difficult to compare, but likely orders of magni-
tude may be estimated, though they should be treated 
with caution. 
 • The most widely quoted figure for the extent of 
money laundered has been the IMF ‘consensus range’ 
of 2% to 5% of global GDP, made public by the IMF 
in 1998. A meta-analysis of the results from various 
studies suggests that all criminal proceeds are likely to 
amount to some 3.6% of global GDP (2.3%-5.5%), 
equivalent to about US$2.1 trillion (2009). 
 • The best estimate for the amount available for laun-
dering through the financial system, emerging from a 
meta-analysis of existing estimates, would be equiva-
lent to 2.7% of global GDP (2.1%-4%) or US$1.6 
trillion in 2009. Still within the IMF ‘consensus 
range’, this figure is located towards its lower end. 
 • If only flows related to drug trafficking and other 
transnational organized crime activities were consid-
ered, related proceeds would have been equivalent to 
around US$650 billion per year in the first decade 
of the new millennium, equivalent to 1.5% of global 
GDP or US$870 billion in 2009 assuming that the 
proportions remained unchanged. The funds available 
for laundering through the financial system would 
have been equivalent to some 1% of global GDP or 
US$580 billion in 2009. 
 • The largest income for transnational organized crime 
comes from illicit drugs, which account for some 
20% (17%-25%) of all crime proceeds, about half of 
transnational organized crime proceeds and 0.6% to 
0.9% of global GDP. In turn, drug-related proceeds 
available for money-laundering through the financial 
system would be equivalent to between 0.4% and 
0.6% of global GDP.
 • Expressed as a proportion of national GDP, all crime 
proceeds appear to be generally higher in develop-
ing countries and tend to be laundered abroad more 
frequently. 
 • The results also suggest that the ‘interception rate’ 
for anti-money-laundering efforts at the global level 
remains low. Globally, it appears that much less than 
Key f indings
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Executive summary
Caribbean, with net inflows of around US$6 billon, 
reflecting significant outflows from North America 
and South America. Such outflows do not appear to 
be compensated by inflows from other regions. The 
outflows from countries in Europe, in contrast, would 
be offset by inflows from other countries in Europe, 
North America and South America. 
 • The presented outcome still relies on a large number 
of assumptions (number of traffickers, market struc-
ture, factors influencing the decisions of money-
launderers) whose validity needs to be tested, opening 
a whole set of new research questions for the future. 
 • Analysis of the socio-economic impact suggests that 
the most severe consequence of criminal funds is the 
further perpetuation and promotion of criminal ac-
tivities. In the drug area, research indicates that the 
socio-economic costs related to drug abuse are twice 
as high as the income generated by organized crime; 
in some countries (USA, UK) one can even find a 3:1 
ratio. 
 • Criminal funds, even if invested in the legal economy, 
may create a number of problems, from distortions of 
the resource allocation, to ‘crowding out’ licit sectors 
and undermining the reputation of local institutions, 
which, in turn, can hamper investment and economic 
growth. The situation is less clear-cut for financial 
centres receiving illicit funds, but the long-term con-
sequences may be negative if they do not actively fight 
money-laundering. 
9estimates of the amounts of money laundered globally 
each year fall within the so-called ‘consensus range’ of 
2%-5% of GDP, originally proposed by the head of the 
International Monetary Fund in 1998 and often cited in 
the literature more than a decade later. The data suggest 
that the best estimates are situated at the lower end of 
the range. But this is to some extent a question of meth-
odology. If tax- and customs-related money-laundering 
activities were included in the calculation, results would 
move towards – and perhaps exceed – the upper end of 
the ‘consensus range’. On the other hand, if only tran-
snational crime-related proceeds were considered, the 
available estimates for laundering would fall to levels 
around 1% of GDP, and thus below the ‘consensus 
range’.
Although a number of proposals exist, there is no method 
that can be regarded as the ‘gold standard’ for estimating 
the extent of money-laundering. All methodologies and 
studies are weakened by various biases or key informa-
tion gaps. This study tested a new method which is more 
directly linked to criminal activities and the resulting 
financial flows. The method consists of the following 
sub-components: 
1. Calculating the financial gains arising from transna-
tional crime activities at the various subregional levels; 
2. Estimating the amounts - arising from transnational 
crime activities in the various subregions - that enter 
the financial system; 
3. Estimating the amounts that cross borders for money-
laundering purposes, reflecting the actual ‘transna-
tional illicit financial flows’ from the proceeds of 
transnational crime. 
The current study does not attempt to map the financial 
dimensions of all transnational organized crime activi-
ties. Instead, it focuses on one prominent example of a 
transnational organized crime sector. The actual calcula-
tions require quite detailed information, which is – for 
the time being – not readily available for most transna-
tional crime activities. Against this background it was 
decided to test the ‘model(s)’ on just one key transna-
tional crime sector where information is available, at 
least to the extent that missing data can be estimated 
with reasonable degrees of confidence, so that not all 
results are the outcome of mere assumptions. Drug traf-
The issue of illicit capital flows has emerged as one that 
is central to the mandate of UNODC: garnered through 
the proceeds of illicit trafficking and other forms of 
organized profit-motivated crime, dirty money pro-
motes bribery and corruption, finances insurgency and, 
in some cases, terrorist activities. It also destabilizes and 
deters legitimate enterprise, foreign investment and 
development. 
This study was undertaken by the Studies and Threat 
Analysis Section, Policy Analysis and Research Branch in 
order to complement previous work done to estimate 
the proceeds of various transnational criminal activities 
and fill some of the knowledge gaps on the extent to 
which these proceeds flow through the international 
financial system. 
The starting point for the study was to estimate the 
global proceeds of crime. To do so, various methodolo-
gies proposed in the scientific literature are summarized 
and reviewed. Subsequently, a broad range of previous 
study results are presented and analysed. The studies 
range in coverage from the global to the national levels, 
and they consider somewhat different types and/or 
aspects of crime. Moreover, the studies were undertaken 
by a diverse set of stakeholders, including academics, 
private-sector companies, international institutions and 
non-governmental organizations. 
In spite of the internal divergence of the various esti-
mates, aggregating them for comparison shows a conver-
gence in the results. The overall best estimates of criminal 
proceeds are close to US$2.1 trillion in 2009 or 3.6% of 
global GDP (95% confidence interval: 2.7%-4.4%). If 
only typical transnational organized crime proceeds were 
considered (resulting from trafficking drugs, counter-
feiting, human trafficking, trafficking in oil, wildlife, 
timber, fish, art and cultural property, gold, human 
organs and small and light weapons), the estimates 
would be around 1.5% of GDP. About half of these 
proceeds were linked to trafficking in drugs. Crime pro-
ceeds linked primarily to the national sector such as 
fraud, burglaries, theft, robberies, loan sharking or pro-
tection racketeering were not included in these esti-
mates. 
The best estimates of the amounts of money that are 
laundered are close to US$1.6 trillion or 2.7% of GDP 
in 2009 (confidence interval: 2.1%-4.0%). The best 
Executive summary
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The model predicts that significant laundering of 
cocaine-related profits, leaving the jurisdictions where 
the profits were generated, would take place in North 
America (US$10 bn) and in West and Central Europe 
(US$7 bn). The Caribbean, in contrast, appears to be 
affected by laundering attempts by traffickers in North 
America (US$3.3 bn), South America (US$2.5 bn) and, 
to a lesser extent, by traffickers from West and Central 
Europe (US$0.2 bn). Countries in the Caribbean would 
thus be the most important destination for the launder-
ing of cocaine-related trafficking income with annual 
net inflows of around US$6 billion, equivalent to some 
2.3% of GDP. 
While profits generated from cocaine trafficking to local 
markets in South America (including Caribbean and 
Central America) are still rather small in monetary terms 
(US$3.5 bn), the overall gross profits of organized crime 
groups operating out of South America, Central Amer-
ica and the Caribbean are important as they also send 
cocaine to overseas markets. 
The overall gross profits thus rise to some US$18 bn 
(including US$16 bn for just South America). Signifi-
cant amounts appear to be laundered in the countries 
where the profits were generated though in addition, 
important amounts leave the countries in South Amer-
ica (> US$7 bn). The single largest destination of such 
outflows appear to be the Caribbean (US$2.5 bn). 
After having focussed on the monetary flows linked to 
one major transnational crime activity (trafficking in 
cocaine) the scope of the analysis was broadened again 
to discuss the overall socio-economic consequences of 
the dirty money generated by organized crime. The 
estimated US$2.1 trillion of crime proceeds believed to 
be generated in 2009 of which US$1.6 trillion available 
for laundering, including crime proceeds of US$0.9 tril-
lion from transnational organized crime of which 
US$0.6 trillion available for laundering, help existing 
crime to flourish and expand, with a large number of 
negative socio-economic consequences, depending on 
the specific predicate crimes. 
For drug-related crime, there tends to be a significant 
‘re-investment’ of illicit funds into drug trafficking oper-
ations which have major negative implications for soci-
ety at large. The ‘losses’ of drug users go far beyond their 
expenditure on drugs. For example, productivity loss has 
been found to be a major drug-related economic cost in 
the USA. Other problems – at the global level - include 
health problems, trafficking-related violence and cor-
ruption.
The implications of investment of criminal financial 
flows in the legal economy are mainly related to distor-
tions of investments, prices, consumption, exports and 
economic statistics, unfair competition and the under-
ficking clearly constitutes the largest income for transna-
tionally operating crime groups worldwide and within 
that area cocaine trafficking plays a key role. The heroin 
market is clearly smaller and the same applies to the 
markets in the various amphetamine-type stimulants. 
The cannabis market – though possibly larger in total - 
is to a large extent dominated by local cultivation and 
consumption. Thus – compared to cocaine – it is less 
characterized by the involvement of transnationally 
operating crime groups.
In order to develop estimates of the extent to which 
proceeds from crime enter the financial system, a litera-
ture review was undertaken to obtain some baseline 
data. Moreover, a number of techniques were developed 
to generate such estimates, including an analysis of indi-
vidual drug seizure cases reported by Member States, 
used as a proxy for the underlying market structure. 
The final challenge was to identify the proportion of 
illegal funds that enter the financial system to be subse-
quently laundered by leaving the respective jurisdiction. 
To overcome this, another literature review was under-
taken and a ‘gravity model’ was developed, a kind of 
threat assessment tool, showing the vulnerabilities of 
subregions for laundering activities. 
The UNODC analysis revealed that out of global 
cocaine retail sales of some US$85 billion (range: 
US$75-US$100 bn) gross profits of some US$84 billion 
from cocaine trafficking are generated of which almost 
three quarters (some US$62 bn, retail and wholesale) in 
the industrialized countries, mostly in the countries of 
North America (US$35 bn) and the countries of West 
and Central Europe (US$26 bn). 
The models used per capita GDP less savings as a thresh-
old level for money-laundering (assuming that only 
income for traffickers above such levels would be avail-
able for laundering) and the distribution of individual 
cocaine seizures as a proxy for the market structure. The 
calculations suggested that on average 46% of gross 
retail profits and 92% of gross cocaine wholesale profits 
were available for laundering at the global level. This 
resulted in an overall money-laundering proportion of 
62% for gross cocaine profits – in line with results in the 
literature suggesting that between 60% and 80% of drug 
profits are laundered. The results have been also close to 
the initial FATF assumptions that between two thirds 
and 70% of drug related funds are laundered. 
Applying the gravity model in its base version to the 
likely amounts available for laundering, suggested that 
about half of the profits may be laundered within the 
same country where the profits were generated (either by 
entering the banking sector or by entering real estate and 
other kinds of investment). The other half would go to 
jurisdictions abroad. 
Executive summary
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mining of legal institutions. For example, an investor of 
illicit funds is likely to make investment decisions based 
on the risk of detection rather than maximum return on 
investment. Criminal funds thus have a negative effect 
on economic growth by diverting resources to less pro-
ductive activities. 
Research undertaken in industrialized countries has 
found that increases in money-laundering activities were 
associated with reductions in overall annual economic 
growth rates. One study, for instance, found that each 
US$1 billion laundered reduced overall economic 
growth by 0.04-0.06 percentage points in the 17 
researched OECD countries. While the picture is some-
what more mixed once money-laundering affects foreign 
jurisdictions, financial centres have developed a self-
interest of not being associated with ‘tainted money’ and 
have signed relevant international instruments to avoid 
the inflow of such criminal finance. 
To enable authorities to follow the money-trail in order 
to detect underlying criminal activities and to dismantle 
the groups involved, anti-money-laundering legislation 
is key. The operations of criminal organizations are 
potentially vulnerable to detection via the money trail, 
and there are good reasons for the authorities to exploit 
these vulnerabilities. Based on all available estimates, 
however, less than 1% of the total amounts that are 
being laundered are seized. Thus, there is a clear need for 
universal and stronger participation in international 
money-laundering efforts at the global level. 
Introduction
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were circulated to Member States for comments twice, 
in February and September 2011. 
Scope of the study 
The study concentrates on the illicit financial flows 
emerging from drug trafficking and other transnational 
organized crime and their socio-economic implications.
One key aim of this study is to determine the likely 
magnitude of crime proceeds and to investigate the 
likely extent of global money-laundering. The report 
thus starts with an overview of the methodologies pro-
posed in the scientific literature to measure illicit finan-
cial flows, followed by an analysis and discussion of 
previous results in this area. While highly diverse in 
nature, it will be shown that by pooling results of research 
undertaken at the national and global levels and by 
expressing estimated crime proceeds and estimated 
amounts of money laundered as a proportion of GDP, 
some likely orders of magnitude of the problem can be 
established. This also helps to aggregate results referring 
to different years. One key question in this area will be 
whether currently available research supports the widely 
quoted IMF ‘consensus range’ of the amounts laundered 
being equivalent to between 2% and 5% of GDP, put 
forward by the IMF back in 1998. 
This is followed by a chapter presenting the methodol-
ogy that was used to analyse financial flows emerging 
from a selected transnational organized crime activity - 
trafficking in cocaine. The chapter analyses the flows 
related to cocaine trafficking profits into the financial 
system and the destinations of these flows. As this is new 
territory, this is a particularly challenging task. Original 
research has been undertaken for this chapter.
A subsequent chapter focuses on the socio-economic 
impact of illicit financial flows emerging from drug traf-
ficking and other transnational organized crimes. It 
analyses the consequences of such flows for the underly-
ing predicate crimes, and their impact if invested in the 
legal sectors of the economy. Finally, it analyses the 
impact of illicit financial flows once laundered in foreign 
jurisdictions, and discusses the consequences for the 
countries of origin as well as recipient countries, both 
short and long-term. 
The discussion on the socio-economic impact will be 
followed by a chapter presenting the legal instruments 
Introduction
Garnered from the proceeds of illicit trafficking and 
other forms of organized profit-motivated crime, ‘dirty 
money’ can hinder governance, stability and economic 
development. Money-laundering is particularly prob-
lematic when it is directly related to organized crime 
activities that cause severe harm and generate consider-
able illicit profits, such as trafficking in illicit drugs, 
theft of natural resources, trafficking in human beings 
and illegal trade in arms, to mention some. While work 
has been done, including by UNODC, to estimate the 
proceeds of various transnational criminal activities, 
there remain considerable knowledge gaps, including on 
the extent to which these proceeds flow through the 
international financial system. 
Member States have been also concerned about the 
dimensions and the impact of illicit financial flows 
related to transnational organized crime and called for 
further work on this topic. This is reflected in the resolu-
tion by the United Nations Commission on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice on “Strengthening 
international cooperation in combating the harmful 
effects of illicit financial flows resulting from criminal 
activities” (April 2011, E/2011/30*; E/CN.15/2011/21*) 
which stated in its introductory paragraphs that it was 
“aware that the availability of information on illicit finan-
cial flows resulting from transnational organized crime, 
including... drug trafficking … is very limited, and of the 
need to improve the quality scope and completeness of such 
information” and in §14 “Requests the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime to continue, in consultation 
with Member States, its research on transnational organ-
ized crime, including illicit financial flows”. 
This study was undertaken by the UNODC Studies and 
Threat Analysis Section, Policy Analysis and Research 
Branch. It is intended as a contribution towards filling 
some of the knowledge gaps related to illicit financial 
flows. 
The methodology applied for this study, notably the 
new approaches developed for Chapter 2 (‘Detailed 
Analysis of a Transnational Organized Crime Sector’) 
were endorsed by an external Reference Group. This 
informal group consisted of renowned experts from the 
academic field as well as from Financial Intelligence 
Units and various international organizations, drawn 
from countries in Europe, North America, Latin Amer-
ica, Africa and Oceania. Drafts of this research report 
Ill IcIT fINANcIAl flowS
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that have evolved over the last two decades to fight such 
illicit money flows at the international level. While these 
efforts concentrated first on drug-related money-laun-
dering, it will be shown how these instruments gradually 
broadened their scope to encompass money-laundering 
of all serious crime related proceeds. 
The report ends with a summary and conclusions. The 
point that – based on all existing estimates – the ‘success 
rate’ for anti-money-laundering efforts is still limited is 
made, and the ensuing need for better results noted. 
There is a clear need for stronger international coopera-
tion, and a need for a better implementation of existing 
international instruments by all jurisdictions. 
15
Est imating the global proceeds of cr ime
1
(AUSTRAC, RMIT University) was commissioned by 
the Australian Financial Intelligence Unit in 1992 to 
undertake such a survey, based on expert opinion, to 
determine the percentages laundered from the proceeds 
of each type of crime.3 As with all surveys, this approach 
has a number of potential biases. The sample might not 
be representative and the people interviewed may have 
their own perception biases, notably as objective and 
verifiable data is generally not available to answer such 
questions. In addition, there can be biases linked to 
interpretation, non-response and sample. 
A further method of estimating money-laundering is to 
analyse suspicious or unusual transactions reported to 
financial intelligence units (FIUs), which have been estab-
lished in most countries to monitor and control money-
laundering. There are, however, variations between 
countries regarding reporting requirements, particularly 
related to thresholds that may trigger a report, or the 
extent to which non-monetary payment instructions 
(such as bearer instruments) should be included. More-
over, information overload can lead to delays in follow-
up investigations. There is also a potential problem of 
strategic dilution of information by respondents4 as they 
may fear negative consequences and start reporting a 
larger number of transactions in order to avoid a later 
accusation of not having informed the authorities. This 
can lead to a strong bias of this indicator in some coun-
tries and make country comparisons difficult.5
In addition, a number of top-down approaches have 
been proposed in the literature. Several of these methods 
are based on the analysis of statistical discrepancies in 
official data.
One method in this category is to analyse the ‘errors and 
omissions’ in the balance of payments (‘hot money 
3 J. Walker, Estimates of the Extent of Money Laundering in and through 
Australia, paper prepared for the Australian Transaction Reports and 
Analysis Centre, John Walker Consulting Services, Queanbeyan, 
Australia, September 1995.
4 E. Takáts, “A Theory of ‘Crying Wolf ’: The Economics of Money 
Laundering Enforcement,” IMF Working Paper No. 07/81, April 
2007; L. Dalla Pellegrina and D. Masciandaro, “The Risk-Based 
Approach in the New European Anti-Money Laundering Legislation: 
A Law and Economics View,” Review of Law and Economics, 2009, 5 
(2), Article 6.
5 B. Unger and F. van Waarden, “How to Dodge Drowning in Data? 
Rule- and Risk-Based Anti Money Laundering Policies Compared,” 
Review of Law and Economics, 5(2), 2009, Article 7.
a)	 Methodological	approaches		
proposed	in	the	literature	
In order to measure illicit financial flows, and thus the 
extent of money-laundering, a number of methods have 
been proposed in the literature.1 The issues at stake are 
very complex. As will be shown below, there is currently 
no single method that would give clear, unambiguous 
and indisputable results. In contrast to several other 
forms of crime, where victims report their case to the 
authorities, money-laundering is a largely hidden phe-
nomenon and only a small proportion of cases tends to 
eventually surface (in reported suspicious transactions, 
court cases, et cetera). Moreover, the definitions of 
money-laundering predicate offences differ between 
jurisdictions, and it is thus not clear to which extent 
national studies are comparable, given that they may not 
be comparing “like with like”. 
Traditional approaches used to discuss money-launder-
ing have been based on field and case studies. In the 
Netherlands, for instance, Meloen et al.2 analysed 52 
criminal cases wherein property had been confiscated. 
They found related money-laundering activities of more 
than one million Dutch guilders (about US$500,000) 
per case. The basic problem with such an approach is 
that it is unclear how representative the studied cases are, 
and to what extent they represent total money-launder-
ing activities in a given country. The case studies are 
helpful to better understand the behavior of launderers; 
what they purchase, where and how they launder and so 
on. In order to go beyond describing and summarizing 
the specific cases, however, a number of additional 
assumptions must be made about the underlying popula-
tion of money-launderers, which may not reflect reality. 
Another way of estimating the amount of money laun-
dered is to carry out surveys and interviews with business 
people and experts from the police and government 
departments and ministries. For instance, John Walker 
1 The following discussions draws heavily on Brigitte Unger, “Money 
Laundering – A Newly Emerging Topic on the International Agenda,” 
Review of Law and Economics, 2009 and Brigitte Unger, The Scale and 
Impacts of Money Laundering, Edward Elgar Publishing, May 2007. 
2 J. Meloen, R. Landman, H. de Miranda, J.van Eekelen and S. van 
Soest, “Buit en Besteding, Een empirisch onderzoek naar de omvang, 
de kenmerken en de besteding van misdaadgeld,” Reed Business 
Information, Den Haag, Netherlands, 2003.
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a currency (‘cash’). This approach was applied by Tanzi9 
to demonstrate both the ‘shadow economy’ and the 
extent of money-laundering. It is assumed here that cash 
is frequently used in hidden transactions to avoid observ-
able traces for the authorities. The extent of cash in an 
economy is used as an indicator of the size of the shadow 
economy or the extent of money-laundering. An increase 
in the shadow economy or money-laundering would 
necessitate more cash, and hence increase the demand 
for a currency. By comparing the amount of money 
printed and the amount of money actually circulating, 
Tanzi (1997) concluded that some US$5 billion in cash 
per year (1984) may have been used for the illegal drug 
trade in the USA. (Subsequent estimates of the overall 
size of the US drug trade – using different methods - 
yielded substantially higher figures).10 One problem of 
the currency demand approach is that it cannot distin-
guish between the shadow economy and money-laun-
dering. Furthermore, cash holdings can be the result of 
dollar or euro hoarding due to fears of devaluation of 
other currencies. Moreover, it cannot be applied to 
countries within a currency zone, such as the euro or the 
West African franc, since the cash supply distribution 
across countries is not known. 
Another method was proposed by Quirk,11 who 
attempted to estimate the correlation between money-
laundering and the demand for money. This method 
suggested that money-laundering, through its effects on 
demand, would affect interest rates and exchange rates. 
An increase in money demand resulting from the need 
for cash to buy drugs would make money more expen-
sive. This means that the price for money – the interest 
rate – would go up. Higher interest rates would then 
attract foreign investors, leading to more capital inflows 
and exchange rate appreciation. This approach may 
work for some countries, although higher interest rates 
and currency appreciations can be the consequence of 
many other causes. The method would not work to 
identify the extent of money-laundering for individual 
countries within a currency zone. 
More recent attempts to measure the extent of money-
laundering are the so-called Latent Variable Approaches. 
Best known here is the ‘dynamic multiple-indicators mul-
tiple-causes’ (DYMIMIC) model, which uses two sets of 
observable variables and links them as a proxy to the 
unobservable variable (the extent of money-laundering). 
9 V. Tanzi, Money Laundering and the International Financial System, 
IMF Working Paper, International Monetary Fund, No. 96/55, 
1996; V. Tanzi, ‘Macroeconomic Implications of Money Launder-
ing,’ in E.U. Savona, Responding to Money Laundering, International 
Perspectives, Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997, Amsterdam, pp. 
91–104.
10 ONDCP, What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, December 
2001.
11 P. J. Quirk, ‘Money Laundering: Muddying the Macroeconomy’, 
Finance & Development, 34 (1), (1997), pp. 7–9.
method’). These are supposed to reflect differences 
between registered capital inflows and -outflows. The 
assumptions are that errors and omissions may arise 
because of a failure to measure certain movements of 
private short-term capital, and that it is appropriate to 
add these to the recorded flows of short-term capital in 
order to get an estimate of total ‘hot money’ flows.6 The 
basic logic is that the better the recording of capital 
flows, the higher the overall transparency of financial 
transactions, the lower the ‘errors and omissions’ and the 
less likely it becomes that countries become victims of 
money-laundering activities. 
The ‘residual approach’ attempts to measure capital flight 
by taking the difference between inflows (sources) of 
funds and outflows (uses) of funds, which are unrecord-
ed.7 The question here is how well the residual reflects 
capital flight. Moreover, the approach does not include 
other discrepancies such as time lags and different calcu-
lation conventions. Another question that arises from 
using this method is to what extent capital flight, which 
may consist of both laundered money and tax evasion, 
actually measures money-laundering. 
Kar and Smith,8 on behalf of Global Financial Integrity 
(GFI), refined these concepts, in order to estimate the 
illicit financial flows out of developing countries (previ-
ously referred to as ‘flight capital’). Starting with an 
analysis of the merits and limitations of the Hot Money 
Method, the Dooley Method, the World Bank Residual 
Methods, the Direction of Trade Statistics-based Trade 
Mispricing Model and the International Price Profiling-
based Trade Mispricing Method, they adopted the World 
Bank Residual Method, applying the ‘change in external 
debt’ (CED) version, in combination with the Trade 
Mispricing Model in its ‘gross excluding reversals’ (GER) 
version as the best model. This was slightly modified 
with a two-stage filtration process on ‘non-normalized’ 
estimates. The results emerging from these models, how-
ever, do not include the proceeds of criminal commer-
cial smuggling such as drugs, minerals and contraband 
goods, and any trade mispricing will not be picked up 
in the model if there was collusion between importers 
and exporters to fake invoices. 
The ‘currency demand approach’ tries to measure the 
discrepancy between the regular and excess demands for 
6 F. Schneider and U. Windischbauer, “Money Laundering: Some 
Facts,” European Journal of Law and Economics, 26(3), 2008, pp. 
387-404.
7 M. De Boyrie, S. Pak and J. Zdanowicz, “The Impact of Switzer-
land’s Money Laundering Law on Capital Flows Through Abnormal 
Pricing in International Trade,” Applied Financial Economics, vol. 15, 
2006, pp. 217-230.
8 D. Kar and D. Cartwright-Smith, Illicit Financial Flows from Devel-
oping Countries: 2002-2006, Global Financial Integrity, Washington 
D.C., 2008. 
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dering in the Netherlands. The input-output models 
have their origins in some of the models originally used 
to analyse socialist economies – but have also proven 
useful for estimating the size of illegal drug markets at 
the regional and subregional level, using triangulation 
techniques based on expert consistency checks. New-
ton’s gravity model is another theoretical foundation for 
these estimates. In fact, a number of newer models in 
international trade theory have shed light on the role of 
distance and borders, and about the attractiveness of 
countries for trade, which can also be applied for 
improving estimates of money-laundering. Once the 
scale of money-laundering is known, its macroeconomic 
effects, as well as the impact of crime prevention, regula-
tion and law enforcement effects on money-laundering 
and transnational crime, can be estimated. An IMF 
Working Group has been trying in recent years to 
improve the attractiveness indicators of these models 
and to establish a threat analysis to show which coun-
tries are more attractive for launderers due to their spe-
cific features (such as financial expertise). The weaknesses 
of the ‘Walker model’ are that it depends on a number 
of assumptions and requires detailed calibration – and 
thus experts in the respective field to judge whether or 
not the results are reasonable. As with any model, the 
accuracy of its results are difficult to verify. 
Further models to estimate the extent of money-laun-
dering are based on observing abnormal prices. Using 
trade to transfer illicit funds is an old technique. Laun-
derers can create fake high-value invoices and ship mer-
chandise of low value or reverse this procedure as a way 
of concealing ill-gotten gains. These techniques are 
known as trade-based money-laundering. In June 2008, 
FATF published a report on Best Practices of Trade-
Based Money Laundering,17 dealing with questions of 
how trade-based money-laundering can be detected. 
Economic analysis of trade data can help to develop risk 
indicators for identifying suspicious trading countries 
and merchandise, and for determining the scale of trade-
based money-laundering. John Zdanowicz18 analysed 
monthly data contained in the United States Merchan-
dise Trade Data Base and identified suspicious merchan-
dise flows, the share of trade subject to money-laundering 
for each country, and the amount of money-laundering 
between the USA and countries on the Al-Qaida watch 
list. He provided both country risk and merchandise risk 
indices that helped identify the countries and products 
most vulnerable to money-laundering. His method is 
Walker Gravity Model,” Review of Law and Economics, 5:2, 2009, pp. 
821-853.
17 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Best Practices paper on Trade 
Based Money Laundering, Paris, June 2008.
18 J. Zdanowicz, Trade-Based Terrorist Financing Analysis: Suspicious 
Trade with Al Qaeda Countries,” International Trade Alert Working 
Paper, 2005.
One set of variables reflects the causes for the shadow 
economy such as regulations, taxation and prosecutions. 
The other set is called indicators, and measures the 
effects of the shadow economy on money-laundering. 
These observable variables parallel money-laundering 
and include the growing demand for money, less official 
growth, and/or increases in crime rates. Schneider12 
used this approach to estimate the shadow economy for 
145 countries. Schneider and Windischbauer13 also 
applied the method to measure the extent of money-
laundering. One problem with this approach is that the 
choice of cause and indicator variables appears to be 
rather arbitrary and is not necessarily reinforced theo-
retically. Instead, the DYMIMIC model uses factor 
analysis to determine how well the different ‘cause vari-
ables’ explain the unobservable variable and those that 
can be grouped together. The same is then done for the 
indicator variables. In other words, statistics decide 
which indicators are used to form the relevant bundle 
for potential causes and indicators of a shadow economy 
(or money-laundering). Tedds and Giles (2000) and 
Schneider (2006) described this model. A MIMIC 
model is formulated as follows: ML is the scalar (unob-
servable) ‘latent’ variable (the size of money-laundering); 
y’ = (y1, y2, ....., yp) is a vector of ‘effects’ or ‘indicators’ 
of ML; x’ = (x1, x2, ....., xq) is a vector of causes of ML. 
DYMIMIC refers to changes in these variables. Under 
the assumption that all the elements are normally dis-
tributed and uncorrelated, one can estimate money-
laundering by regressing the observable causes (or 
change in causes) on the observable effects (or change in 
effects). The advantage of this model is that it can be 
applied to all countries and jurisdictions in the world. 
Its weakness is that one cannot test the extent to which 
the model specifications are correct and have anything 
to do with money-laundering.
Another approach has been chosen by John Walker, who 
– based on an input-output model in combination with a 
gravity model and various triangulation techniques – 
attempted to arrive at a global estimate of money-laun-
dering by measuring illicit flows of money in and out of 
220 countries in 1994.14 In 2006, Unger et al.15 applied 
a modified ‘Walker model’16 to estimate money-laun-
12 F. Schneider, Shadow Economies and Corruption All Over the World: 
New Estimates for 145 Countries, The Open Access, Open Assessment 
E-Journal, 2007.
13 F. Schneider and U. Windischbauer, “Money Laundering: Some 
Facts,” European Journal of Law and Economics, 26(3), 2008, pp. 
387-404.
14  J. Walker, Estimates of the Extent of Money Laundering in and through 
Australia, paper prepared for the Australian Transaction Reports and 
Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), John Walker Consulting Services, 
Queanbeyan, Australia, September 1995.
15 B. Unger, J. Ferwerda, W. de Kruijf, G. Rawlings, M. Siegel and K. 
Wokke, The Amounts and the Effects of Money Laundering, report for 
the Dutch Ministry of Finance, February 2006.
16 J. Walker and B. Unger, “Measuring Global Money Laundering: The 
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dered money that can be considered as anything more than 
an indicative order of magnitude.” But he went on to 
state that ”Such figures are useful to confirm that the phe-
nomenon of money laundering is of sufficient scale to war-
rant public policy attention…” and that ”Such a negative 
assessment … does not imply an endorsement of policymak-
ing by anecdotes… To the contrary, a recurring theme… is 
that better use could and should be made of available data 
…, and greater thought should be given to collecting and 
assembling relevant statistics that aid policymakers.“20 
i. fATf estimates 
One of the first estimates on the extent of illicit financial 
flows and related money-laundering came from the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF). It was founded in 
1989 by the G-7 to help tackle the threats posed by 
money-laundering for the international banking 
system,21 and now has 36 members. It has issued 40 
recognized Recommendations against money-launder-
ing and nine Special Recommendations against terrorist 
financing. 
The starting point for the FATF estimate was drug sales 
in the USA and Europe. The FATF estimated drug sales 
in the late 1980s at some US$124 billion (bn), of which 
they estimated that some US$85 bn (equivalent to 0.8% 
of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the USA and 
Europe, or 0.5% of global GDP) would have been avail-
able for money-laundering. Assuming that drug sales 
may have accounted for a quarter of global illegal pro-
ceeds, FATF estimated the total amounts laundered at 
some 2% of global GDP.22 Based on 2009 GDP data,23 
this would have been equivalent to some US$1.2 tril-
lion. 
20 P. Reuter and E. M. Truman, Chasing Dirty Money – The Fight against 
Money Laundering, Washington D.C., 2004, p. 12.
21 FATF, History of the FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,3417,e
n_32250379_32236836_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
22 “Another approach to estimating the magnitude of financial abuse 
uses information about expenditures and prices involved in criminal 
activity that has been collected in the course of law enforcement 
(micro-data). The most publicized of such estimates have been for 
global money-laundering by the FATF. On the basis of information 
about final sales of some illegal drugs (about US$120 billion a year 
in the United States and Europe in the late 1980s) and extrapolating 
worldwide and generalizing to include all drugs, and subsequently 
assuming that 50-70 percent of that amount would be laundered, the 
FATF estimated that money-laundering could reach about 2 percent 
of global GDP.” (International Monetary Fund, Financial System 
Abuse, Financial Crime and Money Laundering- Background Paper, 
February 12, 2001.) 
23 According to the World Bank, the current global gross domestic 
product amounted to US$58.14 trillion in 2009 (World Bank, The 
World at a Glance – Key development indicators from the World Bank, 
March 2011). 
valid under the assumption that product prices are nor-
mally distributed and that unusual prices have a criminal 
intention and are not, for example, just booking errors 
by customs officials. In this model all transactions with 
a price below the 5% margin or above the 95% margin 
around the ‘usual’ prices are classified as trade-based 
money-laundering attempts. He uses not only country 
prices, but also world prices and variance measures to 
determine unusual transactions. An unresolved weakness 
of this model is that no matter how great the price fluc-
tuations are, the model classifies 10% of all transactions 
as always suspicious (the upper and lower 5%). 
Another evolving approach to measure money-launder-
ing is to use economic theory in combination with 
simulation techniques. This can help to determine how 
much rationally acting launderers would launder. In this 
context, Bagella, Busato and Argentiero19 developed a 
theoretical model for estimating money-laundering in 
Italy by expanding a dynamic two-sector equilibrium 
model and simulating it for the USA and the EU-15 
countries. In this model, agents have the option to work 
partly in the legal and partly in the illegal economy. 
They face transaction costs in the legal sector and costs 
of being detected in the illegal sector. Two types of firms 
produce a legal good and an illegal good with two dif-
ferent technologies. The government sets fines, can 
influence the probability of detection, and can influence 
the liquidity (money supply) of the economy, although 
there is a liquidity constraint. If households want more 
liquid funds, they must engage in the illegal sector. The 
‘optimal’ money laundered depends on the labour allo-
cated to the legal and illegal sector and on the prices and 
quantities of both goods. The model forecasts the devel-
opment of the legal and illegal sectors, and the attrac-
tiveness of the model lies in the possibility to compare 
the model’s forecasts of the licit economy with its actual 
development. One can thus see how well the model 
predicts the observable part of the economy. Assuming 
that the same good fit holds for the unobservable part of 
the illegal sector, one can use the theoretical finding for 
the illegal sector as a measure of money-laundering. 
b)	 Analysis	of	previous	estimates	
A number of results will be discussed in this sub-chapter 
to help get a better understanding of the likely magni-
tudes involved. One caveat should be made, however. As 
Peter Reuter once remarked, after having studied the 
phenomenon and the various proposed methods for 
years: “The review of the … methods comes to a simple 
conclusion: neither yields estimates of the volume of laun-
19 M. Bagella, F. Busato and A. Argentiero, “Money Laundering in a 
Microfounded Dynamic Model: Simulations for the U.S. and the 
EU-15 Economies,” Review of Law and Economics, 5(2), 2009, Article 
4.
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table 1: fATf estimate of money-laundering (1988)
Source: International Monetary fund, financial System Abuse, Financial Crime and Money Laundering- Background Paper, february 12, 2001.
trillion in 2005 (with a ‘best estimate’ of around US$1.5 
trillion)26 and between US$1.2 and US$2.9 trillion in 
2009, with a mid-point estimate of around US$2 trillion 
(based on a global GDP of US$58.2 trillion in 2009). 
The 2% to 5% of global GDP estimate was apparently 
first cited by then-managing director of the IMF Michel 
Camdessus in 1998, as a ‘consensus range’ of the likely 
scale of money-laundering transactions at the global 
level.27 The ‘consensus range’ has been, inter alia, also 
cited in the World Bank’s Reference Guide to Anti-Money 
Laundering and Combating Financing of Terrorism.28 A 
problem with this widely quoted figure has been the lack 
of supporting material and methodology documenting 
how it was established,29 though – according to the 
World Bank – it dates back to research undertaken by 
Vito Tanzi and published in an IMF working paper in 
1996.30 
26 B. Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering, Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, UK, 2007, p. 80. 
27 Mr. Michel Camdessus said in a speech (“Money Laundering: the 
Importance of International countermeasures”) at the Plenary Meeting 
of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering on Febru-
ary 10, 1998: “I hardly need say that the IMF regards the anti-money 
laundering actions advocated by the FATF as crucial for the smooth 
functioning of the financial markets. While we cannot guarantee the 
accuracy of our figures —and you have certainly a better evaluation than 
us—the estimates of the present scale of money laundering transactions 
are almost beyond imagination—2 to 5 percent of global GDP would 
probably be a consensus range….” International Monetary Fund, 
“Money Laundering: the Importance of International Countermeas-
ures”, Paris February 10, 1998 http://www.imf.org/external/np/
speeches/1998/021098.htm
28 World Bank, Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combat-
ing Financing of Terrorism, Washington (2nd edition), 2006, p. 1-6. 
29 F. Schneider, Money Laundering: some Preliminary Findings, Oct. 
2007, http://www.awi.uni-heidelberg.de/with2/seminar/WS%20
0708/Schneider_Money%20Laundering_102007.doc. 
30 V. Tanzi, “Money Laundering and the International Finance System”, 
IMF Working Paper No. 96/55, May 1996. 
Over the 1996-2000 period, the FATF tried to develop 
a more scientific basis for this estimate and invited all 
major actors in this field to a number of expert group 
meetings and workshops. 
Peter Reuter, one of the authors involved in the final 
study to produce a more scientific estimate of the 
amounts globally laundered, had to admit, however, that 
the attempt failed in 2000.24 This was mainly due to the 
unavailability of appropriate data and information, 
despite the participation of the main national, regional 
and global institutions and experts in this exercise. This 
underlined the extreme difficulties to estimate – with 
any level of accuracy and scientific rigour – how much 
‘dirty money’ is being generated and laundered. 
The FATF issued a general recommendation that coun-
tries should estimate the funds generated from crime 
and the extent to which these funds are being laundered 
on a national basis. Only a few countries, however, have 
subsequently undertaken such an exercise. 
ii. IMf estimates 
The most frequently quoted estimate on the extent of 
money-laundering at the global level is an estimate pro-
vided by the head of the International Monetary Fund 
in the mid-1990s. This suggested that the extent of 
money-laundering (that is, of income derived from illicit 
sources) was equivalent to between 2% and 5% of global 
GDP. This would have been between US$0.6 – US$1.5 
trillion in 200625 and – assuming the proportions 
remained unchanged – between US$0.9 and US$2.3 
24 Peter Reuter and Edwin M. Truman, Chasing Dirty Money – The 
Fight against Money Laundering, Washington D.C., 2004, p. 9.
25 OECD Observer, “Ten years of combating money laundering”, 
OECD Observer No 217-218, Summer 1999.
Amounts estimated to have been laundered (1988) As a percentage of global GDP
US$0.34 trillion 2.0%
table 2: IMf estimates of money laundered (1998) 
Source: oEcD observer, “Ten years of combating money laundering”, OECD Observer No 217-218, Summer 1999 and world Bank, World 
Development Indicators (wDI), 2010.
   Minimum Maximum Mid-point
IMf estimates of money laundered as a percentage  
of global GDP 2% 5% 3.5%
Estimate for 1996 in trillion US$ 0.6 1.5 1.1
Estimate for 2005 in trillion US$ 0.9 2.3 1.5
Estimate	for	2009	in	trillion	US$	 	 	 1.2 2.9 2.0
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Assuming that the proportion for crime-related income 
(2.3% of GDP) remained largely stable over the subse-
quent decade – which can be assumed as no increase in 
crime was reported – the criminal income in 2010 
(excluding tax evasion) may have amounted to some 
US$350 bn in the world’s largest national economy. 
This would probably be the upper limit estimate. A 
lower limit estimate – assuming that the nominal 
increases found over the 1990-2000 period continued 
unchanged over the 2000-2010 period, would result in 
an estimate of around US$235 bn for the year 2010 or 
1.6% of GDP. A mid-point estimate would show crimi-
nal income of some US$300 bn (rounded) or 2% of 
GDP for 2010. 
A detailed breakdown for the various criminal proceeds 
in the USA, provided by Reuter for the year 1990, 
showed that tax evasion accounted for more than half of 
the total illegal proceeds. Drug trafficking accounted for 
around one fifth of global illegal proceeds, followed by 
fraud (around one eighth). The other crimes were far 
less important. Excluding tax evasion, drug trafficking 
would have been responsible for almost half (47%) and 
fraud for more than a quarter (28%) of the total. While 
tax evasion, drugs and fraud are likely to continue to 
play important roles for overall criminal proceeds, one 
can assume that other crimes have gained in importance 
over the last two decades and would now appear higher 
on the list. 
iii. National estimates 
Only a few estimates on the extent of crime-related pro-
ceeds at the national level exist so far. These estimates 
tend to be heterogeneous in terms of items included and 
the way the results are generated, which limits direct 
comparability. Nonetheless, they still provide some valu-
able ideas of the likely magnitudes involved. 
• United States
One set of estimates for the USA has been presented by 
Peter Reuter. These estimates on the generation of illegal 
income, including tax evasion, suggest that earnings 
from criminal activities increased in nominal terms over 
the last few decades to some US$780 bn, though – after 
an initial rise between 1965 and 1985 - they remained 
stable over the 1985-2000 period if expressed as a pro-
portion of GDP. Excluding tax evasion, criminal income 
increased from 2.5% of GDP in 1965 to 4% in 1985 (in 
line with the massive increase in drug consumption and 
trafficking over that period) but then gradually declined 
to 2.3% of GDP by 2000 (which also appears to be 
linked to the subsequent fall in drug use, notably the use 
of cocaine and related falls in acquisitive crime and traf-
ficking over the 1985-2000 period). The proportion of 
overall criminal income (some US$220 bn in 2000) to 
total illicit income (including tax evasion of some 
US$780 bn) fell from almost half in 1985 to less than a 
third two decades later and to less than 30% in 2010. 
table 3: Estimated earnings from criminal activity* in the United States, billions of current US$ (1965-2010) 
* criminal activities included: trafficking in illicit drugs, human trafficking, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, robbery, fraud, arson, 
non-arson fraud, counterfeiting, illegal gambling, loan sharking and prostitution. Tax evasion crimes included federal income, federal profits 
and excise tax evasion.  
** Tentative UNoDc estimate based on previous estimates and trends derived from new drug and crime data.  
Source: Peter Reuter, “Chasing Dirty Money – the Fight against Money Laundering,” washington 2004; based on office of National Drug 
Policy (2000 and 2001); Simon and witte (1982); GAo (1980); federal Bureau of Investigations’ annual Uniform Crime Reports; Internal Rev-
enue Service; International organization on Migration; Abt. Smith, and christiansen (1985); Kaplan and Matteis (1967), carlson et al. (1984), 
Key (1979) and world Bank, world Development Indicators (wDI), 2011.
 Tax evasion included  Criminal income (tax evasion excluded)
Estimated 
criminal 
income
in % of GDP
Estimated 
criminal 
income
in % of 
GDP
Ratio of criminal 
income in total 
illicit income
1965 49 6.8% 18 2.5% 37%
1970 74 7.1% 26 2.5% 35%
1975 118 7.2% 45 2.7% 38%
1980 196 7.0% 78 2.8% 40%
1985 342 8.1% 166 4.0% 49%
1990 471 8.1% 209 3.6% 44%
1995 595 8.0% 206 2.8% 35%
2000 779 8.0% 224 2.3% 29%
2010**   300 (235 –350)
2.0% 
(1.6%-2.3%)
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first decade of the new millennium, but these declines 
were less pronounced than in the 1990s.32 
The overall illicit drug market – in nominal terms – 
appears to have remained stable in the first decade of the 
new millennium, as prices and prevalence rates did not 
change significantly. Reported drug use prevalence rates 
increased from 2000-2002, due to improvements in 
survey methodology, then fell until 2008 and rose again 
in 2009. Over the 2002-2009 period, drug use was basi-
cally stable,33 and the same probably applies to the 
32 FBI Uniform Crime Reports, quoted in UNODC, 2010 World Drug 
Report, Vienna 2010, p. 82 
33 The reported annual prevalence rate of drug use in the USA in the 
population aged 12 and above rose from 11.0% in 2000 to 14.9% in 
2002 – mainly due to changes in methodology. The prevalence rate 
then fell over the subsequent years to 14.2% by 2008 before increasing 
again to 15.1% in 2009, mainly due to an increase in cannabis con-
sumption in parallel with the referendum on cannabis legalisation in 
California in 2010. Excluding cannabis, the annual prevalence of drug 
use fell from 8.7% in 2002 to 8.0% in 2008 before rising again to 8.3% 
in 2009. The latter increase was, however, statistically not significant. 
(SAMHSA, Household Survey on Drug Use and Health, 2009 and 
previous years). 
In fact, estimates of the size of the US drug market for 
the year 2000 showed a total figure of US$64 bn, down 
from US$115 bn, expressed in constant 2000 dollars.31 
Expressed as a percentage of GDP, the size of the US 
drug market declined from 1.7% in 1990 to 0.6% in 
2000. This decline was due to overall lower quantities of 
drugs consumed in the USA (as many heavy users either 
received treatment or were imprisoned for drug dealing) 
as well as a decline in drug prices in the 1990s as a con-
sequence of more competition in the drug markets, 
following the dismantling of the big Colombian drug 
cartels. 
The proceeds from other crime, expressed as a percent-
age of GDP, also declined. This was linked to lower 
consumption of drugs (notably of cocaine and crack-
cocaine) and lower levels of all forms of acquisitive crime 
(including burglaries, larceny-theft and motor vehicle 
theft) and violent crime, including robberies and homi-
cides. Crime rates continued to decline further in the 
31 ONDCP, What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, Washington 
D.C, December 2001, p. 3.
table 4: Estimated unlawful earnings, including criminal proceeds, in the United States (1990)
Source: Peter Reuter, “Chasing Dirty Money – the Fight against Money Laundering”, washington 2004; based on office of National Drug 
Policy (2000 and 2001); Simon and witte (1982); GAo (1980); federal Bureau of Investigations’ annual Uniform Crime Reports; Internal Rev-
enue Service; International organization on Migration; Abt. Smith, and christiansen (1985); Kaplan and Matteis (1967), carlson et al. (1984).
Proceeds in billion of  
current US$ in % of total in % of total
Tax evasion 262.2 55.7%
Drug trafficking
    cocaine trafficking 61.3 13.0%
    Heroin trafficking 17.6 3.7%
    Marijuana trafficking 13.5 2.9%
    other drug trafficking 4.8 1.0%
    Subtotal drug trafficking 20.6%
fraud 59.3 12.6%
Prostitution 14.7 3.1%
loan sharking 14.0 3.0%
Motor vehicle theft 8.0 1.7%
Illegal gambling 7.6 1.6%
larceny/theft 3.8 0.8%
Burglary 3.5 0.7%
Robbery 0.5 0.2%
Human trafficking 0.2 0.04%
counterfeiting 0.1 0.02%
fraud arson 0.04 0.008%
Total 471.1 100.0%
As a percentage of GDP 8.1%
Ill IcIT fINANcIAl flowS
22
lent to 0.9% - 1.5% of GDP. The bulk was drug-related. 
The ‘value-added’ of illicit drug sales alone was equiva-
lent to between 0.5% and 1.1% of GDP.35 In compari-
son, data for the USA for 1990 showed drug sales as 
equivalent to some 1.7% of GDP. The size of the pros-
titution market or illicit gambling, in contrast, was very 
similar to that found in the USA, expressed as a propor-
tion of GDP. 
Subsequent studies on the size of the UK illicit drug 
market confirmed the initial range. The total size of the 
UK market in 2003/2004 was estimated at £5.3 billion 
(range: £4.0–£6.6 bn).36 Expressed as a proportion of 
GDP, the drug market estimate declined, however, to 
0.5% (range: 0.4%-0.6% of GDP). The size of the drug 
market was thus – in relative terms – slightly smaller 
than that of the USA. 
35 Chris Groom and Tom Davies, “Developing a Methodology for 
Measuring Illegal Activity for the UK National Accounts,” Economic 
Trends, no. 536, July 1998, pp. 33-71. 
36 Stephen Pudney et al, Institute for Social and Economic Research, 
University of Essex,,“Estimating the size of the UK illicit drug 
market”, in Home Office, Measuring different aspects of problem drug 
use: methodological developments, Home Office Online Report 16/06, 
pp. 46–120. 
2000-2009 period once result changes due to methodo-
logical improvements are accounted for.34 Significant 
changes over the last decade were only reported for 
cocaine. In this case, significant declines in the quanti-
ties of cocaine reaching the US market over the 2006-
2010 period were largely offset by higher cocaine prices, 
resulting in a rather stable cocaine market in financial 
terms. Assuming that the size of the US drug market 
remained in nominal terms unchanged, it would have 
decreased from 0.7% of GDP in 2000 to 0.4%-0.5% of 
GDP by 2009/2010.
• United Kingdom 
The Office of National Statistics estimated the ‘value-
added’ of criminal activities in the late 1990s. This study 
– looking at drugs, prostitution, selling of stolen goods 
and illicit gambling - resulted in estimates of the ‘value 
added’ of some US$10 bn - US$17 bn in 1996, equiva-
34 Due to a number of changes, the response rate could be raised (for 
example, by paying participants a fee of US$30 which increased the 
readiness of many drug users to participate in the survey). The data 
were then no longer directly comparable with previous results. A 
number of other data reported by SAMHSA suggested that overall 
drug use rates remained largely unchanged over the 2000-2002 
period (SAMHSA, Results from the 2002 National Survey on Drug Use 
and Health: National Findings, Rockville MD, Sept. 2003). 
table 5: Estimates of the US drug market, billions of constant 2000 US$ (1990-2000) 
Source: oNDcP, What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, washington D.c, December 2001, p. 3.
 1990 1995 2000
cocaine 69.9 40.0 35.3
Marijuana 15.0 10.2 10.5
Heroin 22.5 13.2 10.0
Methamphetamine 5.7 9.2 5.4
other drugs 2.2 2.7 2.4
Total	(rounded) 115 75 64
In % of GDP 1.6%-1.7%      0.9%          0.7%
table 6: Estimates of criminal proceeds in current US$ (1990-2010) 
* Tentative UNoDc estimates based on previous estimates and trends derived from drug and crime data.  
Sources: Peter Reuter, “Chasing Dirty Money – the Fight against Money Laundering”, washington 2004, p. 20, oNDcP, What America’s Users 
Spend on Illegal Drugs, washington D.c, December 2001, p. 3 and world Bank, World Development Indicators (wDI), 2011.
1990 1995 2000 2010*
Drugs 97 69 64 64
  in % of GDP 1.7% 0.9% 0.7% 0.4%
other crime (excl. tax evasion) 112 137 160 236
  In % of GDP 1.9% 1.9% 1.6% 1.6%
Total	(excl.	tax	evasion)	 209 206 224 300	(235-350)
In % of GDP 3.6% 2.8% 2.3% 2.0% (1.6%-2.3%)
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estimates, fraud accounted for between 60% and 66% 
of total criminal proceeds in Australia in 1998. 
A subsequent update based on new data in 2003, apply-
ing the same methodological approach, arrived at total 
estimates of some US$7 bn-US$8 bn, equivalent to 
some 1.5% of GDP (range: 1.4-1.6% of GDP), that is, 
lower than the US estimates. The difference between the 
1998 and 2003 estimates was mainly due to far lower 
estimates for the criminal income from fraud. Estimates 
for most of the other crime categories increased. None-
theless, fraud appears to have generated the highest 
proportion of total criminal proceeds in Australia (27% 
of the total), followed by income from illicit drug traf-
• Australia
Estimates of criminal proceeds generated in Australia 
have been calculated by John Walker (originally for the 
Australian Institute of Criminology in 1992, updated in 
1998). He arrived at figures ranging from US$7 bn - 
US$13 bn, equivalent to between 1.9% and 3.6% of 
GDP in 1998. These figures were based on estimates of 
the total number of crimes committed in a year and an 
analysis on the average cost of such crime per case. Tax 
evasion was not considered. The overall rather high fig-
ures (the midpoint estimates for criminal income as a 
percentage of GDP of 2.8% were higher than the esti-
mates for the USA) were mainly due to high estimates 
for the criminal income from fraud. According to these 
table 7: Estimates of value added of selected consumers’ expenditure for illegal activities in the UK (1996) 
Source: chris Groom and Tom Davies, “Developing a Methodology for Measuring Illegal Activity for the UK National Accounts,” 
Economic Trends, no. 536, July 1998, pp. 33-71. 
‘Value added’ (in billion £) in % of 1996 GDP
Drugs 3.9 – 8.5 0.5% – 1.1%
Prostitution 1.2 0.2%
Selling of stolen goods 0.7 0.1%
Illegal gambling 0.8 0.1%
Total in billion £  6.5 – 11.1 0.9% - 1.5%
Total in billion US$ 10.2 – 17.3
table 8: Estimates of the UK drug market (2003/2004) 
Source: Stephen Pudney et al, Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Essex, “Estimating the size of the UK illicit drug 
market”, in Home office, “Measuring different aspects of problem drug use: methodological developments”, Home office online Report 
16/06, p. 76. 
England and Wales UK
Aggregate 
street  
quantity 
(tons)
Aggregate 
pure  
quantity 
(tons)
Aggregate 
expenditure 
(£million)
Aggregate 
street  
quantity 
(tons)
Aggregate 
pure  
quantity 
(tons)
Aggregate 
expenditure 
(£million)
cannabis 360.33
±135.81
360.33
±135.81
900.8
±372.4
412.41
±155.44
412.41
±155.44
1031.0
±432.5
Amphetamines 32.68
±17.33
3.60
±2.31
277.8
±72.9
36.70
±19.46
4.04
±2.60
312.0
±81.9
Ecstasy  
(millions of tabs)
52.79
±23.84
13.72
±8.14
237.5
±76.2
59.52
±26.88
15.47
±9.18
267.8
±85.9
Powder cocaine 15.7
±12.17
7.85
±6.16
863.4
±237.1
17.70
±13.72
8.85
±6.94
973.3
±267.3
crack 13.79
±11.76
8.96
±7.71
1,309.8
±348.9
15.58
±13.29
10.13
±8.71
1,480.4
±394.29
Heroin 17.60
±13.14
7.04
±5.32
1,055.9
±199.2
20.11
±15.02
8.04
±6.13
1,206.7
±227.65
Total market value (£billion)  4.645
±1.154
5.271
±1.310
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• Netherlands 
Estimates of unlawful earnings in the Netherlands for 
the year 2003, based on a number of studies collected by 
Unger, amounted to between US$13.5 bn and US$22.3 
bn, equivalent to some 3.5% of GDP (range: 2.6%- 
4.3%); much smaller than the overall estimates for the 
ficking (15-18% of the total).37 Drug-related income 
was equivalent to some 0.3% of GDP, and thus lower 
than in the United States and the UK.
37 B. Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering, Cheltenham 
(UK), Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 2007, pp. 61-62.
table 9: Estimated criminal proceeds in Australia, million $A (1998 and 2003) 
Sources: Data based on John walker (AUSTRAc, RMIT University), 1998 and 2003 (updates from an original paper undertaken by the same 
author for the Australian Institute of criminology in 1992), quoted in Brigitte Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering, chelten-
ham (UK), Edward Elgar Publishing company, 2007, p. 62; John walker (AUSTRAc, RMIT University), The Extent of Money Laundering in and 
through Australia in 2004, Australian Institute of criminology, 2007. 
1998 2003  (revised estimates)
Mid-point estimates in 
% of GDP
 min  max  min  max 1998 2003 (rev.)
fraud 6,710 13,770 3,000 3,500 1.8% 0.4%
Drugs 1,200 2,000 0.2% 0.3%
Theft 1,232 2,712 0.3%
   Shoplifting 1,020 2,460 0.2%
   car theft 654 0.1%
   Stealing from persons 545 0.1%
   other theft 659 0.1%
Burglaries  
(breaking and entering) 893 1,193 0.2% 0.2%
Assaults 331 979 0.1% 0.1%
Homicide 275 323 0.0% 0.0%
Property damage 525 1,645 510 0.2% 0.1%
Robbery and extortion 93 37 0.0% 0.0%
Total  in million $A 11,259 20,919 10,920 12,860 2.8% 1.5%
Total  in billion US$ 7.1 13.1 7.1 8.3
in % of GDP 1.9% 3.6% 1.4% 1.6%
table 10: Estimated unlawful earnings in the Netherlands, million € (2003) 
* Based on the assumption that between 5% and 10% of the total amounts were discovered and reported.   
Source: B. Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering, cheltenham (UK), Edward Elgar Publishing company, 2007, p. 66, based on 
studies by Smekens and Verbruggen (2004), Business criminality: criminaliteit en rechtshandhaving (2001), woDc (2003, p. 60) and NIPo 
(2002). 
Proceeds of crime, 
million €
Mid-point estimates  
in % of total
financial, social security and tax fraud* 7,735 – 15,450 73.3%
Drugs 1,960 12.4%
Illegal workers 490 3.1%
Prostitution 460 2.9%
Theft 345 2.2%
Burglary 340 2.1%
fencing 190 1.2%
Illegal gambling 130 0.8%
Illegal copying 90 0.6%
computer-crime 26 0.2%
Violent offences 6 0.0%
other offences 187 1.2%
Total in million € 11,959-19,674
Total in billion US$ 13.5-22.3
As a percentage of GDP 2.6%-4.3%
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drug-related income would have been equivalent to 
0.4% of GDP, that is, more than in Australia but less 
than in the USA or the UK. 
• Germany 
A detailed study on criminal proceeds was also under-
taken for Germany and reported by the IMF in its 2010 
Assessment Report on Germany. The study suggested 
that total unlawful proceeds amounted to some US$80 
bn in 2007/2008, equivalent to 2.3% of GDP, that is, 
USA. By far the largest components were related to 
financial fraud, tax evasion and social security fraud. 
Together, these categories accounted for some 73% of 
the total unlawful earnings, that is, an even higher pro-
portion than was reported for these items in the USA. 
The next largest sources of criminal income were related 
to drugs: 10% - 16% of total unlawful earnings.38 Total 
38 B. Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering, Cheltenham 
(UK), Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 2007, pp. 65-66.
table 11: Estimated unlawful earnings, including criminal proceeds, Germany (2007/2008)
Notes: 
(a) Sources: National crime statistics 2007, Situation Report on Economic crime in the federal Republic of Germany, 2007. Narcotic Drugs Annual Report 
2007. organized crime Situation Report 2008. All published by the BKA. 
(b) Takes estimate from BKA crime statistics and apportions it upwards for incomplete investigations. 
(c) Unless otherwise noted, these figures are calculated by apportioning estimated profits from organized crime to the crime categories that organized 
crime was identified as being involved in. 
(d) Assumes actual crime is at least 2–3 times reported crime. An analysis of Germany data contained in the UN’s 2004–2005 International crime Victim’s 
Survey and the 2005 European Survey on crime and Safety provides the following justification for this assumption. The number of victims of profit gener-
ating crimes with common titles in the Germany criminal statistics ranged from 2.6 times the recorded level of crime for theft of motor vehicles to 11 times 
the number of reported crimes for consumer fraud with an average of 7.7. while some of this discrepancy can be explained by some recorded crimes 
having multiple victims, it lends weight to scaling up the amount of recorded crime by a factor of 2 or 3 to obtain a more realistic picture of actual crime. 
(e) Industry estimate of insurance fraud only, conveyed to assessors during on-site mission. 
(f) Derived from United Nations office on Drugs and crime, 2005 World Drug Report, estimates of the value of retail drug markets.
(g) Based on finance Minister estimate Bach/Dwenger, “Unternehmensbesteuerung: Trotz hoher Steuersätze nur mäßiges Aufkommen”, DIw-wochen-
bericht Nr. 5/2007, S. 63 ff.), that total tax avoidance and evasion amounts to € 100m per annum. Table assumes 25% is illegal tax and excise evasion.
Sources: fATf, Germany – Mutual Evaluation Report, february 2010 and International Monetary fund, March 2010, and International Mon-
etary fund, “Germany: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money laundering and combating the financing of Terrorism”, IMf country 
Report No. 10/78, washington D.c., february 2010, p. 24. and Statistisches Bundesamt, wiesbaden. 
Recorded  
crimes
Estimated 
loss or 
profit (b)  
(€ billion)
Other 
 proceeds 
or profit 
estimates 
(c)   
(€ billion)
Baseline 
estimate 
(€ billion)
Unreported 
crime 
adjusted 
estimate (d) 
(€ billion)
Baseline 
estimate 
(US$  
billion)
Unreported 
crime 
adjusted 
estimate 
(US$  
billion)
in %  of 
total 
unlawful 
earnings
Robberies and thefts 2,614,640 3.601 3.601 9.003 5.012 12.529 15.8%
fraud 912,899 2.372 4.00(e) 4.000 10.000 5.567 13.917 17.5%
Drugs 248,355 8.794(f) 8.794 8.794 12.239 12.239 15.4%
Human trafficking 0.037 0.037 0.093 0.052 0.1299 0.2%
Arms trafficking 0.005 0.005 0.012 0.006 0.016 0.0%
Sexual crimes 0.032 0.032 0.081 0.045 0.113 0.1%
counterfeiting and 
piracy of products 0.029 0.029 0.071 0.040 0.099 0.1%
Environmental crime 16,528 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.0%
Insolvency offences 5,484 0.0%
Tax and excise  
evasion 25.00(g) 25.000 25.000 34.793 34.793 43.8%
offences against 
commercial  
legislation
7,802 1.609 1.609 4.023 2.239 5.598 7.0%
other crimes 0.021 0.021 0.053 0.030 0.074 0.1%
Total unlawful earn-
ings 6,284,661 7.583 37.920 43.130 57.135 60.025 79.514 100.0%
Percentage of GDP 0.3% 1.6% 1.8% 2.3%
crime excl.  
tax evasion 12.920 18.130 32.135 22.232 44.721
Percentage of GDP 0.5% 0.7% 1.3%
Memorandum 
items:  
- Money-laundering  
 offences 
3,923
  
  
  
 
- Economic crimes 87,934 4.200 4.200 10.500
- organized crime 0.663 0.663 1.658
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US$189 bn for the year 2009, equivalent to 8.9% of 
GDP. This would be far more than the estimates for any 
other developed country, about four times the overall 
crime related proportion of GDP calculated for the 
United States (for the year 2000). Deducting various 
expenditure items, the overall profits of organized crime 
were estimated at some €78 bn or US$109 bn, equiva-
lent to 3.8% of GDP.39 
Italy has a significant organized crime sector, likely 
among the largest in Europe. Nonetheless, how realistic 
are estimates suggesting that organized crime proceeds 
are as high as 9% of GDP in Italy? 
The bulk of the organized crime income (44%) was 
estimated to stem from drug trafficking activities. SOS 
Impresa estimated that €60 bn, or 3.9% of GDP, was 
drug-related. Studies in other developed countries as 
well as other studies in Italy suggest that the estimates of 
drug-related income are – most probably - gross over-
estimates. Other estimates of the Italian drug market 
39 SOS Impresa, XII Rapporto – Le mani della criminalità sulle imprese 
(Sintesi per la Stampa), Rome, 27 January 2010. 
clearly less than in the USA and slightly less than in the 
Netherlands. The largest source of unlawful income in 
Germany was tax and excise evasion (44% of the total), 
followed by fraud (18%), robberies and thefts (16%) 
and drugs (15%). Excluding the tax and excise evasions, 
criminal proceeds amounted to some US$45 bn in 
2007/2008, equivalent to 1.3% of GDP, that is, slightly 
less than the estimates reported for Australia. The largest 
components of criminal proceeds in Germany came 
from financial fraud (31% of the total), robberies and 
thefts (28%) and drug trafficking-related income (27%). 
Drug-related income amounted to between 0.3% and 
0.4% of GDP, that is, less than in the USA or the UK, 
and marginally less than in the Netherlands. 
• Italy 
A number of estimates related to the income of organ-
ized crime have been published for Italy in recent years. 
One of the most prominent institutions is SOS Impresa. 
This association, created in 1991 in Palermo (Sicily) by 
a number of businesspeople to defend themselves against 
mafia protection rackets, generated an estimate of the 
gross income of organized crime in Italy of €135 bn or 
table 12: Estimates of the income and profits of organized crime in Italy (2009) 
Source: SoS Impresa, XII Rapporto – Le mani della criminalità sulle imprese, Rome, 27 January 2010.
Income In billion € Expenditure In billion €
Trafficking drugs 60.00 bosses/management 0.60
Trafficking in human beings 0.87 affiliated members 0.45
Arms trafficking 5.80 arrested persons 0.09
Smuggling 1.20 fugitives 0.03
Subtotal trafficking 67.87 Subtotal ‘salaries’ 1.17
Protection racket 9.00 hiding places 0.10
loan sharking (usury) 15.00 networks 0.10
Subtotal ‘predatory activities’ 24.00 weapons 0.25
Theft and robbery 1.00 1.00 Subtotal ‘logistics’ 0.45
Procurement 6.50 corruption 0.95
Agro-crime 7.50 consultants and specialists 0.05
Games and gambling 2.50 supporters 1.75
counterfeiting 6.50 Subtotal ‘corruption’ 2.75
Illegal construction 2.00 legal fees 0.80 0.80
Subtotal - illegal economic activities 25.00 investment 26.00 26.00
Ecomafia / agromafia 16.00 16.00 money-laundering 19.50 19.50
Prostitution 0.60 0.60 provisions (reserve) 6.50 6.50
financial gains 0.75 0.75
Total	income	in	bn	€ 135.22 135.22 Total	expenditure	in	bn	€ 57.17 57.17
Profits	in	bn	€ 78.05 78.05
Total	income	in	bn	US$ 188.58 Profits	in	bn	US$ 108.85
Total	income	in	bn	US$ 8.9% Profits	in	%	of	GDP 3.8%
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better understanding of illegal drug markets, the total 
proceeds of the organized crime sector could have 
amounted to some US$120 bn, equivalent to 5.7% of 
GDP.41 Deducting the expenditures identified above, 
the remaining profits for organized crime in Italy would 
still be substantial, some US$43 bn or 1.9% of GDP. 
Excluding its involvement in trafficking of drugs, arms 
and human beings, the proceeds generated by organized 
crime in Italy – based on SOS Impresa estimates – appear 
41 The calculations shown in the table may be interpreted to suggest 
that total drug sales go to organized crime in Italy. This is not true. At 
first sight, the calculations would appear to lead to an over-estimation 
of the total income of organized crime. However, one must also take 
into account that Italian organized crime participates to some extent 
in the drug business in other European countries as well. These values 
are missing here. In other words, the calculations assume that the 
amounts of drugs sold by Italian organized crime abroad are similar 
in magnitude to the drugs sold by individuals, not participating in 
organized crime, in Italy. 
were far lower, ranging from €6.3 bn (0.4% of GDP in 
2005) to €11.4 bn (0.7% of GDP in 2008).40 Such 
estimates would be more in line with drug market esti-
mates from other developed countries, ranging from 
0.3% of GDP (Australia in 2003) to 0.7% of GDP 
(USA in 2000). In fact, there are no indications that the 
Italian drug market would be substantially larger than 
the drug markets in the USA or the UK. Moreover, the 
primary market for Italian organized crime is still Italy. 
There are no indications that Italian organized crime 
groups dominate the drug business in other European 
countries, despite some involvement. 
Assuming that SOS Impresa has over the years acquired 
expertise on the involvement of organized crime in 
business-related areas while drug researchers have a 
40 Consicglio Italiano per le Scienze Sociali, Il mercato illecito della droga 
e le sue possibile regolamentazioni, Rome 2010.
table 13: Estimates of the size of the Italian drug market 
* without taking polydrug use into account  
** taking poly-drug use into account 
Sources: consicglio Italiano per le Scienze Sociali, Il mercato illecito della droga e le sue possibile regolamentazioni, Rome, 2010 and SoS 
Impresa, XII Rapporto – Le mani della criminalità sulle imprese, Rome, January 2010. 
Baldassarini,         
Corea (2005)
Canzonetti  
(2008)*
Canzonetti  
(2008)**
SOS Impresa, 
(2009)
in billion € 6.3 9.6 11.4 60.0
in billion US$ 7.8 14.1 16.8 83.7
in % of GDP 0.4% 0.6% 0.7% 3.9%
table 14: Valuation of the Italian drug market in million €* (2008) 
* taking poly-drug consumption into account
Source: A. canzonetti, quoted in consicglio Italiano per le Scienze Sociali, Il mercato illecito della droga e le sue possibile regolamentazioni, 
Rome, 2010. 
Drug users Valuation in million €
problem regular occasional problem regular occasional
Heroin 246,872 143,383 14,291 1,571 365 44
cocaine 270,496 573,459 573,594 2,776 2,354 283
cannabis 181,435 2,899,087 2,962,217 780 2,493 306
others 9,880 166,006 453,754 44 297 96
Total 708,683 3,781,935 4,132,856 5,171 5,509 729
TOTAL 11,409
table 15: Estimates of organized crime proceeds and profits in Italy (2009)
Sources: consicglio Italiano per le Scienze Sociali, Il mercato illecito della droga e le sue possibile regolamentazioni, Rome, 2010 and SoS 
Impresa, XII Rapporto – Le mani della criminalità sulle imprese, Rome, January 2010.
Drugs (in bn €)
(Canzonetti)
Other organized 
crime income (SOS 
impresa) (in bn €)
Total  
in bn €
Total  
in US$
As a  
percentage 
of GDP
Crime	proceeds	 11.4 75.2 86.6 120.8 5.7%
less expenditure 57.2 78.1
Profits 29.4 42.7 1.9%
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bulk - some 57% - of the total crime proceeds (exclud-
ing trafficking) go to organized crime in Italy. 
Total crime, excluding trafficking, is thought to generate 
close to €100 bn in proceeds, equivalent to 6.5% of 
GDP. If estimated trafficking proceeds were added to 
this figure, the total would rise to €116 bn (US$162 bn 
in 2009), or some 7.7% of GDP. 
• Summary of national estimates 
The presentation of the national results and the discus-
sion so far have demonstrated that the methodologies 
applied for generating the various national estimates, 
and the kind of crime categories included in the esti-
mates, differ significantly between countries. They 
sometimes even differ for studies conducted in the same 
country. This limits direct comparability of results over 
time and across countries. Existing results must thus be 
to have decreased in recent years, from a total of €91 bn 
in 2006 to €56 bn in 2009, that is, from figures equiva-
lent to 6.1% of GDP to 3.7% of GDP. This decline was 
mainly due to new, lower estimates of organized crime 
proceeds from loan sharking, illegal construction as well 
as for theft and robberies. Income from other criminal 
sources appears to have remained largely stable. Between 
2007 and 2009 (the year of the financial crisis) the esti-
mates show, however, a small increase, suggesting that 
Italian organized crime benefited from the crisis. 
SOS Impresa also tried to gauge the involvement of 
organized crime in the various criminal sectors. While 
some crime sectors are thought to be controlled by orga-
nized crime, such as protection racketeering or public 
procurement, organized crime is believed to play less of 
role in other sectors such as theft and robberies (15%). 
The overall estimates by SOS Impresa suggest that the 
table 16: Estimates of criminal proceeds, excluding trafficking, in Italy, billion € (2006-2009)
Sources: SoS Impresa, XII Rapporto – Le mani della criminalità sulle imprese, Rome, January 2010; SoS Impresa, XI Rapporto – Le mani della 
criminalità sulle imprese, Rome, November 2008; SoS Impresa, X Rapporto – Le mani della criminalità sulle imprese, Rome, october 2007.
 Organized crime Total crime Proportion 
of organized 
crime in total 
crime
2007  
report
2008  
report
2010  
report
2010  
report
loan sharking 30.0 12.6 15.0 40.0 38%
Protection racketeering 10.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 100%
Theft and robbery 7.0 1.0 1.2 8.0 15%
fraud 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 100%
Smuggling 2.0 1.5 1.2 1.5 80%
counterfeiting 7.4 6.3 6.5 8.0 81%
Illegal construction 13.0 2.0 2.0 10.0 20%
Eco- / agro-mafia 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 100%
Public procurement 6.5 1.2 1.2 1.2 100%
Private contracts and  
supplies (buildings) 5.3 5.3 5.3 100%
Games and gambling 2.5 2.4 2.5 3.0 83%
Total 90.5 53.4 56.1 98.1 57%
Assumed reference year 2006 2007 2009 2009
As	a	percentage	of	GDP 6.1% 3.5% 3.7% 6.5%
table 17: Estimates of overall crime proceeds in Italy, billion € (2009)
Sources: consicglio Italiano per le Scienze Sociali, Il mercato illecito; SoS Impresa, XII Rapporto – Le mani della criminalità sulle imprese, 
Rome, January 2010.
Trafficking in 
drugs 
(in bn €)
(Canzonetti)
Trafficking 
in human 
beings and 
in arms (SOS 
Impresa)
Other crime 
income (SOS 
Impresa)  (in 
bn €)
Total in 
billion €
Total in 
billion 
US$
as a  
percentage 
of GDP
Crime	proceeds	 11.4 6.7 98.1 116.2 162 7.7%
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Assuming - in line with the original FATF estimates - 
that some 70%44 of the overall criminal proceeds are 
laundered (2.5% of GDP; range: 1.4% - 4.5%), the 
resulting crime-related estimates of funds laundered 
would range from 1% to 3.2% of GDP. Extrapolated to 
the global level, this would be between US$0.6 and 
US$1.8 trillion in 2009, with a best estimate of around 
US$1.1 trillion or 1.8% of GDP. Thus, the best estimate 
from this sample for crime related proceeds would be 
below the lower range of the original IMF ‘consensus 
estimate.’ 
Does this mean that the consensus estimate should be 
lowered? Probably not. There are indications that the 
economic importance of crime in the developed world 
as compared to the size of the economy is significantly 
less than in developing countries and countries in transi-
tion (see work of Baker (2005), Schneider (2007) and 
Walker (2009)). An extrapolation of crime figures to the 
global level based on estimates from a sample of indus-
trialized countries is thus likely to result in an under-
estimate. In fact, based on Baker’s implicit ‘correction 
factor’ (1.4),45 the global estimate of money laundered 
44 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Finan-
cial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Paris, 1990, p. 6, quoted 
in UNDCP, Economic and Social Consequences of Drug Abuse and 
Illicit Trafficking, UNDCP Technical Series No. 6, Vienna, 1998, p. 
26.
45 Baker’s estimates of cross-border flows of dirty money (2000-2005) 
suggested that the illicit financial flows out of developing and transi-
tion countries accounted for around half of the world total. Expressed 
as a percentage of GDP such illicit financial flows out of developing 
countries and countries in transition were equivalent to some 7.3% 
of GDP (2000-2005), and thus around 3 times the estimates of 
the illicit outflows of the industrialized countries (2.5% of GDP). 
The proportion of money laundered at the global level, expressed 
as a percentage of GDP (3.6%) was thus – according to Baker’s 
estimates - some 40% higher than his implicit estimates for money 
laundered in foreign jurisdictions among industrialized countries 
(2.5% of GDP). This results in a ‘correction factor’ for industrialized 
countries estimates of around 1.4. (3.6% / 2.5%) which would have 
to be used for extrapolating industrialized countries data to the global 
level. (Source: Raymond W. Baker, Capitalism’s Achilles Heel, Dirty 
Money and How to Renew the Free-Market System, New Jersey, 2005, 
p. 172). 
 A number of other authors also came to similar conclusions. Schnei-
der’s estimates, based on his DYMIMIC estimation methodology, 
seem to confirm Baker’s findings. They reveal a ‘correction factor’ 
of a similar magnitude, if not higher. Schneider’s global estimates of 
crime proceeds of US$1.7 trillion in 2006 were equivalent to 3.4% of 
global GDP and his estimates of crime proceeds in 20 OECD coun-
tries were again substantially lower, amounting to US$0.6 trillion or 
1.8% of GDP of these 20 countries in 2006. In order for his statistics 
to match, Schneider’s implicit estimate of the crime proceeds for 
developing and transition countries must have been around US$1.1 
trillion, equivalent to some 6.8% of developing and transition coun-
tries’ GDP in 2006, i.e. more than 3 ½ times the importance of 
criminal proceeds among OECD countries average (2.5% of GDP). 
(Sources: Friedrich Schneider, Turnover of Organized Crime and 
Money Laundering: Some Preliminary Findings, in Public Choice, Vol. 
144, 2010, pp. 473-486 and Friedrich Schneider, “Money Launder-
ing: some preliminary empirical findings”, Linz, Nov. 2007, Paper 
presented at the Conference ‘Tackling Money Laundering’, Univer-
sity of Utrecht, Utrecht, the Netherlands, November 2–3, 2007). 
interpreted with caution. There is a clear need for stan-
dardization and harmonization of calculations of 
national crime proceeds estimates in order to get more 
reliable and comparable figures. 
Nonetheless, the existing national estimates – irrespec-
tive of their shortcomings - provide an indication of the 
likely magnitudes involved. The calculations of the 
likely crime proceeds suggest that one cannot speak of 
crime being negligible in economic terms, accounting 
for just some fractions of a percentage point of GDP, 
just as one cannot speak of crime dominating the world 
economy with proportions exceeding half of GDP.42 
Instead, crime proceeds, depending on the country, are 
equivalent to a few percentage points of GDP (1% - 8% 
of GDP in the sample of available country estimates). 
Combining these estimates gives an overall average of 
criminal proceeds (excluding tax evasion) of some 2.5% 
of GDP; around a quarter of this total (0.6% of GDP) 
comprises proceeds derived from drug trafficking. 
Applying this proportion to the global level – based on 
the worlds’ total 2009 GDP – would yield an estimate 
of total crime related proceeds of some US$1.5 trillion, 
including some US$350 billion (range: US$270 bn – 
US$430 bn) derived from the sale of illicit drugs. Such 
results with regard to illicit drugs would have been 
largely in line with UNODC global illicit drug market 
estimates of around US$320 bn43 in 2003.
Given the small number of country estimates, the 95% 
confidence interval would be rather large, ranging from 
0.5% to 4.5% of GDP, equivalent to US$0.3 trillion –
US$2.6 trillion in 2009. The lower end of the range, 
however, is unlikely to reflect reality. The range for drug 
sales alone is from US$270 bn - US$430 bn, and there 
is still much income from other crime. Using the first 
quartile instead, as a lower range, would give a possible 
range from 1.4% of GDP to 4.5% of GDP, equivalent 
to US$0.8-US$2.6 trillion at the global level. As will be 
discussed later, there are indications that the relative 
importance of criminal proceeds is larger in developing 
countries and countries in transition. Thus, the best 
estimate of crime proceeds of around 2.5% of GDP or 
US$1.5 trillion, derived from estimates of a few devel-
oped countries, is most likely an under-estimate. 
If proceeds from tax evasion were included, the total 
crime-related proceeds would rise further. Once again, 
given the very limited availability and comparability of 
national data, these estimates must be interpreted with 
caution and considered only as possible orders of mag-
nitude.
42 This was so far only true in a very limited number of countries, such 
as Afghanistan, where over a few years (2004-2007), the illicit opium 
economy exceeded half of the country’s licit GDP. 
43 UNODC, 2005 World Drug Report, Volume 1, Vienna 2005, p. 
127. 
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figures’ of drugs in key markets (USA and Europe).47 In 
fact, the FATF estimated the retail drug turnover for the 
late 1980s at US$108 billion for the United States and 
US$16.3 billion for Europe; a total value of drug sales 
of US$124.3 billion. The largest amount was estimated 
for cannabis (US$74.7 billion), followed by cocaine 
47 In an IMF paper from 2001, reference is made to estimates of ‘final 
sales’ figures of (some) illegal drugs in the late 1980s in the United 
States and Europe amounting some US$120 billion of which some 
70% could be laundered, with the upper limit approaching the above 
quoted figure of US$85 billion: “Another approach to estimating the 
magnitude of financial abuse uses information about expenditures 
and prices involved in criminal activity that has been collected in the 
course of law enforcement (micro-data). The most publicized of such 
estimates have been for global money-laundering by the FATF. On 
the basis of information about final sales of some illegal drugs (about 
US$120 billion a year in the United States and Europe in the late 
1980s) and extrapolating worldwide and generalizing to include all 
drugs, and subsequently assuming that 50-70 percent of that amount 
would be laundered, the FATF estimated that money-laundering 
could reach about 2 percent of global GDP.” (International Monetary 
Fund, Financial System Abuse, Financial Crime and Money Laundering 
- Background Paper, February 2001). 
would rise to 2.5% of GDP (1.8% * 1.4), equivalent to 
US$1.5 trillion in 2009. Such results would then be still 
within the IMF’s ‘consensus range.’
iv. Global estimates linked to  
drug trafficking 
According to Schneider, the FATF mentioned in a 
paper46 (apparently referring to the year 1997) a global 
turnover figure for the sales of illegal drugs of around 
US$300 billion (which would be in line with UNODC 
estimates of the total value of drug sales), resulting in 
US$120 billion in profits out of which US$85 billion 
could have been relevant for money-laundering. 
Such figures (US$120 bn) were already used almost a 
decade earlier, but were then referred to as ‘final sales 
46 F. Schneider, “Money Laundering: some Preliminary Empirical Find-
ings,” presentation, October 2007. 
table 18: Summary of proceeds of crime in selected industrialized countries 
* partial estimate of a limited number of selected crimes.  
** a combined category of fraud and tax evasion was reported for the Netherlands; in order to provide an estimate of total crime, excluding 
tax evasion, it was assumed that the same breakdown existed in the Netherlands as in Germany.  
*** country results weighted by their GDP in 2009. 
Sources: Peter Reuter, “Chasing Dirty Money – the Fight against Money Laundering”, washington 2004, p. 20 and oNDcP, What America’s 
Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, washington D.c, December 2001, p. 3.
chris Groom and Tom Davies, “Developing a Methodology for Measuring Illegal Activity for the UK National Accounts”. Economic Trends, no. 
536, July 1998, pp. 33-71. 
Stephen Pudney, celia Badillo, Mark Bryan, Jon Burton, Gabriella conti, Maria Iacovou ( Institute for Social and Economic Research, University 
of Essex ),“ Estimating the size of the UK illicit drug market”, in Home office, “Measuring different aspects of problem drug use: methodo-
logical developments”, Home Office Online Report 16/06, pp. 46–120. 
Data based on John walker, 2003 (updates from an original paper undertaken by John walker for the Australian Institute of criminology in 
1992), quoted in Brigitte Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering, cheltenham (UK), Edward Elgar Publishing company, 2007, p. 
62. 
Brigitte Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money laundering, cheltenham (UK), Edward Elgar Publishing company, 2007, p. 66, based on 
studies by Smekens and Verbruggen (2004), Business criminality: criminaliteit en rechtshandhaving (2001), woDc (2003, p. 60) and NIPo 
(2002).  
fATf, Germany – Mutual Evaluation Report, february 2010 and International Monetary fund, March 2010, and International Monetary fund , 
“Germany: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money laundering and combating the financing of Terrorism”, IMF Country Report No. 
10/78, washington D.c., february 2010, p. 24. and Statistisches Bundesamt, wiesbaden.  
consicglio Italiano per le Scienze Sociali, Il mercato illecito and SoS Impresa, XII Rapporto – Le mani della criminalità sulle imprese, Rome, 27 
January 2010, SoS.
	as	a	percentage	of	GDP
 Year of  estimate Drugs
Total crime, 
excluding  tax 
evasion
Total crime 
including tax 
evasion
USA 2000 0.7% 2.3 %   8.0%
UK 1996/2003/04 0.5% 1.2%* n.a.
Australia 2003 0.3% 1.5 % n.a.
Netherlands 2003 0.4% 1.7%** 3.5%
Germany 2007 0.4% 1.3 % 2.3%
Italy 2009 0.7% 7.7 % n.a.
Unweighted	average  0.5%	(0.4%-0.6%)
2.6	%
(0.6%-4.6%)
4.6%
(2.2%-7.0%)
Weighted	average***  0.6%(0.5%-0.7%)
2.5	% 
(0.5%-4.5%)
5.3%
(2.9%-7.7%)
Extrapolated	to	the	global	
level	(2009)	in	trillion	US$
0.35
(0.27-0.43)
1.5
(0.3-2.6)
3.1
(1.7-4.5)
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The UNODC study estimated the global drug market 
at US$ 322 billion, equivalent to 0.9% of global GDP. 
North America and Europe were identified as the largest 
drug markets, accounting for 44% and 33%, respec-
tively, of the global market. The largest drug sales were 
related to cannabis, followed by cocaine and opiates. 
Subsequent estimates confirmed the size of the opiate 
market (US$65-US$70 bn), though slightly higher fig-
ures were found for the cocaine market (US$88 bn in 
2008 and US$85 bn in 2009). These recent figures did 
not signal a true increase, but a revision of coca plant 
yield figures in the main producer countries. 
(US$28.8 billion) and heroin (US$12 billion). The 
FATF estimated that out of the US$124 billion in drug 
sales, around US$85 billion could be available for laun-
dering. This was equivalent to 0.7% of GDP in the USA 
and Europe (1988), or 0.5% of global GDP. De facto 
assuming that drugs were responsible for about a quarter 
of global money-laundering, the FATF estimated that 
global money-laundering in the late 1980s would have 
been equivalent to some 2% of global GDP.48 As men-
tioned earlier, an attempt by FATF to generate new 
estimates a decade later failed – and no efforts appear to 
have been made since. 
UNODC undertook a study to estimate the size of the 
global illegal drug market in 2005. This was based on 
production, consumption, seizure, price and purity data, 
combined into a global input/output model, with some 
features of a gravity model. It also allowed for a number 
of calibrations to take expert knowledge into account 
(assuming that the likelihood of seizures in North Amer-
ica or Europe was higher than in Africa where law 
enforcement capabilities are more limited). The model 
arrived at higher figures (US$322 bn) than the old 
FATF estimates of the late 1980s, though the differences 
were not that significant once inflation and the consid-
eration of drug markets besides the USA and Europe 
had been taken into account. If only the European and 
North American markets were considered, the inflation-
adjusted FATF figures (some US$200 bn) would be 
quite similar to the UNODC estimates (US$248 bn ). 
The ‘new’ estimates (US$322 bn) are also similar in 
magnitude to those calculated by UNDCP for the mid-
1990s using a different model (US$360 billion).49 
48 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, FATF 
Working Group on Statistics and Methods - Narcotics Money Launder-
ing, Assessment of the Problem, 1989, Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering, Report, February 7, 1990. 
49 UNDCP, “Economic and Social Consequences of Drug Abuse and 
Illicit Trafficking,” UNDCP Technical Series, 1997 p. 51. 
table 19: fATf estimates (late 1980s) of global amounts of laundered money 
Source: organisation for Economic co-operation and Development, Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Paris, 1990, p. 6. 
quoted in UNDcP, Economic and Social Consequences of Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, UNDcP Technical Series No. 6, Vienna 1998, p, 
26; International Monetary fund, financial System Abuse, Financial Crime and Money Laundering- Background Paper, february 2001.
Estimate of drug sales in key markets (1988) US$124 bn
As a percentage of global GDP (1988) 0.8%
Assumed proportion that is laundered 2/3 -  70%
Estimate of amounts laundered related to drugs US$85 bn
Proportion in % of global GDP (1988) 0.5% of GDP
Estimated proportion of drugs in total amounts laundered 25%
Estimated total amounts laundered in 1988 US$ 340 bn
As a percentage of global GDP 2.0% of GDP
Extrapolated to global GDP in 2000 US$ 0.6 trillion
Extrapolated to global GDP  in 2009 US$ 1.2 trillion
table 20: Size of the global illicit drug market,  
billion US$ (2003)
Source: UNoDc, 2005 World Drug Report, Volume 1, Analysis, 
Vienna 2005, p. 127.
At  
retail  
level
of which 
bought at 
wholesale 
level
of which 
bought from 
producers
Value of  
drugs sold US$322 bn US$94 bn US$13 bn
In %  
of GDP 0.9% 0.3% 0.03%
table 21: Regional breakdown of the global illicit 
drug market, 2003 (N = US$ 322 billion)
Source: UNoDc, 2005 World Drug Report, Volume 1, Analysis, 
Vienna 2005, p. 127.
Value in %
North America 142 44%
South America 9 3%
Europe 106 33%
Asia 35 11%
Africa 14 4%
oceania 16 5%
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extrapolated to 2009, would have resulted in an estimate 
of amounts laundered around US$1.2 trillion). 
• Private sector estimates 
Given the lack of more comprehensive official estimates 
at the international level and the need for the financial 
sector to get more active in the fight against money-
laundering, including in response to anti-terrorism 
efforts and the tightening of anti-money-laundering 
legislation, private consultancy firms got involved in 
estimating the amounts of annual money-laundering. 
Celent, a research and consulting firm operating in the 
financial services industry, estimated global money-
laundering to have amounted to some US$0.9 trillion 
over the 2002-2005 period, that is, 2.6% of global GDP 
in 2002 or 2.0% of global GDP in 2005, thus reaching 
estimates at the low end of the IMF ‘consensus range’. 
According to their estimates, money-laundering is par-
ticularly widespread in the Americas (38%), followed by 
the Asia-Pacific region (31%) and Europe (26%). Africa 
and the Near and Middle East account for just 5% of 
the total. Money-laundering related to criminal activi-
ties was estimated at around US$0.2 trillion, suggesting 
UNODC has a relatively good understanding of the size 
and value of the opiate and cocaine markets at the global 
level. Far higher levels of uncertainty exist with regard to 
the cannabis and synthetic drug markets. While the 
baseline for synthetic drugs is more difficult to establish, 
and the synthetic drug markets may have increased in 
recent years, some recent estimates of the US cannabis 
market suggest that the latter market could be substan-
tially smaller than assumed in the model. Given such 
internal shifts in opposing directions, there are reasons 
to believe that the illicit drug market at the global level 
may still be at a similar magnitude to 2005. Updated 
global estimates of the illicit drugs markets using the 
current model – or alternative estimates from other 
models – falling into a range of US$200 – US$400 bil-
lion could be considered reasonable. Estimates of 
US$910 billion or more - as mentioned by some authors 
in the literature for 200650 – are outside such a range, 
and clearly too high. 
Updating the initial FATF model with the UNODC 
2003 estimates on total drug proceeds would result in an 
estimate of money-laundering equivalent to 2.4% of 
GDP or US$1.4 trillion in 2009, that is, slightly higher 
than the initial FATF estimate (2% of GDP which, 
50 F. Schneider, “Money Laundering: some Preliminary Empirical Find-
ings”, presentation, October 2007. 
table 22: Size of the global illicit drug market, by substances, billion US$ (2003)
Source: UNoDc, 2005 World Drug Report, Volume 1, Analysis, Vienna 2005, p. 127.
Opiates Cocaine Cannabis herb
Cannabis 
resin
Ampheta-
mines ‘Ecstasy’
Retail level 64.8 70.5 113.1 28.8 28.3 16.0
of which bought at 
wholesale level 20.5 18.8 29.7 10.4 6.8 7.7
of which bought 
from producers 1.2 0.5 8.8 0.7 0.6 1.0
table 23: Updated fATf model of global amounts laundered 
Sources: International Monetary fund, financial System Abuse, Financial Crime and Money Laundering - Background Paper, feb. 2001 and 
UNoDc, 2005 World Drug Report, Volume 1, Analysis, Vienna, p. 127. 
Estimate of drug sales in key markets (UNoDc estimate for 2003) US$322 bn
As a percentage of  GDP 0.9% of GDP
Assumed proportion that is laundered  (initial fATf estimate) 2/3 -  70%
Estimate of amounts laundered related to drugs US$220 bn
Proportion in % of global GDP (2003) 0.6 % of GDP
Estimated proportion of drugs in total amounts laundered (initial fATf estimate) 25%
Estimated total amounts laundered in 2003 US$ 880 bn
As a percentage of  GDP 2.4% of GDP
Extrapolated to global GDP in 2009 US$ 1.4 trillion
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such estimates and explaining in detail the methodology 
used to generate them, but towards alerting the financial 
sector of potential training, software and hardware 
requirements to cope with the requirements resulting 
from improved anti-money-laundering legislation. 
v. NGo estimates
• Estimates on illicit cross-border flows 
Raymond Baker,51 the founder of Global Financial 
Integrity (an NGO advocating for increased transpar-
ency in international financial transactions), estimated 
the cross-border flows of global ‘dirty money’ – based on 
a bottom-up approach – to amount to between US$1 
trillion and US$1.6 trillion annually in 2005. This 
included US$0.3 – US$0.5 trillion emerging from crim-
inal activities (drugs, counterfeit goods, smuggling, 
51 R. W. Baker, Capitalism’s Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to 
Renew the Free-Market System, New Jersey 2005, p. 172.
that between a fifth and a quarter of all money-launder-
ing was linked to proceeds of crime. Drug trafficking 
was identified as the single largest crime category (about 
a third), followed by smuggling (about a fifth). The 
amounts of money laundered related to terrorism were 
comparatively small (less than 0.3 %). The research 
work by Celent was not primarily aimed at providing 
table 24: Annual money-laundering by region, billion US$ (2000-2005)
 
* forecasts
Source: celent, Anti-Money Laundering: A Brave New World for Financial Institutions, September 2002.
2000 2002 2005*
Americas 313 328 350
Asia-Pacific 246 254 292
Europe 230 234 241
Middle East / Africa 38 40 44
Total 827 856 927
in % of GDP 2.7% 2.6% 2.0%
table 25: Volume of crime-related money-laundering, 
billion US$ (2002)
 Source: celent, Anti-Money Laundering: A Brave New World for 
Financial Institutions, September 2002.
Drugs 66
Smuggling 37
other crime 90
Terrorism 0.5
Total 193
table 26: cross-border flows of global ‘dirty money,’ billion US$
Source: R. w. Baker, Capitalism’s Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to Renew the Free-Market System, New Jersey, 2005, p. 172.
Dirty money
Global
low in  % high in %
criminal 
- Drugs 120 11.0% 200 12.5%
- counterfeit goods 80 7.5% 120 7.5%
- counterfeit currency 3 0.2% 4 0.2%
- Human trafficking 12 1.1% 15 0.9%
- Illegal arms trade 6 2.0% 10 0.6%
- Smuggling 60 5.6% 100 6.3%
- Racketeering 50 4.7% 100 6.3%
-	Subtotal	crime 331 31.2% 549 34.3%
corrupt 30 2.8% 50 5.1%
commercial
- Mispricing 200 18.9% 250 15.6%
- Abusive transfer pricing 300 28.3% 500 31.2%
- fake transactions 200 18.9% 250 15.6%
- Subtotal commercial 700 66.0% 1000 62.5%
Total 1,061 100.0% 1,599 100%
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half of the global total (US$1-1.6 trillion). Expressed as 
a proportion of average annual GDP, this would have 
amounted to proportions ranging from 5.9% to 8.6% of 
GDP over the 2000-2005 period, suggesting that devel-
oping countries and countries in transition are particu-
larly affected by ‘dirty money’ flows. In comparison, the 
estimates of ‘dirty money’ flows out of the industrialized 
countries (US$522 – US$821 billion) were equivalent 
to 1.9%-3.0% of GDP. Thus, the midpoint estimates 
for developing countries and countries in transition 
were, at 7.3% of GDP, about three times the estimates 
for industrialized countries (2.5% of GDP), and twice 
the global average (3.6%). 
The estimates of the individual categories of ‘dirty 
money’ (related to criminal sources, corruption or com-
mercial activities) were extrapolated from information 
provided by major businesses, government regulatory 
agencies and international organizations, containing a 
limited number of (partial) country estimates. The 
resulting estimates were ’conservative,’ according to the 
author. The criminal component related to money-
laundering (US$0.3 to US$0.5 trillion or 0.9% to 1.5% 
of average global GDP over the 2000-2005 period) was 
based on estimates provided by experts, politicians or 
institutions (for example, OECD and Interpol). These 
included an estimate of global organized crime ‘earnings’ 
at the turn of the new millennium of some US$1.5 
trillion,54 suggesting that between a fifth and third of 
such criminal earnings ended up in cross-border ‘dirty 
money’ flows. 
Baker also presents a number of individual estimates in 
various crime categories and for various commercial 
activities related to the flow of money across borders 
(such as abuse transfer pricing and fake transactions). 
The methodology applied to aggregate the various indi-
vidual estimates and extrapolate them to the global level 
54 Wendy Chamberlin, deputy assistant secretary, U.S. Department 
of State, “Intensifying the fight against Transnational Organized 
Crime”, remarks made at the European Union – United States Con-
ference on Strategies to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, 
Ghent, Belgium, January 23, 2001. 
racketeering et cetera), and US$0.7 – US$1 trillion aris-
ing from illegal commercial transactions, notably those 
violating national tax laws. This suggests that about a 
third of global cross-border flows of dirty money are 
related to funds generated from criminal activities and 
about two thirds from funds related to commercial 
activities, mostly linked to tax evasion attempts. The 
largest proportion of criminal activities were related to 
dirty money generated out of drug trafficking, followed 
by those related to counterfeit goods and smuggling of 
licit goods (such as cigarettes). 
The US$1 trillion to US$1.6 trillion estimate has also 
been adopted by the World Bank as a best estimate.52 
The estimate apparently refers to the first few years of 
the new millennium. This would have been equivalent 
to a proportion of 2.9% to 4.3% of average global GDP 
over the 2000-2005 period53 (with a midpoint estimate 
of 3.6% of GDP). The estimates would thus fall well 
within IMF’s ‘consensus estimate’ of 2% to 5% of GDP. 
The criminal component of dirty money crossing the 
borders (US$331 to US$549 billion) would have been 
equivalent to between 0.9% and 1.5% of GDP over the 
2000-2005 period (midpoint estimate: 1.2% of GDP). 
Extrapolating these percentages to the GDP figures for 
the year 2009 would result in estimates of overall 
amounts laundered of between US$1.7 and US$2.5 tril-
lion (midpoint: US$2.1 trillion). The criminal compo-
nent that was laundered would have amounted to 
between US$520 and US$870 billion (midpoint: 
US$700 bn) in 2009. 
Baker also provided estimates on the amounts of illicit 
flows affecting developing countries and countries in 
transition. The cross-border transactions of ‘dirty money’ 
affecting such countries were estimated to have 
amounted to between US$0.5 and US$0.8 trillion over 
the first few years of the new millennium, that is, about 
52 F. Schneider, The Hidden Financial Flows of the Organized Crime: A 
Literature Review and Some Preliminary Empirical Results, Linz, July 
2010. 
53 World Bank, Indicators (GDP, current US$) http://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?page=1
table 27: cross-border flows of global ‘dirty money’ in trillion US$, shown as a percentage of average GDP over 
the 2000-2005 period
Sources: R. w. Baker, Capitalism’s Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to Renew the Free-Market System, New Jersey, 2005, p. 172 and 
world Bank, Indicators (for GDP).
2000-2005 extrapolated to 2009
in trillion US$ in % of GDP 2000-2005 in trillion US$
low high low high mid-point
overall amounts laundered 1.1 1.6 2.9%-4.3% 1.7 2.5 2.1
   of which criminal component 0.3 0.5 0.9%-1.5% 0.5 0.9 0.7
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• Estimates of the proceeds generated by 
transnational crime 
In February 2011, Global Financial Integrity (GFI) 
published a report on transnational crime in the devel-
oping world.57 Analysing existing estimates of the pro-
ceeds of transnational crime in 12 key categories, which 
have their primary roots in developing countries, GFI 
arrived at a total estimate of US$650 billion of such 
crime proceeds per year. The largest sources were illicit 
drugs, accounting for 50% of the total, followed by 
counterfeiting (39%), human trafficking (5%) and the 
illicit oil trade (2%). The individual proportions of all 
other sectors amounted to 1% of the total or less.58
57 Global Financial Integrity, Transnational crime in the Developing 
World, February 2011. 
58 This study has been one of a few to take a bottom-up approach, tal-
lying together expert estimates on drugs, human trafficking, wildlife, 
counterfeiting, trade in human organs, small arms, diamonds and 
other gems, oil, timber, fish, art and cultural property, and gold. 
Though this list of criminal activity is extensive, it is by no means 
comprehensive. It does not include, for instance, credit card fraud, 
advance fee fraud, intellectual property, piracy, carjacking, smug-
gling out of free trade zones into neighboring or nearby countries, 
and other forms of illicit and underground economic activity. GFI 
acknowledged this, explaining that, as a qualitative study, the goal 
was to balance breadth with depth. In short, the report was seeking 
to analyze both the scope of the problem and the damage caused, 
notably to developing countries.
is not comprehensively presented. Nonetheless, the esti-
mates’ plausibility was discussed, and it was highlighted 
that they were only indicative of the likely magnitudes 
involved. 
Finally, Baker discussed the negative impact that ‘dirty 
money’ flows had on society in developing countries, as 
well as the lack of effective anti-money-laundering 
action across the world. This also applies to countries 
with some of the most sophisticated anti-money-laun-
dering legislation and institutions. Given internal esti-
mates of around US$250 billion of ‘dirty money’ a year 
entering the United States in the second half of the 
1990s and captures of around US$250 million a year, 
Baker claims that just 0.1% of the ‘dirty money’ enter-
ing the United States was intercepted in the 1990s. He 
reports even lower proportions for other countries such 
as Switzerland or Germany.55 Another expert reached 
similar conclusions in terms of orders of magnitude.56 
55 R. W. Baker, Capitalism’s Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to 
Renew the Free-Market System, New Jersey 2005, pp. 173-174.
56 Based on estimates of around US$300 billion of the total volume of 
funds laundered in the United States and total restitutions and fines 
of some US$665 million in 2001 (based on information from the US 
Sentencing Commission), just 0.4% of the total amounts laundered 
in the USA may have been seized and fined by the authorities – a 
proportion one expert classified as ‘almost trivial’ (Peter Reuter and 
Edwin M. Truman, Chasing Dirty Money – The Fight against Money 
Laundering, Washington D.C., 2004, p. 114). 
table 28: cross-border flows of global ‘dirty money’ in billion US$, shown as a percentage of average GDP over 
the 2000-2005 period
Source: R. w. Baker, Capitalism’s Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to Renew the Free-Market System, New Jersey, 2005, p. 172 and world 
Bank, Indicators (for GDP). 
Global of which developing and  transitional economies
low
as	a		
percentage	
of	GDP
high
as	a		
percentage	
of	GDP
low
as	a		
percentage	
of	GDP
high
as	a		
percentage	
of	GDP
criminal 
- Drugs 120 0.3% 200 0.5% 60 0.7% 90 1.0%
- counterfeit goods 80 0.2% 120 0.3% 45 0.5% 60 0.7%
- counterfeit currency 3 0.0% 4 0.0% 1 0.0% 2 0.0%
- Human trafficking 12 0.0% 15 0.0% 10 0.1% 12 0.1%
- Illegal arms trade 6 0.0% 10 0.0% 3 0.0% 4 0.0%
- Smuggling 60 0.2% 100 0.3% 30 0.3% 40 0.4%
- Racketeering 50 0.1% 100 0.3% 20 0.2% 30 0.3%
-	Subtotal	crime 331 0.9% 549 1.5% 169 1.9% 238 2.6%
corrupt 30 0.1% 50 0.1% 20 0.2% 40 0.4%
commercial
- Mispricing 200 0.5% 250 0.7% 100 1.1% 150 1.6%
- Abusive transfer 
  pricing 300 0.8% 500 1.3% 100 1.1% 150 1.6%
- fake transactions 200 0.5% 250 0.7% 150 1.6% 200 2.2%
- Subtotal commercial 700 1.9% 1000 2.7% 350 3.8% 500 5.5%
Total 1,061 2.9% 1,599 4.3% 539 5.9% 778 8.6%
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It should be noted that important crime sectors at the 
national level (in economic terms), such as fraud, bur-
glaries, theft, robberies, loan sharking or protection 
racketeering were excluded from the GFI estimates as 
these are still seen to be primarily linked to domestic 
crime activities. There are signs, however, that this is 
changing. Notably, the importance of internationally 
operating organized crime groups involved in fraud has 
been growing strongly in recent years, in particular in 
connection with the use of information and communi-
cation technologies,59 so that the traditional distinction 
59 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Sixteenth session, Results of 
the second meeting of the Intergovernmental Expert Group to Prepare 
a Study on Fraud and the Criminal Misuse and Falsification of Iden-
tity, Addendum, Economic fraud, E/CN.15/2007/8/Add.2, Vienna, 
23-27 April 2007, p. 3.
The proceeds generated by the 12 analysed transnational 
crime sectors were equivalent to 1.1% of global GDP in 
2009. As some of the large estimates referred to various 
earlier years in the new millennium, however, it may be 
more appropriate to express the total proceeds as a per-
centage of average global GDP over the 2000-2009 
period. This would raise the proportion to some 1.5%. 
Assuming (in line with the initial FATF estimates) that 
some 70% of these proceeds may eventually have been 
laundered, the amounts would have been equivalent to 
some US$450 bn or 1.1% of GDP over the 2000-2009 
period, which would have been similar to Baker’s initial 
estimates of crime-related transnational flows of US$330 
to US$550 bn, equivalent to 0.9%-1.5% of global GDP 
over the 2000-2005 period. Both such estimates for 
transnational criminal flows would fall below the IMF 
consensus range of 2%-5% of GDP. 
table 29: Proceeds of transnational crime 
Sources: Global financial Integrity, Transnational crime in the Developing World, february 2011 and world Bank, Indicators (for current GDP).
 billion US$
in % of 
total Sources
Drugs 320 50% UNoDc, world Drug Report 2005 (data refer to 2003)
counterfeiting 250 39% oEcD, Magnitude of counterfeiting and Piracy of Tangible Products, 2009
Human trafficking 31.6 5% P. Belser (Ilo), forced labor and Human Trafficking:  Estimating the Profits, 2005
oil 10.8 2% GfI estimate based on Baker 2005 (quantities) and US Energy Information Administration (prices: 2003-2010)
wildlife 7.8-10 1.4%
GfI estimate based on francesco colombo, “Animal  
Trafficking – A cruel Billion-Dollar Business,” Inter Press 
Service, September 6, 2003; coalition Against wildlife 
Trafficking, world wildlife fund
Timber 7.0 1.1% GfI estimate for 2009 based on  Seneca creek and wood Resources International, oEcD 
fish 4.2-9.5 1.1%
GfI estimate for 2010, based on  Norwegian national  
advisory group against organized IUU-fishing (ffA) and 
United Nations food and Agriculture organization
Art and cultural property 3.4-6.3 0.8%
GfI estimate based on Interpol, International Scientific and 
Professional Advisory council of the United Nations crime 
Prevention and criminal Justice Programme 
Gold 2.3 0.4%
GfI estimate based on estimates from UNoDc, 2010 and 
other sources on  illegal gold trade in DRc, South Africa 
and Peru
Human organs 0.6-1.2 0.1% GfI estimate based on wHo, council of Europe,  United Nations
Small arms and light weapons 0.3-1.0 0.1% GfI estimate based on Small Arms Survey and UNoDc
Diamonds and coloured  
gemstones 0.9 0.1%
GfI estimate for 2009 based on UN, Kimberley Process: 
Rough Diamond Statistics and US Geological Survey
Total (midpoint estimates) 645 100.0%
Total	rounded 650
in % of global GDP in 2009 1.1%
in	%	of	average	global	
GDP,		2000-2009 1.5%
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tional criminal activities such as drug dealing, burglary, 
robbery et cetera is excluded. The same is true for the 
informal household economy. 
Using the DYMIMIC and the currency demand 
approach, Schneider developed estimates of the shadow 
economies, as defined above, for most countries across 
the world. Based on results from 145 countries, the 
lowest proportions of the shadow economies were in the 
OECD countries (on average 16.3% of GDP in 
2002/2003), rising to, on average, 30.4% of GDP in 
Asia, 33.4% among the South-West Pacific Islands, 
40.1% in the transition countries of Eastern Europe 
(including all the successor states of the former Soviet 
Union), 43.2% in Africa and 43.4% in South America, 
the Caribbean and Central America.62 
The criminal part of the underground economy is sub-
stantially lower than the proportions of the shadow 
economies. The high proportions of the shadow econ-
omy in several parts of the world may, however, indicate 
a special vulnerability of these regions for potential 
exploitation by criminal organizations. A large shadow 
economy can help camouflage criminal activities as 
criminal organizations can make use of the ‘services’ 
provided by legal businesses to circumvent government 
rules and regulations. Thus, the outflow of dirty money 
from developing countries and countries in transition – 
expressed as a percentage of GDP – is substantially 
higher than the outflow of dirty money from developed 
countries. 
62 F. Schneider, Shadow Economies of 145 Countries all over the World: 
Estimation Results over the Period 1999 to 2003, Linz 2005.
between domestic and transnational crime is becoming 
blurred. National estimates have shown that fraud alone 
amounts to between 0.3% and 1.0% of GDP (average 
0.5%). In some countries – from an economic perspec-
tive – fraud is even more significant than trafficking in 
illicit drugs. 
vi. Academic estimates 
• Estimates of the size of the shadow/ 
underground economy 
A broad range of illegal activities is captured in the con-
cept of an ‘underground economy’ (see taxonomy 
below).
According to one expert, the ‘underground economy’ is 
similar to the ‘shadow economy’ which he defined as 
“market-based production of goods and services, whether 
legal or illegal that escapes detection in the official esti-
mates of GDP.“60 Another key expert provided a broad 
definition, in line with the above-mentioned one. The 
shadow economy would include ”those economic activ-
ities and the income derived from them that circumvent 
… government regulation, taxation or observation.”61 
A narrower definition includes only market-based legal 
production of goods and services that are deliberately 
concealed to avoid payment of taxes, social security con-
tributions, to avoid adhering to minimum labour market 
standards or to avoid complying with certain adminis-
trative procedures. Thus all income arising from tradi-
60 P. Smith, “Assessing the size of the underground economy: The sta-
tistics Canada perspectives”, Canadian Economic Observer, Catalogue 
No.: 11-010, 3.16-33, at 3.18; Spiro, Peter S., “Evidence of a Post-
GST Increase in the Underground Economy;” Canadian Tax Journal/ 
Revue Fiscale Canadienne, 1993, 41:2, pp. 247-258.
61 F. Schneider, Shadow Economies of 145 Countries all over the World: 
Estimation Results over the Period 1999 to 2003, based on Lippert, 
Owen and Michael Walker (eds.): The Underground Economy: Global 
Evidences of its Size and Impact, 1997, The Frazer Institute, Vancou-
ver, B.C.
table 30: Taxonomy of types of underground economic activities
Source: f. Schneider, Shadow Economies of 145 Countries all over the World: Estimation Results over the Period 1999 to 2003, based on lip-
pert, owen and Michael walker (eds.): The Underground Economy: Global Evidences of its Size and Impact, 1997, The frazer Institute, Van-
couver, B.c. 
Type of activity Monetary transactions Non-monetary transactions
Illegal activities Trade with stolen goods; drug dealing and 
manufacturing; prostitution; gambling; 
smuggling; fraud, et cetera.
Barter of drugs, stolen goods, smuggling et 
cetera. Produce or growing drugs for own 
use. Theft for own use.
Tax evasion Tax avoidance Tax evasion Tax avoidance
Legal activities Unreported income 
from self-employ-
ment; wages, sala-
ries and assets from 
unreported work 
related to legal serv-
ices and goods.
Employee discounts, 
fringe benefits.
Barter of legal serv-
ices and goods.
All do-it-yourself 
work and neighbour 
help.
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Estimates generated through the DYMIMIC estimation 
methodology suggested that organized crime proceeds 
rose from US$0.8 trillion or 2.5% of GDP in 2001, to 
US$1.5 trillion or 3.3% of GDP in 2005 and US$ 1.7 
trillion or 3.4% of GDP in 2006.64 Assuming that this 
proportion remained subsequently unchanged, the turn-
over of organized crime could have reached some US$2 
trillion in 2009. 
Partly also based on the work of Schneider, Walker and 
Unger (2009) suggested that “excess shadow economy 
64 F. Schneider, “Money Laundering: some preliminary empirical find-
ings”, Linz, Nov. 2007. Paper presented at the conference ‘Tackling 
Money Laundering’, University of Utrecht, the Netherlands, Novem-
ber 2–3, 2007. 
• Academic estimates of turnover  
of organized crime 
A key question when analysing the extent of money-
laundering is how much of the underlying turnover is 
realized by organized crime. One literature review shows 
estimates ranging from US$0.5 trillion (1996) to 
US$2.85 trillion (1998). More recently, the estimated 
proceeds of crime ranged from US$0.6 trillion (2005) 
to US$2.5 trillion (2005),63 equivalent to between 1.3% 
and 5.5% of GDP. 
63 F. Schneider, “Turnover of Organized Crime and Money Laundering: 
Some Preliminary Findings,” Public Choice, Vol. 144, 2010, pp. 473-
486.
table 31: Estimates of worldwide turnover of organized crime, trillion US$, as a percentage of GDP 
* Tentative estimate, assuming that Schneider’s proportion of turnover of organized crime expressed as a percentage of GDP remained 
unchanged over 2006-2009 period 
** extrapolated to global GDP in 2009 
Sources: UNoDc calculations, based on f. Schneider, Turnover of organized crime and Money laundering: Some Preliminary findings, in 
Public choice, Vol. 144, 2010, pp. 473-486; J. walker, ‘How Big is Global Money laundering?’ Journal of Money laundering control, 1999, 
Vol. 3, No. 1; I. Takats, A theory of “crying wolf”: the economics of money laundering enforcement. Paper presented at the conference 
“Tackling Money laundering”, University of Utrecht, Utrecht, The Netherlands, November 2–3, 2007; J.D. Agarwal and A. Agarwal, “Globali-
zation and international capital flows,” finance India, 19, 2004, pp. 65–99; J.D. Agarwal and A. Agarwal, “ Money laundering: new forms of 
crime, and victimization”, paper presented at the National workshop on New forms of crime, and Victimization, with reference to Money 
laundering. University of Madras, Indian Society of Victimology, Department of criminology, 2006; Global financial Integrity, Transnational 
crime in the Developing world, february 2011; J. walker and B. Unger, “Measuring Global Money laundering: The walker Gravity Model,” 
Review of law & Economics, vol. 5, issue 2, the Berkeley Electronic Press; f. Schneider, “Money laundering: some preliminary empirical find-
ings”, linz, Nov. 2007, Paper presented at the conference ‘Tackling Money laundering’, University of Utrecht, the Netherlands, November 
2–3, 2007 and world Bank, Indicators (current GDP). 
Origin/study Year Volume (worldwide) as a percentage of global GDP
M. Schuster 1994 US$ 0.5-0.8 trillion 0.9%-3.0%
International Monetary fund and Interpol 1996 US$ 0.5 trillion 1.6%
UN estimates 1994/98 US$ 0.7-1 trillion 2.4%-3.4%
S. Kerry 1997 US$0.42-1 trillion 1.4%-3.3%
J. walker 1998 US$ 2.85 trillion 9.5%
National criminal Intelligence Service 1998 US$ 1.3 trillion 4.3%
2001 US$ 1.9 trillion 5.9%
2003 US$ 2.1 trillion 5.6%
I. Takats (2007) 2005 US$ 0.6-1.5 trillion 1.3%-3.3%
J.D. Agarwal and A. Agarwal (2006) 2005 US$ 2.0-2.5 trillion 4.4%-5.5%
Global financial Integrity (2011) (estimate 
for transnational crime) 2000-2009 US$ 0.65 trillion 1.5%
J. walker (based on J. walker and B. 
Unger) (2009) 2001 US$1 trillion 3.4%
f. Schneider  
(University of linz)
2001 US$ 0.8 trillion 2.5%
2002 US$ 0.96 trillion 2.9%
2003 US$ 1.2 trillion 3.2%
2004 US$ 1.4 trillion 3.3%
2005 US$ 1.5 trillion 3.3%
2006 US$ 1.7 trillion 3.4%
Tentative estimate* 2009* US$  2.0 trillion 3.4%
Median	of	all	estimates	 2009** US$	1.9	trillion 3.3%
Inter-quartile	range	of	all	estimates	 2009** US$	1.5-2.4	trillion 2.6%-4.1%
Average	of	all	estimates 2009** US$		2.1	trillion 3.6%
Confidence	interval	of	mean	(95%) 2009** US$	1.6-2.6	trillion 2.7%-4.4%
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US$0.6 trillion in 2006, equivalent to 1.8% of GDP of 
the studied countries. The data show that the turnover, 
expressed as a percentage of GDP, increased in the 
second half of the 1990s but remained stable over the 
2001-2006 period. The results of the DYMIMIC esti-
mations suggest that out of eight causal variables, five 
were statistically significant, with illegal drug selling 
showing the highest level of statistical significance, fol-
lowed by criminal activities related to illegal weapon 
sales and the illegal trade in human beings.66 
The results for twenty OECD countries (1.8% of GDP) 
were similar in magnitude, though smaller, than the 
average found in the six OECD countries for which 
country estimates were available (2.6% of GDP). If a 
five-country average (USA, UK, Australia, Netherlands 
and Germany) were calculated, the proportion of crime 
proceeds would fall to between 1.6% (unweighted aver-
age) and 2.0% of GDP (weighted average) - and thus 
come close to the estimate for 20 OECD countries. 
Schneider’s estimates (like those of Baker and Walker) 
also suggest that the significance of organized crime in 
the OECD countries is far lower – in both absolute and 
relative numbers – than in the rest of the world. Accord-
ing to these estimates, 35% of the global turnover of 
organized crime in 2006 was generated in 20 OECD 
countries (US$0.6 trillion) while the bulk (65% or 
US$1.1 trillion) occurred in the rest of the world, that 
66 F. Schneider, Turnover of Organized Crime and Money Laundering: 
Some Preliminary Findings, JEL-Code: K42, H26, O17, H26, http://
www.econ.jku.at/members/Schneider/files/publications/OrgCrime_
Feld4.pdf
may be used as a measure of the proceeds of organized 
crime…”. Some interesting results can be derived by 
comparing Schneider’s estimates of the shadow economy 
as a proportion of GDP against GDP per capita.”65 The 
analysis suggested that poorer countries have higher 
percentages of ‘normal’ shadow economy than rich 
countries, and there appears to be a J-curve, if put on a 
graph. Economic crime – including transnational orga-
nized crime - should be a subset of the shadow economy, 
and many of those countries to the right of the line are 
those reputed to have significant transnational crime, 
illicit drug production and corrupt business practices. If 
one assumes that the J-curve measures the extent of the 
‘normal’ shadow economy, and that there is a distribu-
tion around this J-curve, then anything more than 25% 
above the level indicated by the J-curve could be an 
indication of the activities of organized crime. On this 
basis, Walker derived an estimate of around US$$1.1 
trillion for the proceeds of organized crime for the year 
2001, heavily concentrated in developing countries. This 
would have been equivalent to 3.4% of GDP in 2001. 
Pooling the individual estimates of the ‘proceeds of 
crime expressed as a percentage of GDP’ would result in 
an average of 3.6% of GDP and a median of 3.3% of 
GDP (see Table 31). Applying such proportions to the 
global GDP in 2009 would give estimates of global 
proceeds of crime of US$2.1 trillion and US$1.9 tril-
lion, respectively, for the mean and the median. A calcu-
lation of the inter-quartile range, which can be used to 
better reflect the statistical dispersion of the individual 
estimates around the median while eliminating the 
influence of (apparent) outliers, gives a likely range of 
criminal proceeds from 2.6% to 4.1% of GDP. This 
would have been equivalent to criminal proceeds rang-
ing from US$1.5 to US$2.4 trillion in 2009. The calcu-
lation of the 95% confidence interval around the average 
of the various estimates would have resulted in a range 
of 2.7% to 4.4% of GDP, equivalent to a global total 
range from US$1.6 to US$2.6 trillion in 2009.
Assuming again – in line with the original FATF esti-
mates - that some 70% would have been used for 
money-laundering purposes, such amounts would have 
been equivalent to 2.5% of GDP or US$1.5 trillion in 
2009 (range: US$1.1-1.8 trillion). The estimates would 
fall within the IMF’s original consensus range (2%-5% 
of GDP). 
Schneider undertook an in-depth analysis of the likely 
turnover of organized crime in 20 OECD countries 
using the DYMIMIC estimation methodology, which 
suggested that the turnover of organized crime reached 
65 J. Walker and B. Unger, Measuring Global Money Laundering: “The 
Walker Gravity Model”, Review of Law & Economics, Vol. 5, Issue 2, 
The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009.
table 32: Estimates of the turnover of organized 
crime in 20 oEcD countries (1994-2006) 
Source: f. Schneider, “Turnover of organized crime and Money 
laundering: Some Preliminary findings,” Public Choice, Vol. 144, 
2010, pp. 473-486.
Year bn US$ in % of GDP
1995 270 1.2%
1996 296 1.3%
1997 320 1.4%
1998 334 1.5%
1999 362 1.5%
2000 389 1.6%
2001 420 1.8%
2002 441 1.8%
2003 479 1.7%
2004 515 1.7%
2005 573 1.8%
2006 614 1.8%
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Walker in his initial model on estimated proceeds of 
crime and money-laundering in Australia (1994) arrived 
at proportions of money laundered as a percentage of 
total crime proceeds from 5% to 76% with money-
laundering related to drugs ranging from 20% to 90%. 
His best estimates for drugs ranged from 50% to 70%, 
yielding a midpoint estimate for drugs of 60%. An 
update of the Australian crime situation for the year 
1998 again showed proportions used for money-laun-
dering ranging from 25% to 88% with an average (based 
on midpoint estimates of proceeds of crime and money 
laundered) of 47%. The extent of money-laundering 
related to drugs was raised to 80%71 (see Table 33).
In a separate analysis of the estimated proceeds of crime 
and the extent the money is being laundered, based on 
an expert survey Walker conducted in Australia, the 
perceived proportion of laundered money in Australia 
was substantially higher, ranging from 57% to 73% 
(mid-point: 65%). The proportion estimated by experts 
for illicit drugs reached 83%.72 
For the US drug trade, notably cocaine, such propor-
tions do not seem to hold true, however. This is due to 
large-scale cash smuggling from the USA into Mexico in 
return for drugs smuggled to the USA via Mexico. 
According to estimates collected for a study on US-
Mexico Security Cooperation (2010), the Mexican Gov-
ernment estimated drug-related cash flows from the 
USA to Mexico at some US$11 bn per year.73 An analy-
sis of US banknotes, repatriated from Mexico, revealed 
that at least US$17 bn per year must have been smug-
gled from the USA to Mexico in 2003 and 2004.74 An 
WODC: 211 Onderzoek en Beleid. Centraal Bureau voor de Statis-
tiek, Meppel: BOOM Juridische Uitgevers, Den Haag: WODC 
quoted in Brigitte Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Launder-
ing, Cheltenham (UK), Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 2007, p. 
66.
71 B. Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering, Cheltenham 
(UK), Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 2007, p. 62. 
72 J. Walker, 2005, quoted in J. Walker and B. Unger, “Measuring 
Global Money Laundering: The Walker Gravity Model,” Review of 
Law and Economics, Vol 5, 2009, p. 840.
73 The Mexican Government figure was given in interviews with senior 
members of the Mexican Financial Intelligence Unit. Attorney Gen-
eral Eduardo Medina Mora, appearing before the Mexican Congress 
in October 2007, stated that Mexican banks receive about $1 billion 
from their US counterparts annually, but return up to $16 billion, 
of which about $10 billion “does not have an explanation … and 
could be attributed to the flow of drug trafficking money.” (Source: 
D. Farah, Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling: Challenges for 
the Mérida Initiative, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security 
Cooperation, Trans-Border Institute, University of San Diego, May 
2010, p. 4.)
74 The US$17 billion estimate is based on a review of US banknotes 
repatriated from Mexico. The estimate represents only US currency 
returned to the United States, not all US currency that was smug-
gled to or through Mexico. This estimate is based on analysis of US 
banknotes purchased by US financial institutions from Mexican 
financial institutions from 2003 through 2004. (Source: National 
Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment 2010, 
February 2010.). 
is, mostly in developing countries and countries in tran-
sition. The OECD estimates also turned out to be – in 
relative terms – far smaller than previous estimates for 
organized crime at the global level by the same expert 
(3.4% of GDP in 2006), suggesting that developing 
countries and countries in transition were faced with, on 
average, crime proceeds equivalent to 6.8% of GDP. 
This would be more than three times the average pro-
portion found in the industrialized countries - though 
less than the estimate reported from Italy (7.7% of 
GDP).67 Would such results be plausible? At least for 
some developing countries, organized crime proceeds 
certainly amounted to more than 6.8% of GDP. The 
UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006, for instance, 
found that the proceeds from opiate exports to neigh-
bouring countries amounted to a sum equivalent to 
46% of Afghanistan’s GDP.68 No other proceeds from 
crime were included in this figure, which means that it 
can be assumed that the total Afghan crime proceeds in 
2006 would have been even higher. 
• Estimates of the proportion of crime  
proceeds that are laundered
What proportion of crime proceeds are laundered? A 
review of existing literature does not yield much empir-
ical evidence in this area. Instead, it reveals the various 
authors’ assumptions.
For the drug area, the FATF assumed for the late 1980s 
that out of US$124 bn of drug sales in North America 
and Western Europe, some US$85 bn (68.5%) would 
have been available for money-laundering purposes. 
Taking rounding of figures into account, the FATF de 
facto estimated that between two thirds and 70% of the 
total profits were being laundered.69 
Similarly, Unger - putting together the results of various 
studies conducted in the Netherlands in midst of the 
first decade of the new millennium - arrived at estimates 
of the proportions that were laundered ranging from 
71% to 75% of total crime proceeds. The estimate 
included drug sales, for which it was assumed that some 
80% of profits were available for laundering, and a 
number of domestic crime activities, such as burglaries 
or thefts, for which the assumed proportions for money-
laundering are apparently small.70 
67 See discussion of Italy under the subchapter ‘National Estimates.’ 
68 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006, Vienna 2006, p. 131.
69 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Finan-
cial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Paris, 1990, p. 6. quoted 
in UNDCP, Economic and Social Consequences of Drug Abuse and 
Illicit Trafficking, UNDCP Technical Series No. 6, Vienna 1998, p, 26 
and International Monetary Fund, Financial System Abuse, Financial 
Crime and Money Laundering- Background Paper, February 12, 2001.
70 M. Smekens and M. Verbruggen, De Illegale Economie in Nederland, 
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, September 2004; W. van der 
Heide and A.Th.J. Eggen, Criminaliteit en rechtshandhaving 2001, 
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even higher, ranging from US$18 bn to US$39 bn per 
year,77 with a midpoint estimate of US$29 bn. Applying 
such figures to US drug sales estimates (US$64 bn in 
2000)78 suggest that some 45% of the total receipts may 
be smuggled abroad in cash. This means that the 
amounts available for money-laundering in the USA 
would probably be around 55% (range: 39%-72%) of 
drug-related proceeds. 
Pooling these estimates suggests that around 70% crime 
proceeds may be laundered (range: 40%-80%). For 
drugs, the likely proportions are from 60% to 80%. 
These results are based on a very small and biased 
sample, which means that the actual averages may differ 
substantially. Far more research, from a larger number of 
countries across the globe, would be needed to generate 
more reliable estimates on the extent of money-launder-
ing from criminal proceeds globally. 
• Summary of estimates of crime proceeds 
and money laundered 
Combining the results of the various groups of estimates 
(based on country estimates, global ‘scientific’ estimates, 
et cetera) shows a surprising convergence, irrespective of 
the divergence within each group. The overall best esti-
mates of criminal proceeds seem to fluctuate around 
3.6% of GDP, equivalent to some US$2.1 trillion in 
77 National Drug Intelligence Centre, National Drug Threat Assessment 
2009, (Illicit Finance – Bulk Cash Smuggling), Washington D.C., 
December 2008. 
78 ONDCP, What America’s Drug Users spend on Illicit Drugs, 1988-
2000, Washington 2001. 
estimate by a financial services firm (KPMG) suggested 
cash smuggling from the USA to Mexico at around 
US$25 bn per year. Academic estimates ranged from 
US$6 to US$36 billion.75 Against this background of 
large-scale cash smuggling, potentially fuelling the illicit 
drug trade, the Mexican Government introduced stricter 
regulations in June 2010, imposing limits on US dollar 
currency conversions in Mexico and announcing plans 
to limit the use of cash for the purchase of real estate and 
luxury items.76 Estimates on cash smuggling by both 
Mexican and Colombian organized crime groups are 
75 R. Sierra, Evolución y Situación Actual de la Prevención de Lavado 
de Dinero en el Sistema Financiera Mexicano, KPMG, April 2006. 
The lower figure comes from interviews and writings by Ricardo 
Gluyas Millán, in particular, “Ganancia Ilícita: Prevención Contra 
el Lavado de Dinero, México, 2005,” p. 233. The upper-end figure 
was provided by numerous academic sources in interviews. Accord-
ing to Samuel Gonzalez of the Mexican Autonomous Institute of 
Technology, drug proceeds laundered in Mexico account for as much 
as four percent of the country’s GDP, or roughly US$35.7 billion 
annually. (“Marching as to War,” economist.com, January 31, 2008.) 
All sources quoted in D. Farah, Money Laundering and Bulk Cash 
Smuggling: Challenges for the Mérida Initiative, Working Paper Series 
on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, Woodrow Wilson Center 
for International Scholars/Trans-Border Institute, University of San 
Diego, May 2010, p. 4.
76 The regulations apply to cash for cash transactions from dollars to 
pesos as well as to deposits, credit payments and service fees. The 
Government of Mexico also announced new reforms, including 
greater interagency coordination to identify and investigate suspi-
cious transactions, harsher penalties for using resources from illicit 
activities, and restrictions on the use of large amounts of cash. This 
would prohibit cash purchases of real estate and cash payments in 
excess of 100,000 pesos ($7,700) for luxury items. (Source: US 
Department of State, 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report, Washington D.C., March 2011. 
table 33: Proportion of crime proceeds available for laundering, in per cent
Sources: International Monetary fund, financial System Abuse, Financial Crime and Money Laundering- Background Paper, february 12, 
2001; J. walker (AUSTRAc, RMIT University), “Estimates of the Extent of Money laundering in and through Australia,” paper prepared for 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis centre, John walker consulting Services, Queanbeyan, Australia, September 1995; J. walker 
quoted in J. walker and B. Unger, “Measuring Global Money laundering: The walker Gravity Model”, Review of Law and Economics, Vol 5, 
2009, p. 840; B. Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering, cheltenham (UK), Edward Elgar Publishing company, 2007, p. 62; D. 
farah, Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling: Challenges for the Mérida Initiative, working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico Security coop-
eration, woodrow wilson center for International Scholars/Trans-Border Institute, University of San Diego, May 2010, p. 4; oNDcP, What 
America’s Drug Users spend on Illicit Drugs, 1988-2000, washington 2001 and National Drug Intelligence centre, National Drug Threat 
Assessment 2009, (Illicit finance – Bulk cash Smuggling), washington D.c., December 2008.
Crime of which drugs
midpoint	/	
best	estimate from to
midpoint	/	
best	estimate from To
fATf (1988) 69% 66% 70%
Australia, 1994 5% 76% 60% 50% 70%
Australia, 1998 25% 88% 80% 80% 80%
Australia (based on expert 
survey) 65% 57% 73% 83% 83% 83%
Netherlands 2004 73% 71% 75% 80% 80% 80%
USA, 2009 55% 39% 72%
Unweighted average 69% 40% 78% 71% 66% 76%
Average rounded 70% 40% 80% 70% 60% 80%
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• Estimates of money laundered  
by destination 
Based on an IMF estimate of US$1.5 trillion for the year 
2005 (which would have been within the range of US$1 
to US$1.6 trillion estimated by Baker, and well within 
the US$1.2-2.3 bn estimate for 2009, shown above), 
Unger79 provided an overview of the likely destinations 
of amounts laundered for the 1997-2000 period. The 
results suggested that two thirds of money laundered 
worldwide is transferred to some 20 countries. Most of 
these countries are developed, with sizeable legal econo-
mies. The study also found a limited number of very 
small offshore countries among the top 20 inverstment 
locations. If these 20 countries are categorized by region, 
the model suggests that 31% of global money-launder-
ing takes place in the Americas, 31% in Europe and 5% 
in Asia.
• Estimates of wealth distribution and 
importance of offshore centres 
The subsequent section of the report analyses the licit 
capital flows. In order to better understand the relative 
importance of illicit cross-border money flows, an over-
view of the global distribution of wealth (in the form of 
financial assets) may be useful. Despite of the possibili-
79 B. Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering, Cheltenham 
(UK), Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 2007, p. 80.
2009. The best estimates of the amounts laundered fluc-
tuate around 2.7% of GDP or US$1.6 trillion in 2009. 
Converting the proportions for ‘transnational organized 
crime’ discussed earlier to figures in 2009 suggests that 
some US$ 870 billion (1.5% of global GDP in 2009) in 
proceeds may have been generated by ‘transnational 
organized crime’. Out of this amount some US$ 580 
billion (1% of global GDP in 2009) may have been 
potentially available for money laundering activities. 
The average range of the estimates for the amounts 
available for laundering out of crime in general (2.1% 
- 4.0% of GDP) fall well within the IMF’s original ‘con-
sensus range’ of 2%-5% of GDP, though data also sug-
gest that the best estimates (around 2.7% of GDP) are 
situated towards the lower end of the range (see Table 
34. 
Once tax- and customs-related money-laundering activ-
ities were included, results would move towards the 
upper end of the IMF ‘consensus range,’ or – depending 
on the extrapolation models applied - slightly beyond. 
On the other hand, if only international crime related 
proceeds were considered, available estimates suggest 
that the amounts available for laundering would fall to 
levels around 1% of GDP, i.e. below the original IMF 
consensus range.
table 34: Summary of estimates of criminal proceeds and amounts laundered at the global level 
* Assuming – in line with original fATf estimates – that some 70% of crime proceeds are available for laundering.  
** Including components such as mispricing, abuse transfer pricing and fake invoices which are – inter alia - used for tax or customs avoid-
ance.  
*** Average proportions applied to global GDP in 2009.
 
 
Reference 
year/ 
period
Criminal proceeds Amounts laundered
best		
estimate from to
best		
estimate from To
a/ original fATf estimate 1988 2.0%
b/ fATf estimate updated with 
UNoDc drug data 2003 2.4%
c/ Six industrialized countries 1990-2009 2.5% 1.4% 4.6%
d/ Six industrialized countries 
extrapolated to global level 1990-2009 3.5% 2.0% 6.4% 2.5%* 1.4* 4.5*
e/consulting firm 2002 2.5%
f/ NGo (Baker)** 2000-2005 3.6% 2.9% 4.3%
g/ Scientific estimates (based 
on studies by 10 authors) 1994-2009 3.6% 2.7% 4.4% 2.5%* 1.9* 3.1*
Average	(b,d,f,g)	as	a		
percentage	of	GDP 3.6% 2.3% 5.5% 2.7% 2.1% 4.0%
Extrapolated	to	2009***	in	
trillion	US$ 2009 2.1 1.4 3.2 1.6 1.2 2.3
Memo: IMf ‘consensus range’ 1998 3.5% 2.0% 5.0%
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ties of instant money transfers in the age of communica-
tion by electronic means, the subsequent analysis shows, 
for instance, that there is still a concentration of money 
transfers to nearby countries or countries in the region. 
According to estimates by the Boston Consulting Group, 
an internationally operating management consulting 
firm, ‘global wealth’ - defined as ‘assets under manage-
ment’ by ‘wealth management institutions’ (such as 
banks and other financial services providers) - amounted 
to US$111.5 trillion in 2009, up from US$94.7 trillion 
in 2005. If US$1.5 trillion had been laundered in 2005 
(the above-mentioned IMF estimate), this would have 
been equivalent to 1.6% of such global assets. 
The global financial assets are primarily found in Europe 
(33% of the world total), the USA and Canada (31%), 
and the Asia/Pacific region (29%). Overall wealth in the 
Middle East and Africa (3.5% of the world total) and 
Latin America (3.0%) is comparatively low. 
fig. 1: Development of ‘global wealth,’ 
2004-2009 (and estimates for 2014)
Source: The Boston consulting Group, Global Wealth 2010, 
Regaining Lost Ground, June 2010. 
29.8 32.4 35.1 36.5 34.4 37.1
48.5
29.5 31.8
35.7 38.3 30.5 35.1
43.414.3 14.6
15.1 15.1
14.5
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15.9
9.3
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12.4 14.7
14.1
17.1
28.8
2.9
3.1
3.5
3.8
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2.3
2.4
2.8
3.1
3
3.4
5.1
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2014E
Europe North America
Japan Asia-Pacific (ex Japan)
Middle East and Africa Latin America
	 88.1	 94.7	 104.5	 111.6	 100.0	 111.5	 147.5	
	 Total
fig. 2: Estimates and distribution of ‘global wealth’, by region, 2007-2009 
Note: Assets under management numbers for all years were converted to U.S. dollars at year-end 2009 exchange rates to exclude the effect 
of currency fluctuations. Percentage changes and global totals of assets under management are based on complete, not rounded, numbers. 
calculations for 2007 and 2008 are based on the same methodology used for the 2009 calculations. Global wealth is measured by assets 
under management across all households.  
1 United States and canada.
2 Includes Australia and New Zealand.
3 South America, central America and Mexico.
Source: The Boston consulting Group, Global Wealth 2010, Regaining Lost Ground, June 2010.
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USA (34%), whereas Asian investors trust primarily 
offshore centres in Singapore and Hong Kong, China 
(38%). The closest offshore centres for investors in the 
Middle East and Africa are those located in Europe. 
These investors choose primarily to invest in offshore 
centres in the UK and the Channel Islands (38%) and 
Switzerland (35%). 
The data also indicate the sources of the assets invested 
in offshore centres. Most of the money is sourced from 
Europe (US$3 trillion or 41% of all assets invested off-
shore), followed by the Asia-Pacific region (US$1.5 tril-
lion or 20%) and the Middle East and Africa (US$1.3 
trillion or 18%). Investors from North America account 
for just 9% of global offshore investment. 
Expressed as a percentage of global wealth held in differ-
ent regions, the data suggest that the popularity of 
investing in offshore centres differs substantially across 
regions. The highest ‘proportions’ of offshore invest-
ment are found from clients in the Middle East and 
Africa. Their offshore investment is equivalent to one 
third of financial assets in their own countries. In Latin 
America, the proportion is nearly one quarter. In the rest 
of the world, the proportion of offshore investment is 
well below 10%, falling to just 2% for the USA and 
Canada. 
Offshore wealth, defined by the Boston Consulting 
Group (BCG) as assets booked in a country where the 
investor has no legal residence or tax domicile, amounted 
to US$7.4 trillion in 2009, equivalent to 6.6% of glo-
bally held assets. The BCG identified Switzerland as the 
largest offshore centre,80 with non-resident assets of 
US$2 trillion held there in 2009. This is equivalent to 
27% of all offshore assets or 1.8% of global assets. The 
next largest offshore centres were the British Isles, 
including the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands 
and Ireland (US$1.9 trillion or 26% of all offshore 
assets), the Caribbean and Panama (US$0.9 trillion or 
12%), Luxembourg (US$0.8 trillion or 11%), Hong 
Kong China and Singapore (US$0.7 trillion or 9%) and 
the United States (US$0.6 trillion or 8%). Other off-
shore centres account for US$0.5 trillion or 7% of total 
offshore assets. 
The breakdown suggests that investors tend to prefer 
offshore centres that are geographically close. European 
investors choose primarily (80%) offshore centres in 
Europe (Switzerland, British Isles and Luxembourg). 
Most North American investors also prefer close off-
shore centres (Caribbean and Panama: 44% of the total). 
Similarly, Latin American investors prefer offshore cen-
tres in the Caribbean and Panama (33%) and in the 
80 These ‘offshore centres’ differ from ‘offshore financial centres’ as 
defined by the IMF,in 2007: “An OFC is a country or jurisdiction that 
provides financial services to nonresidents on a scale that is incommensu-
rate with the size and the financing of its domestic economy.”
Origin of  
offshore 
wealth
Wealth	held	in	offshore	centres,	2009	(US$	trillions)
Destination of offshore wealth
Switzer-
land
United  
Kingdom, 
channel 
Islands and 
Dublin
luxem-
bourg
caribbean 
and 
Panama
Hong Kong 
and  
Singapore
United 
States other
Regional 
total
North  
America 0.14 0.22 - 0.31 0.05 0.003 - 0.7
Europe 0.98 0.76 0.67 0.16 0.09 0.13 0.24 3.0
Asia - Pacific 0.21 0.33 0.06 0.11 0.57 0.12 0.06 1.5
latin  
America 0.21 0.06 0.004 0.27 - 0.27 0.01 0.8
Middle East  
and Africa 0.46 0.49 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.23 1.3
Booking	
center	total 2.0 1.9 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 7.4
table 35: Breakdown of financial assets held in offshore centres (2009)
Source: The Boston consulting Group, Global Wealth 2010, Regaining Lost Ground, June 2010.
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table 36: Breakdown of global (financial) assets in 2009 
* United States and canada
Source: The Boston consulting Group, Global wealth 2010, Regaining lost Ground, June 2010.
 Total assets (in trillion US$)
Offshore  
(countries of origin) 
(in trillion US$)
Expressed as a 
percentage of total 
assets
North America* 35.1 0.7 2.0%
Europe 37.1 3.0 8.1%
Asia-Pacific 32 1.5 4.7%
latin America 3.4 0.8 23.5%
Middle East / Africa 3.9 1.3 33.3%
Total 111.5 7.4 6.6%
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Detai led analysis of a transnational 
 organized cr ime sector
dering of proceeds of crime or concern corruption of a 
public official geared towards the obstruction of justice.
An organized criminal group is defined in Article 2 of the 
TOC as ‘a structured group of three or more persons, exist-
ing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim 
of committing one or more serious crimes or offences estab-
lished in accordance with this Convention, in order to 
obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit. In other words, the number of persons needed 
to participate in an organized crime group is limited. 
The group must, however, exist for a period of time and 
be ‘structured’. A  ‘structured group’ is defined as a 
group that is not randomly formed  for the immediate 
commission of an offence. 
The term serious crime (Art. 2) has been defined in the 
Convention as constituting an offence punishable by a 
maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a 
more serious penalty. This requirement (four years or 
more potential prison sentence) is less restrictive than 
the ‘serious crime’ requirement under the FATF recom-
mendations.  
The next criterion is the transnational nature of an 
offence. According to Article 3, para 2, an offence is 
transnational in nature if:  
1. It is committed in more than one State;  
2. It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its 
preparation,  planning, direction or control takes place in 
another State; 
3. It is committed in one State but involves an organized 
criminal group that engages in criminal activities in 
more than one State; or 
4. It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in 
another State.
UNODC has already worked on the identification of 
some key transnational organized crime activities, fulfill-
ing the criteria set out above. They include trafficking in 
drugs such as cocaine and heroin, smuggling of migrants, 
trafficking in persons (for sexual exploitation), smug-
gling of firearms, trafficking of natural resources (such 
as timber and wildlife, including elephant ivory, rhino 
horn and tiger parts), product counterfeiting (including 
counterfeiting of medicines), maritime piracy and cyber-
The previous chapter contained an overview of method-
ologies used and results obtained by various authors on 
the extent of criminal proceeds and the amounts that are 
assumed to be laundered at the global level. This chapter 
will develop a number of models to deal with the process 
of estimating the proceeds of transnational organized 
crime, estimating the amounts entering the financial 
sector and showing the likely destinations of such flows. 
The models that were developed for this study will be 
applied to one specific transnational organized crime 
sector – trafficking in cocaine – where sufficient infor-
mation and expertise is already available to undertake 
such an exercise. 
The models developed for this exercise are - in principle 
- also applicable to other transnational organized crime 
sectors. The analysis of the process and its application to 
one concrete crime sector, however, revealed that this is 
still a complex exercise, requiring detailed insight 
knowledge by experts in order to generate reasonable 
results. Any simple mechanistic application of the 
models to other sectors, without such knowledge, bears 
significant risks of failure.      
There are many definitions of organized crime at the 
national level.1 Though the concept of ‘organized crime’ 
is widely used by criminologists, law enforcement agen-
cies, the justice system and journalists in many coun-
tries, the definition of ‘organized crime’ at the 
international level has been rather vague. The United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime (TOC) defined some of the main constituent 
components of what can be considered transnational 
organized crime. These components include:   
 • a serious offence [notably a serious crime], 
 • the transnational nature of such an offense, 
 • an organized criminal group. 
Article 3 stipulates that the offence has to be transna-
tional in nature, involve an organized criminal group 
and the offence must be serious, that is, either a serious 
crime (as defined below), related to the participation of 
a person in an organized criminal group, involve the laun-
1 In the USA, for instance, the Organized Crime control Act of 1970 
defines organized crime as “the unlawful activities of a highly organ-
ized, disciplined association”.  
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crime2 (see Table 37).
The current study, however, does not attempt to map 
the financial dimensions of all such transnational organ-
ized crime activities. Instead, it focuses on one promi-
nent example of a transnational organized crime sector: 
trafficking in cocaine. Drug trafficking clearly consti-
tutes the largest income for transnationally operating 
crime groups worldwide and within that area cocaine 
trafficking plays a key role. The heroin market is smaller 
and the same applies to the markets for the various 
amphetamine-type stimulants. Though the cannabis 
market is possibly larger in total, it is to a large extent 
dominated by local cultivation and consumption and 
thus – compared to cocaine - less characterized by an 
involvement of transnationally operating crime groups.
The first challenge was to arrive at monetary estimates 
of the cocaine-related flows in the various subregions. 
The next question related to how much of these flows 
are used to maintain the illegal business activities and for 
the personal consumption of traffickers, and to what 
extent such funds enter the financial system. The final 
questions are how much of the flows into the financial 
system remain within the jurisdiction where they were 
generated, and how much is directed to other destina-
tions, including offshore centres. A model has been cre-
ated to help answer these questions. 
a)	 Methodology
i. overview  
The discussions on the methodology in the previous 
chapter have shown that a significant number of propos-
als exists to estimate the extent of money-laundering. 
But there is no single method that can be regarded as the 
‘gold standard’ for undertaking such a study. Though 
promising, most of the methods discussed suffer from a 
number of drawbacks. Some of them rely on case stud-
ies, which raises questions as to the statistical representa-
tiveness of the results. Others are based on interviews to 
gather expert opinion. In this case, there is a potential 
problem of a perception bias. Some models rely heavily 
on financial transactions data, including suspicious 
activity reports. In such models, there is no direct nexus 
between the proceeds of crime and the amounts of 
money being laundered, and the same money may be 
counted multiple times as the funds are moved from 
country to country for laundering. There are also a 
number of problems if the analysis is based on statistical 
discrepancies in balance of payment and trade statistics, 
or if it is based on currency demand.
2 UNODC, The Globalization of Crime – a Transnational Organized 
Crime Threat Assessment, June 2010.
Against this background, a new method was tested for 
this study. This model is more directly linked to criminal 
activities and the resulting financial flows. 
The method consists of the following sub-components: 
1. Calculating the financial gains arising from the tran-
snational crime activities considered at the various 
subregional levels; 
2. Estimating the amounts - arising from transnational 
crime activities in the various subregions - that enter 
the financial system;  
3. Estimating the amounts that cross borders for money-
laundering purposes, reflecting the actual ‘transna-
tional illicit financial flows’ from the proceeds of 
transnational crime.  
Key financial flows emerging from various transnational 
organized crime activities were  summarized in the 
UNODC report The Globalization of Crime – a Transna-
tional Organized Crime Threat Assessment (June 2010). 
The study, which also presented preliminary estimates of 
the amounts involved for some key trafficking flows, 
suggested that drug-related trafficking, notably cocaine 
trafficking, is by far the most important transnational 
organized crime activity in monetary terms (see Table 
37). 
Major challenges exist, however, if one wishes to go 
beyond the numbers presented here. The figures only 
reflect the value of some key trafficking flows in 2008 - 
but not of all trafficking flows. In the case of cocaine, 
the flows going to North America and Europe account 
for around 80% of the global flows in monetary terms.3 
In the case of heroin, the flows to Western Europe and 
the Russian Federation cover around 60% of the total 
flows in monetary terms.4 A detailed methodology for 
arriving at these figures exists as well as a breakdown by 
individual countries or at least some groups of countries. 
The spread of the Hawala system across the Near and 
Middle East complicates, however, the analysis of the 
money flows. This was illustrated when the ‘Paris Pact’ 
requested participating Member States to share informa-
3 UNODC, World Drug Report 2010 and UNODC, World Drug 
Report 2011. 
4 UNODC, Addiction, Crime and Insurgency – the Transnational Threat 
of Afghan Opium, October 2009 and UNODC, The Global Afghan 
Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment, July 2011. 
Estimate 
financial 
gains 
(proceeds of 
crime)
Estimate the 
amounts that 
enter the 
financial 
system
Estimate the 
amounts that 
leave the 
country for 
laundering
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table 37: Estimates of the extent and value of key transnational organized crime-related flows
Source: UNoDc, The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment, June 2010. 
TOC PROBLEM
ESTIMATED
EXTENT
ESTIMATED ANNUAL 
VALUE (US$)
TRAFFICKING		
IN	PERSONS
To EURoPE  
foR SEXUAl EXPloITATIoN
70,000 victims (annual)
140,000 victims (stock)
3 billion (stock)
SMUGGLING	OF	
MIGRANTS
fRoM lATIN AMERIcA To  
NoRTH AMERIcA 3 million entries (annual)
6.6 billion (income for  
smugglers)
fRoM AfRIcA To EURoPE 55,000 migrants (annual) 150 million (income for  smugglers)
COCAINE		
		
fRoM THE ANDEAN REGIoN To 
NoRTH AMERIcA
309 tons (depart)
196 tons  
(at destination)
38 billion (at destination)
fRoM THE ANDEAN REGIoN 
To EURoPE
212 tons (depart)
124 tons  
(at destination)
34 billion (at destination)
HEROIN		
fRoM AfGHANISTAN To THE  
RUSSIAN fEDERATIoN
95 tons (depart)
70 tons 
(at destination)
13 billion (at destination)
fRoM AfGHANISTAN To EURoPE 
(EXcl. RUSSIA)
140 tons (depart)
87 tons  
(at destination)
20 billion (at destination)
TRAFFICKING		
OF	FIREARMS
fRoM THE UNITED STATES To 
MEXIco
20,000 weapons, mostly  
handguns 20 million
fRoM EASTERN EURoPE To THE 
woRlD
At least 
40,000 Kalashnikovs in 
2007/2008
At least 33 million  
(in 2007/2008 at 
destination)
TRAFFICKING		
OF	NATURAL	
RESOURCES
wIlDlIfE fRoM AfRIcA AND 
SoUTH-EAST ASIA To ASIA
Elephant ivory: 75 tons
Rhino horn: 800 kg
Tiger parts: Perhaps 150 tiger 
skins and about 1,500 kg of 
tiger bones
Elephant ivory:  
62 million
Rhino horn: 8 million
Tiger parts: 5 million
TIMBER fRoM SoUTH-EAST ASIA 
To THE EURoPEAN UNIoN AND 
ASIA
Perhaps 10 million cubic 
meters
3.5 billion  
(at destination)
PRODUCT		
COUNTERFEITING
coNSUMER GooDS fRoM ASIA To 
EURoPE
Some two billion  
articles per year
8.2 billion  
(at destination)
MEDIcINE fRoM ASIA To SoUTH-
EAST ASIA AND AfRIcA Billions of dose units
1.6 billion  
(at destination)
MARITIME		
PIRACY off THE coAST of SoMAlIA 217 attacks in 2009 100 million
CYBERCRIME
IDENTITY THEfT Around 1.5 million victims 1 billion
cHIlD PoRNoGRAPHY Perhaps 50,000 new images generated annually 250 million
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tion on the flows of heroin-related proceeds in 2010. 
Most Member States faced considerable difficulties to 
supply such information. Questionnaires were either not 
responded to or sent back blank. 
UNODC’s estimate for trafficking in persons to Europe 
for sexual exploitation would be equivalent to some 
10% of the previous ILO estimate on the amounts gen-
erated from trafficking in persons worldwide.5 For most 
of the other flows no reliable global estimates can cur-
rently be given. A simple extrapolation from these key 
regional flows to the global level would thus be problem-
atic. The most basic estimates in these areas are still 
highly questionable and subject to major error margins. 
Alternatively, the calculations could start from statisti-
cally-based estimates of the proceeds generated by tran-
snational organized crime in individual countries. 
However, such estimates are non-existent for most coun-
tries, notably for developing countries. This does not 
mean that they could not be generated. However, law 
enforcement necessarily focuses on the most visible part 
of the organized crime spectrum and rarely catches a 
glimpse of the whole picture. Occasional proceeds of 
crime data are produced when organized crime suspects 
are convicted, but few countries have conducted any 
comprehensive analysis of the overall proceeds of crime. 
Some of these assessments are dated, going back some 
twenty years, including for  countries such as the United 
States.  
There are some exceptions. Recent work by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, for instance, estimated the pro-
ceeds of crime, excluding tax evasion, in Germany at 
€32 bn equivalent to 1.3% of GDP (as discussed in the 
previous sub-chapter under ‘national estimates’). The 
underlying calculations would provide a useful model 
for other countries to follow. Another exception in this 
regard has been work done by UNODC in a recent 
study on the income derived from the illicit exploitation 
and smuggling of raw materials in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, reflecting some of the most 
prominent transnational organized crime activities in 
this country. This study revealed that such income 
amounts to some US$200 million per year,6 close to 
0.2% of GDP. Nonetheless, serious work on illicit 
money flows and related laundering activities should not 
be based on just a few national studies which are – in 
 
5 International Labour Organisation (ILO), A Global Alliance Against 
Forced Labour, Geneva, 2005.
6 This includes illicit income generated from the illegal exploitation 
and smuggling of gold worth US$120 million; timber US$30 mil-
lion; cassiterite US$ 29 million; diamonds US$21 million,  can-
nabis 5 million and ivory US$3 million, totalling US$$208 million. 
(Source: UNODC, Organized Crime and Instability in Central Africa: 
A Threat Assessment, October 2011).  
addition – using different methodologies to arrive at 
their estimates.  
Against this background, this study was limited to just 
one offence type – trafficking in cocaine - for which a 
body of proceeds of crime data exists, and for which 
methods of estimation could be developed to fill data 
gaps. Even within the area of trafficking in cocaine, 
major difficulties have been encountered. While there is 
knowledge about the extent of cocaine use, and some 
basic understanding of the profits earned by crime in the 
countries of origin and destination, transnational organ-
ized crime also generates important proceeds in transit 
countries, and much less is known about these activities. 
In fact, the area where available information is weakest 
is in the countries of transit. Yet significant profits – 
notably if compared to the size of the economies con-
cerned - may be generated there as the ‘middlemen’ take 
their share of the proceeds in return for services ren-
dered.
As is the case with illicit drugs as well as trafficking in 
other goods and persons, the trade often involves a com-
plex distribution network, covering many countries. 
There are countries of production, wholesalers in a 
range of other intermediate or transit countries, and 
retailers in countries of consumption. All of these need 
to be quantified. While lots of efforts have gone into 
estimating the number of users of drugs, very little 
efforts have gone into quantifying the numbers of traf-
fickers involved. Where numbers of producers, whole-
salers and retailers can be estimated, and sales volumes 
and unit prices are known, estimates can be made of the 
average per capita income of these groups in the net-
work. Then, an estimate can be made of the excess 
income over a measure of living costs, and this can be 
used as an estimate of the amount of ‘launderable’ 
income. In addition, the market structure needs to be 
taken into account. The study on cocaine will experi-
ment with some more sophisticated approaches to deal 
with these problems. 
A further major challenge is to develop estimates of the 
extent to which proceeds from crime enter the financial 
system. For this purpose, a literature review has been 
undertaken to obtain some baseline data. Moreover, a 
number of techniques have been developed and used to 
generate such estimates. They include - in the drug area 
- an analysis of individual drug seizure cases reported to 
UNODC by Member States. This was done to identify 
reasonable cut-off rates for the amounts that are spent 
by small-scale drug traffickers to cover their current 
living costs versus surpluses generated by larger dealers 
that would be available for money-laundering purposes. 
In addition, the study also tried to obtain and analyse 
expert opinions on this topic from Financial Intelligence 
Units (FIUs) and other relevant institutions at the 
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national and international level, as well as from experts 
working in academia. This was done, inter alia, through 
a Reference Group involving experts from various 
regions. 
Another major challenge is the identification of the 
proportion of illegal funds that enter the financial system 
and are subsequently laundered by leaving the respective 
jurisdiction. In order to tackle this problem, a model 
was developed based on a literature review and expert 
opinions from FIUs and other relevant institutions. 
ii. The models
A business is typically formed to earn profit that will 
increase the wealth of its owners and grow the business 
itself. The owners and operators of a business have as 
one of their main objectives the receipt or generation of a 
financial return in exchange for work and acceptance of 
risk.
Transnational organized crimes are generally conducted 
as businesses in one of four main categories:
 • Businesses whose profitability depends on their satis-
fying some demand for prohibited goods/services; for 
example, illicit drugs, firearms, forced labour, body 
parts and endangered species;
 • Businesses involving satisfying a demand for legal 
goods/services, but avoiding tax, excise duties or regu-
lations; for example, cigarettes, alcohol, prostitution 
(where legal) and immigration;
 • Businesses involving satisfying a demand for legal 
goods/services, but through undercover production 
or theft of resources; for example, stolen vehicles, il-
legally copied DVDs, cultural treasures, illegal logging 
or extractive industries such as oil or diamonds;
 • Businesses involving the predatory diversion of gov-
ernment or private funds or business profits through 
fraud or corruption; for example, false invoicing, 
political and financial manipulation of funds, internet 
and ID frauds, stock market manipulation and fraud.
Transnational organized crime groups conduct this busi-
ness because of the significant profits that can be earned. 
Business is conducted in places where profits are maxim-
ised, and may involve various stages, such as production, 
wholesaling and retailing (as in the illicit drugs trades) 
which may each involve transnational movements and 
different degrees of profitability. Profits may be gener-
ated in terms of cash, other financial assets, or in com-
modities (for example, diamonds and timber) that can 
be resold.
Since all of these characteristics of transnational organ-
ized crime are also features of normal business and inter-
national trade - other than their criminality - the 
approach used is inspired by that area of economics. A 
‘gravity model’ of the proceeds of crime and money-
laundering was developed. When provided with esti-
mates of the proceeds of crime and the extent to which 
these proceeds of crime are likely to be laundered, the 
purpose of the model is to estimate the likely extent and 
direction of the resulting flows for the first stage of laun-
dering.7  
iii. The proceeds of crime
The project commenced with a compilation of data on 
the proceeds of crime related to trafficking in cocaine, 
proceeded to estimate the proportion of illegal funds 
that enter the financial system (as opposed to being 
spent on personal consumption or business costs) and 
finally estimated the amounts that subsequently leave 
the jurisdiction in which they were generated. 
In the area of illicit drug trafficking, including traffick-
ing in cocaine, UNODC has compiled a comprehensive 
database with annual time-series data covering a large 
number of countries, and an extensive list of data items. 
These data provide sufficient information to estimate 
the supply, demand, price levels, and therefore profits 
made.8  
The supply of illicit drugs proceeds in stages. Wholesal-
ers import drugs in bulk and sell in smaller quantities to 
their network of retailers for resale, in even smaller 
quantities, to consumers. When crime generates pro-
ceeds in small amounts, the offender will spend a sig-
nificant proportion of this income on living costs and 
7 Note that no attempt is made to analyse subsequent stages of money-
laundering.
8 See, for example, UNODC, World Drug Report 2005, Vol. 1, Ch. 2., 
‘Estimating the Value of Illicit Drug Markets.’
How much 
crime is 
there?
How much 
profit is there 
in the crime?
What  
proportion of 
the profit is 
laundered?
Where does 
it go for 
laundering?
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minor luxuries, leaving only a small proportion available 
for laundering. In contrast, offenders whose proceeds of 
crime accrue in large amounts are likely to launder a 
greater proportion of their income.9 It follows, there-
fore, that there are significant differences between 
wholesalers of illicit goods and services and retailers of 
the same goods and services, in their propensities to 
launder money, since wholesalers typically deal in bulk 
and retailers in much smaller quantities. The modelling 
of the illicit cocaine trade followed this logic. Separate 
estimates of the gross profits were made at the wholesale 
and retail level for each country.
iv. The proportion of proceeds that is 
laundered
The proportions of funds laundered for illegal income 
– as reported in the literature – typically fall within a 
range of 40%-80%, or 60%-80% for illegal drugs (see 
chapter 1). As the literature review also revealed, these 
estimates are mostly assumptions. Relatively little actual 
information exists about the proportions of the proceeds 
of crime that are laundered. Against this background 
some new, innovative approaches have been developed 
for this study to generate more empirically backed esti-
mates on the proceeds of crime that are available for 
laundering purposes.    
One approach would be to estimate average income per 
wholesaler and retailer of cocaine in each country. Once 
‘reasonable living expenses’ are subtracted, an estimate 
could be derived of the amount of ‘launderable’ money 
per capita generated from cocaine trafficking. Summing 
these amounts over the total estimated numbers of 
wholesalers and retailers would give an estimate of the 
total amount of money available for laundering. 
The results from such a model, however, can be grossly 
misleading as the ‘average drug trafficker’ does not exist 
in practice. In fact, the distribution of drug traffickers 
tends to be very uneven, with a few traffickers account-
ing for the bulk of the drugs sold on the market, and a 
large number earning the bare minimum to survive. 
Thus, a more sophisticated model has been developed. 
The basic steps here are to:  
1. estimate the number of traffickers involved at the re-
tail and wholesale levels in key countries;  
2. analyse the market structure; 
3. apply the analysed market structure to the estimated 
number of traffickers at the retail and wholesale levels 
9 Walker, J., Estimates of the Extent of Money Laundering in and through 
Australia, Australian Transaction Reports & Analysis Centre, 1995; 
Walker, J. and J. Stamp, The Extent of Money Laundering in and 
through Australia in 2004, Australian Institute of Criminology, 2007..
and introduce a cut-off rate (‘reasonable living expens-
es’) above which drug traffickers are able to launder 
money. 
• Modelling the money-laundering processes 
– the Gravity Model
There are, of course, differences between how transna-
tional organized crime and legitimate businesses manage 
their activities and determine how to invest their profits. 
But the differences are in the types of risks that are con-
sidered, not in the ways they are assessed. The factors 
that determine whether transnational organized crime 
choose to transfer money from the country in which it 
is generated to another country in which it will be laun-
dered differ only in some respects – particularly in their 
need for secrecy – from the factors that determine legit-
imate business transfers.
One specific difference between legitimate businesses 
and transnational organized crime is in the tendency of 
many crime types to generate proceeds in the form of 
cash, because cash is not traceable. When cash is gener-
ated, placement10 processes are required prior to layering 
and integration.  
 • Banking systems initially attractive to these crime 
types will be those that are cash-friendly, rather than 
particularly sophisticated.
 • Because of the problems involved in transporting large 
amounts of cash, countries that are geographically 
close may be particularly attractive as the first step in 
the laundering process.
10 The Financial Action Task Force defines the three stages of money-
laundering as follows:
 In the initial - or placement - stage of money laundering, the launderer 
introduces his illegal profits into the financial system. This might be 
done by breaking up large amounts of cash into less conspicuous 
smaller sums that are then deposited directly into a bank account, 
or by purchasing a series of monetary instruments (cheques, money 
orders, etc.) that are then collected and deposited into accounts at 
another location.
 After the funds have entered the financial system, the second – or 
layering – stage takes place. In this phase, the launderer engages in 
a series of conversions or movements of the funds to distance them 
from their source. The funds might be channelled through the pur-
chase and sales of investment instruments, or the launderer might 
simply wire the funds through a series of accounts at various banks 
across the globe. This use of widely scattered accounts for laundering 
is especially prevalent in those jurisdictions that do not co-operate in 
anti-money laundering investigations. In some instances, the laun-
derer might disguise the transfers as payments for goods or services, 
thus giving them a legitimate appearance.
 Having successfully processed his criminal profits through the first 
two phases  the launderer then moves them to the third stage – inte-
gration – in which the funds re-enter the legitimate economy. The 
launderer might choose to invest the funds into real estate, luxury 
assets, or business ventures.
 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/29/0,3343
,en_32250379_32235720_33659613_1_1_1_1,00.html.
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 • The money may then proceed to other countries, 
where more sophisticated banking systems perform 
the layering and integration processes. 
Offences that generate non-cash financial proceeds may 
generate funds already placed and maybe layered in 
financial accounts, and do not require these initial laun-
dering stages.  
 • Proceeds will be attracted to the larger or more sophis-
ticated banking systems. 
 • Proceeds may be transferred electronically, so that 
geographic proximity has little relevance. Of more 
significance is the willingness of the banking system 
to protect the identity of the customer, and the capac-
ity of the banking system to provide the necessary 
services. 
 • Offences that generate proceeds in the form of com-
modities may require processes that disguise the illicit 
nature of their origins – for example, integration into 
legitimate businesses.  
 • Proceeds will then appear as the profits from appar-
ently legitimate sources. 
• Attractiveness to money-launderers
There are multiple dimensions to attractiveness to 
money-launderers. In particular, each country will have 
an intrinsic attraction to launderers, based exclusively on 
its own characteristics. Some will be attractive to those 
requiring ‘cash-friendly’ banking services, whereas others 
will be attractive to those requiring sophisticated bank-
ing services.
Essential to these issues are questions of the extent to 
which the country’s regulatory regime prohibits the pro-
vision of money-laundering services, and the finance 
sector has the expertise and capacity to provide such 
services. 
In addition to the country’s intrinsic attractiveness to 
money-launderers, there is the issue of its pair-wise 
attractiveness with other countries, based on shared 
characteristics. Countries that share certain characteris-
tics, including common ethnic backgrounds, common 
language(s), regular and extensive trade and shared (and 
porous) borders will be more attractive to money-laun-
derers because of the greater ease of doing business.
As is shown by Walker and Unger,11 these concepts can 
be brought together in the form of an international 
input-output economic model,12 using a form of ‘grav-
11 Walker, John and Unger, Brigitte, “Measuring Global Money Laun-
dering: “The Walker Gravity Model”,” Review of Law & Economics: 
2009, Vol. 5: Iss. 2, Article 2.
12 Developed by Wassily Leontief (Leontief, W. 1986. Input-Output 
ity model’13 to express the attractiveness factor.  
• Measuring a region’s intrinsic attractiveness 
to money-launderers
The relative size of an economy can attract money-
launderers since it may be easier and safer to hide huge 
illicit funds in a more advanced economy than in a less 
developed country where government institutions would 
not be strong enough to bail out financial institutions in 
case of bankruptcy. Financial services exports and for-
eign direct investment are measures of the capacity of a 
country to undertake transnational financial transac-
tions. Measures of the rule of law may indicate the 
unwillingness of a country’s operators to launder illicitly 
generated funds. Similarly, compliance with the Finan-
cial Action Task Force’s “40+9” recommendations may 
be an indicator of the unwillingness of a country’s oper-
ators to launder illicitly generated funds.  At the same 
time, the existence of a large shadow economy tends to 
facilitate effective hiding of illicit funds and is thus likely 
to act as an incentive for money-launderers to invest 
their funds in such countries.  
Based on the considerations mentioned above, a range 
of variables has been used in this study to measure a 
country’s intrinsic attractiveness to money-launderers. 
Key parameters used in the current model were: 
 • GDP per capita; 
 • the importance of the financial services sector in GDP 
(financial services exports as % of GDP); 
 • foreign direct investment inflows as % of GDP; 
 • indices measuring the rule of law (Rule of Law index); 
 • indices measuring human development (HDI Index); 
 • FATF compliance (Financial Action Task Force rec-
ommendations compliance index); 
 • extent of the shadow economy (Shadow Economy as a 
percentage of GDP). 
The data for some of these variables are far from com-
plete. The methodology for missing values varies accord-
ing to the context and the information available, but 
generally, countries of a similar character to the one with 
missing data were identified, and corrections for popula-
Economics, 2nd edition. Oxford University Press.), and  long used 
by economists as the basis for economic modeling.
13 The gravity model is related to the input-output model and says that 
the amount of trade from place A to place B depends on the size of 
the population in place A, the ‘attractiveness’ of place B to people 
based in A, and the distance between the two places.  The ‘distance’ 
need not refer simply to geographic distance, but can, for example, 
include other geographical deterrents to trade, such as mountain 
ranges. (Walker and Unger, 2009, op. cit.)
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tion or GDP were made where appropriate. For exam-
ple, where no data were found for financial services 
exports as a percentage of GDP for some significant 
financial centres, the data for another financial centre 
with similar characteristics (port city, similar popula-
tion, GDP and regional significance) was applied. In the 
case of numerous, less important centres, regional aver-
ages were applied. 
The Model produces an index based on these data and 
assumptions, which was then aggregated to the subre-
gional level. 
• Measuring specific region-to-region attrac-
tiveness to money launderers
The gravity model (first put forward by Tinbergen 
(196214), assumes that traders (in our case, money-
launderers) will prefer to conduct business between 
countries with attractive trading features, including cul-
tural or linguistic links, but that geographical distance is 
an impediment to laundering. As stated in Walker and 
Unger (2009):
Distance is important for trade flows because it is a 
proxy for transport costs. It also indicates the time 
elapsed during shipment, the damage or loss of the 
good which can occur when time elapses (ship sinks 
in a storm), or when the good spoils. It also can 
indicate the loss of the market, for example when the 
purchaser is unable to pay once the merchandise 
arrives. Distance also stands for communication 
costs; it is a proxy for the possibility of personal con-
tact between managers, customers, i.e. for informal 
contacts which cannot be sent over a wire. Distance 
can also be seen in a wider perspective as transaction 
costs, such as the search for trading opportunities or 
the establishment of trust between partners.
Geographic distances between capital cities can be com-
puted from their latitudes and longitudes. Of course, 
distance is no longer an absolute impediment to busi-
ness, so it is likely that the weight given to this factor 
should be lower in a model based on twenty-first cen-
tury forms of trade, including illicit trade, than it was 
given in earlier models. It is also likely that distance is a 
greater deterrence to illicit financial flows when they are 
in the form of bulk cash, rather than in other financial 
assets, simply because of the risks inherent in moving 
bulk cash across borders. This means that the weight 
given to distance, as a deterrent to money-laundering, 
would depend upon the nature of the proceeds of crime, 
and – in particular – whether the proceeds are generated 
in cash or in other forms. In this case, it is also likely that 
two countries that share a common border may have a 
14 Tinbergen, J., Shaping the World Economy, Twentieth Century Fund, 
1962, New York.
greater mutual attraction than countries that do not 
have a common border, even when they are equidistant.
The model also follows gravity model tradition in 
assuming that launderers will prefer to deal with coun-
tries that share common languages, cultural and trade 
ties. Walker and Unger (2009) note that:
Speaking a common language and sharing a 
common history and cultural background can lower 
transaction costs. “Two countries that speak the 
same language will trade twice to three times as 
much as pairs that do not share a common lan-
guage”.
Principal languages and trading partners can be 
compared, country by country, and similarities 
noted. An analysis of data on major trading part-
ners, languages and distances between capital 
cities produces the following results:
 • Exports decrease with the square of the distance be-
tween countries.
 • Only one out of seven countries traded more with dis-
tant countries than with closer countries.
 • Countries that share a common language are more 
than twice as likely to be named as principal export 
destinations.
 • Only one of five countries was more likely to trade 
with countries of dissimilar languages than with coun-
tries with a similar language.  
Both Di Giovanni (200315) and Wong (200716) have 
used the gravity model to examine what drives (legal) 
capital flows. They included variables that can be con-
sidered as measures of intrinsic attractiveness as well as 
measures of country-to-country attractiveness. Di Gio-
vanni finds that: 
In particular, the size of financial markets, as meas-
ured by the stock market capitalization to GDP 
ratio, has a strong positive association with domestic 
firms investing abroad.  The importance of the stock 
market is particularly strong in market-based vs. 
bank-based economies. Second, bilateral distance 
has a negative effect, while telephone traffic has a 
positive effect. … Third, consistent with the last 
finding, a common language has a positive effect. 
Fourth, bilateral service agreements stimulate deals. 
Fifth, high tax rates in the target country provides a 
15 di Giovanni, J., ‘What drives capital flows? The case of cross-border 
M&A activity and financial deepening,’ Journal of International Eco-
nomics, 2005.
16 Wong, W.K., Comparing the Fit of the Gravity Model for Differ-
ent Cross-Border Flows (http://courses.nus.edu.sg/course/ecswong/
research/wb9-ML.pdf ).
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disincentive, while bilateral capital tax agreements 
have a positive effect. Finally, some other controls, 
such as economic size, are also significant. 
Wong found empirically that a model based on distance, 
language and ‘colonial experience’ “works well for trade 
and telephone traffic, but less satisfactorily for merger and 
acquisition flows”. He found that “bilateral flows are 
higher if two countries share a common border or a common 
language”.
It is reasonable to hypothesize that similar principles to 
those that apply to trade between countries also apply to 
the flows of the proceeds of crime. A range of variables, 
consistent with these findings, has therefore been used 
in this study to measure attractiveness to money-laun-
derers:
 • Geographic distance.17 
 • Whether the countries share a common border or 
are linked by a key transport route (a simple Yes/No 
index).18 
 • Whether the countries share a principal language.19
 • The proportion of exports from country A that go to 
country B.20
The geographic distance and the common border index 
reflect the traditional gravity model, plus Wong’s find-
ings about common borders. The language expresses the 
ease of doing business, and the export data measure the 
strength of existing (mostly legal) trade patterns between 
the two countries. 
The individual country results were then aggregated to 
the subregional level. The results in this study are only 
shown at the subregional level.  
17 Distance was calculated as follows:  Distanceij, for countries i and j 
not sharing common borders = the geographic distance between capi-
tal cities;  for countries i and j sharing common borders = “Distance 
Reduction for Common Borders” * geographic distance between 
capital cities; and for i = j, = “Notional Distance for Internal Laun-
dering” * Min(Distanceij, i not equal j). The ‘notional distance for 
internal laundering is related to the nearest “other” country, so the 
model finds the distance from country I to the nearest country J, 
and multiplies it by 0.049, reflecting the results of research done on 
internal money-laundering in the Netherlands. .
 The data was computed from the latitudes and longitudes of the 
cities: http://www.racerecon.com/trailrecon/gmaps/Chapters/chap-
ter5/ScreenScraping/scrape_me.html.
18 Compiled from Google Maps
19 Source: http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0855611.html
20 Compiled from http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx. A simple 
gravity model, based on the GDPs of the two countries and the dis-
tance between them, was used to estimate the remaining percentages.
• Model calibration
As described in Rodrigue et al (2009), a calibration 
process is necessary to ensure that the gravity model 
produces results that match known facts.
A significant challenge related to the usage of spatial 
interaction models, notably the gravity model, is 
related to their calibration. Calibration consists in 
finding the value of each parameters of the model 
(constant and exponents) to insure that the esti-
mated results are similar to the observed flows. If it 
is not the case, the model is almost useless as it pre-
dicts or explains little. It is impossible to know if the 
process of calibration is accurate without comparing 
estimated results with empirical evidence21.
The model is therefore constructed so that a weighting 
can be applied to each of the variables listed above to 
generate different scores for each country. A zero weight-
ing excludes the variable from the scoring system. A 
negative weighting can be applied to those factors 
believed to reduce the attractiveness to money-launder-
ers. In some cases, a negative value can also be seen as a 
correction factor. The higher the weighting, the more 
influence the factor has in the intrinsic attractiveness 
score. These weightings can then be manipulated to 
achieve a good match between the model’s results and 
observed flows. 
The Attractiveness Index is calibrated in this way by 
reference to the many existing lists of money-laundering 
countries, offshore centres, tax havens and AML compli-
ance matrices,22 and by reference to the few existing 
attempts to quantify elements and correlates of money-
laundering to or from particular countries.23   
b)	 	Application	of	the	model(s)	to	
cocaine	trafficking
The various models outlined above were tested for one 
specific transnational organized crime activity: traffick-
ing in cocaine. Trafficking in cocaine is particularly 
interesting as it tends to have a higher level of organized 
crime involvement than trafficking in other drugs. This 
21 Rodrigue, J-P, C. Comtois and B. Slack (2009), The Geography 
of Transport Systems, Second Edition, New York: Routledge.  See 
http://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch5en/meth5en/ch5m2en.
html.
22 These include the International Narcotics Control Board, the OECD 
tax implementation standards list, and the Tax Justice Network.
23 For example, Baird Maritime, “Laundered ransoms cause Kenyan 
property boom,” 25 February 2010 (http://www.bairdmaritime.
com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5693:p
iracy-cash-lands-in-kenya-property-market-in-nairobi-skyrockets-
&catid=113:ports-and-shipping&Itemid=208), and the Global 
Financial Integrity Programme’s attempt to quantify privately held , 
non-resident deposits in secrecy jurisdictions - http://www.gfip.org/
storage/gfip/documents/reports/gfi_privatelyheld_web.pdf.
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also results in the concentration of funds in a more lim-
ited number of hands and thus in more significant 
amounts potentially available for money-laundering 
than for other drugs. The geographic concentration of 
cocaine trafficking activities in the Western hemisphere 
also means that the banking sector plays a larger role for 
money-laundering than in the Eastern hemisphere 
where traditional, informal financial transaction systems 
(such as the Hawala system, based on trust and family 
ties) are of larger importance.  
Whenever countries are explicitly mentioned in the 
subsequent sub-chapters, this was done to explain the 
methodology used to arrive at estimates, but is not 
intended to denounce such countries or downplay the 
efforts made by these countries to fight the scourge of 
cocaine trafficking. In fact, some of the most frequently 
mentioned countries have been those that have made 
most progress in dealing with the cocaine problem in 
recent years. This includes Colombia which succeeded 
in reducing its area under coca cultivation by 65% over 
the 2000-2010 period, the United States of America, 
which succeeded in significantly reducing cocaine use 
(cocaine positive urine tests among the general work-
force fell by 68% between 2006 and 2010) and Mexico, 
where the Government actively confronted the drug 
cartels in recent years and thus contributed to the mas-
sive decline of cocaine use in the United States.24    
i. Estimating the proceeds of the illicit 
cocaine trade  
UNODC has undertaken several rounds of estimates of 
the various illicit drug markets, notably for cocaine and 
the opiates. With regard to cocaine, UNODC’s latest 
estimates suggest a total retail sales figure of around 
US$85 billion (range: US$75-US$100 bn) for 2009. 
UNODC has compiled a comprehensive database with 
annual time-series data covering almost all countries, a 
range of key drug types, and an extensive list of data 
items. From these data, estimates can be derived of the 
extent of cocaine market-related activities affecting vari-
ous countries, and the profits generated by those activi-
ties. The data include:
 • Estimated numbers of producers.
 • Estimated area under cultivation. 
 • Estimated quantity of production.
 • Estimated quality of production and of the amounts 
trafficked (‘purity’).
 • Estimated ‘farmgate’ prices to producers.
24  UNODC, World Drug Report 2011, June 2011. 
 • Estimated losses in transit to consumers (seizures).
 • Trafficking routes.
 • Estimated wholesale prices (price per kilogram).
 • Estimated retail prices (price per gram).
 • Estimated numbers of consumers.
 • Socio-demographic profiles of consumers.
 • Estimated consumption per consumer (for a limited 
number of countries).
 • Numbers of traffickers /consumers arrested.
These data provide sufficient information to estimate 
the supply, demand, price levels, and therefore, potential 
profits.25  
ii. Number of cocaine users 
The calculation process – using the example of cocaine 
- will be explained here in more detail. The calculation 
starts with estimates of the number of users in each 
country. This information is typically obtained from 
household surveys. The proportion of people who have 
used cocaine at least once over the last 12 months are 
identified via such surveys. Most countries have signed 
and ratified the 1961 Single Convention, and as such, 
the national authorities are required to provide UNODC 
with their best national estimates. Nonetheless, informa-
tion provided by Member States is uneven. Good infor-
mation is available from countries in North America, 
Europe, Oceania and South America (including Central 
America and the Caribbean). On the other hand, infor-
mation is poor for the majority of countries in Asia, and 
– in particular – Africa. 
The population aged 15-64 of a given country is multi-
plied with the prevalence rate to give an estimate of that 
country’s total number of cocaine users. In case the sur-
veys were conducted for different age groups, the results 
are adjusted accordingly, typically assuming that there 
are hardly any cocaine users above the age of 65. In case 
the surveys used other measures (lifetime prevalence, 
past month prevalence), countries in the region having 
measured annual prevalence and lifetime or past month 
prevalence were used to reach – via a regression analysis 
– an estimate of the likely annual prevalence rate of the 
country concerned. Where countries only conducted 
school surveys, regression analyses were undertaken to 
arrive at a prevalence estimate based on information of 
countries that had conducted a school survey and a 
national household survey. Another question is how to 
25 See, for example, UNODC, World Drug Report 2005, Vol. 1, Ch. 2., 
‘Estimating the Value of Illicit Drug Markets,’ 2005.
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handle old information. For the purposes of this exer-
cise, all available estimates were used. The prevalence 
rates obtained from surveys in previous years were 
applied to the current population aged 15-64. A greater 
challenge is to deal with missing information. In these 
cases, the subregional average was taken as a proxy and 
adjusted if other available information (including quali-
tative information) indicated that cocaine use is likely 
higher or lower than the subregional average. 
The result of this complex exercise was a ‘best estimate’ 
of around 15.6 million cocaine users in 2009 or 0.35% 
of the population aged 15-64, which is in line with 
results obtained for the previous year (15.9 million in 
2008). The ‘best estimate’ also falls within the range of 
14.3 to 20.5 million users, or 0.3%-0.5% of the popula-
tion aged 15-64, calculated on the basis of 
rigorous ‘mechanical’ rules in dealing with missing 
information: for each non-reporting country the cocaine 
use levels were set at the 10th percentile and the 90th 
percentile level of the highest and the lowest country 
results at the subregional level (or regional level, in case 
insufficient country estimates at the subregional level 
were available). However, it is unlikely that large-scale 
cocaine use exists, for example, across China, Mongolia 
or in most of inland Africa. Qualitative information, 
suggesting relatively high or low levels of cocaine use in 
individual countries, indicates that the global cocaine 
use figures (estimated at 15.6 million) are probably 
closer to the lower end of the overall range (14 to 21 
million users).   
The model, based on the ‘best estimates,’ suggests that 
the largest numbers of cocaine users are found in North 
America (5.7 million), West and Central Europe (4.1 
million) and South America (2.7 million, including the 
Caribbean and Central America). Estimates for Asia are 
low (0.7 million). The best estimates for Africa give a 
figure of 1.7 million people – but this estimate should 
only be considered as indicative, as most African coun-
tries have not conducted national household surveys.  
iii. cocaine consumption  
The next step was to estimate per capita consumption. 
This was based on the results of the 2005 input-output 
model,26 linking demand and supply. These results were 
adjusted in line with more recent research.   
The per capita use levels range from 6 and 7 grams of 
pure cocaine per year in East Europe and Oceania 
(where cocaine is expensive) to 35 grams in South Amer-
ica, Central America and the Caribbean (where it is 
cheap). Per capita use of cocaine in North America (32 
grams) and West and Central Europe (28 grams) seems 
to be relatively similar. No information has been found 
regarding per capita use of cocaine in either Africa or 
Asia. The number was set at 20 grams per user. Multi-
plying the per capita use levels with the number of 
26 UNODC, World Drug Report 2005, Volume 1: Analysis, 2005, pp. 
123-143.
table 38: Number of cocaine users in 2009 – best estimates
Source: UNoDc, calculations based on replies to the Annual Reports Questionnaire (ARQ) and other information sources. 
Population (in million) Cocaine 
users
in % of  
population aged 
15-64 Total aged 15-64
Europe 804 550 4,522,000 0.82
   west and central Europe 480 322 4,051,000 1.26
   South-East Europe 127 87 157,000 0.18
   East Europe 200 143 313,000 0.22
North America 458 305 5,693,000 1.86
South and central America and 
caribbean
472 307 2,728,000 0.89
Asia 4,063 2,719 673,000 0.02
oceania 36 23 300,000 1.29
Africa 1,008 566 1,711,000 0.30
TOTAL 6,841 4,471 15,627,000 0.35
Americas 929.51 612.53 8,421,000 1.37
western Europe 482.15 320.62 3,900,000 1.21
Eastern Europe 322.07 229.19 624,000 0.27
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cocaine users gives a total global demand for cocaine of 
some 440 tons, including almost 180 tons for consump-
tion in North America, 123 tons for West and Central 
Europe and more than 95 tons for South America, Car-
ibbean and Central America. The estimates for Africa 
(20 tons) and Asia (13 tons) are far lower.  
The consumption estimates of 440 tons at the global 
level were cross-checked against supply estimates. Global 
production of cocaine in 2009 was estimated by 
UNODC to have amounted to between 842 tons and 
1,111 tons. (The difference is due to various assump-
tions about the yields of the coca leaf and the transfor-
mation of coca leaf to coca paste, cocaine base and 
cocaine hydrochloride). Global production must satisfy 
consumption as well as seizures. Global seizures 
amounted to some 732 tons in 2009. Applying average 
retail purity (33%), weighted by the amounts consumed 
in each country, this would be equivalent to seizures of 
pure cocaine of 242 tons, or applying average wholesale 
purity, weighted by the seizures made (81%) would 
amount to seizures of 593 tons of pure cocaine. Assum-
ing that 75% of the cocaine is being seized at the whole-
sale level and 25% at the retail level, purity-adjusted 
global seizures in 2009 would have amounted to 505 
tons of pure cocaine. Adding seizures to consumption 
would result in global total demand for cocaine of 
(440+505=) 945 tons (range: (440+242=) 682 to 
(440+593=) 1,033 tons), which would be basically in 
line with global production estimates for that year (842 
to 1,111 tons for the year 2009). 
iv. cocaine prices  
A subsequent step was to identify the retail and whole-
sale prices in each country, adjusted for purity, in order 
to arrive at a pure price per gram (retail level) or per 
kilogram (wholesale level). This information is also to be 
supplied to UNODC as part of the ARQ process. When 
only price ranges were reported, the midpoint price was 
used – unless official additional information was avail-
able to estimate the typical price. (For example, this was 
        Best estimates
 Users Per capita use
 Consumption 
 
in million in % of total
grams per 
year
 in metric 
tons 
in % of 
total
Americas	 8.4 54% 										32.6	 			275	 63%
    of which      
        South America 2.4 15%               35.0              85 19%
        central America 0.1 1%          35.0                   5 1%
        caribbean 0.1 1%              35.0            6 1%
        North America 5.7 36%            31.5 179 41%
Europe	 4.5 29% 											28.4	 								129	 29%
   of which      
       west and central  Europe 4.1 26%           30.3     123 28%
       South-East Europe 0.2 1% 24.7 4 1%
       East Europe 0.3 2%              6.0           2 < 1%
Africa	 1.7 11% 															12.0	 											21	 5%
    of which      
        west and central Africa 1.1 7%             12.0            13 3%
         Southern Africa 0.3 2%                12.0                   4 1%
         Northern Africa < 0.1 <1%               12.0  < 1 < 1%
         Eastern Africa 0.2 1%                12.0               3 < 1%
Asia	 0.7 4% 														20.0	 												14	 3%
Oceania	 0.3 2% 																	7.3	 												2	 <	1%
Total	 15.6 100% 															28.1	 							440	 100%
table 39: Tentative estimate of the amounts of cocaine consumed in 2009
Source: UNoDc estimates based on UNoDc, Annual Reports Questionnaire data, World Drug Report 2005 and updates based on selected 
scientific studies. 
Detai led analysis of a transnational organized cr ime sector 2
59
done for the United States, where the STRIDE data-
base27 reports all prices of federally seized or purchased 
drugs, including their purity). When 2009 data were not 
available, data from the latest year available were used. 
The challenge was to deal with missing data. For this 
purpose, the unweighted average of the prices or purities 
reported in a subregion or region was applied. A number 
of consistency checks were performed to guarantee that 
retail prices were not lower than wholesale prices, which 
would be unlikely as traffickers tend to make profits, not 
losses. 
The data, aggregated to the regional level, showed – as 
expected - high cocaine retail prices in Oceania (US$785 
per pure gram) and low prices in South America, Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean (US$39 per pure gram). 
Purity-adjusted retail prices in West and Central Europe 
($273 per pure gram) are higher than in North America 
(US$222 per pure gram), even though prices there have 
increased strongly after 2006. Average retail prices at the 
global level (weighted by consumption) amounted to 
US$194 per pure gram in 2009.   
The calculation of wholesale prices was more complex. 
27 The US Drug Enforcement Agency runs a database System to Retrieve 
Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE), which includes detailed 
information of drug seizures and undercover drug purchases, includ-
ing price and purity.   
The ARQ asks for wholesale prices per kilogram and for 
wholesale purity. This gives prices of around US$6 per 
pure gram in South America (including Central America 
and the Caribbean), US$35 in North America and 
US$84 in West and Central Europe. Research in the 
USA (likely true for most other countries as well) shows 
that dealers selling to end users typically do not purchase 
a kilogram of cocaine, as this would be too expensive, 
but rather purchase smaller quantities, ranging between 
20 and 50 grams, from a mid-level dealer. In the USA, 
this quantity is typically an ounce (28.4 grams). Thus, 
in order to calculate the size of the retail market at the 
national level, it would not be particularly useful to 
calculate the difference between gram and kilogram 
prices as this would include a sizeable proportion of the 
national wholesale market. A more appropriate calcula-
tion of retail profits would be based on the price differ-
ence between ‘ounce’ and ‘gram’ prices. 
Detailed prices at several levels are, however, only col-
lected in the USA. Analysing the STRIDE database for 
the years 2002-2006 when the US cocaine market was 
relatively stable (in contrast to subsequent price hikes), 
table 40: Purity-adjusted cocaine retail, wholesale and import prices per gram (2009)
Source: UNoDc, calculations based on replies to the Annual Reports Questionnaire (ARQ) and other information sources.
Consumption
Average 
retail 
price in 
US$
Average wholesale 
prices in US$
Average import price in 
US$
In kilograms per gram
at the 
ounce 
level per 
gram
at the 
kilogram 
level per 
gram
from 
countries 
bought
in countries 
of origin
Europe 128,568 277 115 86 39 2.2
   west and central     
   Europe
122,793 273 112 84 37 2.2
   South-East Europe 3,897 360 153 117 63 2.2
   East Europe 1,877 408 197 160 96 2.2
North America 179,476 222 68 35 15 2.2
South and central 
America and  
caribbean
95,480 39 11 6 2.4 2.2
Asia 13,464 181 102 88 27 2.2
oceania 2,186 785 329 248 38 2.2
Africa 20,533 88 44 36 14 2.2
TOTAL 439,706 194 70 47 20 2.2
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data show that in each period, the ounce prices (per 
gram) (that is, the average prices charged for purchases 
between 20 and 50 grams) has been between the gram 
and the kilogram prices of cocaine, though far closer to 
the kilogram prices, expressed in grams. If the total dif-
ference between the gram and kilogram prices (per 
gram) were set at 100 (0 for gram price and 100 for 
kilogram price, expressed in grams), the ounce prices 
would fluctuate closely around 83. In other words, a 
good approximation of the ounce price is to calculate 
the difference between the retail and kilogram prices, 
calculate 83% of this difference and then deduct this 
price difference from the retail price. This method was 
subsequently applied to all other countries in order to 
obtain an estimate of the ounce prices.    
The next challenge was the calculation of the typical 
import price. While the original import price in the 
Andean region is known (on average around US$2,200 
per kilogram in 2009 or US$2.2 per gram), cocaine is 
not only bought directly from the Andean countries, but 
typically from various transit countries. Thus most of 
the cocaine destined for the USA, for instance, was 
bought in Mexico (that is, shipped by Mexican cartels 
from Mexico across the border into the USA). In order 
to get the typical import price, all available information 
about trafficking routes and transit countries was taken 
into consideration.      
v. Estimating retail and wholesale value   
Multiplying the purity-adjusted retail prices with the 
amounts of cocaine consumed in each country gives the 
retail value. The calculations result in a global retail 
value of the cocaine consumed of US$85 billion for the 
year 2009. The largest markets are North America 
(US$40 billion or 47% of the global market), followed 
by the markets of West and Central Europe (US$34 bil-
lion or 39% of the global market). The other regions 
account for just 14% of the total. 
Valued at ‘ounce prices’ (reflecting the market at which 
street dealers purchase the cocaine) the size of the global 
cocaine market amounts to US$31 billion; valued at 
kilogram prices, the value falls to US$20 billion. Valued 
at the import level, from where the cocaine was bought, 
drug traffickers had to pay some US$9 billion. 
vi. Estimating cocaine-related gross 
profits 
The global retail sales of cocaine were estimated at US$ 
85 billion in 2009. The total value of the cocaine in the 
countries of origin amounted to US$1 billion. This 
indicates that gross profits of some US$84 billion were 
generated in 2009.28
The data calculated above allow for the determination of 
gross profits at the various levels. The data show that 
most gross profits at the global level are made at the 
retail level (US$54 bn), more than twice as much as 
those (US$22 bn) generated at the wholesale level (dif-
ference of import and ounce prices). By far the largest 
gross retail profits are generated in North America 
(US$28 bn) and West and Central Europe (US$20 bn), 
accounting for 87% of global gross retail profits for 
cocaine.   
The overall gross wholesale profits (US$22 bn) can be 
split into two components: wholesale profits at the 
national level (between the kilogram price and the ounce 
price: US$10 bn) and international wholesale profits 
(from the importing country to the national wholesalers: 
US$12 bn). Additionally, gross profits are also made in 
shipping the cocaine from the countries of origin to 
various transit countries (US$8 bn). 
In other words, these figures suggest that international 
cocaine trafficking generates some US$20 bn (US$8 bn 
for trafficking to major transit countries and some 
US$12 bn for trafficking to final destination countries). 
In addition, some US$10 bn are generated from local 
wholesale trafficking and a further US$54 bn from local 
cocaine retail sales, thus totalling some US$64 bn in 
gross profits that are generated at the national level 
related to the consumption of cocaine. 
vii. Adjusting gross profits for seizures    
The gross profits calculated so far do not take into 
account that drug traffickers also lose some of their 
merchandise due to seizures. Taking seizures into 
account does not change the overall profits generated 
(some US$84 bn), however. It only impacts on the dis-
tribution of the profits made across countries. The gross 
profits rise in the producer countries (as more cocaine is 
sold there) and decline in the consumer countries (as 
traffickers have to purchase more cocaine than what they 
can eventually sell to consumers due to seizures).
 This issue is not just of academic interest. As mentioned 
before, global consumption of cocaine – expressed in 
pure drug equivalents – is estimated at some 440 tons. 
Global cocaine seizures amounted to some 732 tons in 
2009. Adjusted for retail purity (≈33%) this would 
amount to seizures of 242 tons expressed in pure cocaine 
equivalents, or – based on wholesale purity (≈81%) – to 
28 ‘Gross profits’ here do not take into account any other expenses that 
may be accruing to drug traffickers. In economic terms, a perhaps 
more correct terminology would be the ‘value-added’; however, this 
terminology has positive connotations which may not be appropriate 
when applied to  harmful and potentially deadly substances such as 
illicit drugs.
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table 41: Value of cocaine consumed in 2009 (in US$ million) 
Source: UNoDc, calculations based on replies to the Annual Reports Questionnaire (ARQ) and other information sources.
Retail value Wholesale value  (in mio US$)
Import value  
(in mio US$)
in mio US $ in %
based on 
‘ounce 
prices’
based on 
kilogram 
prices
Value in 
countries 
bought
Value in 
countries 
of origin
Europe 35,650 42% 14,755 11,068 5,011 154
   west and 
   central Europe 33,480 39% 13,788 10,313 4,585 147
   South-East  
   Europe 1,404 2% 597 455 246 5
   East Europe 767 1% 370 300 180 2
North America 39,873 47% 12,142 6,327 2,700 215
South and central Amer-
ica and caribbean
3,765 4% 1,084 610 229 115
Asia 2,431 3% 1,374 1,187 363 16
oceania 1,716 2% 719 543 83 3
Africa 1,806 2% 897 737 279 25
TOTAL 85,241 100% 30,970 20,472 8,670 528
table 42: cocaine-related gross profits in million US$ generated at the global level – and their distribution (unad-
justed for seizures and transit profits)
Source: UNoDc, calculations based on replies to the Annual Reports Questionnaire (ARQ) and other information sources.
Retail 
profits Wholesale  profits
Profits 
from 
country of 
origin to 
transit 
countries
(from 
ounce to 
gram 
price) 
Total whole-
sale profits 
(from import 
price to ounce 
price) 
Of which: 
National 
wholesale prof-
its (from kg to 
ounce price)
Of which: 
Interna-
tional 
wholesale 
profits (from 
import to kg 
price)
Europe 20,985 9,744 3,687 6,056 4,857
   west and central 
   Europe
19,692 9,203 3,475 5,728 4,437
   South-East Europe 807 209 142 209 242
   East Europe 397 120 70 120 178
North America 27,731 9,442 5,815 3,627 2,485
South and central 
America and carib-
bean
2,681 854 473 381 115
Asia 1,057 1,006 187 819 352
oceania 997 636 176 460 80
Africa 909 618 160 458 254
ToTAl 54,270 22,300 10,498 11,802 8,142
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seizures of 593 tons of pure cocaine. Assuming that half 
was seized at the wholesale level and half at the retail 
level, the purity-adjusted seizures would have amounted 
to 417 tons; assuming that practically all was seized at 
the wholesale level would result in purity-adjusted sei-
zures of 593 tons. Taking the mid-point of the two 
estimates (417 and 593 tons) would result in a ‘best 
estimate’ of around 505 tons of pure cocaine seizures. 
This would be equivalent to an assumption that 75% of 
the seizures take place at the wholesale level and 25% at 
the retail level.   
If such purity-adjusted seizures (505 tons) were to be 
multiplied with the average global purity-adjusted 
wholesale price of cocaine calculated above (≈US$47 per 
gram, based on the amounts consumed), the calcula-
tions suggest that some US$24 bn in gross profits (out 
of global profits of US$84 bn) could shift from traffick-
ers in consumer countries to traffickers in producer 
countries. Such a calculation based on the average 
wholesale price, weighted by the amounts of cocaine 
consumed in each country, would, however, over-esti-
mate the actual shifts. The shifts are smaller as the dis-
tribution of cocaine consumption and cocaine seizures 
at the global levels are far from identical. In fact, sig-
nificant cocaine seizures take place close to the source 
countries where cocaine prices are far lower. 
Once the purity-adjusted cocaine wholesale prices are 
weighted by the seizures made in each country, the aver-
age global cocaine price falls to some US$15 per gram; 
multiplied with purity-adjusted seizures this results in 
shifts in gross profits of some US$7 bn, mainly going 
from consumer towards producer and transit countries. 
The amounts taken out of the market by the authorities 
in the consumer countries de facto increase the gross 
profits of the South American drug traffickers as they are 
able to sell more to their clients in the main consumer 
markets of North America, Europe and other regions. In 
other words, the reductions in profits of the North 
American and European organized crime groups due to 
seizures made in their respective regions help to increase 
– ceteris paribus - the profits of the South American 
crime groups.29 Gross profits at the national level thus 
fall to some US$57 bn (US$64 – US$7 bn) while inter-
national cocaine trafficking profits rise to some US$27 
bn  (US$20 bn + US$7 bn). 
While it is straightforward to identify – with a reasona-
ble degree of accuracy - the overall costs for criminal 
groups related to cocaine seizures, it is far more difficult 
to identify the countries where the costs have to be 
borne. Assume that a cocaine delivery from Colombia to 
Spain is intercepted by the Spanish navy. Who has to 
bear the cost of the lost delivery – the Colombian 
exporters or the Spanish importers? In some cases it may 
be the Colombian exporters, in others the Spanish 
importers. Given the lack of empirical knowledge about 
the frequency distribution, it is assumed in the model 
that the cost will have to be borne by both the Colom-
bian exporters (50%) and by the Spanish importers 
(50%). As some of the losses are covered by the Colom-
bian exporters, the Spanish importers reap a ‘benefit’.    
29 It would be wrong, however, to consider seizures a zero-sum game. Seizures 
increase the risk, and thus the cocaine prices in the consumer countries, which 
helps to limit drug consumption in the consumer countries.
table 43: losses and gains from law enforcement cocaine seizures in million US$ (2009)
Source: UNODC, calculations based on replies to the Annual Reports Questionnaire (ARQ) and other information sources.
 
Losses suffered 
by drug traffick-
ers due to sei-
zures in million 
US$ 
Gains from payments of 
losses by exporters and 
from additional cocaine 
sales in million US$  
(simplified model)
Net losses/gains in  
million US$
Europe -2,469                            1,235 -1,235
   west and central Europe -2,344                            1,172 -1,172
   South-East Europe -114                                 57 -57
   East Europe -11                                   5 -6
North America -3,004                               300 -2,704
South and central America 
and caribbean
-1,598 5,608 4,010
Asia -51                                 25 -26
oceania -43                                 22 -22
Africa -49                                 24 -25
TOTAL -7,214 7,214 0
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This assumption is probably reasonable for most regions. 
Only in North America are there indications that the 
bulk of the trafficking is organized by Mexican drug 
cartels, and thus criminal groups from North America. 
Assuming that the financial cost of the cocaine seizures 
made in North America (equivalent to some US$3 bn) 
have to be borne primarily by North American drug 
traffickers (90%), their net losses still amount to US$2.7 
bn. The net losses for North American drug traffickers 
due to seizures are far higher than the net losses suffered 
by traffickers in West and Central Europe (US$1.2 bn). 
The assumption that seizures in North America affect 
primarily North American drug groups seems to be a 
fair reflection of reality. In this case, all available infor-
mation suggests that the Mexican drug cartels and US 
drug gangs dominate cocaine trafficking and the local 
cocaine markets in North America. 
viii. Transit profits    
In addition, the calculations above revealed that the 
approximately US$8 bn generated in transporting the 
cocaine from the cocaine-producing countries in the 
Andean region to the primary transit countries, have so 
far not been accounted for in the gross profit country 
tables established. 
The gross country by country profits calculated above 
were based on the calculated cocaine consumption in 
each country and did not include transit profits or shifts 
in profits generated due to seizures. A systematic incor-
poration of the missing factors into the calculations at 
the country level is, however, rather difficult. Moreover, 
the factors cannot be tackled in isolation. Seizures are 
reported as an annual total per country. Many seizures 
concern drugs in transit, rather than drugs used for local 
consumption. Deducting the seizures from the gross 
profits realized from consumption would result in ‘nega-
tive profits’ for a number of transit countries. This 
would be wrong, in most cases. In other words, losses 
linked to seizures can only be subtracted once the model 
has been adjusted to take transit profits into account. 
Another issue concerns the actual location of the seizures 
and the appropriate price. As indicated above, there are 
a number of open questions. Assume that the Spanish 
navy makes a big cocaine seizure off its coasts. What 
price should be used to calculate the loss for organized 
crime; the wholesale price in Spain, the import price in 
South America, or some price in between? 
All of this means that the model and the results pre-
sented need to be further refined. Based on the initial 
findings, more than US$20 bn in wholesale profits 
(US$12 bn linked to imports for domestic consump-
tion, US$8 bn linked to so far unaccounted profits from 
producer to transit countries and up to US$7 bn linked 
to seizures) would need to be shifted. In order to do this, 
a number of assumptions need to be made. 
One approach to deal with the identification of the 
transit profits is to start the analysis from the cocaine 
flow out of the source countries to the main consumer 
markets. In the 2011 World Drug Report, the calcula-
tions started with the global cocaine production esti-
mate of 1,111 tons for the year 2009. Deducting 
amounts consumed in the three Andean countries (13 
tons), seizures made in these countries (254 tons, purity-
adjusted), as well as estimates of the losses incurred (56 
tons), the calculations suggested that 788 tons were 
available for export. Most of these exports were thought 
to have been leaving the Andean countries towards 
North America  (378 tons), West and Central Europe 
(217 tons) and other markets (193 tons). Deducting 
seizures in South America, Central America and the 
Caribbean suggested that 280 tons left South America 
(including Central America and the Caribbean) towards 
North America, 158 tons towards West and Central 
Europe, 83 tons were for local consumption in South 
America (including Central America and the Caribbean) 
and 46 tons were for other destinations. The final con-
sumption in the consumer countries was estimated to 
have amounted to 179 tons in North America, 123 tons 
in West and Central Europe and 43 tons in other parts 
of the world, including 21 tons in Africa, 14 tons in 
Asia, 6 tons in East and South-East Europe and 2 tons 
in Oceania. 
Starting with these amounts, the trafficking profits can 
be calculated. There are, first of all, trafficking profits 
generated within the Andean region. Estimates for 2009 
suggest that coca leaf worth slightly less than US$1.2 
billion was produced by farmers in the Andean region.30 
Not all of this was used for cocaine production – some 
was for coca leaf chewing and other ‘traditional uses’ of 
the coca plant. The value of the cocaine actually pro-
duced in the Andean region amounted to some US$1.3 
bn in the main coca producing areas. Statistics suggest 
that only slightly more than 70% of the initial cocaine 
production was actually exported (788 tons out of 1,111 
tons produced). Most of the ‘losses’ were due to seizures 
made in the Andean region (purity-adjusted, some 254 
tons), and, to a lesser extent, local consumption of 
cocaine (13 tons) and some actual losses (56 tons, 
including due to the destruction of some laboratories). 
Despite these losses, the value of the cocaine leaving the 
Andean countries increased to some US$1.7 billion. 
This suggests that in spite of massive seizures, overall, 
some US$0.6 bn in trafficking profits related to cocaine 
consumption outside the region were generated within 
the Andean countries.      
30  UNODC, 2010 World Drug Report, June 2010. 
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Continuing the analysis with the trafficking flows along 
the trafficking routes to the main consumer markets, 
available estimates suggest that the amounts leaving the 
Andean region towards North America amounted to 
some 378 tons of cocaine in 2009, equivalent to a value 
of some US$0.8 bn. Given massive seizures along the 
route, 167 tons of pure cocaine are actually consumed 
in the USA and Canada. Nonetheless, the value of this 
cocaine consumed – measured at wholesale level – rises 
to US$6.1 bn. This suggests that there are gross transit 
profits to be made of around US$5.3 bn. 
The gross transit profits for trafficking cocaine to Europe 
appear to be even higher, though the amounts trafficked 
are smaller. The cocaine destined for West and Central 
Europe amounted to some 217 tons, which in the 
Andean countries is equivalent to some US$0.5 bn. 
Given massive seizures along the way, 123 tons become 
available for consumption in Europe. But, these amounts 
fetch – on average – a purity-adjusted wholesale price of 
US$84,000 in the countries of West and Central Europe, 
which results in a value of the cocaine at the wholesale 
level of US$10.3 bn (or US$7.8 bn if the amounts were 
valued at wholesale prices in Spain, the main entry point 
of cocaine into Europe). Thus, the gross profits until the 
main entry points (using Spanish prices as a proxy) 
amounted to US$7.3 bn, rising to US$9.9 bn once the 
amounts consumed are valued at average purity-adjusted 
West and Central European cocaine wholesale prices.       
While the gross profits arising  from trafficking cocaine 
via the other South American, Central American and 
Caribbean countries are important when it comes to 
trafficking towards North America (US1.1 bn) and 
Europe (US$ 0.6 bn), the cross-country trafficking prof-
its for local consumption within South America, Central 
America and the Caribbean are more modest (US$ 0.3 
bn). A further US$0.2 bn is generated for trafficking 
activities to other regions (Oceania, Africa and Asia). 
Thus, total transit trafficking for countries outside the 
Andean region amounts to some US$2.2 bn.  
table 44: flows of cocaine, purity-adjusted*, to major consumer markets (tons), 2009
*Purity levels tend to decline along the trafficking chain. All numbers in this table have been adjusted to pure cocaine equivalents.  
Seizure data were adjusted based on reported wholesale purity data. 
Source: UNoDc estimates based on Annual Reports Questionnaire data and other government or scientific sources. 
Production 1,111
less seizures in Andean countries -254
less domestic consumption in Andean 
region -13
Potential amounts available for export out 
of  the Andean countries 844
less losses in production and/or losses in 
global trafficking which cannot be 
attributed to specific regions 
-56
Actual exports  out of Andean countries 788
West	and	Central	
Europe North	America
Non-Andean	South	
America	/	Caribbean,	
Central	America,	
Africa,		Asia,	Oceania
Amounts of cocaine leaving the Andean 
countries 217 378 193
less amounts seized in non–Andean South 
America, caribbean and central linked to 
trafficking flows  
-59 -98 -64
less  domestic consumption in non-Andean 
South America / caribbean / central Amer-
ica
-83
 Amounts leaving South America,  carib-
bean and central America  
158 (incl. 21 tons 
via west Africa) 280 46
less amounts seized in consumer countries 
outside South America / central America / 
caribbean 
-35 -101 -3
Amounts of cocaine consumed in countries 
outside South America /  central America / 
caribbean
123
179 (incl. 157 in 
the USA)
43 (incl.  21 Africa, 14 
Asia,  6 East and South-
East Europe;  2 oceania)
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Finally, transit profits are also made in trafficking cocaine 
for local consumption in Asia, Africa and Oceania as 
well as East and South-East Europe. The total transit 
profits for these secondary cocaine markets add up to 
US$3.4 bn.  
All of the gross transit profits to Europe, North America 
and the other regions add up to some US$19 bn and are 
thus of similar magnitude as the previously calculated 
wholesale profits arising from international trafficking 
activities (totalling less than US$20 bn, linked to less 
than US$12 bn of gross profits of international whole-
sale trafficking activities related to local drug consump-
tion plus US$8 bn for non-allocated transit profits to 
transit countries). 
The above calculations helped to identify the likely 
orders of magnitude of the gross transit profits resulting 
from the main flows of the cocaine trade. As a next step, 
these transit trafficking profits have to be ‘allocated’ to 
individual countries. Given the lack of precise input-
output flows of cocaine trafficking activities, any such 
‘allocation’ of regional flows to individual countries 
remains rather arbitrary. The fact that the final results in 
this exercise will only be shown at the subregional level 
entails, however, that potential mistakes in the alloca-
tion of the profits to individual countries are not neces-
sarily significant. The main subregional aggregates are 
still a fair reflection of reality. 
In other words, the next key question concerns the iden-
tification of the share of the transnational cocaine traf-
ficking profits generated by criminal groups from South 
America, versus criminal groups from the Caribbean, 
Central America and Africa.  
Calculating trafficking profits to North America (total 
transit profits of US5.3 bn) is relatively straightforward. 
The largest part of these profits are generated by South 
American groups, notably groups from Colombia (most 
of the US$3.3 bn in profits generated in shipping the 
cocaine to Mexico), followed by profits made by Mexi-
can drug cartels (US$2 bn for shipping the cocaine 
across the border to the USA; far more money is then 
made by the Mexican drug cartels within the United 
States in trafficking the cocaine to the various wholesal-
ers and retailers). Arrest data provided by the US Drug 
Enforcement Administration show that Mexican drug 
traffickers accounted for 15% of all cocaine traffickers 
arrested in the United States or 64% of all foreign 
cocaine traffickers arrested in the USA in 2009. Apply-
ing this proportion (15%) to the retail and wholesale 
profits generated in the USA (US$35 bn), would add 
another US$5 bn in gross profits for the Mexican drug 
cartels. The total profits of the Mexican drug cartels aris-
ing from cocaine sales to the USA and within the USA 
can thus be estimated at around US$7 bn. In addition, 
the Mexican cartels reap profits from cannabis, metham-
phetamine and heroin trafficking to the USA as well as 
from migrant smuggling and other illegal activities. The 
US authorities estimated that the drug-related profits 
alone may have reached some US$13.8 bn for the Mex-
ican cartels in 2006.31 This seems to be in line with 
31 ONDCP,  National Drug Control Strategy, February  2006, p. 35.
map 1: Main global cocaine flows, 2009
Source: World Drug Report 2011, June 2011
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table 45: Gross profits generated from trafficking cocaine to main consumer markets 
Sources: UNoDc calculations based on Annual Reports Questionnaire Data. 
 
Flows in 
tons 
(purity 
adjusted 
Purity 
adjusted 
prices
Comment
Value in 
million 
US$
Gross 
profits in 
million 
US$
Within Andean region for trafficking to other regions
Production of coca leaf  at farmgate level 1,173 
Production of cocaine 1,111 1,200 at farmgate/  laboratory level     1,333 
Exports  out of Andean countries 788 2,200 wholesale price in Andean region       1,734 
 Gross profits                             561
Towards West and Central Europe
Amounts of cocaine leaving the Andean  
countries 217 2,200 wholesale price Andean region 477  
Amounts leaving South America,   
Caribbean and Central America  158 7,000 wholesale price South America 1,106
Amounts of cocaine consumed in West &  
Central Europe 123      84,000 
wholesale price West and Cen-
tral Europe 10,332
9,855 (of 
which 7,139 
up to Europe)
 - via West Africa 21   $84,000 (wholesale price in 
West & Central Europe) 
- $28,000 (wholesale price in 
Africa)              
- about a third done by African groups 7                                                              56,000 392
- direct from South America to Europe     9,463
Towards North America
Amounts of cocaine leaving the Andean 
countries 378  2,200 wholesale price Andean region 832  
 Amounts leaving South America,  Carib-
bean and Central America  280 7,000 wholesale price South America 1,960
Amounts of cocaine arriving in Mexico 280 9500 wholesale price 2,660
Amounts of cocaine in Mexico 280 14,700 wholesale price 4,116
Amounts of cocaine arriving in the USA 250 22,000 wholesale price Texas 5,500
Amounts of cocaine consumed in the USA 157 36,000 wholesale price 5,652
Amounts of cocaine consumed in Canda 10  48,300 wholesale price 483
Subtotal USA, Canada 167   6,135
Gross profits towards North America      5,303
Towards  South America, Central America, Caribbean
Amounts of cocaine leaving the Andean 
countries 127  2,200 wholesale price Andean region 280  
Amounts consumed in South America 83      7,000 wholesale price South America 581
Overall gross profits      301
Towards rest of the  world
Amounts of cocaine leaving the Andean 
countries 58  2,200 wholesale price Andean region 128  
Amounts of cocaine leaving South Amer-
ica, Central America, Caribbean 46 7,000 wholesale price South America 322
- Africa 21 35,900 wholesale price 754
- Oceania 2 248,400 wholesale price 497
- Asia 14 87,400 wholesale price 1,224
- East and South-East Europe 6 167,500 wholesale price 1,005
Amounts consumed in rest of world 43  76,500 3,480 3,352
 Overall transit profits 18,811
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some estimates suggesting that up to $25-$30 billions’ 
worth of illegal drugs come through Mexico into the 
United States each year.32
The next major flow – in volume terms - is to West and 
Central Europe. The calculations suggest that 217 tons 
leave the Andean countries for final consumption of 123 
tons in West and Central Europe. In total, US$9.9 bn 
in gross transit profits are generated by this flow. Of this, 
some US$0.4 bn are generated by traffickers in West 
Africa. Out of the remaining US$9.5 bn, the bulk of the 
money seems to be reaped by organized criminal groups 
from South America, notably groups from Colombia. 
The profits up to the main European transit countries 
(such as Spain and the Netherlands) would amount to 
US$7.1 bn, which are to a large extent reaped by South 
American groups. The remaining US$2.4 bn are mostly 
made by criminal groups within Europe.  
The gross transit profits generated by trafficking cocaine 
to countries within South America, Central America 
and the Caribbean for local consumption are more mod-
erate, amounting to US$300 million. Trafficking groups 
from many South American countries seem to be 
involved in these activities.  
The total gross transit profits for trafficking cocaine to 
the rest of the world for local consumption in Asia, 
Africa, Oceania as well as East and South-East Europe 
are far lower. Calculations suggest that they may total 
close to US$3.4 bn. This includes almost US$1.2 bn 
generated in trafficking cocaine to Asia for local con-
sumption, almost US$1 bn in trafficking cocaine to East 
and South-East Europe, US$0.7 bn in trafficking 
cocaine to Africa for local consumption and US$0.5 bn 
in trafficking cocaine to Oceania. Trafficking to Africa 
involves mainly Colombian, Brazilian and Venezuelan 
criminal organizations. Trafficking to East and South-
East European destinations involves trafficking organi-
zations from the Balkan countries and, to a lesser extent, 
Colombian, Central American and Brazilian organiza-
tions. Trafficking to Oceania and Asia seems to increas-
ingly involve Mexican organizations, in addition to 
various South American ones.     
The next challenge is to combine all of this information 
in order to make reasonable assumptions about the allo-
cation of the gross profits. In order not to complicate 
calculations too much only the most important adjust-
ments to the figures from the initial model will be made. 
As previously mentioned, the ‘import profits’ from the 
transit countries to the countries of final destination 
amount to some US$12 bn. For the purposes of the 
model, it is assumed that a third of these profits are 
32 Stratfor Global Intelligence, Organized Crime in Mexico, March 
2008. 
generated by residents of the final destination countries. 
It is thus assumed, for instance, that a third of the prof-
its generated by importing cocaine from South America 
via Spain to the UK is generated by UK residents (who 
often purchase the cocaine from traffickers in Spain or 
the Netherlands to ship it to the UK, as well as smaller 
amounts directly in South America); the rest is gener-
ated by residents from the respective production and 
transit countries. This assumption has been applied to 
all countries except for the USA, the world’s largest 
cocaine market. All available information suggests that 
US citizens play an important role in selling cocaine to 
users in the United States, but only a minor role in 
importing the cocaine into the USA. Here the assump-
tion has been made that the bulk of the profits are gen-
erated by Mexican drug cartels and just 5% is linked to 
US citizens importing cocaine.   
The next task is to identify the major transit countries 
and to ‘allocate’ the overall transit profits. While availa-
ble data allow for a reasonably good understanding of 
the overall transit profits, the allocation of such profits 
to individual countries remains a major challenge. Given 
current data availability, only rough estimates are possi-
ble, which are subject to change once new information 
becomes available. 
The allocations have been done based on a detailed 
analysis of ARQ replies, reports by other international 
organizations, various government reports (such as the 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report pre-
pared by the US State Department) as well as individual 
drug seizures reported to UNODC. The analysis sug-
gests that criminal groups from South America (notably 
Colombia) continue to play an important role in traf-
ficking cocaine towards North America (in particular 
Mexico) and Europe (in particular Spain). 
Based on the qualitative and quantitative data available 
(and a number of triangulations to cross-check the 
results), it has been assumed that 80% of the cocaine 
flow (and the related gross profits of US$3.3 bn) going 
from Colombia to Mexico are generated by Colombian 
criminal groups. Mexican drug cartels then dominate 
the trafficking flows to the United States. Direct traf-
ficking of cocaine from Colombia to the USA appears to 
hardly play a role any more.  
The situation is different with regard to trafficking of 
cocaine to West and Central Europe. Cocaine is traf-
ficked by Colombian groups to West and Central 
Europe, notably to Spain, Europe’s main entry point for 
cocaine. Here, it has been assumed that some 40% of 
the total flow to the European entry points (generating 
profits of US$7.1 bn) are generated by Colombian 
groups, a further 30% by groups from other countries in 
the Americas, including South America, Central Amer-
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ica and the Caribbean, and most of the rest by various 
European and African groups. 
A similar proportion for the involvement of Colombian 
groups (40%) was also assumed for trafficking cocaine 
to countries in East and South-East Europe (US$1 bn), 
while the importance of Colombian groups for cocaine 
trafficking to Asia (US$1.2 bn), Oceania (US$0.5 bn) 
and Africa (US$1.2 bn) seems to be slightly lower 
(assumed to be around 30%). 
Adding the flows linked to Colombia results in gross 
profits of around US$6.6 bn. These are only the flows 
linked to actual consumption in the various cocaine 
markets. As mentioned earlier, far more cocaine is 
shipped out of the Andean region, only to be seized and 
destroyed by the authorities. Some of this cocaine was 
sold by Colombian groups to traffickers from other 
countries before it was seized. While the income of the 
foreign trafficking groups thus declines, that of the 
Colombians increases. Based on the model assumptions 
that the value of such seizures is measured at wholesale 
prices in the country where the seizures took place,  and 
only half have to be borne by the exporters, such ‘extra-
flows’ of cocaine generated for Colombian organized 
crime groups would result in extra income of some US$ 
3.3 bn, more than offsetting the losses due to the large 
seizures made in Colombia, which have to be borne by 
Colombian crime groups (US$0.5 bn). The difference is 
mainly due to far lower cocaine prices in Colombia 
compared to the much higher prices in North America 
and West and Central Europe. Overall gross profits 
linked to cocaine exports are thus estimated at around 
US$9.4 bn for the Colombian groups. This would be 
equivalent to some 11% of global cocaine profits (whole-
sale and retail) or around 3% of Colombian GDP 
(2010).33 Nonetheless, the importance of cocaine traf-
ficking for the Colombian economy is overall far lower 
than the importance of opium and heroin trafficking for 
the Afghan economy where the corresponding shares 
exceeded 50% of GDP in several years during the last 
decade and amounted to US$2.8 bn, equivalent to 26% 
of GDP in 2009.34
33 Such estimates of gross profits of some US$9.4 billion would also 
be in line with estimates cited by the Colombian Attorney General, 
Viviane Morales, at a meeting of a Pan-American forum on money-
laundering and terrorism financing in July 2011. At this meeting, the 
Attorney General, citing government estimates, reported that at least 
US$8 billion, roughly equivalent to 3% of Colombia’s GDP, were 
laundered in Colombia each year. (Agence France Presse, “$8 billion 
laundered through Colombia each year”, 29 July 2011; Colombia 
Reports, “$8 billion laundered through Colombia every  year”, 28 
July 2011; CNTN, “Billion of dollars laundered in Colombia from 
drug trafficking,” 2 August 2011.)  Other press articles spoke of 
“money laundering operations in Colombia involving funds from 
drug-trafficking amounting to close to US$8.7 billion per year (Alli-
ance for the Advancement of the Agora. “Money Laundering in 
Colombia surpasses 8 billion dollars”).   
34 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2010, December 2010. 
As previously mentioned, overall gross profits linked to 
the drug trade generated by the Mexican drug cartels are 
significantly higher, US$13.8 bn,35 of which some 
US$7 bn (based on calculations in this report) is linked 
to cocaine smuggling from Mexico to the United States 
and trafficking of cocaine within the United States. 
Most of the income of the Mexican drug cartels is made 
in the United States. Some of this money enters the 
financial system already in the USA though some is 
smuggled back to Mexico and enters the financial system 
there. The amounts earned in shipping cocaine from 
Mexico to the USA are comparatively small, estimated 
at around US$2.7 bn in 2009. Including shipments of 
cocaine to Asia and Oceania, the gross profits of the 
Mexican drug cartels related to the cocaine wholesale 
business are estimated at some US$3.5 bn.    
All the numbers quoted above are only indicative of 
likely orders of magnitude involved.
A slightly different approach was used to ‘allocate’ the 
remaining major transit profits to the main transit coun-
tries. The ‘origin’ of cocaine reported in the individual 
drug seizures was used as a proxy for the importance of 
individual subregions (South America, Central America, 
Caribbean, West Africa) for trafficking cocaine to the 
main markets (North America, West and Central 
Europe). Subsequently, seizures made by countries in 
the transit regions were used as an indication of the 
relative importance of individual countries as transit 
locations.  The logic was that seizures can only be made 
if trafficking takes place, and that law enforcement in 
countries within one region with similar levels of devel-
opment will make larger seizures if the trafficking flow 
is significant, and will seize less when trafficking is of less 
importance. Thus, higher seizures in Spain compared to 
the Nordic countries, for instance, are seen in the model 
as a reflection of the fact that trafficking of cocaine via 
Spain to other destinations in Europe is of greater 
importance than trafficking via the Nordic countries. A 
three-year average (2007-2009) was used for the analysis 
of the individual drug seizures to identify the impor-
tance of a country.  
A further criterion was introduced to avoid implausible 
results. If the losses suffered due to seizures in individual 
transit countries exceeded the ‘allocated’ transit profits, 
the allocated transit profits were increased to the value 
of the amounts seized. 
The distribution of the gross wholesale profits at the 
regional level shows significant shifts from the main 
consumer markets (North America and West and Cen-
tral Europe) towards South America. The calculations 
after adjustments suggest that the largest wholesale prof-
35 ONDCP,  National Drug Control Strategy, February  2006, p. 35.
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table 46: cocaine-related gross profits in million US$ generated at the global level prior to adjustments for  
seizures and transit profits
Source: UNoDc, calculations based on replies to the Annual Reports Questionnaire (ARQ) and other information sources.
table 47: cocaine-related gross profits in million US$ generated at the global level after adjustments for seizures 
and transit profits
Source: UNoDc, calculations based on replies to the Annual Reports Questionnaire (ARQ) and other information sources.
Retail  
profits 
Wholesale  profits
 Total wholesale profits 
of which: National 
wholesale profits 
(from kg to ounce 
price)
of which international 
wholesale  
profits
Europe 20,985           6,594 3,687              2,906 
   west and central 
   Europe
19,692           6,272 3,475              2,797 
   South-East Europe 807              212 142                   70 
   East Europe 397              110 70                   40 
North America 27,731           7,095 5,815              1,280 
South and central 
America and carib-
bean
2,681         15,077 473            14,604 
Asia 1,057              460 187                 273
oceania 997              308 176                 132 
Africa 909              706 160                 546 
TOTAL 54,270 								30,239	 10,498 											19,741	
Retail 
profits Wholesale  profits
Profits 
from 
country of 
origin to 
transit 
countries
(from 
ounce to 
gram 
price) 
Total whole-
sale profits 
(from import 
price to ounce 
price) 
Of which: 
National 
wholesale prof-
its (from kg to 
ounce price)
Of which: 
Interna-
tional 
wholesale 
profits (from 
import to kg 
price)
Europe 20,985 9,744 3,687 6,056 4,857
   west and central 
   Europe
19,692 9,203 3,475 5,728 4,437
   South-East Europe 807 209 142 209 242
   East Europe 397 120 70 120 178
North America 27,731 9,442 5,815 3,627 2,485
South and central 
America and carib-
bean
2,681 854 473 381 115
Asia 1,057 1,006 187 819 352
oceania 997 636 176 460 80
Africa 909 618 160 458 254
ToTAl 54,270 22,300 10,498 11,802 8,142
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its are generated by criminal groups operating out of 
South America (including the Caribbean and Central 
America), amounting to some US$15 billion, while the 
largest retail profits are still being generated in North 
America (some US$28 billion), ahead of Europe (US$20 
billion). The calculated overall gross profits at the global 
level (US$84 bn) remain basically unchanged.
ix. The proportion of proceeds from the 
cocaine trade that is laundered
The next question refers to the proportion of the 
amounts laundered out of the total proceeds generated, 
and work is still underway to try to reach reasonable 
estimates based on empirical evidence. Assumptions of 
the amounts laundered related to illicit drug income, 
found in the literature, range from 39% to 83%, with 
an average of around 70%. Such estimates have been 
either assumptions by individual authors, and only in 
one case the results of an expert survey conducted in one 
country (Australia). A key question which will be dealt 
with in this sub-chapter are whether such assumptions 
are reasonable. 
A review of the literature reveals that there are substan-
tial differences in the income levels of drug traffickers. 
Drug traffickers dealing in large amounts at the whole-
sale level usually have a far higher income than street 
dealers who hardly earn enough to cover their cost of 
living.  Thus, it is very likely that there are significant 
differences between the proportion of total income 
laundered at the retail level compared to the wholesale 
level.       
So, what are the proportions laundered in the wholesale 
market? An analysis of the US cocaine market (see 
below) indicates that 51% of retail profits and some 
83% - 90% of wholesale profits could have been subject 
to laundering. But not all laundering starts in the USA. 
Some of the funds generated, notably by the Mexican 
drug cartels, are smuggled in cash out of the USA to 
Mexico and are laundered there.  
Subsequent calculations for other countries suggest that 
the overall proportions available for laundering may be 
slightly lower. Calculations of the distribution of profits 
at the retail level (which accounts for the bulk of the 
profits) suggest that the proportions available for money-
laundering are slightly below 50%.   
• Simple Model for estimating the propor-
tion available for laundering 
One approach to estimating the proportion of proceeds 
that are laundered would be to estimate average income 
per wholesaler and retailer of illicit drugs in each coun-
try. Once ‘reasonable living expenses’ are subtracted, an 
estimate could be derived of the amount of ‘launderable’ 
money per capita, generated from crime. Summing up 
these amounts over the total estimated numbers of 
wholesalers and retailers would give an estimate of the 
total amount of money available for laundering. 
Such a model seems logical and straightforward. None-
theless, it is not without pitfalls. Results could be mis-
leading as the ‘average drug trafficker’ does not exist. 
This would not be a problem with a normal distribution 
around the characteristics of such an ‘average drug traf-
ficker’. However, available information suggests that this 
is not the case. The income distribution of drug traffick-
ers tends to be extremely uneven, with a few traffickers 
accounting for the bulk of the drugs sold on the market, 
and a large number earning just the bare minimum to 
survive. Such an uneven distribution can have an impor-
tant impact on the calculation of the amounts available 
for laundering. 
Model for estimating the proportion available 
for laundering taking market structure into 
account 
Against this background, a more sophisticated model 
has been developed, at least for some key markets. The 
basic steps here are to:  
1. estimate the number of traffickers involved at the re-
tail and wholesale levels in key countries;  
2. analyse the market structure; 
3. apply the analysed market structure to the estimated 
number of traffickers at the retail and wholesale levels 
and introduce a cut-off rate (‘reasonable living ex-
penses’) at which drug traffickers are able to launder 
money. 
Number of cocaine traffickers 
The first challenge – irrespective of the model used - is 
to estimate the number of cocaine traffickers in a coun-
try. While significant research has been undertaken to 
estimate drug production and the number of drug users 
over the last few decades, very little is known about the 
number of drug traffickers. This is a significant knowl-
edge gap, not only for the purposes of this study, but for 
law enforcement in general. How can one effectively 
measure the success of police operations if it is not 
known whether 50%, 10%, 1% or 0.1% of drug dealers 
are actually arrested?   
One study of the cocaine market, which included esti-
mates of the number of wholesalers at the various levels, 
was published by the US Institute for Defence Analyses 
(IDA) in the late 1990s. Their task was to provide the 
US military – and subsequently US drug control author-
ities – with information on the cocaine market structure 
in order to identify potential weaknesses in the supply 
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chain from producer countries to street markets that 
could be targeted by interventions.  
One of the findings of this research was that the cocaine 
market basically follows a so-called ‘power law’ distribu-
tion, also known as ‘Pareto distribution.’36 Based on an 
extensive analysis of production, seizures, purities, typi-
cal transaction prices and the price structure along the 
supply chain and demand data, the IDA research sug-
gested that there may be, on average, 30-32 customers 
for each actor (drug trafficking group) along the supply 
chain.37 Given a cocaine-using population of 5.4 mil-
36 A power law, also known as Pareto distribution, is a special kind of 
mathematical relationship between a data series and its frequency 
distribution, which in common language is often known as the 
80-20 rule (e.g. 20% of the population earn 80% of the income in 
a country; 20% of the cocaine using population account for 80% of 
the total cocaine consumption, etc.).There is evidence that the power 
law distribution is found for a wide variety of physical, biological 
and social phenomena, including such diverse phenomena as Pareto’s 
law of income distribution, the impact and frequency of earthquakes 
(Gutenberg-Richter law for earthquake sizes), craters on the moon, 
solar flares, size and activity of neuronal populations (Stevens’ power 
law of psychophysics), distribution of family names, sizes of power 
outages, scaling laws in biological systems, and frequency and impact 
of wars. The most common power laws relate two variables and have 
the form of where a and k are constants, and 
o(xk) is an asymptotically small function of xk. Here, k is typically 
called the scaling exponent. Thus, a rescaling of the function’s argu-
ment (e.g. having x be in terms of nanometers instead of millimeters) 
changes the constant of proportionality but preserves the shape of the 
function itself.
37 R. Anthony and A. Fries (Institute for Defense Analyses), “Empirical 
modelling of narcotics trafficking from farm gate to street”, United 
lion persons in the USA at the beginning of the new 
millennium, this would have resulted in some 180,000 
street dealers, 6,000 wholesalers and 200 major cocaine 
importers. The total cocaine-dealing population in the 
USA would have amounted to some 186,200 traffick-
ers.38 Given ongoing arrests and long prison sentences 
as well as a fall in the cocaine-consuming population to 
around 5.0 million persons in the USA in 2009, the 
application of the original model would have suggested 
that there was a decline in the total number of ‘cocaine 
dealers’ to 161,300 in the USA by 2009. 
The model and the statistical calculations behind are 
complex. But this does not guarantee that the results 
from the model are a fair reflection of reality. A key 
question is thus whether the findings of this model are 
confirmed by other empirical evidence.
Jonathan Caulkins, another expert on the US cocaine 
market, came to different conclusions. Based on a 
number of plausibility considerations (assuming, for 
instance, an average income per trafficker of US$50,000 
and a size of the total US cocaine market of US$35 bn), 
he arrived at a total of some 700,000 full-time cocaine 
traffickers, which – taking the existence of part-time 
traffickers into consideration - would raise the figure of 
Nations, Bulletin on Narcotics, Nos 1 and 2, 2004, Illicit drug mar-
kets, pp. 1-48, New York 2006.
38 B. Crane (Institute for Defense Analyses),  History of the US Cocaine 
Market”, presentation given to UNODC, November 2009.   
Simple	model	
Retail profits (Pr) / number of retail sellers (R) 
    = avg. gross profits per retailer (pr)
Wholesale profits (Pw)/ number of wholesale trader (W)
   = avg. gross profits per wholesaler (pw) 
Difference between average gross profits per retailer (pr)
or per wholesaler (pw) and a cut-off per capita income figure (i) reflecting reasonable living
expenses [e.g. GDP per capita] gives the average per capita amounts available for laundering 
  for the retailer (lr) = pr - i   or 
  for the wholesaler (lw) = pw - i
Total amounts available for laundering at retail level         Lr  =  lr *  R
Total amounts available for laundering at wholesale level  Lw   =  lW * W
Proportion available of profits available for laundering at
 Retail level                Qr    = Pr  /  Lr 
 Wholesale level         Qw    = Pw / LW
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persons involved in cocaine trafficking to 1 million 
people in the USA, or possibly more.39  
Given some 5 million cocaine users who have used 
cocaine at least once in the previous year (based on US 
household survey data), Caulkins’ estimate suggests that 
there would be, on average, five customers for each 
cocaine dealer. This may seem – at first sight - a small 
ratio. However, it must be taken into account that a 
large number of cocaine users are also dealing in cocaine, 
though in small quantities only, and often providing it 
‘to friends only’. 
Moreover, not all customers have just one dealer. 
Research undertaken in the USA in 2000 found that 
34% of those arrested and admitting to having con-
sumed cocaine over the last 30 days had more than one 
dealer. This proportion rose to 64.5% among those 
admitting to having consumed crack-cocaine. The aver-
age number of dealers that the drug users had over the 
last 30 days was, on average, 1.8 in the case of cocaine 
and 3.2 in the case of crack-cocaine.40 The total number 
of dealers over the last 12 months would probably have 
39 J. Caulkins, 2002, “Law Enforcement’s Role in a Harm  Reduc-
tion Regime,” Crime and Justice Bulletin, Number 64, New South 
Wales Bureau of Crime and Justice Research; J. Caulkins, “Do Drug 
Prohibition and Enforcement Work?”  White paper published in 
the “What Works?” series, 2000, Lexington  Institute, Arlington, Vir-
ginia, USA; J. Caulkins, and P. Reuter,  “Toward a Harm Reduction 
Approach to Enforcement,”  Safer Communities, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2009, 
pp.9-23.
40 US Department of Justice, Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) 
- Annual Report 2000, April 2003.
been even higher. This does not fully explain the differ-
ence between the results of Caulkins and IDA, however. 
In comparing the results of Caulkins with those of IDA, 
one must take into account that the IDA speaks of 
wholesalers as ‘criminal groups’ rather than individuals 
- and some of the criminal groups in the USA are large. 
The US National Gang Intelligence Center reported in 
its National Gang Threat Assessment 2009 that there 
were some 33,500 gangs in the USA, comprising some 
870,000 members (an average of 26 members per gang) 
and that ‘much gang-related criminal activity involved 
drug trafficking.’ The report also stated that gang mem-
bers were the primary retail-level distributors of most 
illicit drugs, including cocaine, in the country, though 
some of them are also involved in wholesale traffick-
ing.41  
Starting with the estimate of some 870,000 gang mem-
bers (based on the aggregation of subregional estimates) 
and assuming that 75% of them were involved in cocaine 
trafficking, one would obtain an estimate of 650,000 
people. Adding another 100,000 non-gang members 
41 National Gang Intelligence Center, National Gang Threat Assessment 
2009,  January 2009.
fig. 3: Price quantity relationship of the cocaine market in the late 1990s
Source: R. Anthony and A. fries (Institute for Defense Analyses), “Empirical modelling of narcotics trafficking from farm gate to street”, 
United Nations, Bulletin on Narcotics, Nos 1 and 2, 2004, Illicit drug markets, pp. 1-48, New York 2006. 
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would give a rough estimate of some 750,000 cocaine 
traffickers in the USA.   
Another method would be to look at the number of 
persons arrested for possession of cocaine (federal and 
state arrests), and to extrapolate this number with some 
ratio to a likely total of cocaine traffickers. The first 
question is to identify the number of cocaine-related 
arrests. The number of trafficking arrests related to 
cocaine and heroin was reported to have amounted to 
118,114 in 2009. No further breakdown is given. A 
breakdown exists, however, for the federal level. An 
analysis of arrests at the federal level reveals that some 
80% of the total (cocaine and heroin trafficking related 
arrests) is related to cocaine trafficking in the USA. 
Applying this ratio to the number of cocaine and heroin 
related trafficking arrests would result in a likely number 
of 94,088 cocaine trafficking-related arrests for the year 
2009. The next question concerns the identification of 
an appropriate extrapolation factor. The analysis of 
reported violent and property crimes reveals an overall 
‘clearance rate by arrest’ of 22.2% in the USA for the 
year 2009.42 The ‘clearance rate’ is far higher for murder 
and manslaughter (66.6%) or aggravated assault (56.9%) 
but far smaller for less severe but more frequent offences 
42 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
Offenses Cleared,  Clearances – Table 25: Percent of Offenses Cleared 
by Arrest,  http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_25.html 
such as motor vehicle theft (12.4%) or burglary (12.5%). 
One could argue that the ‘effectiveness’ of the police to 
detect and arrest cocaine traffickers is probably closer to 
their effectiveness in detecting motor vehicle theft or 
burglary than in identifying and arresting murderers.  It 
may be interesting to note, that the ‘clearance rate’ for 
arresting cocaine users (i.e. persons arrested for cocaine 
possession in percent of past month cocaine users as 
derived from household surveys) also amounted to 
12.4% in the USA in 2009. Applying this ratio to the 
number of  persons arrested for cocaine trafficking gives 
an estimate of around 757,000 cocaine traffickers or, on 
average,  6.6 cocaine traffickers per user. 
But is it fair to assume that police officers are as likely to 
arrest a regular cocaine user as a cocaine trafficker?  
Arguments for lower numbers of drug traffickers: 
 • One could argue that the police tends to pursue traf-
fickers far more vigorously than consumers. This 
would increase the interception rate for traffickers 
(‘clearance rate’). Given a certain number of reported 
cocaine trafficking arrests, it would mean a lower esti-
mate of the number of traffickers. 
 • Moreover, traffickers typically ‘operate’ more hours a 
day in the market than users. This may increase the 
likelihood of arrests of cocaine dealers, leading to an 
overall lower number of cocaine traffickers.
fig. 4: Hierarchical market structure of the cocaine trade in the late 1990s and the late 2000s 
 
Source: B. crane (Institute for Defense Analyses), “History of the US cocaine Market”, presentation given to UNoDc, November 2009. 
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Arguments for higher numbers of drug traffickers: 
 • However, it can also be argued that traffickers are far 
more cautious and knowledgeable about police tactics, 
and thus face a lower risk of arrest than consumers 
who – under the influence of the drug – are far more 
visible and thus an easier target for the police. Once 
facing addiction, consumers have to buy a drug, and 
thus tend to be less cautious than traffickers. This 
would lead to a lower interception rate of traffickers, 
and thus to higher estimates of the number of cocaine 
traffickers based on any given number of persons ar-
rested for cocaine trafficking. 
 • Moreover, the likelihood of a trafficker being arrested 
in a year may be lower as he is usually only arrested 
once, and then put to jail for longer periods. A con-
sumer generally faces far shorter sentences and the 
same person may be arrested several times a year. This 
would lead to lower interception rates and higher esti-
mates of the total number of cocaine traffickers based 
on any given number of persons arrested. 
In short, there is no conclusive answer whether the inter-
ception rate of a trafficker (‘clearance rate’) should be 
higher or lower than the interception rate of a user as 
there are a number of biases working in opposite direc-
tions. Thus, it may be fair to assume that the overall 
interception rates for traffickers may not differ drasti-
cally from those of cocaine users. 
Can such estimates based on arrest data (757,000) be 
brought into line with the IDA estimates, which were 
based on a more sophisticated model of the US cocaine 
market? The original IDA estimate suggested that there 
were some 186,200 ‘groups’ involved. It would thus suf-
fice to assume that each group had, on average, 4.1 
members to reach a total number of 757,000 persons 
involved in cocaine wholesales in 2009. Working with 
the adjusted figures of 161,300 groups (based on a lower 
number of cocaine users for the year 2009), the ratio 
would slightly increase to, on average, 4.7 persons per 
group. This does not seem unrealistic. Given the well-
established presence of large trafficking groups, the IDA 
estimates of the number of groups involved do not really 
contradict the estimate of some 757,000 individuals 
table 48: Estimates of the number of cocaine traffickers in the USA (2009)
Sources: UNoDc, Annual Reports Questionnaire data; B. crane (Institute for Defense Analyses), “History of the US cocaine Market”, presen-
tation given to UNoDc in November 2009; J. caulkins, 2002, “law Enforcement’s Role in a Harm  Reduction Regime,” Crime and Justice Bul-
letin, Number 64, New South wales Bureau of crime and Justice Research; J. caulkins, “Do Drug Prohibition and Enforcement work?” white 
paper published in the “What Works?” series, 2000, lexington  Institute, Arlington, Virginia, USA; J. caulkins, and P. Reuter, “Toward a Harm 
Reduction Approach to Enforcement,” Safer Communities, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2009, pp.9-23; National Gang Intelligence center, National Gang 
Threat Assessment 2009; Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), 2009 National Survey on Drug Use and 
Health Household Survey, office of Applied Studies, NSDUH Series H-38A, HHS Publication No. SMA 10-4586 findings, Rockville, MD, 2010.
Estimate	of	trafficking	groups	(IDA): 		 161,300
Estimate	of	cocaine	traffickers	(Caulkins)												 							>	1,000,000			
Estimated number of gang members (2009):                       870,000
Assumed percentage involved in cocaine trafficking                     75%
Estimate of ‘organized’ cocaine traffickers                            650,000
Estimate of ‘individual’ cocaine traffickers                             100,000
Estimate	derived	from	gang	members:		 						 							750,000		
Number of cocaine/heroin trafficking arrests:                  118,114
Proportion related to cocaine (based on federal data)           79.66%
Estimated number of arrested cocaine trafficker                        94,088
Number of cocaine/heroin possession arrests                  294,454   
Proportion related to cocaine (based on federal data)                     69.13%
Estimated number of arrested cocaine users                           203,544
Number of past month cocaine users in the USA                    1,637,000
Proportion of arrests (‘clearance rate’)                                         12.43% 
Estimated number of arrested cocaine trafficker                        94,088
Estimated ‘clearance rate’                                                            12.43%
Estimated	total	number	of	cocaine	traffickers	
derived	from	arrested	cocaine	traffickers																							
          757,000 
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involved in cocaine trafficking (a minority as individuals 
and a majority as members of a criminal group involved 
in cocaine trafficking).          
The estimation method established above based on (i) 
arrest data for possession of cocaine and for trafficking 
of cocaine, and (ii) monthly prevalence estimates of the 
number of cocaine users was subsequently adopted as 
the currently preferred method for other countries as 
well. It seems to show reasonable results and can be 
replicated for a number of other countries – though dif-
ferences in collecting arrest data and differentiating 
between arrests for possession versus trafficking limit 
direct comparability. Individual country results must 
thus be interpreted with caution and are only tentative. 
Applying this method to 17 mostly industrialized coun-
tries, covering 57% of the global cocaine-using popula-
tion, suggests that there are some 1.4 million cocaine 
traffickers in these countries, equivalent to 6.4 (annual) 
cocaine users per cocaine trafficker. The unweighted 
average ratio of the country results amounts to 5.9 
(annual) users per cocaine trafficker. Applying such 
ratios to the estimates of the number of cocaine users at 
the global level suggests that there could be some 2.5 
million people (2.4 million based on the weighted aver-
age and 2.6 million people based on the unweighted) 
involved in cocaine trafficking worldwide. Using a 95% 
confidence interval of the calculated ratios for the indi-
vidual countries, the ratios at the global level range from 
table 49: Estimated number of cocaine traffickers and ratios of cocaine users per trafficker
 
* a breakdown of cocaine arrest data for possession and trafficking has not been reported by Italy; as a proxy, the breakdown of  possession 
and trafficking violations for all drugs was applied to the cocaine-related offenses to estimate the likely number of cocaine traffickers.  
Sources: UNoDc calculations based on information provided in Annual Reports Questionnaires; EMcDDA, Statistical Bulletin;  
national household surveys.
Estimated number of 
annual cocaine users 
(based on latest 
survey results and 
population in 2009)
Tentative estimates of 
the number of cocaine 
traffickers (extrapo-
lated from arrest and 
survey data)
Ratio annual 
cocaine users to 
1 cocaine  
trafficker 
Australia 281,100 23,000 12.2
Austria 48,600 9,600 5.1
canada 280,500 57,100 4.9
cyprus 3,600 835 4.3
England and wales 813,000 125,100 6.5
Estonia 6,400 2,430 2.6
france 242,600 59,100 4.1
Germany 489,900 60,000 8.2
Greece 7,500 2,100 3.6
Hungary 13,800 2,500 5.5
Ireland 52,300 9,300 5.6
Italy* 824,500 173,500 4.8
Malta 860 123 7.0
Portugal 43,100 30,900 1.4
Spain 795,400 69,800 12.4
Sweden 30,300 5,100 5.9
United States 5,000,000 757,000 6.6
Subtotal	 8,933,460 1,387,488 6.4
Global	total 15,627,000 2,427,000 6.4
Unweighted	average 5.9
Global	total 15,627,000 2,638,000 5.9
Confidence	interval	
(95%) 4.5	–	7.3
Global	range	 15,627,000 2,140,000	-	3,438,6000 4.5	–	7.3
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4.5 to 7.3. The actual number of cocaine traffickers is 
thus likely to fall within a range of 2.1 to 3.4 million 
people.   
There are also some promising alternative approaches to 
estimating the number of traffickers which could yield 
interesting results in the future. Carla Rossi and her 
team from the University of Rome43 have started to 
experiment with a number of capture-recapture models, 
in combination with truncated Poisson models and the 
Chao and the Zelterman estimators to arrive at estimates 
of the number of drug traffickers. 
43 C. Rossi, L. Di Censi, N. Esposito, F. Mascioli and D. Scacciatelli, 
Centre for Biostatistics and Bioinformatics, University of Rome Tor 
Vergata and G. Serpelloni, N. Balestra, B. Genetti, Department of 
Antidrug Policy of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Italy, 
“Estimating the size of the dealers population for monitoring the 
drug market: a comparison between different metropolitan areas in 
Italy”, presentation given to UNODC, November 2010. 
The basic data requirement here is a distribution of the 
number of times a drug trafficker was arrested in the 
past. The minimum requirement is a distribution of the 
number of persons arrested for drug trafficking (i) for 
the first time and (ii) arrested before. 
More precise estimates can be obtained once a more 
detailed distribution is available. Data for Italy for 2009 
showed the following distribution of arrests (total 
48,019):  n1 (persons arrested for the first time):  44,460; 
n2 (persons arrested for the second time): 3,201, n3: 
315, n4: 36; n5: 7. Based on this data the Chao estimate 
of the total number of drug traffickers gives an estimate 
of 361,561 drug traffickers for Italy.44 
44 Carla Rossi (Centre for Biostatistics and Bioinformatics, University of 
Rome Tor Vergata) and Centre for Biostatistics and Bioinformatics, 
University of Rome Tor Vergata (Dept of Mathematics, University 
La Sapienza, Rome), “Capture-recapture methods to estimate preva-
lence indicators for evaluating drug policies”, presentation given to 
One	source	model:	situation
kfff ,...,, 21  frequencies of units identified 1,2,…k times; 0f  is unobserved.
Look at associated probabilities. kppp ,...,, 21 ; 0p  is unknown.
Let:
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Horvitz-Thompson	estimator	under	Poisson	homogeneity
How to estimate N, the size of drug user population?
jf     j=0,1,2…,k   are generated by the same Poisson distribution with parameter λ .
The MLE of λ , for the zero-truncated Poisson distribution, leads to:
λˆ
0ˆ
−= ep
Horvitz-Thompson (1952) estimator follows:
)ˆ1(ˆ 0pnNHT −=
Including	heterogeneity:	Zelterman	and	Chao	estimators
Zelterman (1988) upper bound estimator:
)/2exp(1
ˆ
12 ff
n
NZ −−
=
Chao (1987, 1989) lower bound estimator:
)2/(ˆ 2
2
1 ffnNC +=
The influence of the persons often seen is weighted down in both estimators which are robust 
against heterogeneity.
Source: c. Rossi (centre for Biostatistics and Bioinformatics, University of Rome Tor Vergata) and centre for Biostatistics and Bio-
informatics, University of Rome Tor Vergata (Dept of Mathematics, University la Sapienza, Rome), “capture-recapture methods 
to estimate prevalence indicators for evaluating drug policies”, presentation given to UNoDc, April 2010.
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If such detailed breakdowns of arrest data are available, 
even some simpler approaches can lead to reasonably 
good approximations. Applying a simple exponential 
regression to the data shown above (as provided in 
standard computer software) would give an estimate of 
around 300,000 traffickers not yet arrested (n0), and 
thus a total estimate of around 348,000 (n0 + n1  + n2 
+ n3 + n4 + n5 )  drug traffickers in Italy for the year 
2009. 
The main practical problem with these models - so far 
- is that most countries do not seem to have such distri-
butions of arrest statistics, broken down by individual 
drug categories, readily available. This may change, 
though, once the practical utility of such statistics is 
proven.     
Number of retailers and wholesalers 
A remaining question is the distribution between the 
number of retailers and wholesalers among drug traf-
fickers.
Again, very little on this topic – in quantitative terms - 
has been found in the literature. Taking the ‘licit drugs 
industry’ (pharmaceutical industry, pharmacies and 
drug stores) as a starting point for comparison, data for 
the USA suggests that 85% of such establishments oper-
ate in the retail sector and 15% in the wholesale sector, 
giving a ratio of 5.7 retail enterprises for 1 wholesale 
enterprise (85% / 15%). Would such a ratio also apply 
to the illicit sector?    
The IDA model – as discussed before – arrived at a 
32 : 1 or  30 : 1 ratio, across all  levels along the supply 
chain, and thus also between the retail and the wholesale 
UNODC, April 2010.
sector, that is, 30 retailers for 1 wholesaler. The problem 
is that the average size (in terms of manpower) of a 
criminal group at the retail level versus the size of such 
groups at the wholesale level is not known. There are, 
however, indications that criminal groups at the whole-
sale level tend to be much larger than those at the retail 
level. A 30:1 ratio may be thus true in terms of actors 
(crime groups) involved, but not in terms of persons 
involved.   
So, how could the relationship be determined? One pos-
sible approach is to analyse arrest and sentencing statis-
tics. US data show that about 10% of persons arrested 
for drug trafficking are arrested for federal offences – 
which tend to be far more severe than state offences. 
Similarly, the number of persons incarcerated in a fed-
eral prison account for about 10% of persons charged 
with drug trafficking offences. The numbers of persons 
sentenced to federal prison for more than one year are 
equivalent to 9.6% of all trafficking offences. All of this 
indicates that there could be a 10 : 1 ratio of retailers to 
wholesalers in the USA. Jonathan Caulkins, in personal 
communication with the author, also spoke of a 10:1 
ratio. 
What are likely retail to wholesale ratios in other coun-
tries? Firm results are difficult, if not impossible, to 
obtain. Only some proxy calculations are currently pos-
sible: 
 • Assuming again that the length of a sentence is an 
indication of the amounts trafficked45 and thus of 
whether a trafficker was a retail or wholesale trafficker, 
data for Austria suggest that 15.6% of all persons 
convicted for violations against the narcotics law (349 
out of 2,240) in 200946  got a sentence of one year or 
more, which would be equivalent to a ratio of 5.4 : 1 
(349/(2,240-349). This suggests that there could be 
more than 5 drug retailers for each drug wholesaler in 
Austria. (No breakdown by drug type is available). 
 • Data for Germany are slightly more difficult to inter-
pret. The German narcotics law punishes in §29 drug 
traffickers (3,704 cases related to trafficking of cocaine 
and crack-cocaine in 2009) and in §29a offenders 
45 The Austrian narcotics law foresees sentences for up to 1 year for 
(small-scale) drug traffickers according to (§27); for drug traffick-
ers involved in the trafficking of ‘non-small’ quantities (§28), the 
sentence goes up to 3 years, and increases further for persons import-
ing such drugs (up to 5 years) and goes up to 10 years for people 
involved in drug-related organized crime activities and up to 15 years 
for repeat offenders in organized crime groups. (Source: Bundesge-
setz über Suchtgifte, psychotrope Stoffe und Drogenausgangsstoffe 
(Suchtmittelgesetz – SMG)).  
46 Convictions – in reality - concern drug traffickers rather than con-
sumers in Austria. Out of 22,729 persons charged for violations 
against the Austrian Narcotics Act in 2009, 2,240 were convicted 
(≈ 10%).  Most of the convicted persons had been involved in drug 
trafficking activities.
fig. 5: Estimates on the number of drug  
traffickers in Italy in 2009 based on 
exponential regression 
Source: UNoDc calculations based on Italian arrest data from the 
central Direction of criminal Police of the Italian Ministry of Inte-
rior. 
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trafficking ‘non-small’ quantities of drugs (241 offend-
ers for cocaine and crack-cocaine in 2009). The latter 
can be interpreted as traffickers involved in large-
scale trafficking operations which would typically be 
wholesalers rather than retailers. The ratio of retailers 
to wholesalers could be estimated at 15.4 : 1, that is, 
more than 15 retailers (3,704/241) for one wholesaler. 
The ratio looks, however, quite different once ‘smug-
gling activities’ (trafficking activities across borders) 
are included. The number of arrested persons due to 
cocaine and crack-cocaine trafficking and smuggling 
according to §29 rises slightly to 3,978 cases while the 
number of arrested persons involved in trafficking of 
cocaine and crack-cocaine in ‘non-small quantities’ 
(§29a) and for illegally importing cocaine and crack-
cocaine in ‘non-small quantities’ (§30) would rise to 
783 cases. The ratio of retailers to wholesalers, includ-
ing smuggling activities, would amount to 5.1 : 1, 
that is, more than 5 cocaine retailers (3,978/783) for 
one cocaine wholesaler.47 
 • Indications of the likely distribution of retail to 
wholesale activity in the UK can be derived from 
sentences statistics. Data for England and Wales show 
that there were 56,620 sentences for offenses against 
the drug laws in 2009,48 out of 235,00049 recorded 
drug offences in that year. This included 9,425 per-
sons who were sentenced to immediate custody, 
while others were fined, sent to community service or 
received a suspended sentence. The British judiciary 
distinguishes between the magistrates’ courts and the 
Crown Court. While the average custodial sentence 
for a drug offence at the magistrates’ court was 2.2 
months, it was 35.9 months (almost 3 years) at the 
Crown Court in 2009. It can be assumed that large-
scale traffickers (a proxy for wholesale traffickers) will 
typically have to stand trial before the Crown Court 
where they can expect a sentence for immediate cus-
tody (affecting 8,383 persons in 2009 or 14.8% of all 
persons sentenced). Assuming that most of the other 
sentenced offenders were street dealers, this would re-
sult in a likely ratio of retail to wholesale traffickers of 
5.8 : 1 in England and Wales.  
 • Data for France show 177,964 recorded drug-related 
offences in 2008. Of this, 42,649 persons were sub-
sequently sentenced by the courts. The number of 
persons who were given a prison sentence amounted 
47 Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik (PKS), 
2009, Bundesrepublik Deutschland  - Anhang des PKS Jahrbuch 2009 
abgedruckte Tabellen mit 6-stelligen Straftatenschlüsseln http://www.
bka.de/nn_193360/DE/Publikationen/PolizeilicheKriminalstatistik/
pks__node.html?__nnn=true
48 UK Ministry of Justice, Sentencing Statistics England and Wales, 2009, 
Supplementary Tables, October 2010. 
49 Home Office Statistical Bulletin, Crime in England and Wales 
2009/10, July 2010. 
to 28,849, of which 5,057 persons got a sentence of 
one year or more. Assuming that the persons who ob-
tained a prison sentence for more than one year were 
trafficking in larger quantities while those sentenced 
to less than a year were trafficking in smaller quanti-
ties, a ratio of 4.7 retailers for 1 wholesaler could be 
established.  
An unweighted average of the ‘results’ of the five coun-
tries investigated would give a ratio of 6.2 retail traffick-
ers for one wholesale trafficker. These are tentative 
results that may change substantially once more data 
becomes available. The results so far suggest that there 
are – on average - about 6 (annual) cocaine users for 1 
trafficker, and around 6 retail traffickers for 1 wholesale 
trafficker. 
Income threshold levels  
The next question concerns the identification of an 
appropriate ‘threshold’ beyond which money will be 
available for laundering. A street seller earning just 
enough to make ends meet will not be in a position to 
engage in large-scale money-laundering operations. On 
the other hand, large drug kingpins will not be able to 
spend all their drug-related income on consumption. 
They will try to invest at least some of the drug money 
– and for these purposes will have to launder the ‘dirty 
money’ so that it can enter the legal economy. But at 
what level is surplus income generated?   
There is no straightforward answer to this question. 
Many factors will affect the actual threshold levels. They 
will differ from country to country and among indi-
viduals. So, many hypotheses can be formulated. 
One possibility could be to stipulate that the average 
income in a country is the likely threshold level. It could 
be argued that only income above the average income 
levels are likely to be laundered. Drug-related income 
below the average income would be consumed.  
The gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is some-
times used as a proxy for the average income in a coun-
try. This is a valid approach for cross-country 
comparisons, but it is not without problems. The GDP 
refers to the market value of all final goods and services 
produced in a country in a given period (typically a 
year). The GDP – based on the income approach – con-
sists of wages and salaries, corporate profits, profits of 
unincorporated businesses, interest and other invest-
ment income as well as farmers’ income. These income 
components are added up to give the net domestic 
income at factor cost. Two adjustments are then made to 
get to the GDP. Indirect taxes minus subsidies are added 
to get from factor cost to market prices. Depreciation 
(reflecting ‘capital consumption’) is added to get from 
net domestic product to the gross domestic product. 
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These explanations indicate that the GDP per capita is 
probably an over-estimate of the average income in most 
countries. This can be exemplified with data available 
from UNODC’s host country: Austria. The net national 
disposable income is far smaller than GDP. According to 
national accounts, it is equivalent to around 83% of 
GDP (2009). The total compensation of employees has 
been equivalent to just about half of the country’s GDP 
over the last few years (51% of GDP in 2009). The aver-
age GDP per capita (including babies and retired per-
sons) amounted to €32,800 in 2009; in comparison, the 
average net income of an employee (total wages and 
salaries divided by total number of employees) amounted 
to €25,200 in the same year, equivalent to around 77% 
of GDP per capita. If the median income were used 
instead, income levels per employee would fall further to 
€18,000, equivalent to 55% of GDP per capita. 
Similar magnitudes of such ratios can also be found for 
other countries. Assuming that the threshold level for 
money-laundering is the average or median income of a 
normal employee, the discussion so far has shown that 
the GDP per capita is too high to serve as an appropriate 
proxy for average income in a country. Average or 
median income statistics would be far better indicators. 
The problem here is that such average or median income 
statistics for countries at the global level are not being 
published, at least not in any standardized way. Thus, 
alternative solutions must be identified.   
One possible alternative is to deduct gross savings from 
the gross domestic product figures in order to arrive at a 
proxy for the money needed for consumption. Amounts 
earned above such per capita consumption expenditure 
would be available for money-laundering; amounts 
below would be used for consumption. For the purposes 
of this report, it will be assumed that the threshold level 
upon which money is available for laundering will be 
equivalent to the current gross domestic product less 
gross savings, expressed per capita. The World Bank 
provides such data: current GDP per capita and gross 
savings as a percentage of GDP. The thresholds can be 
calculated by adjusting the GDP per capita figures 
(GDP/N) with the gross savings ratios (GSR). (GDP/N 
* (1 – GSR)). The World Bank defines gross savings as 
gross national income less total consumption plus net 
transfers. Such gross national savings are equivalent to 
some 19% of GDP at the global level - though they 
differ greatly across countries. While gross savings in the 
USA amount to around 10% of GDP, they increase to 
18% in the European Union, around 39% in the Arab 
world and more than 50% in some Caribbean countries. 
Data for Austria show gross savings of 24% of GDP. The 
calculated threshold would thus amount to a figure 
equivalent to 76% of GDP per capita, almost identical 
to the 77% of GDP per capita calculated for the average 
income per employee.       
Market structure in the United States  
As previously discussed, the total number of cocaine 
traffickers in the USA has been estimated at 757,000, of 
which some 90% (680,000) are thought to be involved 
in retail trafficking activities. The total gross retail prof-
its for cocaine (defined as the difference between the 
gram prices and the ounce prices, multiplied with the 
amounts consumed in the USA) equal some US$26.1 
bn – a large amount. Simply dividing the gross profits 
by the number of cocaine retail traffickers would result 
in per capita profits of US$38,400, a relatively small 
amount which would hardly leave any money available 
for laundering. In fact, the GDP per capita in 2009 was 
some US$46,000, that is, far higher than the per capita 
income of the retail cocaine traffickers in the USA. 
Adjusting the GDP per capita figures with gross savings 
to arrive at a proxy figure for per capita consumption 
still gives a figure of around US$41,300 (threshold level 
in this report), which is higher than the per capita 
income of a cocaine retailer. This would mean that no 
money could be laundered from cocaine retail sales in 
the USA. But can it be true that no earnings made from 
US retail sales are laundered? Probably not. 
In fact, the income distribution among cocaine traffick-
ers is extremely uneven. This means that a few cocaine 
traffickers earn large amounts of money – that will be 
available for laundering – while a much larger number 
of cocaine traffickers are hardly able to meet their con-
sumption requirements.  
This was – inter alia – documented in Freakonomics 
(2005), where the question was asked why so many drug 
dealers were still living with their mothers.50 As part of 
field research, starting from 1989 to the early 1990s, a 
then-young sociologist, Sudhir Venkatesh, gained access 
to a Chicago-based street gang selling crack-cocaine. He 
also got access to the notebooks containing the detailed 
monthly income and expenditures of that gang over a 
four-year period. This gang was one of around a hun-
dred branches – or franchises – of a larger criminal 
organization, the ‘Black Disciples’51, also based in Chi-
cago. The Black Disciples had a leader who reported to 
a ‘board of directors’ of close to 20 members. Each street 
gang had to pay the board of directors of the Black Dis-
50 Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, Freakonomics: A Rogue 
Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything, April 2005. 
51 The Black Disciples are one of Chicago’s most well known ‘folks’ 
gangs.  In later years, the Black Disciples were more structured like 
a religious sect. The gang leaders were then called ‘ministers’ and the 
overall head was called ‘king’.  At the same time they continued to 
expand. Around 2004 they encompassed some 300 street gangs in the 
Chicago area, each of some 30 to 40 members. (George Knox, Gang 
Threat Analysis: The Black Disciples, National Gang Crime Research 
Center 2004). Apart from being known as a drug trafficking gang, 
they are also known for extreme violence. While in 1990 they had 
some 5,400 members, their membership increased to more than 
24,000 towards the end of the first decade of the new millennium.  
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ciples nearly 20% of their revenues in exchange for the 
right to sell crack in a designated twelve square-block 
area. The head of the street gang had three officers below 
him, as well as a treasurer and a runner (for transporting 
large quantities of drugs and money to and from the 
supplier). Each officer had a number of street-level sales-
men - known as foot soldiers - beneath him. Depending 
on the season, the gang leader had in total between 25 
and 75 foot soldiers on his payroll. At the very bottom 
of the hierarchy were some 200 members, known as the 
rank and file. They were not employees, but had to pay 
‘dues’ to the gang, for protection from rival gangs or for 
the chance to move up the hierarchy and earn a job as a 
foot soldier. 
Over a four-year period, the gang’s notebooks showed an 
increase in monthly revenue from US$18,500 to 
US$32,000 in the third and US$64,800 in the fourth 
year. The average monthly breakdown of revenues in the 
third year was as follows:
According to the information obtained from the specific 
crack-cocaine selling gang, the Black Disciples had 1 
leader and another 19 on the ‘board of directors’, prob-
ably around 100 street gang leaders, 300 officers (3 * 
100) and 5,000 foot soldiers (50 * 100), that is, in total, 
5,420 ‘members’ at the time. In addition, some 20,000 
unpaid rank-and-file were paying dues to the organiza-
tion.     
The leader and the members of the ‘board of directors’ 
each earned around US$500,000 per year, or more than 
US$40,000 per month. The gang leader’s income of 
US$8,500 was equivalent to an hourly wage of US$66. 
The wages paid to the ‘officers’ amounted to on average 
US$700 a month or about US$7 per hour. The foot 
soldiers, who accounted for the bulk of drug traffickers 
in the organization, earned on average just US$3.30 an 
hour, which was less than the minimum hourly wage in 
the USA (US$3.80 in 1990).52 Thus most of the foot 
soldiers actually held minimum-wage jobs in the legiti-
mate sector to supplement their small illicit earnings. 
The analysis of the income distribution, expressed in 
annual income equivalents, suggests that it follows a 
power-law distribution as can be seen from the graph: 
Assuming that money-laundering would take place for 
income above per capita GDP (US$23,045 in 1990) less 
gross savings (15%), the annual threshold income in 
1990 would have amounted to around US$20,000 
(rounded). According to this structure and the threshold 
levels, only the members of the ‘board of directors’ and 
the gang leaders, some 120 persons out of some 5,420 
members or 2.2% of the total number of traffickers in 
this crack-cocaine distribution network, would have 
earned enough money to engage in laundering activities.
52 Federal Minimum Wage Rates, 1955-2011 (http://www.infoplease.
com/ipa/A0774473.html).
table 50: Average monthly revenues and expenditures of a crack-cocaine selling gang based in chicago, 1990
Source:  Steven D. levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything, 
April 2005.
Revenues: 
Drug sales (crack-cocaine) US$ 24,800  
                             Dues from rank and files US$ 5,100
Extortionary taxes (stores, pimps, fences et cetera) US$ 2,100
Total	monthly	revenues:	 US$	32,000
Expenditures
wholesale cost of drugs (crack-cocaine) US$ 5,000
fees to ‘board of directors’ US$ 5,000
Mercenary fighters (hired to fight turf war) US$ 1,300
weapons US$  300
Miscellaneous (funeral, support for  victim’s  family) US$    2,400
Total	monthly	(non-wage)	costs US$		14,000
wages for three ‘officers’ US$  2,100
wages to foot soldiers US$ 7,400
Monthly wages US$ 9,500
Total	monthly	net	income	for	gang	leader US$	8,500
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fig. 6: Income structure of a crack-cocaine selling distribution network in the USA (chicago), 1990 
Source: UNoDc calculations based on Steven D. levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of 
Everything, April 2005.
Deducting the threshold income needed to cover living 
expenses (estimated at around US$20,000), data suggest 
that the Black Disciples may have laundered some 
US$17.6 million per year. Expressing this amount as a 
proportion of total wages (around US$31.5 million), 
the calculations suggest that more than half (about 56%) 
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table 51: Total ‘wages’ in crack-cocaine distribution network in the USA (chicago), 1990
Source: UNoDc calculations based on Steven D. levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden 
Side of Everything, April 2005.
table 52: calculation of amounts available for laundering, 1990
Source: UNoDc calculations based on Steven D. levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden 
Side of Everything, April 2005.
Number of traffickers Per capita income Total
leader and members of ‘board of 
directors’ 20 $500,000 $10,000,000
Gang leaders 100 $100,000 $10,000,000
officers 300 $8,400 $2,520,000
foot soldiers 5000 $1,800 $9,000,000
Total 5,420 $31,520,000
 Annual income
Threshold 
income
Income for 
laundering
Number of 
persons
Amounts available 
for laundering
Board of directors $500,000 $20,000 $480,000             20 $9,600,000
Gang leaders $100,000 $20,000 $80,000           100 $8,000,000
	Total	 	 	 	 	 $17,600,000
table 53: Proportion of wages available for laundering, 1990
Source: UNoDc calculations based on Steven D. levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of 
Everything, April 2005
Total wages in million US$ Amounts available for laundering in 
million US$
in %
Amounts $31.5 $17.6 56%
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of the total wages may have been subject to laundering. 
Simply dividing the wages of this crime organization by 
the number of its members would have resulted in a per 
capita income of US$5,815 (US$31,520,000 : 5420), 
far below the threshold level for money-laundering. 
Taking the income distribution structure into account is 
thus a prerequisite for arriving at reasonable results for 
the amounts available for laundering. While such 
detailed examples of individual drug trafficking groups 
are certainly interesting to gain a better insight into the 
hierarchical structure of cocaine trafficking, a more gen-
eralized model would still be needed to take the skewed 
market structure into account. The calculations cannot 
hinge on one example of an income distribution of a 
drug trafficking group in one American city back in 
1990. One possibility in this regard is to analyse seizure 
data in more detail. 
Application of the ‘market structure’ to total retail 
sales and number of retail traffickers
As this research - as well as previous work by the Insti-
tute of Defense Analysis - has shown, the cocaine market 
is characterized by a power-law structure. This is also 
true for illegal drug markets in general. This is, inter 
alia, reflected in seizures. The power-law structure is 
particularly visible in the wholesale market, less so in the 
retail market (smaller quantities).  
This statement (see graph) is based on a detailed analysis 
of US seizures over the 2004-06 period, that is, prior to 
the disturbances of the US cocaine market due to major 
reductions in supply. The calculations were based on the 
more than 52,000 cocaine seizure cases reported in the 
DEA’s STRIDE database over the 2004-06 period, 
including more than 31,000 seizure cases at the retail 
level (seizures of less than an ounce) and some 21,000 
seizure cases at the wholesale level (seizures of an ounce 
or more).  
As a next step, the retail market segment will be defined. 
According to US data, there is a frequency of purchases 
at the ounce level (28.4 grams), and then again at the 1 
gram level. This suggests that the retail market mainly 
takes place by retail sales purchasing around an ounce of 
cocaine, and then selling a gram of cocaine to the end 
users.  
The distribution of the retail segment of the market (as 
reflected in seizures) is shown in the graph below. It fol-
lows very closely a binomial regression curve. 
Assuming that the distribution of the seizures, discussed 
above, is a fair reflection of the structure of the US 
cocaine market, the seizure distribution can be used to 
allocate the total US retail market profits to the indi-
vidual drug traffickers. This is shown on the next graph. 
In addition, a benchmark figure or cut-off rate, here 
defined as GDP per capita less gross savings, was intro-
duced. 
The results emerging from this model suggest that 
indeed the majority of the retail sellers (76%) earn less 
than the benchmark income figure.  However, the 
amounts generated above GDP per capita (less gross 
savings) by the remaining 24% of the retail traffickers 
are sufficient for laundering US$ 13.2 billion, or 51% 
of the total gross cocaine retail profits.   
fig. 7: frequency distribution of cocaine seizures 
in the USA, 2004-2006 (logarithmic scale) 
Source: US Drug Enforcement Agency, Retrieve Information from 
Drug Evidence (STRIDE database). 
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fig. 8: Distribution of US cocaine seizures in the 
retail market segment, 2004-2006
Source: US Drug Enforcement Agency, Retrieve Information from 
Drug Evidence (STRIDE database).
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Application of the ‘market structure’ to total whole-
sales and number of wholesale traffickers
Wholesales were defined as all transactions amounting 
to more than 28.4 grams. The ‘simple model’, dividing 
the gross wholesale profits (US$8.8 bn) by the number 
of cocaine wholesalers (76,000) would result in average 
per capita profits of cocaine wholesalers of US$116,720. 
Subtracting the threshold income level (US$41,274 for 
per capita GDP less gross savings) would result in 
US$75,446 available for laundering per cocaine whole-
salers, or US$5.7 bn for the total wholesale market. This 
would have been equivalent to 65% of the total whole-
sale profits. This would be an easy calculation. But are 
such estimates reasonable? Probably not. 
As discussed earlier, the data show that the cocaine 
wholesale seizures follow a power-law structure. Loga-
rithmic scales must be used for the wholesale sector to 
be able to make the underlying seizure patterns more 
visible. 
Based on the assumption that the seizure structure 
reflects the underlying market structure, the next chal-
lenge was to use the shape of the seizure curve to allocate 
the profits made at the wholesale level to individual 
cocaine wholesalers. The total number of cocaine whole-
salers in the USA was estimated at around 76,000. Based 
on such a market structure identified via seizures, the 
model suggests that a few major players in the market 
earn a fortune. As a consequence, the model suggests 
that 90% of the global gross cocaine profits made at the 
wholesale level are available for money-laundering pur-
poses, far more than the initial results of 65% arrived at 
via the ‘simple model’ which did not take the power-law 
structure of the wholesale market into account. In other 
words, US$8 billion out of the US$8.8 billion generated 
in trafficking cocaine from the importing countries to 
fig. 9: Distribution of retail traffickers’ income in 
the USA, 2009 
Sources: US Drug Enforcement Agency, Retrieve Information from 
Drug Evidence (STRIDE database), world Bank and study esti-
mates. 
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fig. 10: Distribution of cocaine wholesale seizures 
in the USA, 2004-2006  
- y axis:  logarithmic scal
Source: US Drug Enforcement Agency, Retrieve Information from 
Drug Evidence (STRIDE database). 
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fig. 11: Distribution of cocaine wholesale seizures 
in the USA, 2004-2006  
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Source: US Drug Enforcement Agency, Retrieve Information from 
Drug Evidence (STRIDE database). 
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street sellers in the USA are available for laundering. The 
model also suggests that a majority of wholesalers were 
earning less than the GDP per capita adjusted for gross 
savings. The latter group of traffickers includes a large 
number of persons who work as mules or part-time traf-
fickers for criminal organizations. 
The gross profits considered so far did not take transit 
profits and seizures into account. Assuming that some of 
the profits made in shipping cocaine into the United 
States will never be available for laundering as they were 
generated by foreign groups, and assuming furthermore 
that the bulk of the seizures affect the wholesale level 
(rather than the retail level) and that wholesalers have to 
bear half of the cost (the other half being borne by the 
exporters), the gross profits of US cocaine wholesalers 
would decline to US$3.4 bn. Conducting the same 
analysis on the adjusted wholesale profits suggest that 
US$2.9 bn or 83% of the total would be available for 
laundering.  
In any case, the model suggests that the proportions 
available for laundering at the wholesale level (83%-
90%) are substantially higher than at the retail level 
(51%). 
Adding wholesale and retail profits in the USA (some 
US$35 bn prior to adjustments for seizures and transit 
profits), the amounts available for laundering (some 
US$21.2 bn) would be equivalent to around 60% of 
gross profits generated by cocaine trafficking.  
Market structure in other key markets   
The United States is certainly a key market, accounting 
for some 35% of global cocaine-related profits. But it is 
not the only market where huge profits are made and 
laundered. So, what are the likely proportions laundered 
in other countries?  
Applying similar calculations – based on seizure patterns 
- to other countries as a proxy for the underlying market 
structure facilitates the calculation of typical profits per 
cocaine trafficker at the retail and wholesale levels. Such 
calculations are, however, very time consuming and have 
only been undertaken for major markets with gross 
profits exceeding US$1 billion. Such countries include 
- in addition to the USA - Colombia, the United King-
dom, Italy, Mexico, Spain, Germany, France, Brazil, 
Canada, Argentina and Australia. Together, these mar-
kets account for 82% of total gross profits or 86% of 
retail profits. Simplified calculations will be used for the 
remaining countries.  
The profits are only indicative and may change substan-
tially once more (reliable) information becomes availa-
ble and/or methodologies to generate such estimates are 
improved. 
Applying the ‘US model’ developed above one to one to 
other countries is, however, difficult if not impossible. 
Reported seizure cases – for most other countries – are 
too small to arrive at any meaningful distribution pat-
terns. This changes only if all other countries are taken 
together. UNODC in its individual seizure database col-
lected some 25,700 cocaine seizures (‘cocaine’ and 
‘cocaine hydrochloride’ seizure cases) made in 99 coun-
tries worldwide (excluding the United States) over the 
2000-2010 period.  
fig. 12: Distribution of cocaine wholesale traffick-
ers’ income in the USA, 2009 
Source: US Drug Enforcement Agency, Retrieve Information from 
Drug Evidence (STRIDE database). 
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Similar to the data found in the USA, an analysis of 
global cocaine seizures (excluding those from the US) 
also indicates that such seizures follow a power-law pat-
tern for amounts exceeding 100 grams. 
As a next step, the seizures were again split into ‘whole-
sale seizures’ and ‘retail seizures’.  For the purposes of 
this report, an ounce was used as a cut-off rate. Seizures 
of one ounce (28.4 grams) or more were considered 
‘wholesale seizures’. Seizures of less than an ounce were 
considered to reflect ‘retail seizures’. Thus the US cut-off 
rate was also used to analyse seizures in other countries. 
One problem here is the low number of seizures falling 
into the category of ‘retail seizures’ that were reported to 
UNODC. Many such small seizures are not considered 
‘significant’ by Member States, and are thus not reported. 
Nonetheless, even the limited number of observations 
that fell within the defined range showed a somehow 
similar pattern as the one that was revealed for the US 
retail market based on more than 30,000 observations 
over the 2004-2006 period. Though the patterns are 
similar, the calculation of the Gini coefficients, measur-
ing the degree of inequality in a distribution, suggest 
that the cocaine market structure at the retail level may 
be more uneven in the USA than in the world at large. 
In contrast, a sufficiently large number of wholesale 
seizures has been reported to UNODC. The organiza-
tion’s individual seizures database contains detailed 
information on more than 25,000 cocaine wholesale 
table 54:  Tentative estimates of gross profits related to cocaine trafficking in million US$ (2009)
 Source: UNoDc calculations based on Annual Reports Questionnaire data. 
Countries where 
gross cocaine  
profits (retail 
and wholesale) 
were estimated 
to exceed US$1 
billion
Year of 
household 
survey on 
cocaine use  
(basis for cal-
culations)
Wholesale 
profits 
(import 
price to 
ounce 
price)
A
Adjusted 
wholesale 
profits (sei-
zures, transit 
profits) 
 
B
Retail profits 
 
 
 
 
 
C
Total 
gross 
profits
 
 
 
B + C
USA 2009 8,871 3,441 26,090 29,531
colombia 2008 9 9,439 48 9,488
UK 2009/10 1,803 1,383 6,948 8,332
Italy 2008 2,197 1,327 3,873 5,200
Mexico 2008 200 3,456 495 3,951
Spain 2009/10 1,619 1,278 1,810 3,089
Germany 2009 918 524 2,197 2,721
france 2005 600 471 1,239 1,710
Brazil 2005 269 479 1,195 1,674
canada 2009 371 198 1,146 1,344
Argentina 2006 267 309 837 1,146
Australia 2009 585 281 910 1,190
other countries 4,584 7,653 7,482 15,133
Global 22,293 30,239 54,270 84,509
Selected	countries	
in	%	of	global 79% 75% 86% 82%
fig. 14: Distribution of retail cocaine seizures re-
ported to UNoDc, 2000-2010
Source: UNoDc, Individual Drugs Seizures Database. 
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seizures over the 2000-2010 period. As mentioned 
before, wholesale seizures at the global level -  like 
wholesale seizures in the USA -  are characterized by a 
power-law structure, notably within the range of 100 
grams to 25 tons.    
Applying these seizure patterns to individual countries 
as a proxy for the underlying market structure facilitates 
the calculation of typical profits per cocaine trafficker at 
the retail and wholesale levels.  
In order to generalize the results, the observed seizures 
are shown as percentages rather than absolute numbers. 
The reported retail seizures were fitted to a 3 binomial 
regression curve which formed the basis for the subse-
quent calculations of the distribution at the retail level. 
This model was then applied to  the retail market for 
individual countries. The key parameters here were the 
estimated number of retail traffickers, the total retail 
profits in a country and the calculated cut-off rate or 
benchmark above which traffickers are estimated to 
launder money. 
The largest cocaine market in Europe is the United 
Kingdom with retail profits estimated at around US$6.9 
billion. As shown earlier, the number of cocaine traffick-
ers in England and Wales was estimated  at around 
125,000 (6.5 users per 1 dealer) of which 85% or 
107,000 were estimated to be cocaine retail traffickers. 
Extrapolating the results from England and Wales to the 
UK as a whole, one can estimate that there may be close 
to 150,000 cocaine traffickers of which 127,000 retail 
traffickers. Assuming again that money-laundering takes 
place only above the threshold level of per capita GDP 
less gross savings ($30,860 per person in 2009) the cal-
culations suggest that out of US$6.9 billion generated in 
gross profits, US$4 billion or 57% are potentially avail-
able for laundering in the UK The simple model would 
have suggested that just 44% is available for laundering. 
In order to calculate the likely amounts of funds laun-
dered at the wholesale level, the global distribution pat-
tern of wholesale seizures (2000-2010) was used. The 
seizure cases were re-converted into percentages.  
Applying this pattern to the UK wholesale market esti-
mates (gross profits of US$1.38 billion) generated by 
some 24,400 traffickers would show US$1.24 billion 
fig. 15: Distribution of wholesale cocaine seizures 
reported to UNoDc, 2000-2010, y axis: 
logarithmic
Source: UNoDc, Individual Drugs Seizures Database. 
fig. 16: Distribution of wholesale cocaine seizures 
reported to UNoDc, 2000-2010, y and x 
axis: logarithmic
Source: UNoDc, Individual Drugs Seizures Database. 
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fig. 17: General model applied to calculate retail 
profits 
 Source: UNoDc, Individual Drugs Seizures Database. 
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available for money-laundering, or almost 90% of the 
total.53 
53 In order to arrive at the results, the percentages of seizure cases were 
re-defined to mean traffickers (24,400 wholesale traffickers in the UK 
were redefined to be 100%). Subsequently, the weight equivalents 
were also shown as a percentage of the total of the reported seizures. 
The total seizures were  ‘redefined’ as total wholesale profits in the 
country. The total wholesale profits were then multiplied with the 
appropriate percentage for each trafficker  to arrive at the likely gross 
profit for each individual cocaine trafficker based on the seizure 
distribution. An example should help to clarify the approach. For 
instance, the 50th largest trafficker in the UK was equivalent in 
the ranking to 0.2% of all cocaine wholesale traffickers (50/24,400 
= 0.2%); 0.2% of all seizures (i.e. the 52nd largest seizures out of 
25,662 reported seizures) had a weight of 3,048 kg.  Expressed as 
a proportion to total weight (927,663 kg), the 52nd largest seizure 
accounted for 0.34% of the total. If the total was now considered 
to be the total wholesale profits (US$1.38 bn), 0.34% of the total 
would have amounted to  US$4.7 million. Thus the 50th largest traf-
ficker in the UK – based on  this model – is assumed to have made 
US$4.7 million in gross profits in 2009, far above the threshold level 
US$30,860 needed to cover his basic needs.       
 The gross profits distribution was then contrasted with the bench-
mark income figures (per capita GDP less gross savings). Gross 
profits exceeding the benchmark figures – reflecting the amounts 
available for laundering - were calculated and aggregated to give the 
total amounts available for money laundering (US$1.24 bn in the 
UK). The model results suggest that more than 1,200 wholesale traf-
fickers earned more than the threshold level in the UK and were thus 
‘forced’ to engage in money-laundering activities. The total of these 
‘excess funds’ amounted to US$1.24 bn.  The proportion available 
for laundering (≈90%) was finally calculated as the amounts avail-
able for money-laundering (US$1.24 bn) divided by the total funds 
generated in the wholesale business (US$1.38 billion). 
The ‘simple’ model (gross profits divided by wholesale 
traffickers (US$56,693) less benchmark income 
($30,860) would have resulted in US$25,833 available, 
on average, for money-laundering per cocaine trafficker, 
or US$630 million for all wholesalers in the UK, equiv-
alent to  46% of the total gross profits generated.  
fig. 18: UK retail market: gross profits per capita 
and benchmark income - amounts avail-
able for laundering, 2009   
Sources: UNoDc, Annual Reports Questionnaire data; UNoDc, 
Individual Drugs Seizures Database; world Bank, world Develop-
ment Indicators (wDI). 
$0
$20,000
$40,000
$60,000
$80,000
$100,000
$120,000
$140,000
$160,000
10
,0
00
20
,0
00
30
,0
00
40
,0
00
50
,0
00
60
,0
00
70
,0
00
80
,0
00
90
,0
00
Retail	traffickers
an
n
u
al
	g
ro
ss
	p
ro
fi
ts
	p
er
	t
ra
ff
ic
ke
r
Cocaine	retail	profits	
Benchmark	income	(per	capita	GDP	less
gross	savings)
fig. 19: Distribution used for wholesale sector 
(seizures), 2000-2010
Source: UNODC, Annual Reports Questionnaire data.
0.010
0.100
1.000
10.000
100.000
1,000.000
10,000.000
100,000.000
0% 0% 0% 1% 10% 100%
Seizure	cases	in	%
w
ei
g
h
t	
in
	k
ilo
g
ra
m
	e
q
u
iv
al
en
ts
fig. 20: Gross profits and benchmark income of 
wholesale traffickers in the UK
 
Sources: UNoDc, Annual Reports Questionnaire data; UNoDc, 
Individual Drugs Seizures Database; world Bank, world Develop-
ment Indicators (wDI). 
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The same type of calculations was subsequently done for 
other countries with gross profits exceeding US$1 bn.54 
These calculations suggest that the amounts available for 
laundering out of retail profits may actually differ quite 
substantially across countries, ranging among the 
selected countries from 21% (Canada or Brazil) to 57% 
(UK).  The unweighted average of the results amounted 
to 40%. The countries reviewed accounted for 86% of 
global gross retail profits. Assuming that such an 
unweighted average (40%) would be also typical for 
other countries, calculations suggest that out of US$54 
billion in global cocaine retail profits some US$25 bil-
lion may have been actually available for laundering, 
equivalent to 46% of the global retail cocaine profits.    
A regional breakdown of the results of the above calcula-
tions suggests that 55% of the funds available for 
money-laundering linked to global cocaine retail sales 
are to be found in North America (US$13.8 billion) and 
a further 35% in West and Central Europe (US$8.7 bil-
lion). In other words, 90% of the funds generated out 
of cocaine retail trafficking and available for subsequent 
money-laundering activities are concentrated in these 
two subregions.  
A similar approach was subsequently taken to estimate 
the amounts available for laundering resulting from 
wholesale trafficking. Countries estimated to have 
cocaine-related gross profits of more than US$1 billion 
(retail and wholesale) were investigated. The total gross 
wholesale profits in these 12 countries were estimated at 
US$22.6 bn, equivalent to 75% of the global total. 
While the unweighted average of the simple model 
results suggested that slightly more than half (53%) of 
the profits would be available for laundering, the esti-
mates taking the market structure into account (derived 
from seizure statistics)  showed an unweighted average 
of around 90% (88%-92% confidence interval). The 
total amounts potentially available for laundering at the 
global level were estimated at around US$27.7 bn, 
equivalent to 92% of the global cocaine wholesale prof-
its. The model identified particularly high proportions 
for Colombia, Spain, Mexico and Brazil, reflecting the 
involvement of traffickers from these countries not only 
in domestic sales but also in export and transit activities. 
Analysing the regional distribution, the model suggests 
that above average proportions available for money-
laundering out of cocaine wholesale trafficking activities 
are to be found in South America (94% of gross profits). 
Below average proportions (87% of gross profits) seem 
to exist in North America.  
54 Calculations for Colombia – another country with total profits 
exceeding US$1 billion - are not shown in the table. These calcula-
tions suggested that hardly any of the income from the retail trade 
within Colombia is available for laundering. In contrast, most of the 
wholesale profits are laundered.   
Adding retail and wholesale profits, the model results 
suggest that some US$53 bn out of global gross cocaine 
profits of US$84 bn are available for laundering (equiv-
alent to 62% of the total). The overall proportions of 
cocaine related profits that are available for laundering 
seem to be highest in South America (85%), while in 
North America and Europe just 57% and 55%, respec-
tively, of the generated profits are available for launder-
ing.   
Nonetheless, most funds available for money-laundering 
out of cocaine trafficking are to be found in North 
America (US$20 bn or 38% of the total). Though over-
all profits related to cocaine trafficking are larger in 
Europe compared to South America, the amounts avail-
able for laundering are basically of similar magnitudes in 
South America (including the Caribbean and Central 
America) and Europe: around US$15 billion each, or 
29% each of the global total. Amounts available for 
laundering emerging from other parts of the world 
account for less than US$3 billion or less than 5% of the 
funds laundered out of the global cocaine trade. 
As mentioned before, the proportions of the funds gen-
erated at the retail level available for laundering are far 
smaller (46% of gross profits at the global level) than at 
the wholesale level (92% of gross profits). This is a 
reflection of the fact that cocaine trafficking is – globally 
- far more concentrated at the wholesale level than at the 
retail level. 
The amounts available for laundering at the wholesale 
level (some US$28 bn in absolute terms) are only slightly 
larger than the amounts emerging from retail sales (some 
US$25 bn). This indicates that the cocaine retail sector 
– notably in the industrialized countries – should not be 
neglected as a source for money-laundering activities. In 
fact, in both North America and Europe the largest gross 
profits – expressed in absolute figures – seem to be gen-
erated at the retail level, while the largest gross profits in 
South America are from the wholesale sector. As a con-
sequence, excess funds generated at the retail level that 
can be used for money-laundering purposes appear to be 
– according to the model results – more important in 
both North America and Europe than the funds gener-
ated at the wholesale level. 
In contrast, such retail sales play hardly any role for drug 
traffickers in South America from an economic point of 
view. This is mainly due to the low cocaine prices in 
South America. While cocaine consumption is far from 
low in South America, funds generated out of retail sales 
are still negligible there. 
The same is even more true when it comes to money-
laundering based on cocaine retail sales in South Amer-
ica. Less than US$1 bn or less than 4% of global funds 
from retail sales related to cocaine for money-laundering 
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table 55: Tentative estimates of amounts available for laundering out of cocaine retail sales, 2009 
Sources: UNoDc calculations based on UNoDc, Individual Seizures Database and UNoDc, Annual Reports Questionnaire data. 
table 56: Tentative estimates of regional distribution of amounts available for laundering out of cocaine retail 
sales in 2009, in billion US$
Sources: UNoDc calculations based on UNoDc, Individual Seizures Database and UNoDc, Annual Reports Questionnaire data.
 Countries where 
gross cocaine  
profits (retail 
and wholesale) 
were estimated 
to exceed US$1 
billion
Gross retail 
profits  
(in million US$)
Proportions laundered at the 
retail level
Amounts available 
for laundering 
 (in million US$)‘Simple 
model’
Model taking 
market structure 
into account
USA  26,090 0% 51%      13,219 
UK  6,948 44% 57%        3,958 
Italy  3,873 0% 30%        1,169 
Germany  2,197 27% 49%        1,069 
Spain 1,810 15% 42%           765 
france 1,239 0% 23%           282 
Brazil 1,195 5% 21%           255 
canada  1,146 0% 21%           243 
Australia  910 28% 49%           443 
Argentina  837 17% 43%           361 
Mexico  495 40% 55%           274 
Unweighted average  16% 40%  
confidence interval  
(95%) 32% - 48%
Subtotal 46,740       22,038 
other countries 7,530  40%  (32% - 48%)
3,020 
 (2,407 – 3,633)
Global	total	 54,270 46%		(45%	-	47%)
25,055	
	(24,445	–	25,671)
 Gross retail profits (in bn US)
Proportion laun-
dered
Amounts available 
for laundering (in 
bn US$)
Europe 20.9 44% 9.1
  west and central  Europe 19.7 44% 8.7
  South-East Europe 0.8 40% 0.3
  East Europe 0.4 40% 0.2
North America 27.7 50% 13.8
South America (incl. central 
America and caribbean) 2.7 32% 0.9
Asia 1.0 40% 0.4
oceania 1.0 48% 0.5
Africa 0.9 40% 0.4
TOTAL 54.3 46% 25.1
Ill IcIT fINANcIAl flowS
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purposes are being generated in South America while 
South America accounts with US$14 bn for more than 
51% of the global funds generated for money-launder-
ing out of wholesale related trafficking activities.  
table 57: Tentative estimates of amounts available for laundering out of cocaine wholesale trafficking, 2009 
* gross profits made by the Mexican cartels operating in the wholesale and retail trade within the United States are not included  
in these figures.  
Sources: UNoDc calculations based on UNoDc, Individual Seizures Database and UNoDc, Annual Reports Questionnaire data. 
 Countries where 
gross cocaine   
profits (retail and 
wholesale) were 
estimated to 
exceed US$1 billion
Gross wholesale 
profits, adjusted 
for seizures and 
transit profits  
(in million US$)
Proportions laundered at 
the wholesale level
Amounts  
available for launder-
ing (in million US$)
‘Simple 
model’
 Model taking 
market structure 
into account
colombia 9,439 96% 97% 9,146 
Mexico* 3,456 89% 92% 3,191 
USA 3,441 9% 83% 2,868 
UK 1,383 47% 89% 1,237 
Italy 1,327 46% 90% 1,188 
Spain 1,278 81% 93% 1,190 
Germany 524 40% 89% 467 
Brazil 479 74% 92% 442 
france 471 25% 88% 415 
Argentina 309 63% 91% 281 
Australia 281 62% 91% 255 
canada 198 0% 85% 168
Unweighted average  53% 90%  
confidence interval  
(95%) 88% - 92%
Subtotal 22,586 20,848
other countries 7,653 90%  (88% - 92%)
6,892  
(6,735-7,021)
Global	(confidence	
interval,	95%) 30,239
92%	
	(91%-92%)
27,740	
	(27,583	–	27,869)
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table 58: Tentative estimates of regional distribution of amounts available for laundering out of cocaine whole-
sale trafficking in 2009, in billion US$
Sources: UNoDc calculations based on UNoDc, Individual Seizures Database and UNoDc, Annual Reports Questionnaire data. 
 Gross wholesale profits (in bn US)
Proportion 
 laundered
Amounts available 
for laundering (in 
bn US$)
Europe 6.6 90% 5.9
  west and central  Europe 6.3 90% 5.7
  South-East Europe 0.2 90% 0.2
  East Europe 0.1 90% 0.1
North America 7.1 87% 6.2
South America (incl. central 
America and caribbean) 15.1 94% 14.2
Asia 0.5 90% 0.4
oceania 0.3 91% 0.3
Africa 0.7 90% 0.6
TOTAL 30.2 92% 27.7
table 59: Tentative estimates of all cocaine-related profits laundered in 2009, in billion US$ 
Sources: UNoDc calculations based on UNoDc, Individual Seizures Database and UNoDc, Annual Reports Questionnaire data. 
 
*   As shown in the table “cocaine-related gross profits in million US$ generated at the global level after adjustments for seizures and    
           transit  profits.” 
**       Based on the proportions shown in the table “Tentative estimates of regional distribution of amounts available for laundering out of  
           cocaine wholesale trafficking in 2009, in billion US$.” 
***     Based on the proportions shown in the table “Tentative estimates of regional distribution of amounts available for laundering out of  
           cocaine retail sales in 2009, in billion US$.” 
****    ‘Total profits available for laundering’ / ‘Total of gross profits.’ 
Gross profits* in billion 
US$
Profits available for 
laundering, from
Overall  
proportion 
laundered 
****
 Whole-sale Retail Total
Whole-
sale** Retail*** Total
Europe 6.6 20.9 27.5 5.9 9.1 15.1 55%
  west and central  Europe 6.3 19.7 26.0 5.7 8.7 14.3 55%
  South-East Europe 0.2 0.8 1.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 50%
  East Europe 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.3 51%
North America 7.1 27.7 34.8 6.2 13.8 20.0 57%
South America (incl. central 
America and caribbean) 15.1 2.7 17.8 14.2 0.9 15.1 85%
Asia 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.4 0.4 0.8 55%
oceania 0.3 1.0 1.3 0.3 0.5 0.8 58%
Africa 0.7 0.9 1.6 0.6 0.4 1.0 62%
TOTAL 30.2 54.3 84.5 27.7 25.1 52.8 62%
Ill IcIT fINANcIAl flowS
92
Detai led analysis of a transnational organized cr ime sector
x. Amounts of cocaine money laundered 
and main destinations of the laun-
dered funds 
After having established the likely distribution of 
cocaine-related profits and the amounts available for 
money-laundering, the last question concerns the (first) 
location of the money-laundering activities. In order to 
arrive at a likely distribution of such funds, a new model 
(‘gravity model’) was developed and tested for cocaine-
related trafficking profits available for laundering. 
The model logic and its underlying assumptions and 
theories were discussed before in more detail in the 
methodology section and will only be summarized here. 
The basic concept of the gravity model is that there are 
a number of enabling and limiting factors which increase 
or decrease the likelihood of money-laundering in for-
eign jurisdictions. In that way, it is a potential threat 
assessment tool rather than a precise tool for estimating 
actual illicit money flows. 
The enabling factors can be classified into those showing 
a ‘capability’ or ‘capacity’ of operators in a certain coun-
try or territory to launder money (reflected, for instance, 
in the existence of a financial services sector), into fac-
tors reflecting ‘susceptibility’ of countries to money-
laundering (reflected, for instance, in the level of secrecy 
granted to the financial sector or the non-compliance 
with international anti-money-laundering standards) 
and cultural factors (such as common languages). Finally, 
the ‘distance’ from where the proceeds are generated and 
where they are laundered, plays a role. 
The model generates first a general ‘intrinsic attractive-
ness’ of a country to money launderers. This depends on 
a number of enabling or limiting factors, such as the size 
of the financial service sector, corruption, bank secrecy, 
FATF compliance, et cetera. Then, there are certain fac-
tors that influence the attractiveness of a potential 
money-laundering territory for the country where the 
criminal proceeds have been generated and enter the 
financial system. Such factors include trade links and 
common language(s) (‘pairwise attractiveness’). The 
overall attractiveness of a certain country for another 
country is then calculated as  its “intrinsic attractiveness” 
multiplied with its “pairwise attractiveness” and divided 
by the  distance to the other country.  Results emerging 
from the model are then shown at the subregional level. 
The key parameters used in the current model to estab-
lish a country’s attractiveness for potential money laun-
derers were GDP per capita, the importance of the 
financial services sector in GDP, foreign direct invest-
ment inflows, indices measuring the rule of law, human 
development, FATF compliance and the extent of the 
shadow economy, existing trade links, language com-
monalities and distance (in kilometres as well as in terms 
of the existence of common borders). 
Extensive efforts went into the calibration of the model, 
that is, into the question regarding the weights to be 
given to the individual parameters, partly based on 
research in the field, partly based on cross-checking 
results with other data sets. The model was created so 
that additional parameters that may be of relevance 
could be easily included, if needed.55 
The exercise, having undergone several rounds of adjust-
ments and fine-tuning, seems to now show results that 
are plausible. Nonetheless, what is presented here is only 
a risk-threat assessment, that is, a likelihood distribution 
of the intermediate destination(s) used for cocaine-
related funds laundered worldwide.  
55 Such additional parameters  (for example, banking secrecy,  offshore 
centres, corruption, terrorism, religion and other cultural similarities) 
were not added to the model at this stage as it was feared that the 
accuracy of some of the sources used for these additional indicators 
(collected by individual countries or NGOs) could be questioned by 
Member States.
Algebra	of	the	Gravity	Model
Intrinsic Attractiveness of Country i to Money Launderers = Attractivenessi
= GDPperCapi * FinancialServicei  * FDInflowsi  * FATFCompliancei* ……et cetera
Specific Attractiveness of Country j to Money Launderers based in Country i = PairwiseAttractivenessij
= Tradelinksij * Languagesij *  ……etc
Affinity of Country j to Moneylaunderers in Country i = Affinityij     
   Attractivenessi * PairwiseAttractivenessij   
                        Distanceij
= 
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In addition, the model provides some answers as to the 
likely impact that such laundering attempts may have 
for specific countries or regions (net inflow versus net 
outflow). The exercise may thus help in understanding 
the likely magnitudes of such flows and the severity of 
the problem. But the results should not be mistaken for 
precise dollar figures. They are simply the best currently 
available estimates which may change substantially once 
better information becomes available.   
A first overview of the results shown in the table below 
provides information on: 
 • the likely gross profits generated out of cocaine traf-
ficking in each subregion (US$84.5 bn at the global 
level); 
 • the profits available for laundering, taking the market 
structure and country-specific benchmark income into 
account upon which money-laundering is likely to 
take place (US$52.8 bn at the global level); 
 • the likely amounts laundered within the same jurisdic-
tion and going to other jurisdictions (‘total outflow’). 
According to the base version of the model (power for 
gravity model distance = 1) significant amounts of the 
gross cocaine profits (US$26.6 bn) would have  remained 
within the respective jurisdictions where they were gen-
erated. The main ‘beneficiaries’ of such domestic invest-
ment of cocaine-related profits would be countries in 
North America (US$10.5 bn), followed by countries in 
West and Central Europe (US$7.2 bn) and countries in 
South America (close to US$6 bn). Expressed as a pro-
portion of GDP, the amounts locally laundered and 
invested, however, do not seem to be particularly large 
at the regional level (0.06% of GDP in North America, 
0.04% of GDP in West and Central Europe; 0.2% of 
GDP in South America).  
The other half (US$26.2 bn) would have gone to juris-
dictions abroad. The largest outflows would have taken 
place in countries of the Americas. Countries in North 
America (US$9.6 billion), South America (US$7.4 bil-
lion) and Europe (US$7.4 billion) together account for 
some US$25 billion in annual outflows; 95% of the 
global total. 
The last column shows the net outflow, taking into 
account that outflows from countries in the region are 
partly or fully compensated from inflows from drug traf-
fickers from other regions. Thus, the model results sug-
gest that slightly more funds from cocaine traffickers 
would actually be entering Europe than leaving it. 
Europe would thus have a net inflow of some US$0.8 
bn, equivalent to 3% of its gross cocaine related profits 
or 0.004% of GDP. 
The inflow of cocaine-related ‘dirty money’ into North 
America would not be sufficient to cover the outflow 
(US$9.6 bn). North America would have a net outflow 
of US$7.8 billion, equivalent to 22% of the gross profits 
generated out of cocaine profits or 0.05% of GDP. 
According to the model, cocaine-related funds would 
also be flowing from South America to other regions, 
notably to the Caribbean. Out of US$16 billion gener-
ated in cocaine-related gross profits in South America, 
some US$13 billion would be potentially available for 
money-laundering, of which US$7.4 would actually be 
leaving jurisdictions in South America. Taking inflows 
to various other South American countries into account, 
table 60: weights used for the calculation of the model   
Intrinsic	attractiveness
      Attractiveness Index weighting for GDP per capita 0.069 
      Attractiveness Index weighting for financial service trade (% of GDP) 0.598 
      Attractiveness Index weighting for fDI inflows per GDP 2009. -0.194 
      Attractiveness Index weighting for Rule of law (wGI) 0.074 
      Attractiveness Index weighting for Human Development (wGI) -0.067 
      Attractiveness Index weighting for fATf compliance Index 0.098 
      Attractiveness Index weighting for Shadow Economy % of GDP 0.009 
Specific	attractiveness	(‘pairwise	attractiveness’)	
      weighting for Trade links 0.100 
      weighting for language commonality 0.900 
Distance	
      Distance Reduction for common Borders (a figure <1, reflecting ease of trade across common     
      borders) 0.600 
      Notional Distance for Internal laundering 0.049 
      Power for Gravity Model Distance 1.000 
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there would still be a net outflow of US$ 4.7 bn, equiv-
alent to about 29% of the original profits made or 
almost 0.2% of GDP. 
The main destination of the outflows from funds from 
North America appears to be the Caribbean. The net 
inflow of cocaine-related funds into the Caribbean 
would amount to some US$ 6 billion, equivalent to 
2.3% of GDP, that is, amounts that are not negligible. 
Inflows of cocaine-related profits exceeding US$1 bil-
lion are still shown by the model for countries in Central 
America (US$1.9 bn, equivalent to 1.6% of GDP). The 
net inflow or outflow for all other regions is shown to be 
below US$1 billion according to the model.    
The subsequent table provides a more detailed break-
down of the flows. It shows, for instance, the distribu-
tion of the funds targeting the Caribbean region for 
laundering purposes. Funds flowing into the Caribbean 
(totalling US$6.4 billion or 2.4% of GDP) would be 
coming mainly from North America (US$3.3 billion) 
and South America (US$2.5 billion). Smaller amounts 
would also come from West and Central Europe 
(US$0.2 bn).  
table 61: Model results - base version (Power for gravity model distance = 1): Estimates of cocaine-related prof-
its, funds available for laundering and amounts leaving the country and net outflow,  in million US$, in 
2009
* The subregional totals do not always add up fully to the regional averages due to rounding errors and the  extrapolations used. 
Sources: UNoDc calculations based on UNoDc,  fATf, UNDP and UNcTAD. 
Gross  
profits gen-
erated out 
of cocaine 
trafficking 
(retail and 
wholesale)
Profits 
available 
for  
laundering
Profits 
domestically 
laundered
Total out-
flows:
Funds 
 leaving the  
jurisdiction of 
the respective 
countries in 
the region
Net outflows:
Funds leaving 
the respective 
region taking 
inflows from 
other regions 
into account
Americas* 52,584 35,135 17,614 17,521 4,687
- North America 34,825 20,022 10,465 9,557 7,822
- South America 16,035 12,895 5,539 7,356 4,744
- caribbean 1,074 904 544 360 -6,019
- central America 650 533 285 248 -1,860
Europe* 27,489 15,083 7,648 7,435 -805
- west and  
  central Europe 25,964 14,312 7,223 7,089 -188
- South-East    
  Europe 1,018 513 311 202 -489
- East Europe 507 258 114 144 -128
Africa* 1,615 993 608 385 -2,105
- west and  
  central Africa 900 628 399 229 -842
- Southern Africa 124 192 123 69 -284
- Eastern Africa 262 146 75 71 -367
- Northern Africa 55 28 12 16 -612
Asia* 1,516 836 453 383 -1690
East and  
South-East Asia 854 487 261 226 -540
South Asia 364 195 95 100 -122
Near and Middle 
East / west Asia 277 142 89 53 -764
central Asia 22 12 8 4 -264
Oceania 1,305 760 257 503 -85
GLOBAL 84,509 52,809 26,582 26,227 0
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The next largest destination area for cocaine-related 
money flows would be Central America (US$1.9 bn). 
The total flows into Central America would amount to 
some US$2.1 bn, equivalent to 1.6% of GDP.  The larg-
est inflows here would be again from North America 
(close to US$1 bn) and South America (US$0.9 bn). 
The model also suggests that there would be relatively 
strong flows – in absolute numbers – from Europe, as 
well as to Europe. In total US$7.3 billion of cocaine-
related funds would be flowing into the financial sector 
of countries in Europe. However, this would be equiva-
lent to just 0.04% of GDP. The origin of these funds 
would be mostly from traffickers in Europe (that is, traf-
fickers investing their cocaine-related profits in other 
European countries), notably from traffickers in West 
and Central Europe (US$5 bn), followed by money 
flows from traffickers in North America to Europe 
(US$1.5 bn) and from South America to Europe 
(US$0.7 bn). Thus West and Central Europe – despite 
of total outflows of US$7.1 bn of cocaine-related profits 
- would still have a net inflow of cocaine-related funds 
of US$0.2 bn according to this model (Model estimates 
based on ‘power for gravity model distance’  factor = 1).
The results are dependent upon the calibration of the 
model, that is, the weighting of the individual parame-
ters. 
One key parameter in this regard is the importance 
given to distance. If the importance of distance is 
reduced (‘power for gravity distance’ < 1), the model 
shows that more funds will be laundered abroad; if the 
importance of distance is increased  (‘power for gravity 
distance’ > 1) then more funds will be laundered within 
the jurisdiction where the profits were generated. 
 
Profits  
available 
for  
laundering :
Total outflows in % of total outflow
Power 
for 
gravity 
= 1.3
Power 
for 
gravity 
= 1
Power 
for 
gravity 
= 0.7
Power 
for 
gravity 
= 1.3
Power 
for 
gravity 
= 1
Power 
for 
gravity 
= 0.7
Americas* 35,135 7,376 17,521 28,473 65% 67% 67%
- North America 20,022 3,701 9,557 16,153 33% 36% 38%
- South America 12,895 3,428 7,356 11,237 30% 28% 26%
- caribbean 904 142 360 665 1% 1% 2%
- central America 533 105 248 418 1% 1% 1%
Europe* 15,083 3,393 7,435 11,936 30% 28% 28%
- west and central 
Europe 14,312 3,248 7,089 11,344 29% 27% 27%
- South-East Europe 513 77 202 378 1% 1% 1%
- East Europe 258 68 144 214 1% 1% 1%
Africa* 993 140 385 745 1% 1% 2%
- west and central 
Africa 628 80 229 459 1% 1% 1%
- Southern Africa 192 25 69 140 0% 0% 0%
- Eastern Africa 146 28 71 119 0% 0% 0%
- Northern Africa 28 7 16 27 0% 0% 0%
Asia* 836 153 383 652 1% 1% 2%
East and South-East 
Asia 487 92 226 383 1% 1% 1%
South Asia 195 39 100 162 0% 0% 0%
Near and Middle East / 
west Asia 142 20 53 98 0% 0% 0%
central Asia 12 2 4 9 0% 0% 0%
oceania 760 261 503 672 2% 2% 2%
GLOBAL 52,809 11,323 26,227 42,477 100% 100% 100%
Proportion of outflows 21% 50% 80%
table 62: Total outflows depending on the importance given to ‘distance’
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Increasing the ‘power for gravity distance ’ to 1.3 would 
reduce the total amounts of cocaine-related money laun-
dered abroad to US$11.3 bn or 21% of the total profits 
available for laundering. Lowering the ‘power for grav-
ity’ to 0.7 would increase the amounts thought to be 
laundered in foreign jurisdictions to US$42.5 bn or 
80% of the gross profits available for laundering. The 
internal structure of the outflows, expressed as a propor-
tion of total outflows, would change only slightly if the 
importance given to the distance parameters were 
increased or reduced. 
If  a ‘power for gravity distance’ figure of 0.7 were chosen 
(instead of ‘1’),  the basic structure of the net outflows 
would still be similar, with main destinations of the 
money being the Caribbean and the main outflows 
coming from North America and South America (see 
Table). For the European countries, the small surplus of 
net inflows would, however, turn into a small net out-
flow.  
The gravity model is helpful in determining the relative 
risk for countries and subregions and helps to maintain 
internal consistency for the results obtained. But it 
cannot, for the time being, determine with any degree 
of certainty whether the use of a ‘power for gravity dis-
tance’ figure of 1 (chosen here as the best estimate) is 
more or less appropriate than the use of another figure. 
This would need additional research.
To sum up, it should be noted that a number of new 
approaches have been tried here to estimate the genera-
tion of cocaine profits and an innovative approach has 
been tested with the creation and application of a ‘grav-
ity model’ showing the likely distribution of cocaine 
profits across the financial system. The results shown 
above – on the whole - seem to be plausible and in line 
with other findings. Moreover, the use of such a model 
allows for internal consistency of the results. Nonethe-
less, more research would still be needed to cross-check 
several of the detailed results and to adjust the model 
accordingly. In particular, very little is known about how 
much money is being laundered within the same juris-
diction and how much is laundered in other jurisdic-
tions. One precondition here would be a better 
understanding of the behaviour of money launderers. 
Detailed accounts of the court records of sentenced 
money launderers and detailed interviews during their 
prison sentence could be one way forward.     
At the same time, work with the gravity model has also 
shown that a simple mechanistic application of the 
model in its current form to other crime sectors – with-
out additional knowledge about the operations of the 
actors in the specific crime market(s) – is potentially 
problematic as it may lead to misleading results. Experts 
are still required to lead the process and validate the 
results obtained, and adjust the model accordingly. In 
other words, the ‘gravity model’ created for this exercise 
is an interesting new approach and a quantitative risk 
assessment tool, but it is still in its development phase 
and the results obtained should be treated with caution.
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Socio-economic impact of f inancial  f lows  
emerging from drug traff icking and  
other transnational organized cr imes
3
The actual dangers of these flows for society depend 
much on the nature of the underlying criminal activities. 
The socio-economic impact of the actual amounts gen-
erated by transnational organized crime is less significant 
than the underlying criminal activities. 
i. financial flows resulting from  
trafficking in drugs 
An analysis of criminal cases in the Netherlands (1999) 
suggested that criminals used, on average, 7% of their 
total criminal income for consumption and lifestyle, 
57% for ‘conventional investment’ (property, bank 
accounts, fixed interest assets and securities), 23% for 
‘irregular business’ activities (legal or illegal) and 9% for 
hoarding money, mainly for subsequent reinvestment 
into illegal activities. In this context, the tendency of 
drug dealers to hoard money for subsequent reinvest-
ment into the drug business (77% of all drug-related 
cases showed indications of some hoarding) was more 
pronounced than the general tendency of criminals to 
hoard money for reinvestment into criminal activities 
(54% of all cases).2 This suggests that the overall propor-
tion of money used by drug traffickers for reinvestment 
into their ‘business sector’ is higher than for criminals in 
general. In other words, income from drug trafficking 
seems to promote drug trafficking stronger than income 
from other crimes fosters other crimes. 
… resulting in health costs 
Trafficking in illegal drugs – prompted by expectations 
of significant financial benefits - contributes, first of all, 
to serious health problems worldwide. Transnational 
organized crime links producers with consumers of ille-
gal drugs. A significant number of people worldwide 
suffer from the negative health consequences of drug 
consumption. According to WHO data, some 200,000 
people per year die from drug abuse. More than 11 mil-
lion disability-adjusted life-years are lost every year due 
to consumption of drugs (opiates, cocaine and ampheta-
mines), equivalent to some 19 years per 100 drug users, 
2 J. R. Meloen, H. Landman, J de Miranda,.van Eekelen and S. van 
Soest, Buit en Besteding, Een empirisch onderzoek naar de omvang, de 
kenmerken en de besteding van misdaadgeld, Den Haag: Reed Busi-
ness Information, 2003, p. 246, quoted in Brigitte Unger, The Scale 
and Impacts of Money Laundering, Cheltenham (UK), Edward Elgar 
Publishing Company, 2007, p. 126.
The estimated US$2.1 trillion of crime proceeds believed 
to be generated every year by crime, of which US$1.6 
trillion are believed to be available for laundering, 
including crime proceeds of US$0.9 trillion from trans-
national organized crime of which some US$0.6 trillion 
are thought to be available for laundering, create a large 
number of negative socio-economic consequences, 
depending on the specific predicate crimes. 
The main threat emerging from financial flows related 
to transnational organized crime activities is linked to 
the ability of such flows to foster the economic viability 
of the underlying criminal activities, thus contributing 
to their spread and expansion. This can be compared to 
the need for oxygen for human beings and most ani-
mals: without oxygen, most life on earth would not 
exist. Similarly, without financial flows emerging from 
drug trafficking and other transnational organized crime 
activities, most transnational crime would not take 
place.1 In addition, financial flows linked to transna-
tional organized crime have negative socio-economic 
implications in their own right. Subsequent money-
laundering activities may pose potential threats for the 
financial stability of some of the countries concerned. 
The analysis of the socio-economic implications will 
start with an analysis of the implications of criminal 
financial flows for the spread of various forms of organ-
ized crime, and how such crimes affect society. The 
socio-economic implications of criminal financial flows 
invested in the legal economy will be discussed in a sub-
sequent sub-chapter. This will be followed by an analysis 
of the socio-economic consequences of money-launder-
ing, notably that taking place in foreign jurisdictions. 
a)	 Implications	of	illicit		
financial	flows	contributing		
to	the	spread	of	transnational		
organized	crime	
The threats for society emanating from illicit financial 
flows lie primarily in the underlying criminal activities 
that such flows promote. These underlying crimes – 
which would not have been committed without the 
incentive of forthcoming financial benefits – pose seri-
ous socio-economic threats to societies across the globe. 
1 Reference Group Meeting, January 2011. 
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USA, 29.6% of the larceny cases, 27.2% of the robbery 
cases and 6.8% of the motor vehicle thefts were attribut-
able to drug abuse, as well as 15.8% of the homicides, 
5.1% of the assaults and 2.4% of the rapes in the coun-
try.12 
A study on the overall economic costs related to drug 
abuse in the United States arrived at a figure of more 
than US$180 billion (or US$650 per capita) for the year 
2002, equivalent to 1.7% of the US gross domestic 
product (GDP) in that year.13 The economic costs 
related to drug abuse in the USA alone were thus higher 
than the GDP of 172 countries and territories in 2002 
(out of 198 countries and territories for which the World 
Bank provided data), and similar in magnitude to the 
total GDP of countries such as Saudi Arabia, Norway or 
Denmark.14 
Expressed as a percentage of GDP, the economic losses 
due to drug abuse were calculated to have been even 
higher in the United Kingdom (1.8% of GDP in 2000), 
though in absolute numbers they were lower (£12 bil-
lion or US$18 bn, about US$450 per capita).15 These 
figures were significantly higher than a decade earlier. 
An investigation commissioned by the European Com-
munity identified the costs of drug abuse to be some 
$3.2 billion for the UK in 1988,16 equivalent to 0.4% 
of GDP or about $60 per capita. A study for the year 
2003/2004, however, demonstrated far higher costs 
related to drug abuse in the new millennium. ‘Class A 
drugs’ (cocaine, heroin, ecstasy, LSD et cetera) were 
found to cost £15.4 bn (US$26 bn) for England and 
Wales for the fiscal year 2003/2004,17 equivalent to 
1.8% of GDP. A subsequent study on the social and 
economic costs of drug abuse in Scotland showed a 
figure of £3.5 bn for the year 2006, equivalent to some 
3.8% of GDP.18 Almost 96% of these costs were caused 
12 Study quoted in Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), 
The Economic Costs of Drug Abuse in the United States, 1992-2002, 
Washington D.C., December 2004.
13 Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), The Economic 
Costs of Drug Abuse in the United States, 1992-2002, Washington 
D.C., December 2004, p. 64.
14 World Bank, Global Development Indicators, Washington, February 
2011. 
15 C. Godfrey, G. Eaton, C. McDougall, and A. Culyer, The Economic 
and social costs of class A drug use in England and Wales, 2000. Home 
Office, London 2002, quoted in National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP), The Economic Costs of Drug Abuse in the United States, 
1992-2002, Washington D.C., December 2004.
16 Commission of the European Communities, The Social and Economic 
Costs of Drug Abuse in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, 
London, 1990, p. 2.
17 Loma Gordon, Louise Tinsley, Christine Godfrey, Steve Parrott, “The 
economic and social costs of Class A drug use in England and Wales, 
2003/04“, in Home Office, “Measuring different aspects of problem 
drug use: methodological development”, 2nd edition, Home Office 
Online Report 16/06, London 2006, pp. 41-45. 
18 Jane Case, Gordon Hay, Christine Godfrey, Steve Parrott, Assessing 
the Scale and Impact of Illicit Drug Markets in Scotland, Glasgow, 
far more than for tobacco (5 years per 100 users) or for 
alcohol (2 years per 100 users).3 For the United States 
alone, there were some 31,400 direct drug-induced 
deaths in 2007, up from 19,100 in 1999. This was 
higher than the number of deaths due to homicides 
(18,400) or deaths due to firearms (31,200, including 
accidents with firearms) or direct alcohol-induced deaths 
(23,200) in 2007.4 Russian figures suggest that some 
30,000 people died from heroin abuse in 2009.5 There 
were more than 7,000 drug overdose deaths in the EU 
in 20076 though this figure would rise further if all 
drug-related deaths were included. 
… and overall high socio-economic costs related  
to drug abuse
The huge financial flows generated via drug trafficking 
to consumers also put a significant financial burden on 
to the drug users. The users can often only pay for their 
consumption by committing various forms of acquisitive 
crime. Data for Australia show for instance that 0.1% of 
the general population aged 14 years or older used heroin 
in the previous month.7 Drug tests among adult detain-
ees across the country8 – in contrast – revealed that 
opiate traces in urine samples was found for 11% of the 
tested detainees in 2008,9 suggesting that the proportion 
of heroin use among detainees is more than 100 times 
larger than among the general population. 
Similarly, in the USA, about 1% of the male population 
(aged 12 years and above) consumed cocaine in the pre-
vious month10 while, at the same time, almost 29% of 
males arrested (mostly related to various forms of acquis-
itive crime) in 2008 were found to have consumed 
cocaine (based on urine tests conducted among arrestees 
in 10 US cities).11 A previous study – based on data for 
2002 – suggested that 30% of the burglary cases in the 
3 World Health Organisation, World Health Report 2002, Geneva 
2003. 
4 ONDCP, Fact Sheet – Consequences of Illicit Drug Use in America, 
December 2010. 
5 Victor Ivanov (Federal Drug Control Agency) quoted in BBC News, 
“Russia blames Nato for heroin surge from Afghanistan” , 27 Febru-
ary 2010. 
6 EMCDDA, Statistical Bulletin 2010, Lisbon 2010. 
7 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2007 National Drug 
Strategy Household Survey – Detailed Findings, December 2008. 
8 Locations for the tested detainees were: Adelaide, Alice Springs, 
Bankstown, Brisbane, Darwin, East Perth, Footscray, Parramatta and 
Southport.
9 Australian Institute of Criminology, Drug use monitoring in Australia: 
2008 annual report on drug use among police detainees, Canberra 
2010. 
10 SAMHSA, 2008 National Survey on Drug Use & Health, Volume 1. 
Summary of National Findings, Office of Applied Studies, NSDUH 
Series H-38A, HHS Publication No. SMA 10-4856 Findings. Rock-
ville, MD, USA. 
11 ONDCP, Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Program – ADAM II, 
2008 Annual Report, April 2009. 
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lent to 0.4% of GDP in 1992,22 for Germany, they 
amounted to some 0.4% of GDP23 and for Canada, the 
costs were 0.2% of GDP in 1992,24 rising to 0.7% in 
2002.25 Calculations for France resulted in a figure of 
€2.8 bn for the year 2000, equivalent to 0.18% of GDP, 
up from a figure of French francs 13.3 bn (€2.0 bn) or 
0.16% of GDP in 1997.26 Estimates for Spain for 1997 
22 David. J. Collins and Helen M. Lapsley, “The social costs of drug 
abuse in Australia in 1998 and 1992”, National Drug Strategy, Report 
prepared for the Commonwealth Department of Human Services 
and Health, Feb. 1996. 
23 Karl-Hans Hartwig, Inge Pies, Rationale Drogenpolitik in der Demo-
kratie, (J.C.B. Mohr Verlag), Tübingen, 1995.
24 E. Robson Single, L., X. Xie,, J Rehm,. The Economic Costs of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Illicit Drugs in Canada, 1992, Addiction 93: 
983-998.
25 CCSA-CCLAT ( J. Rehm, D. Baliunas, S. Brochu, B. Fischer, W. 
Gnam, J. Patra, S. Popova, A. Sarnocinska-Hart, B. Taylor In col-
laboration with E. Adlaf, M. Recel, E. Single), The costs of Substance 
Abuse in Canada 2002, March 2006
26 Observatoire francais des drogues et des toxicomanies (Pierre Kopp 
and Philippe Fenoglio), » Le coût social des drogues licites ( alcool et 
tabac) et illicites en France », OFDT, Étude No. 22, Paris 2000. 
by problem drug users. These data, however, also 
included estimates for the ‘emotional pain’ experienced 
by the families of drug users who died as a result of their 
drug use19 as well as estimates for various costs to vic-
tims of crime emerging from assaults, stealing, fraud and 
forgeries related to drug abuse. Excluding such ‘wider 
costs to society,’ the drug abuse-related costs still amount 
to more than £1.7 bn or 1.9% of GDP. 
Calculations for other countries showed lower figures. 
For Australia,20 for instance, the costs amounted to 
around 1% of GDP in 2002,21 up from a figure equiva-
October 2009. Accessable at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publication
s/2009/10/06103906/0. 
19 EMCDDA, Annual Report 2010: The state of the drugs problem in 
Europe (Chapter on ‘Social Costs of Drug Use’), Lisbon 2010, pp. 
28-29. 
20 D. Collins and H. Lapsley, H., Counting the Cost: Estimates of the 
Social Costs of Drug Abuse in Australia, 1998-9. Report for the Com-
monwealth Department of Health and Ageing, Canberra 2002.
21 E. Robson Single, L., X. Xie, J Rehm, “The Economic Costs of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Illicit Drugs in Canada,” 1992, Addiction 93: 
983-998.
table 65: Economic costs of drug abuse, expressed as a percentage of GDP in selected countries
* Productivity losses (‘costs to the economy’), criminal justice costs, health and social care costs;  
** including ‘wider costs to society’ such as the emotional and physical pain endured by the families of drug users that lost their lives and the 
‘victim costs’ for the crimes committed by drug users (assaults, thefts, frauds etc). 
Sources: J. case, G. Hay, c. Godfrey and S. Parrott, Assessing the Scale and Impact of Illicit Drug Markets in Scotland, Glasgow, october 
2009; l. Gordon, l. Tinsley, c. Godfrey and S. Parrott, “The economic and social costs of class A drug use in England and wales, 2003/04“, 
in Home office, Measuring different aspects of problem drug use: methodological development, 2nd edition, Home office online Report 
16/06, london 2006, pp. 41-45; office of National Drug control Policy (oNDcP), The Economic Costs of Drug Abuse in the United States, 
1992-2002, washington D.c., December 2004; D. collins and H. lapsley, counting the cost: Estimates of the Social costs of Drug Abuse in 
Australia, 1998-9, Report for the commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing, canberra, 2002; K-H. Hartwig and I. Pies, Rationale 
Drogenpolitik in der Demokratie, J.c.B. Mohr Verlag, Tübingen, 1995; ccSA-cclAT (J. Rehm, D. Baliunas, S. Brochu, B. fischer, w. Gnam, J. 
Patra, S. Popova, A. Sarnocinska-Hart and B. Taylor in collaboration with E. Adlaf, M. Recel and E. Single), The costs of Substance Abuse in 
Canada 2002, March 2006; A. Garcia-Altes, J. Ma olle, f. Antonanzas and J. colom, “The social cost of illegal drug consumption in Spain,” 
Addiction, No. 97, pp. 1145-1153, Society for the Study of Addiction to Alcohol and other Drugs, 2002; P. Kopp, P. fonoglio and V. Parel, 
“le coût social de l’alcool, du tabac et des drogues illicites en 2000”, adsp (‘Acualité et dossier en santé publique’), No. 55, June 2006; Inter-
American Drug Abuse control commission, Program to Estimate the Social and Economic costs of Drugs in the Americas, “A summary of 
Results from the Pilot Study in Six countries in latin America and the caribbean”, washington 2007.
Country Year as a percentage of GDP
Scotland 2006 1.9%* (3.8%)**
England and wales 2003/2004 1.8%
United States 2002 1.7%
Australia 1998 1.0%
canada 2002 0.7%
costa Rica 2003 0.5%
Germany 1992 0.4%
El Salvador 2004 0.3%
Spain 1997 0.2%
chile 2003 0.2%
france 2000 0.2%
Mexico 2003 0.1%
Unweighted	average 0.7%
Overall	average	(weighted	by	GDP) 1.2%
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where between US$400 billion and 700 billion per year. 
The actual figures are probably closer to the lower end 
of this range. Assuming that the missing industrialized 
countries had economic costs related to drug abuse of 
around 0.9% of GDP (unweighted average of the seven 
industrialized countries for which data is available32) and 
that the missing developing countries had costs of around 
0.3% of GDP (unweighted average of the four develop-
ing countries), the global economic costs of drug abuse 
could amount to some US$460 billion, which is at the 
lower end of the above-mentioned range (US$400 bn to 
US$700 bn). This is equivalent to some 0.8% of global 
GDP in 2009 (range: 0.7% to 1.2%). 
The calculations of the ‘economic costs of drug abuse‘ 
have been based – in most cases – on a ‘cost of illness’ 
(COI) approach33 and do not include a number of 
crime-related costs linked to drug abuse. Drug related 
robberies, burglaries or larceny (stealing of goods) to 
purchase drugs are – according to this concept – simple 
transfers in ownership that do not affect overall GDP 
(except for damages caused in the process). Therefore, 
they have not been considered in these calculations 
(except for the calculations done for the UK). 
Though this is correct from a purely methodological 
point of view, the application of the COI approach falls 
short of what the general public would associate with 
‘drug-related costs’. Assuming for the USA, for instance, 
that around a fifth34 of the total illicit drug purchases 
(total: US$64 bn)35 were financed out of criminal activ-
ities and that stolen goods often can only be sold by 
drug addicts at prices far below the prevailing market 
prices, the overall costs related to drug abuse would rise 
from more than US$180 bn in 2002 to more than 
US$200 billion. Total costs related to drug abuse – 
which is linked to the financial flows emerging from 
transnational organized crime - may thus have amounted 
to some 2% of GDP in the USA in 2002. This would 
still be a conservative estimate. Calculations for Scotland 
suggest that taking ‘wider costs to society’ into account 
(i.e. all crime-related costs and emotional costs linked to 
the pain suffered by family members due to the death of 
drug using children, partners or parents), the socio-
economic estimates may double. 
Even using the lower published figure of US$181 bn for 
the USA - which excludes the acquisitive crime-related 
32 ‘England and Wales’ and ‘Scotland’ were considered to be one coun-
try (United Kingdom).
33 Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse (CCSA), International Guide-
lines for Estimating the Costs of Substance Abuse, 2001.
34 This would be equivalent to the proportion of people in state prisons 
reporting to have financed their drug habit out of various criminal 
activities. 
35 ONDCP, What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, December 
2001, p. 3.
suggested that drug abuse cost the Spanish economy “at 
least 0.2% of GDP”.27 A number of economic costs 
estimates of drug abuse were also undertaken for coun-
tries in Latin America by CICAD. These estimates 
showed cost estimates ranging from 0.1% of GDP in 
Mexico in 2003 to figures equivalent to 0.22% of GDP 
in Chile (2003), 0.27% of GDP in El Salvador (2004) 
and 0.5% of GDP in Costa Rica (2003).28
Though direct comparability – for data and methodo-
logical reasons – of the various estimates may be limited,29 
they still provide some ideas of the likely orders of mag-
nitude of such costs, ranging from 0.1% to 1.9% of 
GDP. The unweighted average of these estimates amounts 
to some 0.7% of GDP. If this proportion were applied 
to global GDP, the economic costs related to drug abuse 
would have amounted to some US$400 bn at the global 
level in 2009. This seems to be a relatively conservative 
estimate. If the national proportions of the twelve coun-
tries for which data is available were applied to the 
respective national GDP in 2009, the resulting total 
economic costs related to drug abuse would reach almost 
US$320 bn, equivalent to 1.2% of the GDP in these 
twelve countries. Global economic costs is expected to 
be substantially higher than the total in the twelve coun-
tries. Applying a proportion of 1.2% to the global GDP 
(based on World Bank data from 176 countries)30 yields 
a figure close to US$700 billion. This is likely to be an 
upper-end estimate. Most of the countries for which no 
data is available are developing countries and most of 
them are likely to have low economic costs of drug 
abuse,31 though there are also a number of exceptions 
(notably transit countries and countries close to drug 
producers). Against this background, it seems likely that 
global economic costs related to drug abuse lie some-
27 Anna Garcia-Altes, Josep Ma Olle, Fernando Antonanzas and Joan 
Colom, “The social cost of illegal drug consumption in Spain”, 
Addiction, No. 97, pp. 1145-1153, Society for the Study of Addiction 
to Alcohol and Other Drugs, 2002. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/10.1046/j.1360-0443.2002.00170.x/pdf
28 The Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission’s Program to 
Estimate the Social and Economic Costs of Drugs in the Americas 
(Cost Program), A Summary of Results from the Pilot Study in Six 
Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Washington 2007 ( 
http://www.issdp.org/conferences/oslo2007/Marya_L.pdf ). 
29 A recent evaluation on studies estimating the economic cost of drug 
abuse by RAND concluded: “It is not possible to simply draw on 
the independent efforts being undertaken within particular nations, 
as such efforts – while significant and highly valuable to the nations 
conducting them – will not reflect the need for conformity in mea-
surement that is necessary to enable cross-country comparisons. 
Thus, the ability to systematically compare the cost of drug use 
across nations may remain out of our reach for a few more decades.” 
RAND, Issues in estimating the economic cost of drug abuse in consum-
ing nations, Report 3, prepared for the European Commission , 2009, 
Santa Monica, California, USA.
30 World Bank, World Development Indicators 2010. 
31 This can be deduced from still lower prevalence rates of drug abuse as 
well lower opportunity costs as per capita income of persons working 
in developing countries is much lower than in developed countries. 
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Most of the economic costs in the USA related to drug 
abuse – based on the COI approach – were due to pro-
ductivity losses (US$129 bn in 2002 or 71% of the 
total), mainly resulting from the inability of drug users 
to work productively during their times of incarceration, 
due either to their careers as drug dealers and criminals, 
drug abuse-related illnesses or premature death. Health 
care costs accounted for around US$16 bn or 9% of the 
total, mostly related to treatment demand. Most of the 
remaining costs were related to incarceration costs (9%), 
police work (5%) and other drug supply control efforts 
(3%). These costs would not have been incurred if crim-
inal groups had not supplied the general public with 
drugs in the first place.
Expressed in constant 2002 dollars, the drug abuse-re-
lated costs based on the cost of illness approach rose 
from US$138 bn in 1992 to US$181 bn in 2002; a real 
rise of 31% over that period.37 This rise is remarkable as 
the purely drug-related expenditures for drug users 
declined from US$88 bn in 1992 to US$64 bn in 2000 
(in constant 2000 US dollars), equivalent to a decline of 
37 Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), The Economic 
Costs of Drug Abuse in the United States, 1992-2002, Washington 
D.C., December 2004, p. 64.
costs – and comparing this figure with the overall 
amounts spent by drug users for the purchase of their 
illicit substances (around US$64 billion, of which 
US$35 bn spent on cocaine and US$10 bn on heroin),36 
data indicate that the economic costs prompted by drug 
abuse were around 3 times as high as the drug-related 
sales figures, or 3 times the gross drug-related profits of 
organized crime (as just 1% of the drug sales actually 
goes to farmers in the Andean region or Afghanistan). 
The data also suggest that the ‘benefits’ generated for 
organized crime by the drug trade are far smaller than 
the drug-related ‘economic costs’ which have to be 
largely borne by the general public. The ‘net results’ of 
the drug business are thus clearly negative. 
Estimates for the UK show similar patterns. Estimates 
suggest that the economic and social costs related to 
drug abuse (which include costs related to acquisitive 
crime) are 3½ times larger than the illicit drug retail 
sales, again indicating that the ‘profits’ generated by 
organized crime are far lower than the costs generated 
for the public at large. 
36 ONDCP, What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, December 
2001, p. 3.
fig. 21: Illicit drug sales (2000) and economic costs 
related to drug abuse (2002) in the USA 
Sources: office of National Drug control Policy (oNDcP), The Eco-
nomic Costs of Drug Abuse in the United States, 1992-2002, 
washington D.c., December 2004 and oNDcP, What America’s 
Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, December 2001.
fig. 22: Illicit drug sales (2003/2004) in the United 
Kingdom and economic and social costs 
related to drug abuse - based on estimates 
for England & wales (2003/2004) and  
Scotland (2006) in billion £
Sources: S. Pudney, c. Badillo, M. Bryan, J. Burton, G. conti and 
M. Iacovou, Estimating the size of the UK illicit drug market, Insti-
tute for Social and Economic Research, University of Essex; l. 
Gordon, l. Tinsley, c. Godfrey and S. Parrot,“ The economic and 
social costs of class A drug use in England and wales, 2003/04” 
in Home office, Measuring different aspects of problem drug use: 
methodological developments, Home office online Report 16/06, 
london 2006; J. case, G. Hay, c. Godfrey and S. Parrott, Assess-
ing the Scale and Impact of Illicit Drug Markets in Scotland, Glas-
gow, october 2009. 
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of the total). ‘Problematic drug users’ (‘drug addicts’) 
were responsible for 99% of the total drug use-related 
cost though they only account for a small proportion of 
the total number of drug users.
… and problems of drug trafficking-related violence 
An even bigger problem than the large cost of acquisitive 
crime – notably for many drug producing and -transit 
countries – has been the emergence of organized crime 
groups that use lethal violence as a tool to defend or 
increase their market shares. In fact drug trafficking goes 
hand in hand with illegal gun-carrying in many coun-
tries. The increased presence of guns also enhances a 
culture of violence among gangs – or against the author-
ities, which has an impact on members of the local com-
munity who have to live with the enhanced threat of 
violence.39 This happened – inter alia – in Colombia in 
the 1980s and the early 1990s when the main drug 
39 RDO, Mexican Homicides Database, 2011. 
27%,38 with no significant changes reported over the 
subsequent two years. In other words, a decline in the 
overall drug sales figures - and thus in the drug related 
financial flows for organized crime - went hand in hand 
with rapidly growing drug abuse-related costs in the 
USA. This shows that drug abuse, once established, 
tends to develop dynamics of its own. 
Economic and social cost calculations of drug abuse 
(class A drugs) for England and Wales (total: £15.4 bn 
or US$26.1 bn in the financial year 2003/2004) – based 
on a different approach – also reveal a different break-
down. According to these calculations, 90% of the drug-
related cost are crime-related, 6% are related to drug 
death and only 3% are health-related. Drug consump-
tion-related activities prompting acquisitive crime, nota-
bly fraud, burglary, robbery and shop-lifting, account 
for the bulk of the drug-related economic cost (86.5% 
38 ONDCP, What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, December 
2001, p. 3.
table 66: Total costs related to drug abuse in the USA in billion US$ (2002) 
Source: office of National Drug control Policy (oNDcP), The Economic Costs of Drug Abuse in the United States, 1992-2002, washington 
D.c., December 2004.
 in billion US$ (2002)
in % of all drug 
related costs
in % of 
GDP
PRoDUcTIVITY loSSES      
Premature death 24.6 13.6%
Drug abuse-related illness 33.5 18.5%
Institutionalization/hospitalization 2.0 1.1%
Productivity loss of victims of crime 1.8 1.0%
Incarceration 39.1 21.6%
crime careers 27.6 15.3%
Subtotal 128.6 71% 1.2%
HEAlTH coSTS
Treatment, ambulatory care and special disease cost 8.6 4.8%
HIV/AIDS 3.8 2.1%
Prevention 1.4 0.7%
Research 1.0 0.5%
other (insurance administration, training, crime victim 
health care cost) 1.2 0.6%
Subtotal 15.8 9% 0.2%
oTHER coSTS
State and local police protection 9.8 5.4%
State and local legal adjudication 2.3 1.3%
federal, state and local corrections 16.9 9.4%
federal spending to reduce supply 6.2 3.4%
Private legal defence 0.6 0.4%
Property damage for victims 0.2 0.1%
Social welfare 0.2 0.1%
Subtotal 36.4 20% 0.3%
TOTAL	DRUG-RELATED	COSTS 180.9 100.0% 100.0% 1.7%
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losing their lives in the hostilities in Afghanistan which 
are – to some extent – financed by the Taliban from the 
opium and heroin trade from Afghanistan to neighbour-
ing countries. 
… and corruption 
Available data show that there is a correlation between 
drug trafficking and corruption, or, more generally 
speaking, weak ‘rule of law’. The most successful crimi-
nal organizations are usually those that are able to make 
use of corruption (supported by violence and systematic 
intimidation) to weaken official controls and law 
enforcement. That is why cities, countries or other geo-
graphical areas exposed to intense drug trafficking activ-
ities often have a high incidence of corruption (and 
violence). In some instances, criminal organizations also 
manage to buy the protection of public officials so that 
they can undermine the activities of competing criminal 
organizations and establish a near-monopoly over illicit 
drug markets.43
tional Narcotics Control Board for 2003, Chapter I: Drugs, Crime and 
Violence: the Microlevel Impact, pp. 1–11. 
43 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board for 2010, United Nations pub-
cartel of that country tried to infiltrate the political 
system and attempted to impose its will on to the rest of 
society. As a consequence, the number of homicides 
reported in Colombia rose from some 22 per 100,000 
inhabitants in 1970 and 33 per 100,000 in 1980 to 86 
per 100,000 in 1992 (close to 30,000 people) before 
gradually falling to 36 persons per 100,000 inhabitants 
by 2008 as the Government re-established its authority 
against organized crime.40 Similarly, the Mexican drug 
cartels responded with ever more violence to attempts by 
the federal authorities to counter their activities. Thus, 
the number of homicides in Mexico rose from some 
2,800 cases in 2007 to more than 15,200 cases in 2010, 
or more than 30,000 homicides since the beginning of 
the Government’s decision in late 2006 to actively con-
front the operations of the drug cartels.41 Drug-related 
violence is also a serious challenge in Brazil. Almost 
30,000 homicides were reported annually in the new 
millennium, with a high proportion linked to illicit drug 
trafficking.42 Even larger numbers of people have been 
40 UNODC, The Globalization of Crime, A Transnational Organized 
Crime Threat Assessment, June 2010. 
41 RDO, Mexican Homicides Database, 2011. 
42 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the Interna-
table 67: Economic and social costs of class A drug use in England and wales (2003/2004)
 
Sources: l. Gordon, l. Tinsley, c. Godfrey and S. Parrot, “The economic and social costs of class A drug use in England and wales, 2003/04” 
in Home office, Measuring different aspects of problem drug use: methodological developments, Home office online Report 16/06, london 
2006. 
Million 
British 
pounds
million 
US$
in % of total  
economic cost
in % of 
GDP
DRUG-RElATED cRIME
fraud 4,866 8,239 31.6%
Burglary 4,070 6,892 26.4%
Robbery 2,467 4,177 16.0%
Shoplifting 1,917 3,246 12.4%
Drug arrests 535 906 3.5%
Subtotal 13,855 23,460 90.0% 1.6%
DRUG-RElATED DEATHS 923 1,563 6.0% 0.1%
DRUG-RElATED HEAlTH coSTS
Inpatient care 198 335 1.3%
Inpatient mental health 88 149 0.6%
Accident and emergency (A&E) 81 137 0.5%
community mental health 61 103 0.4%
Primary care GP visits 32 54 0.2%
Neonatal effects 3 5 0.0%
Infectious diseases 25 42 0.2%
Subtotal 488 826 3.2% 0.1%
DRUG-RElATED SocIAl cARE 69 117 0.4% 0.0%
other 65 110 0.4% 0.0%
TOTAL 15,400 26,076 100.0% 1.8%
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The maintenance of smuggling networks is clearly nega-
tive. There are ongoing reports of violence suffered by 
victims of smuggling or trafficking activities. There are 
also reports of corruption linked to such activities. 
Nonetheless, the violence and corruption created by 
such activities are still more localized and overall less 
severe for the societies concerned than what is true for 
drug trafficking. The victims of violence are, in general, 
the persons trafficked or smuggled and corruption tends 
to be limited to lower-level police and customs officers, 
but in general it does not reach higher levels in the 
enforcement apparatus.
The countries of origin are, of course, losing human 
resources due to smuggling or trafficking, which can 
result in a ‘brain drain,’ thus reducing the economic 
prospects of the countries concerned.48 
However, such human resources are often under-
employed in the countries of origin. In fact, the main 
underlying problem leading to smuggling and traffick-
ing in persons are the poor socio-economic prospects for 
large sections of the population in many developing 
countries. If the political and living conditions could be 
improved in the countries concerned and the mid-term 
prospects were to become reasonably good, the problem 
of smuggling and trafficking in persons would gradually 
fade away. 
From a purely economic perspective, the smuggled 
migrants or the trafficked persons may – even in cases of 
clear exploitation (sexual exploitation or forced labour) 
– generate larger financial incomes in their destination 
countries than in their countries of origin. This will 
enable victims to assist their relatives in their countries 
of origin, thus raising private consumption and, to a 
lesser extent, private investment there. 
The ‘advantages’ for the countries receiving illegal 
migrants are mixed. In contrast to legal immigration, 
where recipient countries can match vacancies with 
needed skills and integration can take place, illegal 
immigration can disturb the labour market and the 
overall social fabric and can lead to unfair competition. 
Some companies in the recipient countries will benefit 
from such unfair competition while others – generally 
those playing by the rules – will lose. In the end, this 
may be to the detriment of the local population, includ-
ing legal immigrants. 
 
48 Michel Beine, Fréderic Docquier, Hillel Rapoport, “Brain Drain and 
Human Capital Formation in Developing Countries: Winners and 
Losers”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 118, Issue 525, April 2008, pp. 
631-652. 
Thus, the main drug producing countries are also con-
fronted with high levels of corruption, notably the two 
main opium producing countries, Afghanistan and 
Myanmar, ranking 176 out of 178 countries assessed in 
2010 according to Transparency International.44
In general, the countries surrounding the drug produc-
ing countries also suffer from relatively high levels of 
corruption, and the same applies to several drug transit 
countries. 
Thus, the very mechanisms to reduce the illicit drug 
trade can be hindered or neutralized by corruption. In 
some countries, drug-related corruption has even been 
detected among high-level officials, including heads of 
drug law enforcement agencies. 
Corruption also helped the internationally operating 
drug cartels to grow and operate effectively out of 
Mexico, increasingly challenging the state’s authority. 
Against this background, the Government of Mexico 
launched ‘Operation Clean-up’ in 2008, aimed at purg-
ing the top ranks of the police of drug cartel influence. 
This resulted in the arrests and convictions of both the 
interim commissioner of the federal police and the 
acting head of the division of drug control operations.45 
ii. financial flows emanating from  
smuggling of migrants and trafficking 
in persons 
The financial flows generated out of smuggling of 
migrants or trafficking in persons are – at the global level 
– estimated to be substantially lower than the financial 
flows generated out of illicit drug trafficking. Past esti-
mates suggested that there could be, in economic terms, 
a 10:1 ratio in terms of the importance of drug traffick-
ing (more than US$320 bn)46 versus trafficking in 
human beings (some US$32 bn).47 
Moreover, the socio-economic impact is less clear when 
it comes to smuggling of migrants or trafficking in 
persons. 
lication, Sales No. E.11.XI.1, ISBN: 978-92-1-148258-4, ISSN: 
0257-3717 New York 2011, p 3.
44 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, October 
2010.
45 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board for 2010, United Nations pub-
lication, Sales No. E.11.XI.1, ISBN: 978-92-1-148258-4, ISSN: 
0257-3717 New York 2011, p 4.
46 UNODC, 2005 World Drug Report, Volume 1: Analysis, Chapter: 2: 
Estimating the value of illicit drug markets), Vienna 2005, pp. 123-
143. 
47 Patrick Belser, Forced Labor and Human Trafficking: Estimating the 
Profits, International Labour Organization/Cornell University, Work-
ing Paper 42, March 2005, p. 17.
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with HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases. 
This may force other sex workers to follow this example 
in order to stay in business. 
It may also help explain, partly, why – at times when the 
trafficking of persons into the EU increased, the overall 
numbers of new HIV infections in the EU-27 countries 
also increased, from 13,800 new infections in 2000 to 
26,000 new infections in 2009 (5.8 per 100,000 
people).52 Data show that the increases were linked to 
sharply increasing homo- and heterosexual infections 
over the 2000-2009 period while new infections from 
injecting drug use showed a decline.53 
Even if trafficking victims try to escape exploitation, they 
may still find it difficult to find a job where they earn a 
decent income and are treated with respect. Their previ-
ous jobs in combination with traditional moral attitudes 
often makes it difficult for them to return to their coun-
tries of origin. 
The large potential profit for traffickers keeps this busi-
ness going and expanding, and some initial victims have 
become themselves engaged in trafficking in persons 
activities later. 
iii. financial flows emanating from the 
smuggling of counterfeit medicines 
The huge funds to be generated out of smuggling activ-
ities also fuel the counterfeit medicines business. If the 
frequently quoted (including by the World Health 
Organization, WHO)54 estimate of a global market for 
counterfeit medicines of some US$75 bn for 201055 
were correct, the size of these activities – in economic 
terms – would be more than twice as large as the income 
generated from trafficking in persons56 and equivalent 
52 European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and World 
Health Organization, Surveillance Report HIV/AIDS surveillance in 
Europe 2009, ISBN 978-92-9193-228-3, Stockholm 2010. 
53 European Centre for the Epidemiological Monitoring of AIDS 
(WHO and UNAIDS Collaborating Centre on AIDS), HIV/AIDS 
Surveillance in Europe, EuroHIV Surveillance in Europe, End-year 
report 2003, 2004, No. 70 and European Centre for Disease Preven-
tion and Control and World Health Organization, Surveillance Report 
HIV/AIDS surveillance in Europe 2009, ISBN 978-92-9193-228-3, 
Stockholm 2010. 
54 World Health Organisation, Fact Sheet, Counterfeit medicines, Fact 
sheet No. 275, revised November 2006. Accessable at http://web.
archive.org/web/20080724031944/http://www.who.int/mediacen-
tre/factsheets/fs275/en/
55 Up from US$35 bn in 2004. Pacific Research Institute (PRI) and 
Center for Medicines in the Public Interest (CMPI), 21st Century 
Health Care Terrorism: The Perils of International Drug Counterfeiting. 
Sept. 2005. 
56 United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 
Emerging Crimes – Trafficking in Human Beings. Accessable at 
http://www.unicri.it/emerging_crimes/human_trafficking/
While smuggled people working below minimum wages 
may increase the profits and/or the competitiveness of 
those individuals or companies 
exploiting them, most industrialized countries already 
suffer from unemployment. 
The cost of unemployment has to be borne by the gen-
eral public. Unemployment insurance funds are fed by 
both employees and employers in many countries. 
Increasing unemployment means having to increase 
such contributions, which in turn may reduce the com-
petitiveness of companies. This can lead to further cuts 
in the workforce. 
Other problems are linked to the increasing difficulties 
faced by illegal immigrants to access the legal economy49 
which may prompt them to look for income opportuni-
ties in the various illicit sectors. 
An increase of illegal immigration, notably if taking 
place in parallel with rising levels of unemployment and 
crime associated with foreigners, may contribute to or 
strengthen existing xenophobia and racism50 and poten-
tially lead to social unrest, with immigrants and asylum 
seekers often being the first victims.51 
Sexual exploitation – which accounts for the bulk of the 
persons trafficked - constitutes primarily a problem for 
the persons concerned. Violence is mostly used against 
the victims of such exploitation, to make them 
submissive. 
Sexual exploitation may also entail a health problem, as 
well as a moral problem, for society at large. Some of the 
victims, who often operate without protection and con-
trol by the authorities, are forced to engage in unpro-
tected sex practices, thus raising the risks of being infected 
49 C. Fijnaut and L. Paoli, Organised crime in Europe: concepts, patterns, 
and control policies in the European Union and Beyond, Springer, Dor-
drecht, the Netherlands, 2004, p. 613
50 In fact, there are indications that an increase in illegal immigration 
went hand in hand with an increase of xenophobia in Europe in 
recent years (A. Kohut and R. Wike, Xenophobia on the Continent, 
The National Interest, November-December 2008; (http://fra.europa.
eu/fraWebsite/attachments/AR_2010-conf-edition_en.pdf ), V. Pop, 
“Economic crisis fuelling racism in Europe, report warns” EUOb-
server, 27.5.2010. Accessable at http://euobserver.com/9/30149.
51 The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights reported that 
in 9 of the 12 Member States that collected criminal justice data on 
racist crime experienced an upward trend in recorded racist crime 
over the 2007-2008 period. Overall recorded racist crime cases clearly 
increased in the twelve EU countries, for which data is available, 
over the 2000-2008 period, with increases reported in 11 out of 12 
countries. Rather high proportions of Roma (10%) and Africans 
(9%) from both North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa reported to 
have been assaulted or threatened over the past twelve months in 
Europe – a far higher proportion than people from the respective 
majority populations. (European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights, Annual Report 2010, Vienna 2010.) 
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these companies tend to be large and rich, the general 
understanding of the risks associated with such smug-
gling is often limited. This does not mean, however, that 
such activities are risk-free. Once the amounts of coun-
terfeit medicines found on the market exceed certain 
thresholds, there is a risk that heavy investment into 
research for new medicaments will not be profitable 
anymore. Then, humanity as a whole could suffer from 
counterfeit medicines. This is partly true already today 
as priority is often not given to research medicaments 
needed in developing countries. This is due to the lack 
of reasonable expectations of economic profits, and to 
the widespread smuggling of counterfeit medicines in 
these countries. 
More immediate dangers are linked to the substandard 
quality of some of the counterfeit medicaments, as high-
lighted by the WHO. This has immediate negative 
health impacts on the persons using such medicines, 
affecting ever larger sections of the population in devel-
oping countries of Africa, Asia and partly also the Amer-
icas. It could be argued that many ordinary people in 
some of these countries could not afford to purchase 
legal medicines, given their low levels of purchasing 
power and the lack of properly working social security 
systems. Low levels of active ingredients may be better 
than no medicaments at all. However, this is not neces-
sarily true. Diluted and mixed counterfeit medicines can 
be harmful and dangerous. The ingredients range from 
inactive, ineffective preparations to random mixtures of 
harmful toxic substances. Counterfeit medicines can 
result in treatment failure or even death. Eliminating 
them is a considerable public health challenge.63 
Moreover, there are indications that poor quality medi-
caments, notably in the area of antibiotics, may assist in 
the development of antibiotics-resistant bacteria, endan-
gering the lives of millions of people who are no longer 
protected from serious diseases. The WHO also warns 
that counterfeit medicines containing insufficient active 
ingredients contribute to increased resistance in the case 
of antimalarials, which may lead to large numbers of 
deaths. Half of the world’s population is considered at 
risk from malaria, mainly in developing countries. Each 
year, there are almost 250 million cases, causing 860,000 
deaths. Approximately 85% of these deaths are among 
children, and most of them occur in Africa.64 A WHO 
study in seven African countries found that between 
20% and 90% of anti-malarials (often counterfeit med-
icines) failed basic quality tests.65 The emergence of 
63 World Health Organization, Fact Sheet, Counterfeit medicines, Fact 
sheet No. 275, revised January 2010. Accessable at http://www.who.
int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs275/en/index.html.
64 World Health Organization, WHO releases new malaria guidelines 
for treatment and procurement of medicines. Accessable at http://www.
who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2010/malaria_20100308/en/.
65 World Health Organization quoted in Sanofi-Aventis, Drug Counter-
to almost a quarter of global illicit drug sales.57 The size 
of the global counterfeit medicine market would then 
have amounted to some 9% of the global pharmaceuti-
cal market in 2010.58
As the WHO highlights, counterfeit medicines are now-
adays found everywhere in the world.59 Nonetheless, 
some geographic concentrations can be identified. The 
analysis of incidents (more than 2,000 cases in 2009) of 
identified counterfeit medicines suggest that 43% of 
incidents occurred in Asia, followed by Latin America 
(28%).60 The number of reported incidents more than 
doubled between 2004 and 2009.61
According to previous WHO estimates, the counterfeit 
medicines market ranges from around 1% of sales in the 
developed countries to more than 10% in developing 
countries. Many countries in Africa and parts of Asia 
and Latin America have areas where more than 30% of 
the medicines on sale are counterfeit. Overall, a reason-
able range for developing countries – according to WHO 
– is between 10% and 30%. Many of the former Soviet 
republics have a proportion of counterfeit medicines 
which is above 20% of market value. Medicines pur-
chased over the Internet from sites that conceal their 
physical address were found to sell counterfeits in over 
50% of the cases,62 and such Internet sales are rapidly 
increasing. 
The socio-economic impact of these revenues appears to 
be, at first sight, less problematic for society at large than 
the illicit drug-related trafficking income. Violence 
related to counterfeit medicine smuggling is not signifi-
cant and the same applies to corruption at high levels. 
The ability of such activities to contribute to a weaken-
ing of the state is also limited. The problems are mainly 
concentrated in the area of public health. 
The socio-economic impact of counterfeit medicine 
smuggling is linked to losses (or foregone profits) suf-
fered by legal pharmaceutical companies. As many of 
57 UNODC, 2005 World Drug Report, Volume 1: Analysis, Chapter: 2: 
Estimating the value of illicit drug markets), Vienna 2005, pp. 123-
143. 
58 “IMS Health Forecasts Global Pharmaceutical Market Growth of 
5-7 Percent in 2011, Reaching $880 Billion”, WorldPharmaNews, 
20 December 2010.
59 World Health Organisation, Fact Sheet, Counterfeit medicines, Fact 
sheet No. 275, revised January 2010. Accessable at http://www.who.
int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs275/en/index.html
60 Pharmaceutical Security Institute – Counterfeit Situation – Geo-
graphic Distribution. Accessable at http://www.psi-inc.org/counter-
feitSituation.cfm.
61 Pharmaceutical Security Institute – Counterfeit Situation – Incident 
Trends. Accessable at http://www.psi-inc.org/incidentTrends.cfm. 
62 World Health Organization, Fact Sheet, Counterfeit medicines, Fact 
sheet No. 275, revised November 2006. Accessable at http://web.
archive.org/web/20080724031944/http://www.who.int/mediacen-
tre/factsheets/fs275/en/.
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 • Distortion of economic statistics and thus potential 
errors in economic policy decision- making; 
 • Undermining the credibility of legal institutions.
i. Distortions in the resource allocation 
One of the clearest differences between investment 
based on licit sources and investment based on criminal 
funds affects the decision-making parameters of how to 
invest these funds. While a ‘normal investor’ will direct 
his or her investment into a venture that will yield the 
highest possible return based on his or her willingness to 
take economic risks, the predominant consideration for 
an investor of criminal funds is to obtain the strongest 
possible guarantee that the criminal origin of the invest-
ment will not be detected. This leads to investment 
decisions that focus on concealment, while accepting 
low rates of return.68 A sub-optimal resource allocation 
is the consequence. Criminal funds thus have a negative 
impact on economic growth by diverting resources to 
less productive activities.69 
In other words, money will be directed away from sound 
investments towards low quality ones, which in the end 
will generate relatively little future-oriented economic 
activity. Criminal finance encourages investment in 
non-productive sectors.70 Thus criminals often invest 
their criminal proceeds in real estate, as well as in sectors 
that are familiar to them such as bars, restaurants, pros-
titution, cars and transport companies.71 This has also 
been confirmed in a study on organized crime in Europe 
(2004).72 However, the statement that organized crime 
groups are ready to accept low rates of return has to be 
qualified. By investing in hotels, restaurants, night clubs 
and so on, the organized crime groups often create an 
infrastructure for other illegal activities, such as install-
ing illegal slot machines or selling drugs. Similarly, 
investment in transport companies helps them to infil-
trate this sector and plays a key role in the transportation 
of drugs by sea, air and road.73 
68 B.L. Bartlett, “The negative effects of money laundering on economic 
development”, Platypus Magazine (77), 2002, pp. 18-23. 
69 World Bank, Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combat-
ing the Financing of Terrorism, Washington 2006, p. II-8. 
70 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board for 2002, Sales No. E.03.XI.1, 
New York 2002, p. 5.
71 E.R. Kleemans, M.E.I. Brienen and H.G. van de Bunt (eds) (2002), 
Georganiseerde criminaliteit in Nederland, tweede rapportage op basis 
van de WODC – monitor, Ministerie van Justitie, Wetenschappelijk 
Onderzoek – en Documentatiecentrum, quoted in Brigittte Unger, 
The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering, Cheltenham (UK), 
Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 2007, pp. 109-182. 
72 C. Fijnaut and L. Paoli, Organised crime in Europe: concepts, patterns, 
and control policies in the European Union and Beyond Springer, Dor-
drecht, the Netherlands, 2004. 
73 C. Fijnaut and L. Paoli, Organised crime in Europe: concepts, patterns, 
and control policies in the European Union and Beyond Springer, Dor-
antimicrobial resistance due to inappropriate or irra-
tional use of antimicrobial medicines, prompted – inter 
alia - by counterfeit medicines, may also be problematic. 
About 440,000 new cases of multidrug-resistant tuber-
culosis (MDR-TB) emerge annually, causing at least 
150,000 deaths worldwide. Extensively drug-resistant 
tuberculosis (XDR-TB) has been reported in 64 coun-
tries to date.66
b)	 Implications	of	investment	of	
criminal	financial	flows	in	the	
licit	sector	
The most negative impact of criminal financial flows 
from the activities of transnational organized crime 
stems from their capacity to perpetuate and expand 
criminal ventures by financing them. However, even 
when such funds enter the licit economy, they remain 
potentially problematic. Given the overall size of these 
criminal funds – with estimates now around US$2 tril-
lion (see chapter on ‘previous results’) – their socio-
economic impact is significant, notably for some of the 
smaller countries in the developing world. 
Some of the main socio-economic effects of such crimi-
nal financial flows, as discussed in the literature,67 
include: 
 • Distortions in the resource allocation from high-yield-
ing investments to investments that run a low risk of 
detection; 
 • Distortions of prices, notably in the real estate sector;
 • Distortions of consumption and impact on imports; 
 • Distortion of exports and potential problems with in-
vestment and economic growth;
 • Unfair competition; risks of crowding out licit activi-
ties and negative impact on direct foreign investment; 
 • Corruption;
 • Risks of real sector volatility; 
 • Strengthening of skewed income and wealth 
distributions; 
feiting. Accessable at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/
docs/conf2008/wilfried_roge_en.pdf.
66 World Health Organization, Antimicrobial resistance, Fact sheet No. 
194, February 2011. Accessable at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/
factsheets/fs194/en/index.html.
67 Detailed elaborations of such impacts, as found in the scientific 
literature, can be found in United Nations International Drug Con-
trol Programme (UNDCP), “Economic and Social Consequences 
of Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking”, UNDCP Technical Serices, 
Vienna 2007, No. 6; International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), 
Report of the International Narcotics control Board for 2002, Sales No. 
E.03.XI.1, New York 2002, Chapter 1 (Illicit drugs and economic 
development), pp. 1-10; B. Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money 
Laundering, pp. 109-182, in D. Masciandaro, E. Takáts and B. 
Unger, Black Finance: The Economics of Money Laundering, Chelten-
ham (UK), Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 2007. 
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banks in order to facilitate money-laundering activi-
ties.78 
ii.  Distortions of prices
One problem, frequently highlighted in the scientific 
literature, is the tendency of illicit money flows to dis-
tort market prices. This seems to be particularly pro-
nounced in the real estate sector. This sector is very 
attractive for investment because it tends to be non-
transparent, that is, the ‘objective value’ is difficult to 
asses (which helps in the money-laundering process) and 
– at the same time – it is considered a rather ‘safe 
investment’.79 In a 1999 Dutch study on the spending 
patterns of criminals, data showed, for instance, that in 
56% of all criminal cases, the persons or groups involved 
invested some of their criminal proceeds into immova-
ble property, ranging from apartments to villas.80 
The basic underlying problem – from an economic 
point of view - is that the large sums of criminal pro-
ceeds tend to be concentrated among a limited number 
of organized crime groups which then invest these funds 
in a limited number of economic sectors, notably in real 
estate. This can lead to massive increases in real estate 
prices, thus pricing people who rely on legal sources out 
of the market. 
iii. Distortions of consumption patterns 
and impact on imports 
Another problem of criminal funds are related to the 
differences in consumption patterns of persons relying 
on licit income versus those relying on illicit income. 
Criminal finance encourages conspicuous consumption 
(expensive cars, yachts, electronic equipment and cloth-
ing, usually imported) at the expense of long-term 
investment.81 
In fact, the Dutch study on the use of criminal finance 
(1999) found high expenditure on luxury cars, jewellery, 
boats and planes: 79% of criminals used some of their 
78 D. Farah, “Russian Crime Finds Haven in Caribbean”, The Washing-
ton Post, October 7, 1996. 
79 H. Nelen, ‘Criminaliteit en onroerend goed’, Presentation held at 
the seminar Zicht op misdaad en onroerend goed, 15 December 2004, 
Centre for Information and Research on Organised Crime, Amster-
dam, Vrije Universiteit, quoted in quoted in B. Unger, The Scale 
and Impacts of Money Laundering, Cheltenham (UK), Edward Elgar 
Publishing Company, 2007, pp. 130-131.
80 J. R. Meloen, H. Landman, J de Miranda,.van Eekelen and S. van 
Soest, “Buit en Besteding, Een empirisch onderzoek naar de omvang, 
de kenmerken en de besteding van misdaadgeld”, Den Haag: Reed 
Business Information, 2003, quoted in Brigittte Unger, The Scale 
and Impacts of Money Laundering, Cheltenham (UK), Edward Elgar 
Publishing Company, 2007, p. 130. 
81 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board for 2002, Sales No. E.03.XI.1, New 
York 2002, p. 5.
A study in the Netherlands (1999) revealed that around 
80% of the criminal income was ‘invested’; 57% of the 
total went into ‘conventional investment’ (real estate, 
banking, securities) and 23% was directly invested into 
various business activities, mostly ‘coffee shops’ (where 
cannabis is sold), shops, hotels and brothels. The data 
also confirmed that the higher the criminal income, the 
lower the proportion used for consumption, and the 
higher the proportion of the criminal funds going into 
investment. More than half of the criminal funds used 
for ‘conventional investment’ were invested into real 
estate and more than 40% into fixed interest-bearing 
assets,74 thus underlining the rather conservative invest-
ment strategies of criminals in the licit sector. Similarly, 
the cartels in Colombia in the 1990s were reported to 
have concentrated their investments in real estate and in 
the construction sector. Once the construction boom 
drew to a close, the city of Medellín suffered an eco-
nomic decline and high unemployment because little 
alternative productive investment had been made.75 In 
West Africa, in recent years, significant amounts of 
criminal money seems to have been invested in the con-
struction of casinos. Recent examples of arms and drug 
dealers in some of the western Balkan countries revealed 
major investments in large-scale construction, ranging 
from apartment houses, shopping malls and business 
centres to yacht ports, officially financed by foreign 
banks, though with criminal funds – parked in offshore 
centres – serving as the guarantee for repayment of the 
loans.76 Reports from countries such as Canada or the 
United States, where significant parts of the receipts of 
illicit drug trafficking and from other organized crime 
activities are reinvested, indicate that drug money is 
often channeled to small, cash rich businesses which 
have no need to issue large numbers of official invoic-
es.77 In the Caribbean (and a number of other regions), 
reports – going back more than a decade - suggest that 
organized crime groups even funded or bought whole 
 
 
drecht, the Netherlands, 2004. 
74 J. R. Meloen, H. Landman, J de Miranda,.van Eekelen and S. van 
Soest, “Buit en Besteding, Een empirisch onderzoek naar de omvang, 
de kenmerken en de besteding van misdaadgeld,” Den Haag: Reed 
Business Information, 2003, quoted in Brigittte Unger, The Scale 
and Impacts of Money Laundering, Cheltenham (UK), Edward Elgar 
Publishing Company, 2007, pp. 124-126.
75 L. Tullis, “Illegal drugs in nine countries-socioeconomic and political 
consequences”, report prepared for UNRISD and the United Nations 
University, published as Unintended Consequences; Illegal Drugs and 
Drug Policies in Nine Countries, Boulder, Colorado, USA, Lynne 
Rienner, 1995, p. 145. 
76 Austrian Press Agency, Hypo zahlte 100 Millionen Euro an Mafia-
Boss, 24 August 2010; “Carinthian capers – The Austrian bank at 
the centre of a growing web of scandal”, The Economist, 9 September 
2010. 
77 UNDCP, “Economic and Social Consequences of Drug Abuse and 
Illicit Trafficking”, UNDCP Technical Serices, No. 6, p. 28.
3111
Socio-economic impact of f inancial  f lows emerging from 
drug traff icking and other transnational organized cr imes
(around 1.55) than from licit exports (2.45).85 This is a 
result of a higher propensity for drug traffickers to live 
luxurious lifestyles, and to invest their illicit funds less 
productively into the economy. Nonetheless, the net 
result – in the short term at least - will be positive from 
a purely economic point of view.86 
The mid- to long-term consequences, however, tend to 
be negative. One possible mechanism is the danger of a 
revaluation of the exchange rate linked to the inflows of 
illicit funds. This phenomenon – known and discussed 
in the literature as ‘Dutch Disease’87 – tends to reduce 
the competitiveness of legally produced goods and serv-
ices at the local level. The legal exports (notably of 
manufactured goods) will be replaced by illegal exports 
– linked to organized crime. In other words, legitimate 
exports will be systematically crowded out by illicit drug 
exports. Overvalued exchange rates also pose problems 
for domestic industry producing for the local market 
because domestic production will be increasingly substi-
tuted by imports. Thus, overvalued exchange rates can 
ruin entire economic sectors, which, once they cease to 
exist, may be difficult to re-establish.88 
As illegal exports do not show up in official export sta-
tistics, the officially calculated foreign trade balance will 
deteriorate. International rating agencies will use this 
information to downgrade the credit risk of the coun-
tries concerned. This implies higher interest rates on 
loans taken out abroad, and thus higher costs of con-
ducting business in the countries concerned, leading to 
overall lower economic growth rates. 
Such effects will only be noticed once certain thresholds 
are exceeded. Thus, smaller countries, characterized by 
small domestic economies, will be far more vulnerable 
to such effects than larger countries with much larger 
legal economies. Irrespective of the scenario described 
above, large-scale operations of organized crime in a 
country usually go hand in hand with large-scale corrup-
85 The multiplier, assuming a savings ratio of 20 per cent and an import 
ratio of 26 per cent, was calculated as follows: 1 ÷ (1-(0.8 x 0.74)) = 
2.45.
86 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board for 2002, Sales No. E.03.XI.1,New 
York 2002, p. 3.
87 The ‘Dutch disease’ is a concept in economics that explains the rela-
tionship between an increase in the exploitation of natural resources 
and a decline in the manufacturing sector. An increase in revenues 
from natural resources (including production of illicit drugs) will 
make a given nation’s currency stronger compared to that of other 
nations, resulting in the nation’s other exports becoming more expen-
sive for other countries to buy, making the manufacturing sector less 
competitive. The term was apparently first coined by The Economist 
in an article in 1977, describing the decline of the manufacturing 
sector in the Netherlands following the discovery of a large natural 
gas field in 1959.
88 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board for 2002, Sales No. E.03.XI.1,New 
York 2002, p. 6.
criminal income to purchase luxury vehicles, 37% pur-
chased jewellery, music instruments and art, 33% 
bought planes or boats and 29% had a luxurious life-
style.82 In developing countries, these conspicuous con-
sumption patterns result in high levels of imports. This 
can also affect the foreign trade balance and thus the 
current account balance and may raise the country’s risk 
in the eyes of the international rating agencies and thus 
the interest rates at which countries obtain loans from 
foreign banks. This can, in turn, impact negatively on 
overall economic growth. While the import ratio of 
goods and services in low-income countries amounted 
to 27 % of GDP on average at the beginning of the new 
millennium (34% of GDP in 2009)83 the items usually 
purchased by drug trafficking groups in the main drug 
producing countries resulted – according to INCB esti-
mates – in expenditures on imported goods of up to 
80% of total expenditure.84
Organized crime groups often spend money on weap-
ons. Such purchases not only prevent alternative spend-
ing on capital equipment, but also contribute to the 
spread of fear and violence, making the overall business 
environment more unfavourable. 
iv. Distortion of exports and  
potential problems with investment 
and economic growth
In case of ‘export-oriented’ organized crime (such as 
drug trafficking with final destination in other coun-
tries), the economic impact for the societies concerned 
may appear positive in the short run. Additional foreign 
exchange may enter the local economy. Any money 
entering the economy tends to have, at least initially, a 
positive economic impact. Some of the money will be 
spent, thus creating new employment opportunities. 
Some of the money will be invested, thus creating even 
larger employment opportunities in the medium term, 
and some of the money will be saved, thus enabling 
financial institutes to grant credits and loans to the busi-
ness sector and individuals which in return will act as a 
stimulus to the local economy. 
As reported by the INCB, the economic multipliers 
from drug exports can be expected to be far lower 
82 J. R. Meloen, H. Landman, J de Miranda,.van Eekelen and S. van 
Soest, “Buit en Besteding, Een empirisch onderzoek naar de omvang, 
de kenmerken en de besteding van misdaadgeld”, Den Haag: Reed 
Business Information, 2003, quoted in B. Unger, The Scale and 
Impacts of Money Laundering, Cheltenham (UK), Edward Elgar Pub-
lishing Company, 2007, pp. 124-126.
83 World Bank, World Development Indicators 2010, Washington 2010. 
84 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board for 2002, Sales No. E.03.XI.1, 
New York 2002, p. 5.
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overall economic activity in that country. Instead, 
according to preliminary estimates, it ran in parallel to a 
significant increase in the country’s GDP (35% over the 
2007-2010 period).92 Similarly, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran and Pakistan, which reduced or completely elimi-
nated opium poppy production in the late 1980s, 
recorded positive economic growth rates in both the 
1980s and the 1990s. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
the economic growth rates rebounded in the 1990s, 
without any recourse to illicit opium production. Paki-
stan, which reported the strongest declines in opium 
production in the early 1980s, actually had the strongest 
economic growth rate (6.3 % annually) in South-West 
Asia, exceeding growth at the global level (3.4 %).93
A similar pattern of economic development was also 
observed in South-East Asia. In the 1980s, illicit opium 
production in Myanmar increased tenfold, but at the 
same time, the country had the lowest GDP growth rate 
in the region. When opium production declined by one 
third in the 1990s, GDP growth increased to the levels 
reported in neighbouring countries. If the clandestine 
sector, based on illicit opium production, had provided 
a basis for economic development, Myanmar would not 
have had the lowest per capita income in the region, 
based on purchasing power parities.94 In contrast, Thai-
land was the first country in the region to drastically 
curtail illicit opium production (from 146 tons in the 
period 1965-1966 to less than 60 tons in 1982, 6 tons 
in 200095 and negligible levels in 2010). As the levels of 
illicit opium production in Thailand fell in the 1980s, 
its GDP growth rate exceeded those of neighbouring 
countries, and today Thailand is one of the most devel-
oped countries in the region. Similarly, data for both the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Viet Nam showed 
higher GDP growth rates in the 1990s than in the 
1980s. The increase in the GDP growth rate in both 
countries took place while opium production declined 
there in the 1990s.96 
Similarly, there was increased illicit production of can-
nabis and opium in Lebanon, notably in the Bekaa 
valley, in the 1980s, fuelled by the civil war, the break-
down of state institutions and efforts by the various 
militias to use the illicit drug trade to finance their 
92 World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Update, May 2011, p.17.
93 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board for 2002, Sales No. E.03.XI.1, 
New York 2002, p. 4.
94 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board for 2002, Sales No. E.03.XI.1, 
New York 2002, p. 4.
95 Ronald D. Renard, Opium Reduction in Thailand 1970- 2000: a 
Thirty-Year Journey, Chiang Mai, Silkworm Books, Bangkok 2002.
96 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board for 2002, Sales No. E.03.XI.1, 
New York 2002, p. 4.
tion as well as violence and intimidation. These phe-
nomena deter investment activities by the legal sector, 
including direct foreign investment, and thus deter eco-
nomic growth. 
Has there been any empirical evidence of financial 
inflows from transnational organized crime having had 
a negative consequence for economic growth? Such ‘evi-
dence’ is difficult to establish in a scientific way, but 
there are certainly some interesting correlations. 
It can be noticed, for instance, that in the Andean region, 
the increase of coca bush cultivation in the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia and Peru in the 1980s and in Colombia 
in the 1990s did not lead to an overall increase in eco-
nomic growth. Though coca bush cultivation increased 
drastically in Colombia in the second half of the 1990s, 
economic growth lost momentum and even turned neg-
ative.89 Despite falling coca leaf production in the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia and Peru in the late 1990s, 
economic growth accelerated in these countries through-
out most of the decade, exceeding the average for Latin 
American countries. Notably in the period 1998-1999, 
when coca leaf production headed towards a low, eco-
nomic growth in both the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
and Peru remained above the Latin American average. In 
parallel, economic growth declined in Colombia, in 
spite of increased coca bush cultivation. Over the 2000-
2009 period, in contrast, Colombia showed a massive 
decline in the area under coca leaf cultivation (-58%).90 
Over the same period, economic growth amounted to 
3.9% per year, up from 0.4% over the 1995-99 period, 
when the area under coca leaf production in Colombia 
more than tripled.91
Trends in South-West Asia showed similar patterns. 
Though reliable data on Afghanistan’s economic devel-
opment in the 1980s and the 1990s do not exist, eco-
nomic growth was undoubtedly negative between 1980 
and 2000, despite the fact that Afghanistan engaged in 
large-scale illicit opium poppy cultivation as of the 
beginning of the 1980s. Overall living standards clearly 
fell in the 1980s and the 1990s. The massive increase in 
opium production, which turned Afghanistan into the 
world’s largest producer of illicit opiates in the early 
1990s, helped fuel civil wars, but clearly failed to con-
tribute to the country’s overall social and economic 
development. Similarly, the strong declines in Afghan 
opium production between 2007 and 2010 (-56%) did 
not go hand in hand with any significant decline in 
89 World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001, Washington, D.C., 
2002; United Nations International Drug Control Programme, 
Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002, United Nations publication, Sales 
No. E.02.XI.9, Vienna 2002.
90 UNODC, 2010 World Drug Report, Vienna 2010, p. 162.
91 World Bank, World Development Indicators & Global Development 
Finance, 15 December 2010. 
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v. Unfair competition
Organized crime can infiltrate or acquire control of large 
sectors of the economy through investment.101 A conse-
quence of sizable illicit funds in the legal sector is the 
ability of enterprises financed out of illegal income to 
undercut current market prices.102 
At first sight, this may appear positive for customers and 
create short-term welfare gains. It creates, however, the 
risk (often in combination with the use of violence) that 
enterprises financed by criminal money will crowd out 
existing legal enterprises. Local merchants and busi-
nesses may find that they cannot compete with front 
companies organized to launder and conceal illicit funds. 
Such front companies may offer their goods and services 
at below-market rates or even at a loss because their 
primary objective is to launder money. Such companies 
do not need to compete properly in the marketplace and 
do not have to make any profits for their owners.103 If 
criminals acquire and operate businesses and use addi-
tional criminal funds to subsidize them, this provides 
them with a clear competitive advantage over legitimate 
ventures to the point where they will drive them out of 
business.104 In other words, illicitly funded enterprises 
create unfair competition and can bankrupt legitimate 
competition. In such cases, low prices do not reflect 
efficiency. Instead, they may force more efficient, legiti-
mate companies out of business, leaving entire sectors in 
the hands of unlawful enterprises.105 
Once certain thresholds are reached, such criminal 
enterprises may also act as deterrents for investment 
activities, including direct foreign investment. Such situ-
ations are particularly problematic as new competitors 
are deterred from entering the market.106 This will neg-
atively affect overall economic growth. The mid- and 
long-term consequences are thus clearly negative. 
101 Financial Action Task Force, “Money Laundering FAQ”. 
Accessable at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/29/0,3746
,en_32250379_32235720_33659613_1_1_1_1,00.html#Wheredo
esmoneylaunderingoccur.
102 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board for 2002, Sales No. E.03.XI.1, 
New York 2002, p. 5.
103 World Bank, “Topic: Anti-Money Laundering”, Washington D.C., 
2011. Accessable at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTER-
NAL/WBI/WBIPROGRAMS/PSGLP/0,,contentMDK:2029299
0~menuPK:461615~pagePK:64156158~piPK:64152884~theSit
ePK:461606,00.html.
104 D. Masciandaro, E. Takáts and B. Unger, Black Finance: The Econom-
ics of Money Laundering, Cheltenham (UK), Edward Elgar Publishing 
Company, 2007, p. 157. 
105 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board for 2002, Sales No. E.03.XI.1, 
New York 2002, p. 6.
106 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board for 2002, Sales No. E.03.XI.1, 
New York 2002, p. 6.
activities.97 Though there are no reliable estimates of 
economic growth in the country in the 1980s, it can be 
assumed that the destruction of production capacity 
resulted in negative growth. In the 1990s, the authorities 
succeeded in implementing a ban on illicit drug produc-
tion.98 At the time of the enforcement of the ban on 
illicit drug production in Lebanon, GDP grew by 7.7 
per cent annually; a growth rate that was clearly above 
the world average (2.5 % per year) and the average for 
the Middle East and North Africa (3.0 % per year).99 
There is, of course, no proof that increased illicit drug 
production, and thus a stronger involvement of organ-
ized crime, is necessarily linked to a decline in overall 
economic activity. The involvement of organized crime 
is only one of many different factors that determine 
economic development. Economic decline and poor 
growth are often the result of overall situations of insta-
bility, which, in turn, may lead to increased illicit crop 
cultivation, drug trafficking and a stronger role for 
organized crime because of a country’s weak governmen-
tal and administrative capacity. Good governance, in 
contrast, tends to have a positive impact on growth. 
The most obvious explanation for the apparent negative 
correlation between illicit drug production and eco-
nomic development is that engaging in such illicit activ-
ities has been, in many parts of the world, a reaction to 
deteriorating economic conditions. That was the case 
with the expansion of illicit coca production and illicit 
opium poppy cultivation in the Andean region and in 
Asia in the 1980s. Such a defensive reaction does not 
address the underlying social tensions and development 
problems in a society. Indeed, it may perpetuate them; 
eventually, it may itself become the key impediment to 
development as the emergence of a large illicit sector 
with the involvement of organized crime can result in 
the destabilization of the state, the political system, the 
economy and civil society.100
97 US Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report, Washington 2000. 
98 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board for 2002, Sales No. E.03.XI.1, 
New York 2002, p. 4.
99 World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001, Washington, D.C., 
2002.
100 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board for 2002, Sales No. E.03.XI.1, 
New York 2002, p. 5.
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vii. Risks of real sector volatility
Another negative aspect of investment derived from 
criminal funds is the lack of continuity. Much of the 
investment actually depends on the continuity of the 
illicit operations. Because of their illegality, the criminal 
flows may be suddenly disrupted and related invest-
ments may disappear due to law enforcement actions 
and prosecution.111 As a consequence, several crime-
dependent regions, such as those depending on illicit 
drug production, trafficking, piracy, unlawful exploita-
tion of natural resources et cetera have undergone steep 
boom and bust cycles. 
This has applied, in particular to the limited number of 
sectors that are often targets for criminal money, such as 
construction and real estate. Once the real estate boom 
draws to a close – for example, as the supporting crimi-
nal activities are curtailed – the bubble can burst and 
prompt a general economic decline.112 This has been 
observed at the local level in various countries at certain 
periods in time. There are – at least so far – no reports 
that they would have affected the national economy of 
any country. However, the subprime mortgage crisis in 
the USA (2007) showed that problems in the property 
sector can spill over to the national economy and – 
through new instruments such as mortgage-backed secu-
rities – even prompt a global recession (2008/2009). 
viii. Strengthening of skewed income and  
 wealth distributions
The emergence of huge criminal money flows tends to 
result in more pronounced uneven income and wealth 
distributions.113 This may – at first sight – appear to be 
counter-intuitive, as criminals are often perceived to 
come from the poorer sections of society. However, once 
criminal organizations are formed, they tend to generate 
large amounts of money quickly. Subsequently, more 
money will be concentrated in just a few hands, and 
existing uneven income distributions may become even 
more marked. 
This was true, for instance, in several of the Andean 
countries, when drug-related income flourished. The 
emergence of the drug business went hand in hand with 
a consolidation, partly even increase, of already skewed 
income and wealth distributions. 
111 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board for 2002, Sales No. E.03.XI.1, 
New York 2002, p. 6.
112 UNDCP, “Economic and Social Consequences of Drug Abuse and 
Illicit Trafficking”, UNDCP Technical Serices, No. 6, p. 28.
113 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board for 2002, Sales No. E.03.XI.1, 
New York 2002, p. 5.
vi. corruption
A further consequence of the existence of large criminal 
financial flows in a country, even if legally invested, are 
the attempts by criminal groups to use their financial 
power to corrupt the authorities107 and to gain addi-
tional advantages for their ‘legal’ enterprises. Once crim-
inals have infiltrated a particular sector of the economy, 
they will further bribe public officials in order to gain 
control of even larger sectors of the economy.108 Once 
established, they will drive out legitimate business com-
petitors and introduce a parasitic, anti-competitive 
approach to business. Thus an additional risk is created, 
namely that such enterprises, sourced by criminal 
money, will eventually crowd out existing legal enter-
prises.109 
In parallel, the criminal organizations will also use their 
funds to engage in corruption to protect their criminal 
activities. Since criminal organizations must mitigate the 
risk of detection and prosecution, they tend to use the 
proceeds of their illegal activities to corrupt law enforce-
ment, justice and other officials, to obstruct justice and 
to enable them to operate without interference. 110 
Data show that corruption levels tend to be high in poor 
countries with high levels of organized crime (such as 
Somalia, Afghanistan and Myanmar) and smaller in the 
more developed countries, which have good governance 
structures and where the criminal funds – expressed as a 
proportion of the size of the total economy – tend to 
play a smaller role. This effect can also be seen in some 
developed countries that suffer from the presence of 
strong organized crime groups (such as Italy).
While there appears to be a clear negative correlation 
between GDP per capita and corruption, a causality 
relationship is more difficult to establish. Activities of 
transnational organized crime, including the funds gen-
erated from drug trafficking, seem to play a key role. 
Trafficking and corruption seem to be mutually rein-
forcing, that is, corruption fosters trafficking by transna-
tional organized criminals and trafficking activities 
increase corruption.
107 Financial Action Task Force, “Money Laundering FAQ”. 
Accessable at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/29/0,3746
,en_32250379_32235720_33659613_1_1_1_1,00.html#Wheredo
esmoneylaunderingoccur.
108 P. Alldridge, ‘The Moral Limits of the Crime of Money Laundering’, 
Buffalo Criminal Law Review, 2002, No. 5 (1), pp. 279–319.
109 D. Masciandaro, E. Takáts and B. Unger, Black Finance: The Econom-
ics of Money Laundering, Cheltenham (UK), Edward Elgar Publishing 
Company, 2007, p. 96 and p. 178. 
110 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board for 2010, United Nations publica-
tion, Sales No. E.11.XI.1, New York 2011, p 3.
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ix. Distortion of economic statistics and 
thus potential errors in economic 
policy decision-making 
Another potential problem linked to the existence of a 
large illicit sector in an economy is a strong likelihood 
that economic data and statistics will no longer accu-
rately reflect reality. Criminal finance can distort eco-
nomic data and thus macroeconomic analysis and 
policy-making.116 
The potential problem of low credit ratings due to – on 
paper – large foreign trade and current account deficits 
has already been discussed. In addition, macroeconomic 
management can be negatively affected. Macroeconomic 
management is generally difficult, but with huge crimi-
nal funds circulating in the economy, it becomes even 
more so. Macroeconomic management is particularly 
challenging when there is a need for economic policy 
changes, such as austerity measures to curb inflation. In 
such situations, a large illicit sector may counteract gov-
ernment action, either by preventing a predicted out-
come from materializing, prolonging the time frame for 
macroeconomic stabilization or prompting the govern-
ment to take measures that are too drastic, thus creating 
unemployment and social unrest.
The reaction to inflationary pressure, for instance, often 
results in the introduction of more severe monetary 
policies, leading to a decline in the money supply and 
increased interest rates. However, such policies will only 
prove successful if the economy reacts in a predictable 
way to the changes. But when large amounts of illicit 
funds are available in an economy, and criminally 
financed entities can take over some of the lending func-
tions, either internally (that is, within the enterprises 
belonging to the organized crime group) or externally 
(that is, granting loans to other businesses), the economy 
may continue to overheat, showing marked inflation, 
despite a restrictive monetary policy. This may prompt 
authorities to take even more drastic monetary and 
other restrictive economic measures. In the process, 
legitimate businesses, without access to illicit funds, may 
be squeezed out of the market due to high interest rates, 
and new legitimate investments may not take place.117
116 P. J. Quirk, Macroeconomic Implications of Money Laundering, Inter-
national Monetary Fund Working Paper 96/66, Washington D.C., 
June 1996.
117 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board for 2002, Sales No. E.03.XI.1, 
New York 2002, p. 6. World Bank, World Development Indicators 
2010, Washington 2010.
At the same time, skewed income distributions also 
seem to act as an incentive for criminal activities. In 
other words, if large sections of society – notably young 
men – do not perceive to have any realistic chance to get 
a decent income through hard work, while observing 
that a few people in society live an extremely luxurious 
lifestyle without any hard work, they may become 
tempted to engage in criminal activities. Such patterns 
are exacerbated by high levels of unemployment, migra-
tion and related problems.
Thus, income inequalities can be seen as causes for a 
rapid expansion of organized crime activities, though 
the establishment of an illicit sector is likely to further 
accentuate already existing income inequalities. This is 
particularly problematic because income inequality is at 
the heart of various social problems faced by many 
countries, including illicit drug production and traffick-
ing, thus forming a vicious circle. In other words, une-
qual income in itself is apparently an important factor 
affecting the readiness of people to participate in the 
illicit drug industry, while the existence of an illicit drug 
industry fosters unequal income distribution.114
In fact, World Bank data show that several of the main 
drug producing or trafficking countries are also charac-
terized by uneven levels of income distribution. 
Similarly, UNDP data reveal high levels of income ine-
quality (with Gini coefficients of more than 50) for 
several drug producing or transiting countries. 
For comparison, the average Gini coefficient of income 
distribution at the global level is 41. It is also 41 in the 
USA, 31 in the EU and 25 in Japan. The illicit drug 
sector in the USA – and thus organized crime supplying 
these substances – is far more prominent than in the 
EU, and the illicit drug sector in Japan is smaller than 
in the USA and appears to also be smaller than in the 
EU. Even within the EU, countries with relatively higher 
levels of income inequality such as Italy, the UK or 
Spain (with Gini coefficients ranging from 35-37) are 
also the European countries with relatively stronger 
illicit drug sectors and transnational organized crime 
groups benefiting from this, while the illicit drug sectors 
are more limited in countries characterized by low 
income inequalities (with Gini coefficients ranging from 
22-25).115 
114 International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board for 2002, Sales No. E.03.XI.1, 
New York 2002, p. 6. World Bank, World Development Indicators 
2010, Washington 2010.
115 UNDP, Human Development Report 2010, The Real Wealth of Nations: 
Pathways to Human Development, New York 2010, pp. 152-155. 
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the criminal funds on the financial sector,120 notably if 
such funds are laundered abroad and are not flowing 
back to the ‘originating countries.’
The proportions of the proceeds of crime that are laun-
dered via the financial system differ from country to 
country. One can assume that they will be higher in the 
more developed countries where cash transactions are 
less prominent while lower proportions may be expected 
in some developing countries. Nonetheless, the overall 
proportions seem to be substantial. Based on a study of 
criminal cases in the Netherlands in the late 1990s, 
Unger calculated that some 80% of the total crime pro-
ceeds were laundered.121 Another study from the Neth-
erlands arrived at proportions ranging from 71% to 
75% of total crime proceeds. These calculations included 
income from a number of crime activities which are 
domestic rather than transnational in nature, such as 
burglaries or theft, for which the proportions going into 
money-laundering appear to be small.122 
Available research suggests that the immediate impact 
for the recipient countries of criminal funds – at least in 
the short run – is positive. This applies in particular to 
so-called transfer countries of criminal money, that is, 
countries through which the money flows.123
If larger geographical areas are analysed as a unity, the 
opposite is true. Empirical research undertaken by Quirk 
in 18 industrialized countries found that increases in 
money-laundering activities were associated with reduc-
tions in overall annual economic growth rates.124 Simi-
larly, research undertaken by Unger in 17 OECD 
countries of West Europe and North America suggests 
that overall money-laundering dampens economic 
growth. Each US$1 billion increase of money-launder-
ing in the 17 OECD countries tends to reduce overall 
economic growth by 0.03 to 0.06 percentage points in 
these countries. 
However, Unger’s study also showed that if money-
laundering was separated from the predicate crime – for 
120 For a discussion on the financial instruments used for laundering 
proceeds of crime and possible indications for persons working in the 
financial sector to detect money-laundering attempts see UNODC, 
Risk of Money Laundering through Financial Instruments, Bogota 
2010. 
121 B. Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering, Cheltenham 
(UK), Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 2007, p. 124.
122 M. Smekens, M. and M Verbruggen (2004), De Illegale Economie in 
Nederland, Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 20 September 2004; 
van der Heide, W. and A.Th.J. Eggen, Criminaliteit en rechtshand-
having 2001, WODC: 211 Onderzoek en Beleid. Centraal Bureau 
voor de Statistiek, Meppel: BOOM Juridische Uitgevers, Den Haag 
quoted in B. Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering, 
Cheltenham (UK), Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 2007, p. 66.
123 B. Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering, Cheltenham 
(UK), Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 2007, p. 150.
124 P.J. Quirk, “Money Laundering: Muddying the Macroeconomy”, 
Finance & Development, No. 34 (1), 1997, pp. 4-9. 
x. Undermining the credibility of legal 
institutions
A key problem of many of the effects discussed so far is 
their impact on the credibility of the legal institutions in 
a country. If the income and wealth disparities are large 
and increasing, unemployment is rising due to strong 
sector volatilities, erroneous macroeconomic decision-
making because of inaccurate underlying economic data, 
various distortions in the allocation of resources due to 
unfair competition, and when society is confronted with 
widespread corruption at all levels – prompted by the 
existence of a relatively large and expanding criminal 
sector – the authority of the legal institutions and the 
state as such will suffer as well. This will also happen, as 
pointed out by Tanzi, if criminal elements are able to 
generate sufficient capital to corrupt the political proc-
ess, for instance by financing election campaigns that 
result in the installation of ‘more friendly administra-
tions’.118 In other words, the funds generated by crimi-
nal organizations provide them with economic and 
potentially even political power and can weaken the 
social fabric, collective ethical standards and ultimately 
the democratic institutions of society.119
Investment into the economy, however, depends to a 
significant extent on the credibility of state institutions. 
Legal investors – both domestic and foreign - will not 
risk their money if they cannot trust the authorities. 
Without investment, economic growth will be seriously 
jeopardized. Moreover, many ordinary citizens will ask 
themselves whether it is really worthwhile and still 
appropriate to play by the rules. This can have a negative 
impact on overall tax morality in a country, which leaves 
the authorities with a limited number of choices: either 
reduce government services and thus risk the future of 
the country, or increase existing tax rates, thus further 
raising the incentives to evade taxes, and creating a 
potentially vicious circle. 
c)	 Implications	of	laundering		
criminal	financial	flows,		
including	in	foreign	jurisdictions	
So far, the discussion centred on the impact of criminal 
flows for the underlying criminal activities, followed by 
an analysis of major impacts once the flows enter the 
licit sector. A remaining question concerns the impact of 
118 V. Tanzi, “ Macroeconomic Implications of Money Laundering”, in 
E.U. Savona, Responding to Money Laundering, International Perspec-
tives, Harwood Academic Publishers, Amsterdam, 1997, pp. 91-104. 
119 Financial Action Task Force, “Money Laundering FAQ”. 
Accessable at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/29/0,3746
,en_32250379_32235720_33659613_1_1_1_1,00.html#Wheredo
esmoneylaunderingoccur.
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of developing countries’ efforts to develop their domes-
tic economies. However, he also points out that studies 
on the effectiveness of establishing offshore financial 
centres (OFC) as an economic development strategy 
have failed to show that “notional” OFCs – unless based 
on sound rules and regulations - contribute significantly 
to the surrounding economy. “Notional” OFCs are 
defined as OFCs that provide minimal financial services 
and are to be distinguished from “functional” OFCs, 
which provide a wide-range of value-added financial 
services. Thus, “notional” OFCs do not form a sound 
basis for sustained economic growth. In fact, economic 
growth was shown to depend on sound domestic finan-
cial institutions.130
Disregarding the true origin of criminal funds cannot 
and should not be a ‘recipe for success.’ It is also a moral 
obligation not to accept illicit funds. While every coun-
try has the right to introduce policies aiming at improv-
ing the well-being of its citizens, this cannot be done by 
inflicting misery on others. There is a clear need for 
international rules, which must be adhered to by as 
many players as possible.  
But even from a purely economic point of view it 
remains questionable whether a ‘free rider’ approach is 
an effective response in the long run. A number of argu-
ments have been put forward which raise doubts whether 
a strategy based on ignoring international rules and 
standards in the fight against money-laundering will 
provide positive results for the countries concerned. 
ii. Volatility in the financial sector with 
macro-economic implications
Financial centres depending on tainted money may find 
themselves exposed to high levels of volatility. This can 
affect the financial institutions concerned. Financial 
institutions that accept illegal funds cannot rely on those 
funds as a stable deposit base. Large amounts of laun-
dered funds are likely to be suddenly wired to other 
financial markets as part of the laundering process, 
threatening the institution’s liquidity and solvency. A 
financial institution’s reputation and integrity can be 
irrevocably harmed if involved in money-laundering.131 
Bartlett provides a case study of a run on a bank in the 
Balkan region, sparked by various economic actors fol-
lowing reports that this bank was heavily involved in 
major money-laundering operations.132 
130 B. L. Bartlett, The negative Effects of Money Laundering on Economic 
Development, (Report for the Asian Development Bank), May 2002, 
pp. 29-33. 
131 World Bank, “Topic: Anti-Money Laundering”, Washington D.C., 
2011. Accessable at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTER-
NAL/WBI/WBIPROGRAMS/PSGLP/0,,contentMDK:2029299
0~menuPK:461615~pagePK:64156158~piPK:64152884~theSit
ePK:461606,00.html.
132 B. L. Bartlett, The negative Effects of Money Laundering on Economic 
instance by only looking at the recipient countries and 
assuming that such laundering activities would not lead 
to other crimes in the recipient countries – the money-
laundering-related coefficients turn positive, resulting in 
an expected economic growth of between 0.06 and 0.14 
percentage points of GDP for each US$1 billion laun-
dered.125 In other words, money-laundering itself does 
not dampen economic growth; the crime that it is inter-
mingled with does.126 
How can this be explained? If money is wired from the 
country where the underlying criminal activities are 
taking place to a transfer country, additional value added 
is created in financial services, without such countries 
having to bear the costs of crime.127 Such criminal funds 
invested abroad will assist in expanding the financial 
services sector in the recipient countries. They will help 
create income for individuals, for the companies con-
cerned as well as for the recipient state in terms of higher 
tax income. There are also indications that in some 
countries the interest rates – partly due to the inflow of 
such money – may have been lower than they would 
otherwise have been.128 This assists domestic trade and 
industry to get improved access to finance, which may 
help them invest and generate economic wealth. 
In fact, many of the offshore centres in Europe, North 
America, the Caribbean, South-East Asia and even in 
Sub-Saharan Africa which may attract funds emerging 
from various criminal activities, have been doing eco-
nomically well. This applies not only to countries or 
jurisdictions in the developed world, but also to many 
of the small international financial centres in developing 
regions.129 This may also explain why a number of other 
countries, including some small island countries in Oce-
ania, have been trying to copy this ‘recipe for success.’ 
i. Problems to generate sustainable  
economic growth 
Bartlett notes that over the past decade, dozens of off-
shore financial centres (OFCs) have been created as part 
125 B. Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering, Cheltenham 
(UK), Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 2007, p. 155.
126 J. Ferwerda and S.Z. Bosma, The effect of money laundering on eco-
nomic growth, Paper for Onderzoekskeuzevak Economie von de 
Publieke Sector, Utrecht School of Economics, Utrecht 2006.
127 B. Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering, Cheltenham 
(UK), Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 2007, p. 150.
128 The argument holds more for closed economies than for open econo-
mies. (B. Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering, Chelten-
ham (UK), Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 2007, p. 140).
129 P. R. Land and G. M. Milesi-Ferretti, “International Monetary Fund, 
Cross-Border Investment in Small International Financial Centers”, 
IMF Working Paper, WP/10/38, Washington D.C., February 2010 
and Tax Justice Network, “IMF: trillions lost offshore”, March 15, 
2010; l E.J. Fagan, “IMF: Trillions of Undeclared Funds Offshore”, 
Task Force, Financial Integrity & Economic Development, March 15, 
2010. 
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model, first elaborated by Masciandaro, and later refined 
by Unger, suggests that the amounts of money laun-
dered tends to lead to additional crime proceeds of 
between 6% and 10% of the original crime proceeds. 
Thus, a ‘free-rider’ attitude can backfire.137 
In fact, there is a risk that financial institutions – and 
eventually even whole financial centres - will become 
corrupt or even controlled by criminal interest. Small 
developing countries are particularly vulnerable in this 
regard.138
iv. Reputation of the financial centres 
Thirdly, and probably more importantly, the “reputa-
tion” of a financial sector139 plays an increasingly impor-
tant role for legal investors. A reputation for integrity is 
one of the most valued assets by investors. Various forms 
of financial system abuse may compromise the reputa-
tion of financial institutions and jurisdictions, under-
mine investors’ trust in them, and, therefore, weaken the 
financial system.140
In general, investors do not want to see their names 
associated with investments in financial centres that 
have a questionable reputation. Once the reputation of 
a financial centre is in jeopardy, there is a risk that legal 
investors will withdraw their funds. In other words, 
illegal transactions can contaminate legal ones.141 Thus, 
financial sectors have a self-interest in not being associ-
ated with tainted money. The growing number of finan-
cial centres that have signed relevant international 
instruments and adopted at least basic financial control 
mechanisms to avoid the inflow of criminal finance in 
recent years is an indication. 
v. Risk of legal sanctions 
Fourthly, lax anti-money-laundering enforcement meas-
ures can prompt legal sanctions by important trade and 
investment partners. This can more than offset the 
potential benefits from following a free-rider strategy. 
Such sanctions – for example, banning dollar transac-
tion”, European Journal of Law and Economics, No. 7, 1999, pp. 
225-240. 
137 B. Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering, Cheltenham 
(UK), Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 2007, p. 169.
138 B. L. Bartlett, The negative Effects of Money Laundering on Economic 
Development, Report for the Asian Development Bank, May 2002. 
139 B. L. Bartlett, The negative Effects of Money Laundering on Economic 
Development, Report for the Asian Development Bank, May 2002, p. 
9. 
140 International Monetary Fund, Financial System Abuse, Financial 
Crime and Money Laundering, IMF Background Paper, Washington 
D.C. 2001. 
141 This argument was already found in the literature more than a decade 
ago. P.J. Quirk, “Money Laundering: Muddying the Macroeconomy,” 
Finance & Development, No. 34 (1), 1997, pp. 4-9.
Money-laundering, however, can also lead – at a much 
higher level - to volatility in exchange rates and interest 
rates due to unanticipated in- and outflows of capital.133 
Such volatility of both exchange rates and interest rates 
tends to be negative for overall economic growth. Peri-
ods of a sharp surge in financial activity, followed by an 
equally sharp decline will result in severe macroeco-
nomic instability. This tends to be further aggravated as 
local authorities, in general, will not be in a position to 
introduce offsetting monetary or exchange rate measures 
in a timely manner.134 
Moreover, the initial inflow of funds can lead to either 
an appreciation of the exchange rate or an increase in the 
monetary base. An increase in the exchange rate may 
entail a reduction in exports and an increase in imports, 
and thus a deterioration of the foreign trade balance, 
which can jeopardize whole sectors of the economy. An 
increase in the monetary base, on the other hand, can 
lead to rising prices, which may translate into higher 
wages and a reduction of the international competitive-
ness of the licit economy.135 
iii. limited ability to maintain the  
separation between predicate crimes  
and money-laundering
Secondly, the question remains whether money-launder-
ing and predicate crimes can always be properly geo-
graphically separated. Even if organized crime groups 
decide not to undertake their primary criminal activities 
(for example, drug trafficking) in the countries where 
they have their money invested, it would be unrealistic 
to assume that they would not engage in other criminal 
activities, such as corruption. In fact, a number of 
authors have argued that money-laundering can lead to 
spillover mechanisms from criminal money to crime. 
Because of the possibility of money-laundering in the 
financial sector, reinvestment of the money in illegal 
activities in the licit sector can be the consequence.136 A 
Development, Report for the Asian Development Bank, May 2002, p. 
11. 
133 V. Tanzi, ‘Money Laundering and the International Financial 
System’, IMF Working Paper, International Monetary Fund, No. 
96/55, Washington D.C. 1996; McDonell, R., ‘Money Laundering 
Methodologies and International and Regional Counter-Measures’, 
Presented at: Gambling, Technology and Society: Regulatory Chal-
lenges for the 21st Century, Rex Hotel, Sydney, 7–8 May, 1998; J. 
Boorman, and S. Ingves ‘Financial System Abuse, Financial Crime 
and Money Laundering’, IMF Background Paper, Washington D.C. 
2001; Financial Action Task Force, Money Laundering FAQ, Wash-
ington D.C, 2011, Accessable at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/
29/0,3746,en_32250379_32235720_33659613_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
134 B. L. Bartlett, The negative Effects of Money Laundering on Economic 
Development, Report for the Asian Development Bank, May 2002. 
135 V. Tanzi, ‘Money Laundering and the International Financial System’, 
IMF Working Paper, International Monetary Fund, No. 96/55, Wash-
ington D.C. 1996. 
136 D. Masciandaro, “Money Laundering: The Economics of Regula-
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ing efforts at the global level. Otherwise, the system will 
be only as strong as its weakest link and will be exploited 
by organized crime. 
Though it is important to be aware of the various socio-
economic consequences, economic considerations alone 
cannot and should not be decisive factors for enacting or 
implementing appropriate legislation or regulation. The 
key objective has to remain the fight against organized 
crime in all its dimensions. Anti-money-laundering leg-
islation and measures form an integral part of this 
endeavour. 
The subsequent chapter will give an overview of existing 
instruments at the international level to fight organized 
crime and related money-laundering activities. The dis-
cussion will show that most of the necessary instruments 
to fight organized crime and related money-laundering 
activities exist already. Yet, the existing ‘success’ rate of 
identifying criminal capital flows is limited, to say the 
least. Based on all available estimates, less than 1% of 
the total amounts that are being laundered are detected. 
Data collected by the US State Department suggest that 
some US$3.1 billion were seized in connection with 
money-laundering activities in 38 countries out of 62 
countries analysed (2010 or latest year available); more 
than 80% of this was seized in North America.144 This 
would be equivalent to some 0.2% of the best estimate 
of the extent of money-laundering at the global level. In 
comparison, more than 20% of the globally produced 
illicit opiates are being seized and more than 40% of the 
cocaine.145 Are money-launderers really so much smarter 
than drug traffickers, or is there something wrong with 
the existing control system? The problem appears not to 
be a lack of international instruments (as will be shown 
in the next chapter), but shortcomings in the implemen-
tation of existing instruments in a number of jurisdic-
tions. 
 
144 US Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report 2010 and 2011; Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund 
for fiscal year 2010; Department of Treasury Assets Forfeiture Fund 
for fiscal year 2010.
145 UNODC, World Drug Report 2010, Vienna 2010. 
tions with countries concerned - can be damaging for 
financial centres that do not want to adhere to interna-
tional rules and regulations.142 Thus, incentives are cre-
ated for financial centres to forego possible short-term 
benefits. 
In order to guarantee the application of uniform, objec-
tive criteria, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
engaged in an initiative on ‘non-cooperative countries 
and territories’ (NCCTs). Using 25 criteria, the FATF 
researched the potential weaknesses of international 
financial centres which enabled it to identify those where 
the regulations and practices significantly infringed the 
fight against money-laundering and international coop-
eration. Based on these findings, the FATF established a 
list of countries and territories with important flaws in 
their anti-money-laundering instruments or a lack of 
willingness to cooperate in combating money-launder-
ing. Published first in 2000, this list was periodically 
updated. The FATF requested that the identified coun-
tries and territories adapt their systems to internationally 
recognized standards. The mere threat of appearing on 
this list of ‘non-cooperative countries and territories’ 
prompted many countries and territories to improve 
their systems, so that they could be removed from the 
list.143 In 2006, the FATF adopted a new surveillance 
process - the International Co-operation Review Group 
(ICRG) – to identify, examine and engage with vulner-
able jurisdictions that are failing to implement effective 
AML/CFT systems. This replaced the NCCT process. 
In 2009, the ICRG procedures were amended, and the 
FATF now publishes a list of countries with strategic 
AML/CTF deficiencies after every FATF meeting.
vi. Key role of global anti-money-launder-
ing efforts – enabling the authorities 
to follow the money trail 
Finally, one should not forget the key role of any anti-
money-laundering legislation: enabling state authorities 
to follow the money trail in order to detect underlying 
criminal activities and to dismantle the groups involved. 
This remains the main reason for the implementation of 
anti-money-laundering measures. The operations of 
criminal organizations are potentially vulnerable to 
detection via the money trail and there are good reasons 
for the authorities to exploit these vulnerabilities.
Any such system, however, will only work if there are no 
loopholes. Thus, there is a need for comprehensive, all-
inclusive participation in international money-launder-
142 B. L. Bartlett, The negative Effects of Money Laundering on Economic 
Development, Report for the Asian Development Bank, May 2002, 
p. 9. 
143 PolyReg, FATF Sanctions, February 2011. Accessable at http://www.
polyreg.ch/e/sanktionslisten/fatf.html. 
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strengthen the rule of law. The Declaration, inter alia, 
made it clear that (para 6) “men and women have the 
right to live their lives and raise their children … free from 
… fear of violence, oppression or injustice” and in para 9 
the Heads of State and Government resolved “to inten-
sify our efforts to fight transnational crime in all its dimen-
sions, including trafficking as well as smuggling in human 
beings and money laundering”. Taking all of this into 
account, a special convention was signed a few months 
later in December 2000 to promote international coop-
eration in preventing and combating transnational orga-
nized crime. This became known as the 
 • United Nations Convention against Transnational Or-
ganized Crime (TOC), 2000 (also known as the Pal-
ermo Convention) 
This convention also contains two Protocols:
 ° Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplement-
ing the United Nations Convention against Transna-
tional Organized Crime 
 ° Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, 
Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Con-
vention against Transnational Organized Crime
In line with the above approach, Member States subse-
quently also agreed on a further 
 ° Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Traf-
ficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and 
Ammunition (adopted by General Assembly resolution 
55/255 of 31 May 2001). 
In addition to the TOC convention, a special conven-
tion was drafted, signed and ratified a few years later, 
dealing with the specific problems related to corruption, 
the
 • United Nations Convention against Corruption, 2003
A special convention focussing exclusively on money-
laundering does not exist. However, most of the above 
mentioned conventions do not only deal with drug traf-
ficking, corruption and other areas of organized crime 
but they also demand the contracting parties to crimi-
nalize activities undertaken to hide or launder the pro-
ceeds related to such predicative crimes and foresee 
measures to confiscate such proceeds. This reflects the 
fact that illicit financial flows have been understood to 
a)	 Overview	
A number of legal instruments have developed over the 
last few decades dealing with various aspects of organ-
ized crime at the international level. Key elements in all 
these instruments consist of measures aiming at foster-
ing international cooperation and harmonizing the 
approaches taken. 
The by far longest history of legal instruments to deal 
with specific aspects of organized crime has been related 
to international drug control. Since the beginning of the 
20th century, a number of conventions have been devel-
oped, signed and ratified, dealing with various aspects 
the drug problem. This process started with the 1909 
Opium Conference in Shanghai and the 1912 Hague 
International Opium Convention. It became a truly inter-
national instrument after World War I, as countries 
signing the peace treaties de-facto also ratified the drug 
convention. The organized crime aspect related to drug 
trafficking was implicitly present from the start and was 
particularly highlighted in the 1936 Geneva Convention 
for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous 
Drugs. 
The currently valid drug conventions are the:
 • Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 as amended 
by the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention 
on Narcotics Drugs, 1961 
 • Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971
 • United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in  
Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988
Transnational organized crime covers, of course, a much 
broader field than drug trafficking, even though the 
latter – given the financial dimensions and its links to 
violence and corruption – continues to play a key role 
within the area of organized crime. 
A new momentum to expand the scope of cooperation 
at the global level was gained by the Millennium Decla-
ration1 adopted by the Heads of State meeting at the 
United Nations in September 2000 which reaffirmed 
the need for more decisive measures to guarantee and 
1 United Nations Millenium Declaration, Resolution adopted by the 
General Assembly (A/55/L.2). Accessable at http://www.un.org/mil-
lennium/declaration/ares552e.htm.
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intimidated the general public by means of violence.
The key Articles of the 1988 Vienna Convention with 
regard to money-laundering can be summarized as fol-
lows: 
 • The Convention obliges parties to make drug-related 
money-laundering activities a criminal offence (Art. 
3 – for text, see Annex). 
 • The Convention foresees to confiscate such proceeds 
(Art. 5 – see Annex). The Convention also invited 
member states to remit parts of such funds to ‘inter-
governmental bodies specializing in the fight against 
illicit traffic in and abuse of narcotic drugs and psy-
chotropic substances’. 
 • Money-laundering also became an extraditable offence 
at the international level, though such extraditions 
remained subject to a number of preconditions, such 
as the existence of bilateral extradition treaties. If a 
country had restrictions in extraditing nationals, the 
Convention foresaw that such a county should con-
sider to judge its national(s) according to the law of 
the requesting Party (Art. 6). 
 • Mutual legal assistance also extends to the fight 
against such illegal capital flows (Art.7 – see Annex). 
 • The Convention also made it clear that bank secrecy 
cannot be used as an excuse for not acting. 
The 1988 Vienna Convention is today almost univer-
sally adhered to (184 States Parties as of July 2010) and 
has formed for many countries the basis for their anti-
money-laundering legislation.
ii. fATf Recommendations
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Money 
Laundering was established by the G-7 countries in 
1989. This inter-governmental body was intended to 
become an international policy-making body in the 
fight against money-laundering and was created to gen-
erate the necessary political will to bring about legisla-
tive and regulatory reforms to counter the abuse of the 
financial system by criminals. 
In 1990, the FATF promulgated its initial “Forty Rec-
ommendations” which provided a general anti-money-
laundering (AML) framework, starting with the 
ratification and implementation of the 1988 Vienna 
Convention while extending anti-money-laundering 
from drug trafficking to all serious offences. 
Key provisions are: 
 • Recommendation 1 sets out that money-laundering 
activities related to offences that are punishable by 
a minimum penalty of more than six months and a 
be highly detrimental for society at large, de-facto pro-
viding criminals with strong incentives to undertake 
such crimes as long as they do not have to fear to lose 
the crime related proceeds again. Moreover, illicit finan-
cial flows can result large-scale corruption, disturbances 
of competition, violence and economic equilibria and 
can contribute towards a weakening of the state, thus 
jeopardizing the rule of law. 
Against this background a number of stipulations in 
Conventions as well as Resolutions and Action Plans, 
passed by the international community and by selected 
groups of countries have been geared towards effectively 
fighting illicit financial flows and money-laundering at 
the national, regional and international levels. The most 
important instruments containing specific stipulations 
against money-laundering include the: 
 • United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Nar-
cotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988
 • FATF recommendations
 • 1998 Political Declaration and the related Action Plan 
(“Countering Money-Laundering”)
 • United Nations Convention against Transnational  
Organized Crime, 2000
 • United Nations Convention against Corruption, 2003
 • 2009 Political Declaration and Plan of Action on In-
ternational Cooperation towards an Integrated and Bal-
anced Strategy to counter the World Drug Problem
 • 2010 Salvador Declaration on Comprehensive Strategies 
for Global Challenges: Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice Systems and Their Development in a Changing 
World
The most relevant stipulations in these legal instruments 
will be discussed below. 
b)	 Most	relevant	stipulations	in	
international	legal	instruments	
i. United Nations convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and  
Psychotropic Substances, 1988
The first major international agreement in this field was 
the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 (also 
known as the 1988 Vienna Convention). The at the 
time almost revolutionary stipulations against money-
laundering were introduced against the background of a 
rapidly rising economic power of internationally operat-
ing drug cartels as of the late 1980s. Given their finan-
cial power, they started to corrupt whole regions and 
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ants, lawyers and notaries. In addition, the FATF 
adopted 8 Special Recommendations on Terrorist 
Financing in October 2001. These were supplemented 
by another Recommendation in October 2004. In 2009 
the FATF again initiated a review of some of its recom-
mendations. The review is scheduled to be finalized in 
early 2012.
The FATF Recommendations were a clear step forward 
in providing a sufficiently detailed framework for legal 
action. Even though membership in the FATF more 
than doubled over the years - from originally 16 to the 
current 362 in addition to 8 FATF Style Regional Bodies 
(FSRBs)3 and various international organizations4 which 
are now either associate members or FATF observers - 
one key problem for the FATF in the initial years was to 
gain international acceptance of these Recommenda-
tions beyond the participating FATF states. 
This changed with the 1998 Political Declaration and 
the adopted ‘Measures to enhance international coopera-
tion to counter the world drug problem” which included 
in section D, measures for “Countering Money Launder-
ing” passed by the UN General Assembly in June 1998. 
The FATF recommendations were identified as “the 
standard” by which “the measures against money-launder-
ing” adopted by individual States “should be judged” (see 
below). 
Similarly, in 2005 the UN Security Council in its resolu-
tion 1617 strongly urged “all Member States to imple-
ment the comprehensive international standards embodied 
in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Forty Recom-
mendations on Money Laundering and the FATF Nine 
Special Recommendation on Terrorist Financing”. 
This was repeated a year later by the UN General Assem-
bly (20 Sept. 2006) in its resolution 60/288. In the 
Annex ‘Plan of Action’ to this resolution the Member 
States of the United Nations resolved in §10 ”To encour-
2 FATF, About the FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,3417,en_3
2250379_32236836_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
3 There are currently 8 FATF Style Regional Bodies (FSTBs) which 
implement and monitor the FATF standards. They include the Asia/
Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Caribbean Finan-
cial Action Task Force (CFATF), Eurasian Group (EAG), Eastern 
and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), 
the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of 
Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism 
(MONEYVAL) - formely PC-R-EV, the Financial Action Task Force 
on Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD), Inter Gov-
ernmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa 
(GIABA) and the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action 
Task Force (MENAFATF). 
4 They include, inter alia, UNODC, Interpol, the World Customs 
Organisation, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, 
the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, the Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision or the Group of International Finance 
Centre Supervisors; (FATF, “Member Countries and Observers 
FAQ”). Accessable at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/5/0,3746,
en_32250379_32236869_34310917_1_1_1_1,00.html.
maximum penalty of more than one year’s imprison-
ment constitute serious offences. Money-laundering 
related to such offences has to be criminalized. 
 • Recommendation 3 asks countries to take appropriate 
legislative measures to enable their competent authori-
ties to confiscate property laundered as well as pro-
ceeds from money-laundering or predicate offences. 
 • Recommendations 4 lays down that secrecy laws 
should not inhibit implementation of the FATF Rec-
ommendations and Recommendation 5 asks financial 
institutions not to keep anonymous accounts or ac-
counts with fictitious names and that they should ap-
ply due diligence, including identifying and verifying 
the identify of their customers, notably when estab-
lishing business relations and carrying out transactions 
above designated thresholds. 
 • Recommendations 10 specifies that financial institu-
tions should maintain for at least five years all neces-
sary records. 
 • Recommendation 13 lays down that financial institu-
tions have to report suspicious transactions to the ap-
propriate Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). 
 • Recommendations 15 sets out that financial institu-
tions have to develop appropriate programmes against 
money-laundering, including internal policies, screen-
ing procedures and employee training programs.
 • Recommendation 18 makes it clear that countries 
should not approve the establishment or continued 
operation of shell banks and that other financial insti-
tutions should refuse to enter into relationship with 
such shell banks with foreign financial institutions 
permitting their accounts to be used by such shell 
banks. 
 • Recommendation 19 asks countries to ‘consider the 
feasibility’ of reporting all currency transactions above 
a fixed amount to a national central agency.
 • Recommendation 26 asks for the establishment of Fi-
nancial Intelligence units (FIU).
 • Recommendations 36-39 deal with the need to reduce 
restrictions for money-laundering related mutual le-
gal assistance, enable confiscations and extraditions. 
Thus countries should not deny legal assistance on the 
grounds that national laws require financial institution 
to maintain secrecy or confidentiality. 
The Forty Recommendations were revised in 1996 and 
again in 2003, eventually also covering the non-banking 
sector, including various other financial sectors, such as 
insurance, and a number of ‘gatekeeper’ professions such 
as real estate agents, dealers in precious metals, account-
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more detailed FATF recommendations were thus de 
facto introduced through the back-door into the interna-
tional system as the standards for fighting money-laun-
dering. 
iv. United Nations convention against 
Transnational organized crime, 2000
In the subsequent United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (TOC Convention),7 
passed in December 2000, the criminalization of money-
laundering was extended from drug-related money-
laundering activities to all forms of money-laundering 
derived from proceeds of crime, notably serious crime 
(Article 6). This was an important step ahead, although 
this convention does not have – as yet – the same adher-
ence level (163 States Parties as of September 2011) as 
the 1988 Convention. The content of the TOC Con-
vention gets more complicated if the predicate offence 
was committed in another country. Offences committed 
outside the jurisdiction of a State Party only constitute 
a predicate offence for subsequent money-laundering if: 
(a) it was a criminal offence in the foreign jurisdiction, 
and (b) it was a criminal offence under the domestic law 
of the State Party implementing the convention (Art. 6, 
para 2, (c)). Tax evasion, for instance, may be a criminal 
offence in one jurisdiction and an administrative offence 
in another. Thus, money-laundering linked to tax eva-
sion is not necessarily covered by the TOC Convention, 
in contrast to money-laundering linked to all kinds of 
‘serious crime’, that is, offences entailing maximum 
prison sentences of at least four years (Art. 2). 
The ‘Measures to combat money-laundering’ are summa-
rized in Article 7, which basically repeats existing anti-
money-laundering techniques, including customer 
identification, record keeping, reporting of suspicious 
transactions, et cetera. A new element was the obligation 
for countries to establish ‘financial intelligence units’ to 
serve as national centres for the collection, analysis and 
dissemination of information regarding potential money-
laundering and the implementation of “measures to detect 
and monitor the movement of cash and appropriate nego-
tiable instruments across their borders”. 
1996 in which the Commission noted that “the forty recommenda-
tions of the Financial Action Task Force established by the heads of 
State or Government of the seven major industrialized countries and 
the President of the European Commission remained the standard by 
which the measures against money-laundering adopted by concerned 
States should be judged.”
7 UNODC, United Nations Convention against Transnational Organ-
ized Crime and the Protocols thereto, New York, 2004. 
age States to implement the comprehensive international 
standards embodied in the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering 
and the FATF Nine Special Recommendation on Terrorist 
Financing, recognizing that States may require assistance in 
implementing them”. 
Finally, the 2009 Political Declaration reaffirmed the 
1998 Political Declaration and the related action plans 
and in §51 urged Member States to “foster international 
cooperation by implementing the provisions against money-
laundering contained in all relevant international and 
multilateral instruments, such as the 1988 Convention, the 
Organized Crime Convention and the Convention against 
Corruption and.. the Financial Action Task Force Recom-
mendations on Money Laundering…..”.
iii. 1998 Political Declaration and the 
related Action Plan (“countering 
Money-laundering”)
The obligations resulting from the 1988 Convention 
were further detailed in the 1998 Political Declaration5 
and the related Action Plan (“Countering Money-Laun-
dering”), passed unanimously by the UN General 
Assembly at its twentieth Special Session on the World 
Drug Problem, held 8-10 June 1998. 
 This foresaw, inter alia, the 
“Establishment of an effective financial and regulatory 
regime to deny criminals and their illicit funds access to 
national and international financial systems, thus preserv-
ing the integrity of financial systems worldwide…” includ-
ing, 
(i) Customer identification and verification require-
ments applying the principle of “know your customer”, 
in order to have available for competent authorities 
the necessary information on the identity of clients and 
the financial movements that they carry out;
(ii) Financial record-keeping;
(iii) Mandatory reporting of suspicious activity;
(iv) Removal of bank secrecy impediments to efforts 
directed at preventing, investigating and punishing 
money-laundering; …
Additionally, in the preamble to the Action Plan, refer-
ence was made to a United Nations Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs (CND) resolution which de facto ele-
vated the status of the 40 recommendations of the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) as the global stand-
ard in the fight against money-laundering.6 The far 
5 In the preamble of the 1998 Political Declaration Member States 
promised to “… make special efforts against the laundering of money 
linked to drug trafficking …”.
6 Recalling Commission on Narcotic Drugs resolution 39/5 of 24 April 
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of the CND, 12 March 2009, that (Art. 29) “illicit crop 
cultivation and illicit drug production, manufacturing, 
distribution and trafficking have been increasingly con-
solidated into a criminally organized industry generating 
enormous amounts of money, laundered through the 
financial and non-financial sectors…”. They thus com-
mitted themselves to “strengthening the effective and 
comprehensive implementation of regimes for counter-
ing money-laundering and to improving international 
cooperation, including judicial cooperation, in order to 
prevent, detect and prosecute such crimes, dismantle 
criminal organizations and confiscate their illicit pro-
ceeds…”. Member States decided “to establish 2019 as 
a target date for States to eliminate or reduce signifi-
cantly and measurably:… money-laundering related to 
illicit drugs”. 
Part III, subheading E of the Plan of Action was dedi-
cated to measures ‘countering money-laundering’. At 
the outset it was stated that (Art. 50) “The laundering 
of money derived from illicit drug trafficking and other 
serious crimes continues to be a global problem that 
threatens the security and stability of financial institu-
tions and systems, undermines economic prosperity and 
weakens governance systems.” 
Countries committed themselves (Art. 51) to strengthen 
existing legislative frameworks, inter alia, by 
“(i) Widening the scope of predicate crimes for 
money-laundering to include all serious crimes, 
giving due consideration to crimes related to the 
misuse of new technologies, cyberspace and elec-
tronic money transfer systems and to transnational 
cash smuggling…. 
(iii) Promoting the use of internationally accepted 
asset-sharing procedures in international confisca-
tion cases, such as the Model Bilateral Agreement 
on the Sharing of Confiscated Proceeds of Crime or 
Property, adopted by the Economic and Social 
Council in its resolution 2005/14…; and 
(vii) Making money-laundering an extraditable 
offence…“
as well as by ” Establishing new or strengthening existing 
financial and regulatory regimes for banks and non-
bank financial institutions, including natural and legal 
persons providing formal or informal financial ser-
vices…” and by the “.., establishment of dedicated 
financial intelligence units to serve as national centres 
for the collection, analysis and dissemination of suspi-
cious transaction reports …”. (for details, see Annex). 
The importance of the 2009 Political Declaration and 
Plan of Action with regard to measures against money-
laundering is that it also applies to UN Member States 
that have not – as yet – signed and ratified the TOC 
Convention.
v. United Nations convention against 
corruption, 2003
The issue of money-laundering was also taken up in the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption, 2003, 
and are summarized in Article 14 “Measures to prevent 
money-laundering”, in Article 52 “Prevention and detec-
tion of transfers of proceeds of crime” and Article 54 
“Mechanisms for recovery of property through interna-
tional cooperation in confiscation”. The basic idea here 
is to prevent money-laundering related to corruption 
though the actual measures foreseen in dealing with the 
problem of money-laundering, are not limited to cor-
ruption related money-laundering but to all types of 
transfers related to the illicit acquisition of personal 
wealth. Thus, in the preamble the convention speaks of 
the need to ‘prevent, detect and deter in a more effective 
manner international transfers of illicitly acquired assets 
and to strengthen international cooperation in asset recov-
ery. The underlying ‘proceeds of crime’ are defined in 
Article. 2 as “any property derived from or obtained, 
directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offence”. 
While providing a good summary of necessary measures 
to prevent and fight money-laundering, the convention, 
does not really include many significant new elements 
for the fight against money-laundering, which would go 
beyond those laid down in the Convention against Tran-
snational Organized Crime. Perhaps the most important 
new element is found in Article 14, para 4 in which the 
FATF recommendations are de-facto brought up to the 
international level, not only for drug related money-
laundering (as was already the case in the 1998 Political 
Declaration and the related Action Plans), but for 
money-laundering in general. Article 14, para 4 makes 
it explicit that ‘In establishing a domestic regulatory and 
supervisory regime under the terms of this article … States 
Parties are called upon to use as a guideline the relevant 
initiatives of regional, interregional and multilateral orga-
nizations against money-laundering”. 
vi. 2009 Political Declaration and Plan of 
Action on International cooperation 
towards an Integrated and Balanced 
Strategy to counter the world Drug 
Problem
Despite of all of these efforts, Member States recognized 
in the 2009 Political Declaration and Plan of Action on 
International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Bal-
anced Strategy to counter the World Drug Problem,8 
adopted at the High-Level Segment of the 52nd session 
8 UNODC, Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International 
Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter 
The World Drug Problem, High-level segment, Commission on Nar-
cotic Drugs, Vienna, 11-12 March 2009. 
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vii. 2010 Salvador Declaration on com-
prehensive Strategies for Global chal-
lenges: crime Prevention and criminal 
Justice Systems and Their Develop-
ment in a changing world
The importance of actions against money-laundering 
was also highlighted in the 2010 Salvador Declaration on 
Comprehensive Strategies for Global Challenges: Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice Systems and Their Devel-
opment in a Changing World (April 2010). This Declara-
tion, adopted by the 12th UN Congress on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice (Salvador, Brazil, 12-19 
April 2010) emphasized (Art. 22) the need for the adop-
tion of effective measures to implement the provisions 
on preventing, prosecuting and punishing money-laun-
dering contained in the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime and the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption and encour-
aged Member States to develop strategies to combat 
money-laundering based on the provisions of these two 
Conventions. In Article 23 it goes a step further and 
encourages “Member States to consider developing strat-
egies or policies to combat illicit financial flows and to 
curb the harmful effects of uncooperative jurisdictions 
and territories in tax matters”. In Article 24 the Declara-
tion recognized the ‘need to deny criminals and criminal 
organizations the proceeds of their crimes’ and called on 
Member States to ‘adopt effective mechanisms for the sei-
zure, restraint and confiscation of proceeds of crime and to 
strengthen international cooperation to ensure effective and 
prompt asset recovery’.
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towards the lower end of the range. If tax- and customs-
related money-laundering activities were included, 
results would move towards the upper end of the IMF 
consensus range, or – depending on the extrapolation 
models applied – slightly beyond. On the other hand, if 
only transnational organized crime related proceeds 
were considered, the available estimates for laundering 
would fall to levels around 1% of GDP, and thus below 
the IMF consensus range. 
Selected criminal sector – trafficking  
in cocaine 
Previous research suggested that drug trafficking was 
responsible – in economic terms – for the largest profits 
of transnationally operating crime groups. (According to 
GFI, drugs even accounted for half of total income of 
transnational organized crime). Within the area of drugs, 
the cocaine market appears to be the single largest 
market (retail sales of US$85 bn in 2009) dominated by 
transnationally operating crime groups. 
The study established a number of models to analyse 
illicit financial flows and their geographic distribution 
and applied them to trafficking in cocaine. Steps in this 
calculation were to establish the size of the market, to 
deal with the problem of transit profits and to analyse 
the extent to which excess money would be available for 
laundering. The last step was the development of a grav-
ity model to allocate the flows according to a number of 
parameters representing the ‘capabilities’ and ‘suscepti-
bility’ of countries to money laundering, as well ena-
bling factors such as culture (language), lack of distance 
and trade relations – all of which may increase the risks 
of countries to be targeted by money laundering opera-
tors. A number of innovative approaches were explored 
in this analysis. 
The issue of illicit financial flows has been emerging in 
recent years as a phenomenon of global importance that 
cannot be ignored. At the same time, research in this 
area is still limited, scattered, based on a large number 
of assumptions (as opposed to empirical findings) with 
most results not directly comparable once rigorous sci-
entific criteria are applied. As one expert correctly 
observed, estimates of the proceeds of crime and of the 
subsequent volumes of laundered money are still not 
much more than indicative of the orders of magnitude 
involved. But they confirm that money-laundering is of 
sufficient scale to merit policy attention. 
Keeping these caveats in mind, the study aims at provid-
ing some answers concerning the likely amounts of illicit 
funds generated, and the extent to which they are being 
laundered at the global level. In addition, efforts were 
made to identify the magnitude of profits generated by 
a selected illicit crime activity – trafficking in cocaine – 
and how these crime proceeds are distributed across 
jurisdictions. It is hoped that the approach used, starting 
with the analysis of one concrete criminal market, will 
further stimulate research in these areas. The study also 
examined the socio-economic impact of illicit financial 
flows and provided an overview of existing international 
legal instruments to tackle these flows.
Extent of financial flows 
The overall best estimates of criminal proceeds are close 
to 3.6% of GDP or US$2.1 trillion in 2009. The best 
estimates of the amounts laundered are close to 2.7% of 
GDP or US$1.6 trillion in 2009. The best estimates of 
the amounts laundered fall well within the IMF’s origi-
nal ‘consensus range’ of 2%-5% of GDP, though the 
data also suggest that the best estimates are situated 
Summary of estimates of criminal proceeds and amounts laundered at the global level
 
Reference 
year / 
period
Criminal proceeds Amounts laundered
 Best estimate Range Best estimate Range
As	%	of	GDP 3.6% (2.3%-5.5%) 2.7% (2.1%-4.0%)
In	trillion	US$ 2009 2.1 (1.4-3.2) 1.6 (1.2-2.3)
Memo: IMf ‘consensus 
range’ (as % of GDP) 1998 3.5% 2.0% 5.0%
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its would be available for laundering, which was in 
line with previous estimates provided in the literature 
suggesting that between 60% and 80% of drug funds 
are subsequently being laundered. 
 • Given the calculated profits (US$84 bn) and the cal-
culated proportions available for laundering the model 
claims that almost US$53 billion of cocaine related 
profits would have been laundered in 2009. 
 • Significant amounts of the cocaine profits (about half 
or US$27 bn) appear to have remained within the re-
spective jurisdictions where they were generated - ac-
cording to the model results. 
 • The main ‘beneficiaries’ of such domestic investment 
of cocaine related profits would have been countries in 
North America (US$10 bn), followed by countries in 
West and Central Europe (US$7 bn) and countries in 
South America (US$5½ bn). 
 • The other half (US27 bn) would have been ‘invested’ 
abroad. 
 • Most of this ‘investment’ originated again from 
countries in North America (US$ 10 bn), countries 
in West and Central Europe (more than US$7 bn) as 
well as countries in South America (more than US$7 
bn), together accounting of 95% of such cocaine prof-
its related investment abroad. 
 • The main destination regions of such investment 
abroad would have been countries in the Caribbean 
(US$6 bn), getting their funds mainly from countries 
in North America (US$3.3 bn), countries in South 
America (US$2.5 bn) and, to a lesser extent, from 
traffickers in West and Central Europe (US$0.2 bn). 
 • The model results suggested that no region was spared 
by cocaine trafficking and the laundering of cocaine 
related money. 
Socio-economic impact
The study also examined the potential socio-economic 
impact of the some US$2 trillion of crime proceeds that 
are generated every year. First of all, these criminal flows 
help existing crime to flourish and expand, with a large 
number of negative socio-economic consequences, 
depending on the specific predicate crimes. Second, the 
funds generated – even when invested in the legal sector 
– will entail a number of negative micro- and macro-
economic consequences. Third, there is an additional set 
of problems when such funds are laundered in foreign 
jurisdictions and invested abroad. 
Implications of money flows for the  
underlying predicate crime 
The negative socio-economic impact arising from illicit 
flows generating further criminal activity is most appar-
ent when it comes to drugs. There tends to be a signifi-
Although the cocaine market has been studied for years, 
the analysis still revealed a number of knowledge gaps: 
 • Little is still known about per capita consumption, 
purity-adjusted prices or on the number of drug 
dealers in a given country. As far higher proportions 
of funds generated at the wholesale level are being 
laundered than at the retail level, a clear distinction 
between retail and wholesale profits is crucial. A prob-
lem in this context is that the calculation of prices at 
the wholesale level (defined as prices at the kilogram 
level), and the retail level (defined as prices at the 
gram level) is not sufficient for the calculation of re-
tail and wholesale profits. One intermediate measure 
would be still needed such as prices at the ‘ounce level’ 
(or something similar), reflecting the quantities typi-
cally bought by retailers from the wholesalers. 
 • A further challenge is that very little is known about 
drug dealers’ distribution in terms of income levels. 
This is crucial for estimating the extent to which drug 
dealers earn an income in excess of their living costs. 
 • Another challenge has been the allocation of drug 
transit profits. In addition to the model applied in 
this study, based on the analysis of seizure statistics, 
UNODC has also started to experiment with more 
complex route-finder models which may turn out to 
be more appropriate in the future for appropriately al-
locating such transit profits across countries. 
 • More research would be also needed to test the results 
of the ‘gravity model’ which estimates the likely flows 
of money for laundering purposes to the various juris-
dictions. This model is rather demanding, requiring, 
for instance, profit estimates for each country in the 
world. 
Despite of these challenges, the analysis of available data 
was sufficient to highlight a few key characteristics of the 
global cocaine market, the profits generated and the 
likely amounts laundered: 
 • The calculations suggested that the global cocaine 
market is worth at the retail level some US$85 billion 
(range: US$75-US$100 bn). 
 • Gross profits amount to some US$84 billion. 
 • Taking seizures and transit profits into account, calcu-
lations show that the bulk of these profits (retail and 
wholesale) are generated in North America (US$ 35 
billion), in ‘West and Central Europe’ (26 billion) and 
in ‘South America, Central America and the Carib-
bean’ (US$18 bn). 
 • The model suggested that the proportion available for 
laundering reaches 92% of global profits at the whole-
sale level and 46% of global profits at the retail level. 
The rest would be consumed by the drug traffickers 
themselves. Overall around 62% of gross cocaine prof-
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 • Unfair competition; risks of crowding out licit activi-
ties and negative impact on direct foreign investment 
 • Corruption
 • Risks of real sector volatility 
 • Strengthening of skewed income and wealth 
distributions 
 • Distortion of economic statistics and thus potential 
errors in economic policy decision taking 
 • Undermining the credibility of legal institutions
One of the clearest differences between investment 
based on licit sources and that based on criminal funds 
affects the decision-making parameters of how to invest 
these funds. While a ‘normal investor’ will direct his or 
her investment into a venture that will yield the highest 
possible return based on his willingness to take eco-
nomic risks, the predominant parameter for an investor 
of criminal funds is a strong guarantee that the criminal 
origin of the investment will not be detected. This leads 
to investment decisions that focus on concealment, 
while accepting low rates of return. A sub-optimal 
resource allocation is the consequence. Criminal funds 
thus have a negative effect on economic growth by 
diverting resources to less productive activities. Criminal 
finance encourages conspicuous consumption at the 
expense of long-term investment. The purchase of weap-
ons is also not productive for society at large. If invested, 
a study in the Netherlands revealed that criminal income 
went in particular into real estate, into normal bank 
accounts, or into various ‘business activities’, mostly 
‘coffee shops’ (where cannabis is sold), normal shops, 
hotels and brothels. None of this is particularly produc-
tive from a wider economic perspective. Similarly, the 
cartels in Colombia in the 1990s were reported to have 
concentrated their investment mainly in real estate and 
in the construction sector. 
Another potential danger, notably for smaller econo-
mies, is a revaluation of the exchange rate linked to the 
inflows of illicit funds. This phenomenon – known in 
the literature as ‘Dutch Disease’ - tends to reduce the 
competitiveness of legally produced goods and services. 
Legal exports (notably of manufactured goods) will be 
replaced by illegal exports. Overvalued exchange rates 
also pose problems for domestic industry producing for 
the local market because domestic production will be 
increasingly substituted by imports. Thus, overvalued 
exchange rates can ruin entire economic sectors, which, 
once they cease to exist, may be difficult to re-establish. 
In some cases, organized crime can also infiltrate or 
acquire control of large sectors of the economy through 
investment. A subsequent consequence of large amounts 
of illicit funds in the legal sector is the ability of such 
enterprises to undercut current market prices. This may 
cant ‘re-investment’ of illicit funds into drug trafficking 
operations which have major negative implications for 
society at large. If goods are stolen, the gains by the 
criminals involved will be, overall, equivalent to the 
losses of the victim (or of his or her insurance company). 
From an economic perspective, such crime can be seen 
as a ‘transfer,’ which should not affect the overall econ-
omy significantly. 
The situation with regard to drugs is, however, quite 
different. The gains of the criminal groups can be linked 
to the expenditure of the drug users. Up to this point, 
one person’s losses can be seen as equivalent to another 
person’s gains. However, the ‘losses’ of the drug users go 
far beyond their expenditure on drugs. Large socio-
economic costs are linked to drug consumption. While 
the crime proceeds of organized crime resulting from 
drugs were estimated at around 0.6% of GDP at the 
global level in 2009, the overall average estimate of the 
costs associated with illicit drug use (based on data from 
12 countries in North America, Europe, South America 
and Oceania) amounted to 1.2% of GDP, or US$700 
billion if extrapolated to the global level. Thus, available 
data suggest that these costs were in fact twice as high as 
the income for organized crime. This indicates a net loss 
for society, and not simply some kind of ‘transfers’ from 
some individuals to organized crime. For the USA and 
the UK, where estimates of both the size of the domestic 
drug market and the costs linked to drug abuse are avail-
able, data suggest that these costs are three times as high 
as the drug sale figures (USA: economic costs of drug 
abuse: US$181 bn; drug sales US$64 bn in 2000/2002; 
UK: economic costs: £18.9 bn versus drug sales: £5.3 bn 
in 2003/2004 for England and Wales and 2006 for 
Scotland). Data for the US suggest that some 70% of 
the cost were related to productivity losses, including 
from premature death and drug abuse-related illnesses. 
Data for England and Wales, which also include drug-
related crime, show that some 90% of the total cost was 
actually crime-related. Other problems – at the global 
level – include health problems, trafficking-related vio-
lence and corruption. 
Implications of investment of criminal  
financial flows in the legal economy
The implications of the investment of crime-related 
funds in the legal sector are mainly related to the risks 
of: 
 • Distortions in the resource allocation from high-yield-
ing investments to investments that run a low risk of 
detection
 • Distortion of prices, notably in the real estate sector
 • Distortion of consumption and impact on imports 
 • Distortion of exports and potential problems with in-
vestment and economic growth
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criminal organizations may provide them with enough 
economic and even political power to weaken the social 
fabric, collective ethical standards, and ultimately, the 
democratic institutions of society.
Implications of laundering criminal financial 
flows, including in foreign jurisdictions 
Finally, there are a number of socio-economic implica-
tions linked to the laundering of the financial flows. 
Research undertaken in industrialized countries repeat-
edly found that increases in money-laundering activities 
were associated with reductions in overall annual eco-
nomic growth rates. One study, for instance, found that 
each US$1 billion laundered reduced overall economic 
growth by 0.04-0.06 percentage points in the 17 
researched OECD countries. 
The issue becomes more complicated once laundering 
affects foreign jurisdictions. The net impact of money-
laundering activities for the ‘originating countries,’ 
where the underlying crimes have been committed, 
tends to worsen once the crime proceeds leave the coun-
try. Assuming that trafficking profits originated prima-
rily from drugs sold to the local population, such profits 
were actually siphoning off purchasing power from the 
country concerned. If these funds were re-invested in 
the local economy, at least some of the initial losses in 
purchasing power could be offset. When they are used 
for money-laundering purposes and subsequent invest-
ment abroad, the country concerned will suffer the full 
financial loss.
The situation looks – at first sight - different for the 
recipient countries of such funds. Available research sug-
gests that the immediate impact for these countries is 
not necessarily negative. A study showed that if money-
laundering was separated from the predicate crime the 
money-laundering-related coefficients turned positive. 
However, studies on the effectiveness of establishing 
offshore financial centres (OFC) as an economic devel-
opment strategy failed to show that notional offshore 
financial centers – unless based on sound rules and regu-
lations - contribute to the surrounding economy. They 
could not provide a basis for sustained economic growth. 
Thus, even from a purely economic point of view - and 
disregarding all moral arguments - it remains question-
able whether a ‘free rider’ strategy can be effective in the 
long run. 
Arguments in this context relate, inter alia, to the likeli-
hood of increased volatility in the financial sector with 
negative macro-economic implications. The volatility 
may relate to the swift reactions by criminal groups to 
shift the location of their laundered funds, which – once 
certain levels are surpassed - can threaten a financial 
institution’s liquidity and solvency. Moreover, there is a 
risk that banks or even whole jurisdictions may lose their 
initially appear positive for customers and create some 
short-term welfare gains. It creates, however, the risk 
that such enterprises will crowd out existing legal ones. 
Another consequence of the existence of large criminal 
finance, even if legally invested, is that criminal groups 
will attempt to use their financial power to corrupt the 
authorities and gain additional advantages for their 
‘legal’ enterprises, thus driving out legitimate business 
competitors. 
There is also a risk that huge criminal money flows will 
result in a more uneven income and wealth distribution. 
World Bank data, for instance, show that several of the 
main drug producing or trafficking countries are charac-
terized by highly uneven levels of income distribution. 
Once criminal organizations are formed, they tend to 
expand quickly. Subsequently, more money is concen-
trated in a few hands, and existing uneven income dis-
tributions may become more marked. At the same time, 
income inequality can be also seen as one cause for the 
expansion of organized crime as is increases the readiness 
of some people (mostly young unemployed males) to 
participate in the illicit sectors of the economy. 
Another potential problem linked to the existence of a 
huge illicit sector in an economy is a strong likelihood 
that economic data and statistics will not reflect reality 
any longer. Criminal finance can distort economic data 
and thus macroeconomic analysis and policymaking. 
Macroeconomic management is particularly difficult 
when there is a need for economic policy changes, such 
as austerity measures to curb inflation. In such situa-
tions, a huge illicit sector may counteract government 
action, either by preventing a predicted outcome from 
materializing, prolonging the time frame for macroeco-
nomic stabilization or prompting the Government to 
take measures that are too drastic, thus creating unem-
ployment and social unrest. In the process, legitimate 
business, which does not have access to illicit funds, may 
be squeezed out of the market. 
A further problem is that the credibility of legal institu-
tions may suffer. If income and wealth disparities are 
very large and increasing, unemployment is rising due to 
strong sector volatilities, if inadequate macro-economic 
decisions are made because of inaccurate underlying 
economic data and/or various distortions in the alloca-
tion of resources, due to unfair competition, and if 
society is confronted with widespread corruption – 
prompted by the existence of a large and expanding 
criminal sector - the credibility and authority of the state 
will suffer as well. An additional problem arises from the 
possibility of organized crime groups generating suffi-
cient capital to corrupt the political process, for instance 
by financing election campaigns to install more ‘friendly’ 
administrations. In other words, the funds generated by 
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money-laundering activities in 38 countries out of 62 
countries analysed (2010 or latest year available), more 
than 80% of this was seized in North America. This 
would be equivalent to some 0.2% of the best estimate 
of the extent of money-laundering at the global level. In 
comparison, more than 20% of the globally produced 
illicit opiates are being seized and more than 40% of the 
cocaine. The question that arises is whether money-
launderers really are so much smarter than drug traffick-
ers, or whether there is something wrong with the 
existing control system? The problem does not seem to 
be a lack of international instruments – as illustrated in 
this report – but, more likely, shortcomings in the imple-
mentation of existing instruments.
reputation and integrity if involved in large-scale money-
laundering operations. This can lead to the withdrawal 
of funds from licit investors and – as experienced in a 
few cases - may even lead to the bankruptcy of the insti-
tutions concerned. 
Against this background, financial centres have devel-
oped a self-interest of not being associated with ‘tainted 
money’ and have signed relevant international instru-
ments to avoid the inflow of such criminal finance. 
Whether money-laundering and predicate crimes can 
remain properly separated geographically over longer 
periods of time is also questionable. Research has sug-
gested that the amounts of money laundered tend to 
prompt additional crime proceeds of between 6% and 
10% of the original crime proceeds. Even if the predi-
cate crime will not take place in the money-laundering 
jurisdiction, it is likely that criminal groups would use 
their financial power, at least for corruption, which will 
impact negatively on the jurisdictions concerned. Finally, 
non-cooperating jurisdictions run a risk of legal sanc-
tions. Such sanctions (for example, banning dollar trans-
actions with countries concerned) can more than offset 
potential short-term gains from following a free-rider 
strategy and can be damaging for the financial centres 
concerned. 
Key role of global anti-money-laundering 
efforts – enabling the authorities to follow 
the money trail and seize the proceeds of 
illicit activities 
The key role of anti-money-laundering legislation is to 
enable authorities to follow the money-trail in order to 
detect underlying criminal activities and to dismantle 
the groups involved. This remains the main reason for 
implementing anti-money-laundering measures, irre-
spective of all other considerations. The operations of 
criminal organizations are potentially vulnerable to 
detection via the money trail, and there are good reasons 
for the authorities to exploit these vulnerabilities. 
Such a system will only work well if there are no loop-
holes. Thus, there is a clear need for universal participa-
tion in international money-laundering efforts at the 
global level, and a high degree of transparency. Other-
wise the system will remain only as strong as its weakest 
link and will be exploited by organized crime. 
While most of the necessary instruments to fight organ-
ized crime and related money-laundering activities 
already exist at the international level, the current ‘suc-
cess rate’ of identifying criminal capital flows is limited. 
Based on all available estimates, less than 1% of the total 
amounts that are being laundered are seized. 
Data collected by the US State Department suggest that 
some US$3.1 billion were seized in connection with 
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2. Each of the offences to which this article applies shall be 
deemed to be included as an extraditable offence in any 
extradition treaty existing between Parties. The Parties 
undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences 
in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them.
3. If a Party which makes extradition conditional on the 
existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from 
another Party with which it has no extradition treaty, 
it may consider this Convention as the legal basis for 
extradition in respect of any offence to which this article 
applies. The Parties which require detailed legislation in 
order to use this Convention as a legal basis for extradi-
tion shall consider enacting such legislation as may be 
necessary.
4. The Parties which do not make extradition conditional 
on the existence of a treaty shall recognize offences to 
which this article applies as extraditable offences between 
themselves.
5. Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided 
for by the law of the requested Party or by applicable ex-
tradition treaties, including the grounds upon which the 
requested Party may refuse extradition.
6. In considering requests received pursuant to this article, 
the requested State may refuse to comply with such re-
quests where there are substantial grounds leading its ju-
dicial or other competent authorities to believe that com-
pliance would facilitate the prosecution or punishment 
of any person on account of his race, religion, nationality 
or political opinions, or would cause prejudice for any of 
those reasons to any person affected by the request.
7. The Parties shall endeavour to expedite extradition pro-
cedures and to simplify evidentiary requirements relat-
ing thereto in respect of any offence to which this article 
applies.
Article 7 on MUTUAL LEGAL  
ASSISTANCE, 
compels Parties to: 
1. “ afford one another… the widest measure of mutual le-
gal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial 
proceedings in relation to criminal offences established 
in accordance with article 3…” [Note: this includes 
money-laundering; see above]. including by 
2. (f ) Providing originals or certified copies of relevant 
documents and records, including bank, financial, 
corporate or business records; 
(g) Identifying or tracing proceeds … for evidentiary 
purposes “ 
and it is made explicit that 
5. “A Party shall not decline to render mutual legal assist-
ance under this article on the ground of bank secrecy”.
ANNEX:	Text	of	relevant	sections	
of	international	legal	instruments	
• United Nations convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, 1988
Article 3:
“Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary 
to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, 
when committed intentionally …
(b)  (i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing 
that such property is derived from any offence or 
offences established in accordance with subpara-
graph (a) [i.e. drug related offences] …, or from an 
act of participation in such offence or offences, for 
the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit 
origin of the property or of assisting any person who 
is involved in the commission of such an offence or 
offences to evade the legal consequences of his 
actions;
 (ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, 
source, location, disposition, movement, rights with 
respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that 
such property is derived from an offence or offences 
established in accordance with subparagraph (a) of 
this paragraph or from an act of participation in 
such an offence or offences:
(c)  …(i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, 
knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property 
was derived from an offence or offences established 
in accordance with subparagraph (a) of this para-
graph or from an act of participation in such offence 
or offences;…”.
Article 5: CONFISCATION 
compels Parties to: 
1. adopt such measures as may be necessary to enable confis-
cation of: 
 (a) Proceeds derived from offences established in 
accordance with article 3, paragraph I, or property 
the value of which corresponds to that of such pro-
ceeds; 
2. adopt such measures as may be necessary to enable its 
competent authorities to identify, trace, and freeze or 
seize proceeds, property, instrumentalities or any other 
things referred to in paragraph 1 of this article, for the 
purpose of eventual confiscation.
Article 6: EXTRADITION
1. This article shall apply to the offences established by the 
Parties in accordance with article 3, paragraph 1 [Note: 
this includes money-laundering; see above].
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ber 1995, and by such bodies as the Inter-American Drug 
Abuse Control Commission of the Organization of Ameri-
can States, the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, 
the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, the Offshore 
Group of Banking Supervisors and the Commonwealth, all 
of which are well-recognized multilateral initiatives aimed 
at combating money-laundering and constitute legal or 
policy frameworks within which concerned States are defin-
ing and adopting measures against money-laundering,
Aware that the proceeds of illicit drug-trafficking and other 
illicit activities, which are laundered through banks and 
other financial institutions, constitute an obstacle to the 
implementation of policies designed to liberalize financial 
markets in order to attract legitimate investment, in that 
they distort those markets,
Emphasizing that there is a need to harmonize national 
legislation with a view to ensuring appropriate coordina-
tion of policies for combating money-laundering, without 
prejudice to the action each State is undertaking within its 
own jurisdiction to combat this form of criminality,
Recognizing the need to promote and develop effective 
mechanisms for the pursuit, freezing, seizure and confisca-
tion of property obtained through or derived from illicit 
activities, so as to avoid its use by criminals,
Recognizing that only through international cooperation 
and the establishment of bilateral and multilateral infor-
mation networks such as the Egmont Group, which will 
enable States to exchange information between competent 
authorities, will it be possible to combat effectively the prob-
lem of money-laundering,
Emphasizing the enormous efforts of a number of States to 
draw up and apply domestic legislation that identifies the 
activity of money-laundering as a criminal offence,
Realizing the importance of progress being made by all 
States in conforming to the relevant recommendations and 
the need for States to participate actively in international 
and regional initiatives designed to promote and strengthen 
the implementation of effective measures against money-
laundering,
1. Strongly condemns the laundering of money derived 
from illicit drug trafficking and other serious crimes, 
as well as the use of the financial systems of States for 
that purpose;
2. Urges all States to implement the provisions against 
money-laundering that are contained in the United 
Nations Convention against Illicit Trafficking in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 
and the other relevant international instruments on 
money-laundering, in accordance with fundamental 
constitutional principles, by applying the following 
principles:
(a) Establishment of a legislative framework to crimi-
• Political Declaration and Action Plan 
against Money laundering adopted at the 
Twentieth Special Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly devoted to 
“countering the world drug problem 
together
Resolution S-20/4 D Countering  
Money-Laundering
The General Assembly,
Recognizing that the problem of laundering of money 
derived from illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psycho-
tropic substances, as well as from other serious crimes, has 
expanded internationally to become such a global threat to 
the integrity, reliability and stability of financial and trade 
systems and even government structures as to require coun-
termeasures by the international community as a whole in 
order to deny safe havens to criminals and their illicit pro-
ceeds,
Recalling the provisions of the United Nations Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances of 1988, according to which all parties to the 
Convention are required to establish money-laundering as 
a punishable offence and to adopt the measures necessary to 
enable the authorities to identify, trace and freeze or seize 
the proceeds of illicit drug trafficking,
Recalling Commission on Narcotic Drugs resolution 5 
(XXXIX) of 24 April 1996,(21) in which the Commission 
noted that the forty recommendations of the Financial 
Action Task Force established by the heads of State or Gov-
ernment of the seven major industrialized countries and the 
President of the European Commission remained the stand-
ard by which the measures against money-laundering 
adopted by concerned States should be judged, as well as 
Economic and Social Council resolution 1997/40 of 21 
July 1997, in which the Council took note with satisfaction 
of the document entitled “Anti-drug strategy in the hemi-
sphere”, approved by the Inter-American Drug Abuse Con-
trol Commission of the Organization of American States at 
its twentieth regular session, held at Buenos Aires in Octo-
ber 1996 and signed at Montevideo in December 1996, 
and urged the international community to take due account 
of the anti-drug strategy in the hemisphere as a significant 
contribution to the strengthening of the Global Programme 
of Action adopted by the General Assembly at its seventeenth 
special session,(22)
Recognizing the political will expressed by the international 
community, especially as reflected in such initiatives as the 
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confisca-
tion of the Proceeds from Crime, adopted in 1990 by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, the Min-
isterial Communiqué of the Summit of the Americas Con-
ference Concerning the Laundering of Proceeds and 
Instrumentalities of Crime, held at Buenos Aires in Decem-
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• United Nations convention against  
Transnational organized crime, 2000
Article 6. Criminalization of the laundering 
of proceeds of crime
1. Each State Party shall adopt, in accordance with funda-
mental principles of its domestic law, such legislative and 
other measures as may be necessary to establish as crimi-
nal offences, when committed intentionally:
(a) (i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing 
that such property is the proceeds of crime, for the 
purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin 
of the property or of helping any person who is 
involved in the commission of the predicate offence 
to evade the legal consequences of his or her 
action;
 (ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, 
source, location, disposition, movement or owner-
ship of or rights with respect to property, knowing 
that such property is the proceeds of crime;
(b) Subject to the basic concepts of its legal system:
 (i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, 
knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property 
is the proceeds of crime;
 (ii) Participation in, association with or conspiracy 
to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abet-
ting, facilitating and counselling the commission of 
any of the offences established in accordance with 
this article.
2. For purposes of implementing or applying paragraph 1 of 
this article:
(a)  Each State Party shall seek to apply paragraph 1 of 
this article to the widest range of predicate 
offences;
(b) Each State Party shall include as predicate offences 
all serious crime as defined in article 2 of this 
Convention [i.e. offences punishable by a maxi-
mum prison sentence of at least 4 years] and the 
offences established in accordance with articles 5 
[participation in organized crime group], 8 [cor-
ruption] and 23 [obstruction of justice] of this 
Convention. In the case of States Parties whose 
legislation sets out a list of specific predicate offences, 
they shall, at a minimum, include in such list a 
comprehensive range of offences associated with 
organized criminal groups;
(c) For the purposes of subparagraph (b), predicate 
offences shall include offences committed both 
within and outside the jurisdiction of the State 
Party in question. However, offences committed 
outside the jurisdiction of a State Party shall con-
stitute predicate offences only when the relevant 
nalize the laundering of money derived from seri-
ous crimes in order to provide for the prevention, 
detection, investigation and prosecution of the 
crime of money-laundering through, inter alia:
 (i) Identification, freezing, seizure and confisca-
tion of the proceeds of crime;
 (ii) International cooperation; and mutual legal 
assistance in cases involving money-laundering;
 (iii) Inclusion of the crime of money-laundering in 
mutual legal assistance agreements for the purpose 
of ensuring judicial assistance in investigations, 
court cases or judicial proceedings relating to that 
crime;
(b) Establishment of an effective financial and regula-
tory regime to deny criminals and their illicit funds 
access to national and international financial sys-
tems, thus preserving the integrity of financial sys-
tems worldwide and ensuring compliance with 
laws and other regulations against money-launder-
ing through:
 (i) Customer identification and verification 
requirements applying the principle of “know your 
customer”, in order to have available for competent 
authorities the necessary information on the iden-
tity of clients and the financial movements that 
they carry out;
 (ii) Financial record-keeping;
 (iii) Mandatory reporting of suspicious activity;
 (iv) Removal of bank secrecy impediments to efforts 
directed at preventing, investigating and punishing 
money-laundering;
 (v) Other relevant measures;
(c) Implementation of law enforcement measures to 
provide tools for, inter alia:
 (i) Effective detection, investigation, prosecution 
and conviction of criminals engaging in money-
laundering activity;
 (ii) Extradition procedures;
 (iii) Information-sharing mechanisms;
3. Calls upon the United Nations Office for Drug 
Control and Crime Prevention to continue to work, 
within the framework of its global programme against 
money-laundering, with relevant multilateral and 
regional institutions, organizations or bodies engaged 
in activities against money-laundering and drug traf-
ficking and with international financial institutions to 
give effect to the above principles by providing train-
ing, advice and technical assistance to States upon 
request and where appropriate. 
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transfer of substantial quantities of cash and appropriate 
negotiable instruments.
3. In establishing a domestic regulatory and supervisory 
regime under the terms of this article, and without preju-
dice to any other article of this Convention, States Parties 
are called upon to use as a guideline the relevant initia-
tives of regional, interregional and multilateral organiza-
tions against money-laundering.
4. States Parties shall endeavour to develop and promote 
global, regional, subregional and bilateral cooperation 
among judicial, law enforcement and financial regula-
tory authorities in order to combat money-laundering.
• United Nations convention against  
corruption, 2003
Article 14. Measures to prevent  
money-laundering
1. Each State Party shall:
(a) Institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and 
supervisory regime for banks and non-bank finan-
cial institutions, including natural or legal persons 
that provide formal or informal services for the 
transmission of money or value and, where appro-
priate, other bodies particularly susceptible to 
money laundering, within its competence, in order 
to deter and detect all forms of money-laundering, 
which regime shall emphasize requirements for 
customer and, where appropriate, beneficial owner 
identification, record-keeping and the reporting of 
suspicious transactions;
(b) Without prejudice to article 46 of this Convention, 
ensure that administrative, regulatory, law enforce-
ment and other authorities dedicated to combating 
money-laundering (including, where appropriate 
under domestic law, judicial authorities) have the 
ability to cooperate and exchange information at 
the national and international levels within the 
conditions prescribed by its domestic law and, to 
that end, shall consider the establishment of a 
financial intelligence unit to serve as a national 
centre for the collection, analysis and dissemination 
of information regarding potential money-laun-
dering.
2. States Parties shall consider implementing feasible meas-
ures to detect and monitor the movement of cash and 
appropriate negotiable instruments across their borders, 
subject to safeguards to ensure proper use of information 
and without impeding in any way the movement of legit-
imate capital. Such measures may include a requirement 
that individuals and businesses report the cross-border 
transfer of substantial quantities of cash and appropriate 
negotiable instruments.
conduct is a criminal offence under the domestic 
law of the State where it is committed and would 
be a criminal offence under the domestic law of the 
State Party implementing or applying this article 
had it been committed there;
(d) Each State Party shall furnish copies of its laws that 
give effect to this article and of any subsequent 
changes to such laws or a description thereof to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations;
(e) If required by fundamental principles of the domes-
tic law of a State Party, it may be provided that the 
offences set forth in paragraph 1 of this article do 
not apply to the persons who committed the predi-
cate offence;
(f ) Knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element 
of an offence set forth in paragraph 1 of this article 
may be inferred from objective factual circum-
stances.
• United Nations convention against  
Transnational organized crime
Article 7. Measures to combat  
money-laundering
1. Each State Party:
(a) Shall institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory 
and supervisory regime for banks and non-bank 
financial institutions and, where appropriate, 
other bodies particularly susceptible to money-
laundering, within its competence, in order to 
deter and detect all forms of money-laundering, 
which regime shall emphasize requirements for 
customer identification, record-keeping and the 
reporting of suspicious transactions;
(b) Shall, without prejudice to articles 18 and 27 of this 
Convention, ensure that administrative, regula-
tory, law enforcement and other authorities dedi-
cated to combating money-laundering (including, 
where appropriate under domestic law, judicial 
authorities) have the ability to cooperate and 
exchange information at the national and interna-
tional levels within the conditions prescribed by its 
domestic law and, to that end, shall consider the 
establishment of a financial intelligence unit to 
serve as a national centre for the collection, analy-
sis and dissemination of information regarding 
potential money-laundering.
2. States Parties shall consider implementing feasible meas-
ures to detect and monitor the movement of cash and 
appropriate negotiable instruments across their borders, 
subject to safeguards to ensure proper use of information 
and without impeding in any way the movement of legit-
imate capital. Such measures may include a requirement 
that individuals and businesses report the cross-border 
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State Party or on its own initiative, of the identity 
of particular natural or legal persons to whose 
accounts such institutions will be expected to apply 
enhanced scrutiny, in addition to those whom the 
financial institutions may otherwise identify.
3. In the context of paragraph 2 (a) of this article, each 
State Party shall implement measures to ensure that its 
financial institutions maintain adequate records, over an 
appropriate period of time, of accounts and transactions 
involving the persons mentioned in paragraph 1 of this 
article, which should, as a minimum, contain informa-
tion relating to the identity of the customer as well as, as 
far as possible, of the beneficial owner.
4. With the aim of preventing and detecting transfers of 
proceeds of offences established in accordance with this 
Convention, each State Party shall implement appropri-
ate and effective measures to prevent, with the help of 
its regulatory and oversight bodies, the establishment of 
banks that have no physical presence and that are not 
affiliated with a regulated financial group. Moreover, 
States Parties may consider requiring their financial in-
stitutions to refuse to enter into or continue a correspond-
ent banking relationship with such institutions and to 
guard against establishing relations with foreign financial 
institutions that permit their accounts to be used by 
banks that have no physical presence and that are not af-
filiated with a regulated financial group.
5. Each State Party shall consider establishing, in accord-
ance with its domestic law, effective financial disclosure 
systems for appropriate public officials and shall provide 
for appropriate sanctions for non-compliance. Each State 
Party shall also consider taking such measures as may 
be necessary to permit its competent authorities to share 
that information with the competent authorities in other 
States Parties when necessary to investigate, claim and 
recover proceeds of offences established in accordance with 
this Convention.
6. Each State Party shall consider taking such measures as 
may be necessary, in accordance with its domestic law, to 
require appropriate public officials having an interest in 
or signature or other authority over a financial account 
in a foreign country to report that relationship to appro-
priate authorities and to maintain appropriate records 
related to such accounts. Such measures shall also provide 
for appropriate sanctions for non-compliance.
Article 54. Mechanisms for recovery of  
property through international cooperation 
in confiscation
1. Each State Party, in order to provide mutual legal assist-
ance pursuant to article 55 of this Convention with re-
spect to property acquired through or involved in the com-
mission of an offence established in accordance with this 
Convention, shall, in accordance with its domestic law:
3. States Parties shall consider implementing appropriate 
and feasible measures to require financial institutions, 
including money remitters:
(a) To include on forms for the electronic transfer of 
funds and related messages accurate and meaning-
ful information on the originator;
(b) To maintain such information throughout the pay-
ment chain; and 
(c) To apply enhanced scrutiny to transfers of funds 
that do not contain complete information on the 
originator.
4. In establishing a domestic regulatory and supervisory 
regime under the terms of this article, and without preju-
dice to any other article of this Convention, States Parties 
are called upon to use as a guideline the relevant initia-
tives of regional, interregional and multilateral organiza-
tions against money-laundering.  
5. States Parties shall endeavour to develop and promote 
global, regional, subregional and bilateral cooperation 
among judicial, law enforcement and financial regula-
tory authorities in order to combat money-laundering.
Article 52. Prevention and detection of  
transfers of proceeds of crime
1. Without prejudice to article 14 of this Convention, each 
State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, 
in accordance with its domestic law, to require financial 
institutions within its jurisdiction to verify the identity of 
customers, to take reasonable steps to determine the iden-
tity of beneficial owners of funds deposited into high-val-
ue accounts and to conduct enhanced scrutiny of accounts 
sought or maintained by or on behalf of individuals who 
are, or have been, entrusted with prominent public func-
tions and their family members and close associates. Such 
enhanced scrutiny shall be reasonably designed to detect 
suspicious transactions for the purpose of reporting to 
competent authorities and should not be so construed as 
to discourage or prohibit financial institutions from do-
ing business with any legitimate customer.
2. In order to facilitate implementation of the measures 
provided for in paragraph 1 of this article, each State 
Party, in accordance with its domestic law and inspired 
by relevant initiatives of regional, interregional and mul-
tilateral organizations against money-laundering, shall:
(a) Issue advisories regarding the types of natural or 
legal person to whose accounts financial institu-
tions within its jurisdiction will be expected to 
apply enhanced scrutiny, the types of accounts and 
transactions to which to pay particular attention 
and appropriate account-opening, maintenance 
and recordkeeping measures to take concerning 
such accounts; and
(b) Where appropriate, notify financial institutions 
within its jurisdiction, at the request of another 
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Article 51 - towards an Integrated and  
Balanced Strategy to counter the World Drug 
Problem
Art. 51. Member States should continue to foster interna-
tional cooperation by implementing the provisions against 
money-laundering contained in all relevant international 
and multilateral instruments, such as the 1988 Conven-
tion, the Organized Crime Convention and the Conven-
tion against Corruption and, in accordance with national 
legislation, the Financial Action Task Force Recommenda-
tions on Money Laundering, and also by:
(a) Establishing new or strengthening existing domes-
tic legislative frameworks to criminalize the laun-
dering of money derived from drug trafficking, 
precursor diversion and other serious crimes of a 
transnational nature in order to provide for the 
prevention, detection, investigation and prosecu-
tion of money-laundering by, inter alia:
 (i) Widening the scope of predicate crimes for 
money-laundering to include all serious crimes, 
giving due consideration to crimes related to the 
misuse of new technologies, cyberspace and elec-
tronic money transfer systems and to transnational 
cash smuggling;
 (ii) Adopting or strengthening legal measures pro-
viding for the identification, freezing, seizure and 
confiscation of the proceeds of crime and consider-
ing, where compatible with fundamental principle 
of domestic law, nonconviction-based confisca-
tion;
 (iii) Promoting the use of internationally accepted 
asset-sharing procedures in international confisca-
tion cases, such as the Model Bilateral Agreement 
on the Sharing of Confiscated Proceeds of Crime or 
Property, adopted by the Economic and Social 
Council in its resolution 2005/14;
 (iv) Ensuring that legal provisions in compliance 
with due process of law, such as banking secrecy 
laws, do not unnecessarily impede the effectiveness 
of their systems for countering money-laundering 
and do not constitute
grounds for the refusal of mutual legal assistance;
 (v) Granting the widest range of mutual legal 
assistance in investigations, prosecutions and other 
judicial proceedings related to money-laundering 
and confiscation cases;
 (vi) Ensuring that the crime of money-laundering 
is covered by mutual legal assistance agreements for 
the purpose of ensuring judicial assistance in inves-
tigations, court cases and other judicial proceedings 
relating to that crime;
 (vii) Making money-laundering an extraditable 
offence, in accordance with national legislation;
(a) Take such measures as may be necessary to permit 
its competent authorities to give effect to an order 
of confiscation issued by a court of another State 
Party;
(b) Take such measures as may be necessary to permit 
its competent authorities, where they have jurisdic-
tion, to order the confiscation of such property of 
foreign origin by adjudication of an offence of 
money-laundering or such other offence as may be 
within its jurisdiction or by other procedures 
authorized under its domestic law; and
(c) Consider taking such measures as may be necessary 
to allow confiscation of such property without a 
criminal conviction in cases in which the offender 
cannot be prosecuted by reason of death, flight or 
absence or in other appropriate cases.
2. Each State Party, in order to provide mutual legal assist-
ance upon a request made pursuant to paragraph 2 of 
article 55 of this Convention, shall, in accordance with 
its domestic law:
(a) Take such measures as may be necessary to permit 
its competent authorities to freeze or seize property 
upon a freezing or seizure order issued by a court 
or competent authority of a requesting State Party 
that provides a reasonable basis for the requested 
State Party to believe that there are sufficient 
grounds for taking such actions and that the prop-
erty would eventually be subject to an order of 
confiscation for purposes of paragraph 1 (a) of this 
article;
(b) Take such measures as may be necessary to permit 
its competent authorities to freeze or seize property 
upon a request that provides a reasonable basis for 
the requested State Party to believe that there are 
sufficient grounds for taking such actions and that 
the property would eventually be subject to an 
order of confiscation for purposes of paragraph 1 
(a) of this article; and (c) Consider taking addi-
tional measures to permit its competent authorities 
to preserve property for confiscation, such as on the 
basis of a foreign arrest or criminal charge related 
to the acquisition of such property.
• 2009 Political Declaration and Plan of Action 
on International cooperation towards an 
Integrated and Balanced Strategy to counter 
the world Drug Problem
 Article 50: 
“The laundering of money derived from illicit drug traf-
ficking and other serious crimes continues to be a global 
problem that threatens the security and stability of financial 
institutions and systems, undermines economic prosperity 
and weakens governance systems.” 
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methods and techniques for laundering money, 
including money derived from drug trafficking, 
from the diversion of precursors and from the abuse 
of cyberspace, money transfer systems and payment 
cards; and the provision of technical assistance for 
building the capacity of developing countries in 
this regard, including the development of national 
detection instruments;
(d) Promoting effective cooperation in strategies for 
countering money-laundering and in money-laun-
dering cases by, inter alia:
 (i) Strengthening mechanisms for domestic inter-
agency coordination and information-sharing;
 (ii) Strengthening regional and international net-
works for the exchange of operational information 
among competent authorities, in particular finan-
cial intelligence units;
 (iii) Avoiding, to the extent possible, the duplica-
tion of data-collection tools related to Member 
States’ obligations with respect to countering money-
laundering, as set out in relevant United Nations 
instruments.
(b) Establishing new or strengthening existing finan-
cial and regulatory regimes for banks and non-
bank financial institutions, including natural and 
legal persons providing formal or informal finan-
cial services, thus preserving the integrity, reliabil-
ity and stability of financial and trade systems 
through, inter alia:
 (i) Customer identification and verification 
requirements, namely, application of the “know-
your-customer” principle in order to have available 
for competent authorities the necessary information 
on the identity of clients and their financial trans-
actions;
 (ii) Requirements for the submission of meaningful 
beneficial ownership information for legal per-
sons;
 (iii) Financial record-keeping;
 (iv) The mandatory reporting of suspicious trans-
actions;
 (v) Mechanisms to detect and monitor the cross-
border transport of cash and other negotiable bearer 
instruments;
 (vi) Consideration of establishing partnerships 
with the private sector, including financial busi-
nesses, with a view to ensuring sound and effective 
due diligence procedures to counter money-laun-
dering;
 (vii) The introduction of measures to keep central-
ized statistical data on legal action taken to coun-
ter money-laundering;
(c) Implementing effective detection, investigation, 
prosecution and conviction measures, including:
 (i) The establishment of dedicated financial intel-
ligence units to serve as national centres for the 
collection, analysis and dissemination of suspicious 
transaction reports and the consideration of exist-
ing and affordable information technology solu-
tions to assist financial intelligence units in the 
analysis of suspicious transaction reports;
 (ii) The development of specialized law enforce-
ment techniques, consistent with national legisla-
tive frameworks, to support efforts to counter 
money-laundering;
 (iii) The encouragement of specialized training for 
law enforcement and judicial personnel in tech-
niques for countering money-laundering;
 (iv) The consideration, in conformity with domes-
tic legislation, of utilizing confiscated funds to 
support law enforcement activities, demand reduc-
tion programmes and efforts to counter money-
laundering;
 (v) The development and use of instruments to 
detect and counter, in a timely manner, emerging 
